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Abstract 
 
The thesis compares Argentine and Australian fiscal systems from the late nineteenth to 
the late twentieth centuries.  It uses institutionalist and endowments approaches to 
evaluate the importance of state credibility and taxation on long run economic 
development. After rapid convergence in the early twentieth century, Argentina and 
Australia clearly diverged in the latter twentieth century. Divergence emanated from 
different institutional experiences, which ultimately originated from dissimilar 
experiences of state credibility. State credibility is the extent to which society trusts the 
state to act in its interests. Fiscal institutions are a clear and comparable measure of state 
credibility over time as they frankly express underlying political economy. As 
Argentina and Australia were once similarly successful settler economies with 
comparable geographic prospects for development, the comparison promises to 
transcend geographically deterministic explanations for development. Geography 
primarily consists of factor endowments and location. In fact Argentina was better 
placed to succeed in geographic terms than Australia. Yet Australia, not Argentina, 
secured the status of a developed country. Australia and Argentina exemplify the 
relative insignificance of geography in shaping development. Divergence resulted from 
a failure of Argentine institutions to generate sufficient space for negotiation and 
compromise, and a ‘latent civil war’ was entered from the 1930s until the early 1980s. 
A key finding of the thesis is that divergence in fiscal institutions, especially differing 
capacities to embed progressive systems of direct taxation was crucial to divergence in 
development. This finding is based upon the discovery of new evidence and the 
harmonisation of fragmented time series which enable comparison over a long period of 
time. Argentina and Australia took different paths in the latter half of the twentieth 
century due to distinct institutional environments and their legacies for social consensus 
and development.  
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‘Australia’s total area is roughly similar to that of Brazil’s … but Brazil’s soil is more 
than twice as fertile. … Brazil abounds in large rivers … whereas Australia is very poor 
in waters and soil fertility, with only one river of medium size. … Nonetheless Brazil 
not only has a much inferior level of productivity than Australia, but is also much 
poorer in production, income, industry, wealth, culture and political and intellectual 
liberty. … [Yet] Brazil has a constitutional government under the most able monarchy, 
… with more than three centuries of colonisation, while Australia has not even been 
colonised for a century! … How will the generally backward Latin populations, 
superstitious and ignorant, with so many physical and moral obstacles to progress, ever 
compete with the noble, intelligent, strong, free and industrious Anglo-Saxon and 
Germanic races? Only with good and progressive governments, such as we [Argentina] 
and Brazil have today, will we approach the degree of freedom, skill and culture that 
they display. … This inferiority is not due to race or character. Fortunately it is due 
solely to a complete lack of intellectual and moral liberty, and of political, scientific, 
and industrial education.’ 
(Newton and Llerena 1882), Volume V, pp.322-4 
 
‘No deus ex machina translates endowments into political outcomes. Were it so, 
Argentina would be as rich as the United States; and Hong Kong, Japan, and South 
Africa would never have become rich.’ 
(North, Summerhill et al. 2000), p.19 
 
[Italics and translations in quotations above are mine.] 
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Origins and Aims of Thesis 
 
Argentina and Australia shared similar contexts and opportunities for development, yet 
took starkly different paths. After rapid convergence in development in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, divergence increasingly emerged and was clear 
from the mid twentieth century. This paradox once attracted much attention. It raises the 
broad question of what determines development, which is the primary concern of this 
thesis. Development is a sustained rise in living standards throughout a society over 
time. The key indicator of development is growth in income per capita, which is 
necessary but not sufficient, as development is more than economic growth. Economic 
historians sought to explain Australian and Argentine divergence in order to gain 
greater insights into development, to measure Argentina’s failure, and to warn Australia 
of a darker future. Yet no durable explanations for divergence appeared. This thesis 
revives the Argentine-Australian comparison from the perspective of New Institutional 
Economics (NIE), which was yet to be formalised when much of the earlier work was 
done.1 The NIE perspective provides a more enduring answer as to why divergence 
occurred after such a long period of convergence, and the particular comparison 
proposes some answers as to what determines development.  
 
Argentina and Australia both developed on the periphery of the world market. This 
presented them with similar opportunities, which were originally determined by their 
underlying wealth in land. Australia used these opportunities to transform limited factor 
endowments into development from the early nineteenth century. Argentina did not do 
so until much later in the nineteenth century, despite evidently more abundant factor 
endowments. Both countries turned towards their national markets as potential engines 
for development as export led development became problematic in the interwar period, 
namely between the World Wars. Internal led development ultimately proved an 
unsuccessful strategy. In the post World War II period Australia re-engaged with 
external markets, continuing and diversifying exports, whereas Argentina did not. How 
did similar geography, i.e. similar opportunities and contexts for development, translate 
into such different experiences of development? Geography primarily consists of factor 
                                                 
1 The theoretical framework of NIE is discussed extensively in Chapter One. An important statement of 
NIE is North, D. C. (1990). Institutions, institutional change, and economic performance. Cambridge ; 
New York, Cambridge University Press. 
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endowments and location (the spatial interaction between economic agents).2 This thesis 
shows that institutions determined the ability of geography to engender development in 
Argentina and Australia. To state that their geography was comparable actually gives a 
favourable bias to Argentina, as Australian endowments and spatial location were 
weaker. Judging by geography alone, Argentina should have been more, not equally 
successful. The comparison also gets beyond the argument that highly concentrated land 
tenure was to blame for Argentina’s later difficulties, as Australia also had highly 
concentrated land tenure.3 If these countries had so much in common geographically, 
why did they take such starkly different paths? The answer is their differing institutional 
environments, and the legacies these had for social consensus and collective action.  
 
Within the institutional approach, property rights are often seen as the fundamental 
causation of development. A different approach is taken here. The state and its 
credibility, as the largest potential collective actor, is seen as more fundamental. State 
credibility is the faith a society has in the state to act collectively in the interests of 
society. How can state credibility be measured and compared? Fairly direct 
measurements are fiscal institutions (the ability to raise revenue), the provision of public 
goods, and public credit. Without credibility the state will struggle to erect viable and 
substantial fiscal institutions, as society will be highly uncooperative in providing 
taxation. The state will be largely limited to indirect, regressive and relatively 
unproductive sources of tax, and is more likely to resort to inflation taxation or 
seigniorage. A deficiency of lucrative fiscal institutions hinders the state’s ability to 
provide the public goods (directly or via regulation of the market) that are typically 
necessary for development. Della Paolera and Taylor observe that a key macroeconomic 
challenge for a small open economy is the construction of institutions and commitments 
that support stable fiscal and monetary policies.4 Long-run price stability and the 
resulting benefits of financial markets are only possible if a country is successful in 
constructing such supporting institutions. If a small open economy is unsuccessful it 
                                                 
2 Crafts, N. and A. J. Venables (2003). Globalization in History, A Geographical Perspective. 
Globalization in historical perspective. M. D. Bordo, A. M. Taylor and J. G. Williamson. Chicago, 
University of Chicago Press: ix, 588 p., p.323 
3 This is particularly relevant to the arguments put forward in Engerman, S. L. and K. L. Sokoloff (2002). 
"Factor Endowments, Inequality, and Paths of Development among New World Economies." National 
Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 9259. They argue that concentrated land tenure ultimately 
undermined Argentine institutions. See Chapter One for further discussion. 
4 Della Paolera, G. and A. M. Taylor (2001). Straining at the anchor : the Argentine Currency Board and 
the search for macroeconomic stability, 1880-1935. Chicago, University of Chicago Press., p.10 
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risks volatile inflation, leading to increased financial instability and banking and 
currency crises. Yet how does a society construct the institutions and commitments 
necessary for stable fiscal and monetary policies? Fiscal institutions are the basis upon 
which all macroeconomic institutions are built. Monetary institutions, for instance, 
require solid fiscal institutions to be sustainable.5 Otherwise the primary role of a 
country’s currency will likely be as a source of seigniorage (i.e. inflation taxation), 
which will undermine the development of monetary and financial institutions. Fiscal 
institutions are the immediate and investigable result of state credibility. They are also a 
proximate cause of further macroeconomic institutional development. As such they are 
an ideal focus for the comparative investigation of state credibility. State credibility and 
ensuing fiscal institutions are the foundation upon which efficient institutions that 
engender development are built.  
 
Overview of Convergence and Divergence 
 
Argentina and Australia both emerged as new nations over the nineteenth century. 
Australia quickly began to develop within the institutional shelter provided by Britain, 
whereas Argentine development was initially delayed by the chaos that ensued from the 
break-up of the Spanish empire. Nonetheless they began to converge in the latter half of 
the nineteenth century as Argentine institutions consolidated. Argentina rapidly 
converged with Australia and other developed countries as GDP grew at an annual 
average of just over 6% for almost half a century, from 1870-1913.6 This high rate of 
growth became possible once Argentina established an institutional environment, 
allowing the pursuit of an export led model of development. Only then could 
Argentina’s rich and varied factor endowments become viable means for significant 
development. By the late nineteenth century Argentina was considered a rising star of 
development, and its national wealth was listed alongside (and compared favourably 
with) Europe, the US, Canada, and Australia in the leading statistical compendium of 
                                                 
5 A point illustrated in Cortés Conde, R. and G. T. McCandless (2001). Argentina: From Colony to 
Nation - Fiscal and Monetary Experience of the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries. Transferring wealth 
and power from the old to the new world : monetary and fiscal institutions in the 17th through the 19th 
century. M. D. Bordo and R. Cortés Conde. Cambridge, UK ; New York, Cambridge University Press: x, 
482 p. 
6 Derived from Maddison, A. (2003). The World Economy: Historical Statistics. Paris, OECD 
Development Centre. 2005. 
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the time.7 Australian institutional stability allowed development from an earlier date, 
but this was somewhat limited by poor factor endowments that amounted to little more 
than deprived pasture or rangelands and alluvial gold. It was not until the twentieth 
century that publicly funded technology and ongoing institutional stability allowed for 
an impressive increase in Australia’s range and wealth of endowments. In spite of 
limited factor endowments, Australian institutions permitted such impressive 
development in the nineteenth century that Australia was the world’s wealthiest country 
in terms of GDP per capita by the late nineteenth century. Even with Australia’s 
impressive lead, Argentina was nearing Australian GDP per capita by the early 
twentieth century. Argentina was then so successful that GDP per capita exceeded that 
of France and Germany, and was nearing the leading ‘western offshoots’ of Australia, 
New Zealand, the USA, and Canada.8 In fact the use of GDP per capita understates the 
extent of Argentine convergence, as population growth was much higher than in 
Australia. Argentina and Australia had almost equal populations in 1870, but by 1913 
Argentina’s population was 1.6 times as large as Australia’s, largely due to 
immigration. In the late 1920s Argentina reached a relative peak of convergence, when 
its GDP per capita was 81 and 87 percent of the UK and Australia respectively. 
Argentina then roughly maintained a developed standard of GDP per capita until the 
early 1950s, when a clear and sustained divergence began, one that greatly accelerated 
in the 1970s.9  
 
The history of the Argentine-Australian comparison is dynamic. Australia is an 
excellent standard for comparison as it was not a superstar of development during the 
twentieth century, unlike the USA for example. Australia and Argentina both struggled 
with a difficult external context in seemingly similar ways. As that external context 
became more trying during the interwar period, Australia and Argentina attempted, and 
largely failed, to develop an internally led alternative via protectionism and import-
substitution industrialisation. With the end of World War II the international market re-
emerged as a powerful option for development. After a brief lull, Australia revived 
                                                 
7 Mulhall, M. G. (1899). The dictionary of statistics. London,, G. Routledge and Sons., p.589 In a related 
publication Argentina was explicitly compared to Canada and Australia. Mulhall, M. G. and E. T. Mulhall 
(1892). Handbook of the river Plate. Buenos Ayres, London, M.G. and E. T. Mulhall: K. Paul, Trench & 
co., p.65 
8 Maddison, A. (2003). The World Economy: Historical Statistics. Paris, OECD Development Centre. 
2005. 
9 The timing of convergence and divergence is detailed in Chapter One. 
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exports in the postwar period, alongside a newer and seemingly expensive protectionist 
path. Despite Argentina’s richer, more easily exploitable factor endowments, and 
superior proximity to world markets, Argentina was not able to maintain a balance 
between export led and internal led growth. Argentine exports fell into a long decline 
despite the renewal of opportunities. For much of the postwar period Argentina was not 
even able to maintain the volume of agricultural production achieved in the 1920s.  
 
Australia and Argentina exemplify how little important the luck of geography was in 
their development. Argentina had a much greater natural diversity of potential staple 
exports, more fertile soils, and was closer to markets. Yet Australia always achieved 
more impressive development in terms of GDP per capita. Australian institutions played 
the crucial role. In the nineteenth century they transformed wool, potentially a highly 
inequitable staple due to the need for large areas of land, into a source of widespread 
development. In the twentieth century Australian institutions greatly expanded potential 
endowments via their sponsorship of investment and technology. Institutions translated 
into much greater means for creating wealth in Australia, whereas they eventually did 
the opposite in Argentina. Argentine institutions ultimately failed to generate the 
compromises that were essential for state credibility, which was required for the state to 
deliver (or prevent the undermining of) development. A primary reason for the 
undermining of development was the ‘latent civil war’ that emerged in Argentina from 
the 1930s onwards.10 In the 1980s the Argentine state emerged from this half century of 
latent civil war as a democratic entity, but one that has so far failed to reconsolidate 
fiscal institutions upon the basis of greater credibility. In contrast Australian institutions 
achieved much compromise. The ‘Australian compromise’ between state and society 
was implemented by the new federal state in the early twentieth century, and was 
relatively unaltered until the 1980s.11 The Argentine comparison with Australia shows 
just how expensive the failure of institutions, particularly state credibility, has been.  
 
 
 
                                                 
10 This is the expression coined by Diaz Alejandro to describe the rupture of Argentine social consensus 
for much of the twentieth century. Díaz Alejandro, C. F. (1970). Essays on the economic history of the 
Argentine Republic. New Haven,, Yale University Press., p.132 
11 See Lloyd, C. (2002). "Regime Change in Australian Capitalism: Towards a Historical Political 
Economy of Regulation." Australian Economic History Review 42(3): 238-266. 
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Supplements to the literature 
 
A fundamental claim of New Institutional Economics is that property rights are the 
underlying causation of development.12 A more fundamental cause is state credibility as 
property rights in themselves are a public good, a result of underlying state credibility. 
The most skilfully written rules still depend upon the state and its legal system to 
deliver them, as North puts it: ‘the polity makes and puts in place the economic rules of 
the game.’13 State credibility is a wide concept, reflecting the degree of cohesion and 
cooperation between state and society. It can be usefully and objectively compared 
between different societies over long periods of time via fiscal institutions, public goods 
provision and public credit. Fiscal institutions reflect the willingness of society to fund 
the state, and are thus a powerful representation of state credibility. Less credible states 
cannot access as wide a range of fiscal institutions as more credible states can, 
especially in regards to direct taxation. A state may monopolise violence, but 
compulsion is highly limited as a tool for collecting tax, and the most lucrative fiscal 
institutions (such as income taxation) are the most dependent upon consent. Capable 
fiscal institutions reflect a high degree of cooperation between state and society. Fiscal 
institutions are the primary tool through which the state can establish credibility, by 
providing society with desirable public goods. The focus of NIE needs to be redirected 
away from property rights per se and towards state credibility and resulting fiscal 
institutions. Property rights are important but proximate. This thesis shifts the emphasis 
of NIE in long run development from property rights to the more fundamental roles 
played by state credibility.  
 
Another contribution of the thesis is the construction of new data and amalgamations of 
data to enable comparisons over a long period of time. The comparison of income 
taxation required the construction of time series from annually published official 
sources for both Argentina and Australia. In Argentina the data constructed is from 
1935 to 1945, income taxation’s most relevant period, which may be expanded in the 
future. This appears to be the first time such data has been constructed. For Australian 
federal income tax, a time series from 1915-70 was constructed. Upon these data new 
                                                 
12 This is explained in detail in Chapter One. 
13 North, D. C. (2003). "The Role of Institutions in Economic Development - Gunnar Myrdal Lecture." 
UNECE Occasional Paper., p.4 
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forms of analysis were used to compare them, which will serve as a model for future 
studies. Long-term compilations of time series, often over a century, were also 
constructed from a wide variety of sources, especially in the case of Argentina. They 
were made in order to disaggregate the fiscal state and reveal the underlying political 
economy. They include the sources of revenue and taxation, the destination of public 
expenditure, the experience of budget deficits, and the details of public credit, amongst 
others. A considerable degree of Argentine statistics, contemporary, and primary 
sources were also “rediscovered” in the archives, especially from the Argentine Central 
Bank (BCRA) and the Ministry of the Economy. The historical backgrounds of the key 
chapters (for instance in public credit, public goods provision, and income taxation) use 
these sources extensively. Many contemporary and relatively unknown sources were 
used to judge how well the views of that period fit with statistical findings. For instance 
the stony silence of the statistics on the decline of Argentine income taxation was filled 
by sources written at the time, often by highly credible Argentines. In Australia the 
Parliamentary debates were used to see how statistical graphs and theoretical ideas of 
the thesis compared with the thoughts of contemporary governors. For instance it was 
somewhat surprising to see how frequently many Australian Ministers saw the state as a 
firm in the service of the taxpayer, to whom they must provide a significant return. 
Finally the analysis allows the validity of some accepted statistics, especially Argentine 
budget deficits, to be brought more clearly into question, particularly in the postwar 
period. These new time series and primary sources contribute to the historical 
knowledge of Argentina and Australia.  
 
Structure 
 
The first part of the thesis outlines the methodology and reviews the literature. Chapter 
One presents the theoretical foundations of the thesis and explores the comparative 
literature. The second chapter compares the political and economic histories to reveal 
the roles played by state and market formation. These chapters form Part One, 
establishing the foundations and background upon which later chapters are built.  
 
Part Two assesses the role that state credibility played in divergence by comparing 
fiscal institutions, public goods provision, public credit, and income taxation. Chapter 
Three contrasts fiscal institutions on a broad scale over a long time period, in particular 
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fiscal revenues and expenditures, which indicate long-term distribution policies and 
political economy. It finds that strong elements within convergence and divergence 
were the ability to shift taxation from indirect to direct, and to whom public goods were 
provided for. There was an increasing failure in Argentine state credibility in the 
postwar period that was reflected in fiscal institutions and public goods provision. This 
fuelled divergence. Chapter Four analyses the links between public credit, public goods 
and state credibility over time. It finds that postwar Argentine fiscal breakdown was 
mirrored in a failure of public credit, further restricting room for manoeuvre, and 
encouraging a negative path dependency of state credibility. It compares public goods 
provision in greater historical detail, revealing their chaotic financing and poor quality 
in postwar Argentina. This advances an argument for dramatic postwar divergence in 
state credibility, reflected in public goods and public credit. Chapter Five investigates 
the important role played by income taxation, and how this relates to development. Both 
Argentina and Australia successfully built important progressive and lucrative income 
taxes, but Argentina’s income tax failed in the postwar period while Australia’s 
continued to succeed. This played a crucial role in divergence, as income taxation was 
the most lucrative and progressive fiscal institution of the twentieth century, crucial to 
the credible financing of expanding states in the postwar developed world. The 
considerable postwar expansion of the Argentine state could not be credibly funded, as 
income taxation declined with state credibility. In the process the Argentine state 
became dependent upon seigniorage. The decline of Argentine state credibility and 
fiscal institutions combined with expanding public expenditure to result in extremely 
high budget deficits that society was unwilling to finance. Ultimately the state turned to 
seigniorage, which significantly accelerated the decline of credibility.  
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Chapter One: 
The Fiscal Roots of Argentine and 
Australian Divergence 
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The comparison of Argentina and Australia raises the broad question of what 
determines development. The development of basic state credibility and public order 
allowed long periods of highly successful development in each. Australia continued to 
build state credibility, helping to sustain development by increasing the level of social 
consensus, underwritten by strong democratic institutions. Argentina succeeded in 
establishing the necessary state credibility and public order for at least half a century of 
highly successful development. Unfortunately state credibility and institutions began to 
break down in the decades following the 1930 military coup, which was soon followed 
by divergence. Argentine state credibility clearly began to deteriorate from the mid 
twentieth century, reaching profound depths by the hyperinflations of the 1970s and 
1980s. The deterioration in state credibility and fiscal institutions corresponded with 
divergence in the post World War II period.  
 
This chapter establishes the theoretical foundations of the thesis and surveys the 
comparative literature. It is divided into the following four sections of stylised facts: a 
theoretical grounding; past themes in the comparative literature; an overview of 
Argentine and Australian convergence and divergence; and the roots and merits of a 
fiscal institutional comparison.  
 
I Theoretical Grounding  
 
As an objective is to compare Argentina and Australia from the perspective of New 
Institutional Economics (NIE), it is important to outline and define this perspective. The 
economy is often seen as an independent entity, separate from a wider and possibly 
interfering society. In such a view society is at best a neutral force upon the economy. 
New Institutional Economics offers an alternative view, placing the economy firmly 
within society. In NIE the economy emanates from society through society’s 
institutions. These institutions are both formal, such as legislation, and informal, such as 
public morality. They largely determine the economy’s path, but over the long term the 
economy feeds back into society’s institutions helping to sustain that path, which is 
often called path dependency. The following subsections outline and evaluate: the main 
ideas of NIE, the ideas of collective action and the state, and the relevance of the 
comparative approach.  
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An exposition and evaluation of New Institutionalism 
 
Arguably the best-known proponent of New Institutional Economics is Douglass North. 
He defines institutions as the rules of the game in society, or the boundaries that shape 
human interaction.14 As a result they structure the incentives in all types of human 
exchange by structuring individuals’ options. Ultimately they decrease uncertainty by 
establishing a stable construction of human interaction, but this construction varies in its 
efficiency.15 In other words they are necessary to establish order but their mere 
existence is not sufficient to ensure that order’s quality. The crucial question for 
economic growth and development from an NIE perspective is how to create efficient 
institutions, i.e. institutions that create a high quality of public order.  
 
Economic growth, defined as a long-run rise in income per capita, is the result of 
efficient economic organization.16 Efficiency is achieved through institutions and 
property rights that bring the private rate of return close to the social rate of return. Thus 
efficiency hinges on having institutions and property rights that incorporate externalities 
into private activity as much as possible. Yet the efficient economic organisation where 
all externalities are eliminated is highly idealistic, as the transaction costs of 
establishing such an economic organization would be prohibitive. Externalities 
persist because the cost of incorporating each exceeds the benefits.17 In the end North 
finds that efficient institutions will occur in polities that have built-in incentives to 
create and enforce efficient property rights.18 For North, property rights are the 
foundation stone of efficient institutions.  
 
                                                 
14 North, D. C. (1990). Institutions, institutional change, and economic performance. Cambridge ; New 
York, Cambridge University Press., p.3-4 See also: North, D. C. and R. P. Thomas (1973). The rise of the 
Western world : a new economic history. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.;  North, D. C., W. 
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Property Rights and State Credibility  
 
If property rights are the foundation stone of efficient institutions, and efficient 
institutions are the key to development, the implication is that property rights are the 
fundamental means to promote development. Indeed North and Thomas identify 
property rights as the fundamental vehicle to increase economic growth, via 
improvements in their definition and enforcement.19 Two historical reasons are 
identified as to why property rights have not been able to incorporate externalities: 1) a 
lack of ability to counter free-riders and compel people to bear their share of transaction 
costs; and 2) the costs of property rights may exceed their benefits to a group or 
individual.20 Thus the limits to exclusivity and the costs of property rights emerge as the 
primary barriers to economic growth and development within the classic NIE 
framework.  
 
Yet property rights are ultimately a public good provided by the state. The state offers 
to establish and enforce property rights in return for revenue.21 Within the theoretical 
framework of NIE, states are organisations paid to establish and enforce property rights, 
but not necessarily those property rights that are the most efficient and productive. For 
instance states may find it in their immediate interests to provide property rights that 
promote rent seeking rather than productive activity.22 Bates, in his criticism of NIE, 
makes a similar point. He also claims that property rights emanate from the state and 
that the question of which system of property rights will prevail is determined by the 
nature of a state’s political institutions.23 Property rights that encourage more productive 
activity than rent seeking are obviously more conducive to development. Unsurprisingly 
North asserts that many ‘developing’ countries have property rights more favourable to 
rent seeking than productive activity.24 The immediate and impending fiscal needs of 
states may encourage the protection of property rights that impede rather than promote 
                                                 
19 North, D. C. and R. P. Thomas (1973). The rise of the Western world : a new economic history. 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press., p.2-3 
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growth.25 NIE thus identifies the role of the state and its fiscal institutions as being 
important determinants of property rights. Yet the focus of NIE remains upon the more 
proximate cause of property rights than the more fundamental issue of the state and its 
fiscal institutions. NIE thereby confuses proximate with more fundamental causes of 
development. The argument presented here is that property rights are an important 
proximate cause, but the most fundamental cause is the state and its fiscal institutions.  
 
How can states be usefully compared and contrasted? The fundamental causation of 
differing institutional structures, and thereby propensities for development, is a state’s 
credibility. State credibility is positively correlated with the state’s ability to provide 
productive and efficient property rights, and thereby plays a decisive role in the 
formation of efficient institutions. Without credibility, the state does not have a viable 
monopoly over property rights, and thus has few property rights to sell. The developing 
world abounds with examples of large legal vacuums where informal property rights 
flourish, i.e. without legal foundation in the state.26 The greater a state’s credibility, the 
greater the state’s ability to provide property rights that are widely distributed and 
promote efficiency and growth, reinforcing credibility. As the interaction between state 
and society is somewhat self-reinforcing, state credibility has a high degree of path 
dependency (i.e. the encouragement of virtuous and vicious cycles).27 State credibility is 
not emphasised in the NIE literature but is essential to resolving the dilemma of whether 
states provide property rights that promote rent seeking or productive activity. The state 
is usually the only collective body large enough within a society to have a chance of 
overcoming the two problems of establishing property rights: exclusivity and direct cost 
to the individual. The state is typically the main vehicle for collective action and the 
minimisation and incorporation of externalities in society. Yet in order for it to do so the 
state must have the credibility of society entrusted in it. State credibility is a more 
fundamental cause of development than property rights, as only a credible state is able 
to provide the extensive public goods typically necessary for development, one of which 
is property rights.  
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A key idea of NIE is path dependence. Path dependence arises from the nature of 
institutions, which are both created and perpetuated to serve the interests of those with 
the bargaining power to devise them.28 Path dependence means that society is bound by 
its history through its institutions, and therefore dramatic, rapid change can be difficult. 
It means that history is important. Current choices cannot be understood without tracing 
the evolution of institutions.29 Path dependence partly results from the power of self-
interested groups, who continually recreate institutions in their own interests. This 
ensures that current paths are self-reinforcing, suggesting that historical equilibriums of 
little change can be reached. Yet institutional change is also the crucial dynamic by 
which societies evolve over time.30 The path of history itself is very important in NIE. 
North finds that the path of institutional change is shaped by two factors: 1) the lock-in 
that results from the symbiotic relationship between institutions and the groups that 
have evolved from their incentive structure; and 2) the feedback process by which 
people perceive and react to changes in the opportunity set.31 As a result historical 
paths, whether balanced towards productivity or rent-seeking, tend to persist. Productive 
institutions may not naturally evolve on their own, and this is an important insight for 
development policy. Path dependence means that development policy must address 
institutions and those behind them as a first priority; otherwise its efforts may be 
undermined.  
 
A fundamental dilemma for NIE is that any state strong enough to protect property 
rights, enforce contracts, and provide macroeconomic stability is also strong enough to 
confiscate all citizens’ wealth. This is also referred to as the ‘commitment problem’.32 
The addition of state credibility as a fundamental institution for efficient institutions 
largely resolves this issue. In the long run, only those states that foster credibility via 
self-restraint and the fostering of continued development will maintain strong positions 
of power. If development is largely the result of credible states, widespread confiscation 
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of wealth would go against the purpose and construction of the state itself. It is thus 
unlikely that such states would confiscate their citizens’ wealth, unless dramatic change 
occurs.  
 
NIE’s answer of institutions suggests a new path towards engendering development 
and/or alleviating poverty, as installing and encouraging growth-inducing institutions 
could achieve these goals. Yet path dependence implies that this isn’t easy. Institutional 
change can occur incrementally and/or dramatically. North sees a tendency for 
institutions to change incrementally rather than discontinuously due to embedded 
informal constraints.33 Formal rules such as legislation can be changed overnight, but 
informal institutions or norms (e.g. traditions) take time. The institutional matrix that 
shapes economic performance is a combination of formal rules, informal norms, and 
their enforcement. Yet policy-makers have no control, at least in the short run, over 
informal norms, and only very imperfect control over the enforcement of both formal 
rules and informal norms.34 Thus the possibility for rapid change is limited. The simple 
changing of legislation is not usually enough to produce real change unless it reflects 
underlying informal institutions. Ultimately a state must rely on informal norms for its 
formal rules to be enforced, as it cannot afford to enforce formal rules without 
widespread societal support. States can only afford to enforce rules that are broken 
exceptionally and are usually reported. This is true even in the most developed societies 
with the most capable states. NIE thus proposes how development is engendered, but it 
does not offer simple, easy solutions. As Olson points out, finding that institutional 
problems are the main stumbling block to development does not help much.35 Yet the 
problem has to be understood if answers are to be found.  
 
State credibility is a potentially large and nebulous concept, which may explain NIE’s 
preference for focussing on property rights. State credibility is defined broadly above, 
but direct and tangible expressions of state credibility are fiscal institutions. Fiscal 
institutions are the manner and capacity in which a state raises revenue. Fiscal 
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institutions are a clear expression of a society’s faith in the state, i.e. state credibility. If 
a society lacks faith in the state, fiscal institutions should be highly limited in their 
ability to raise revenue; and vice versa. States require credibility to raise revenue 
efficiently, productively, and sustainably. Compulsion is highly limited as a tool within 
fiscal institutions. For instance, once tax evasion (a clear sign of low state credibility) 
becomes widespread and pervasive, there is little any state can do from a coercive 
perspective over the long run. Ultimately the state must re-establish credibility. The 
most lucrative fiscal institutions are forms of direct taxation, especially income taxation, 
which are also the most dependent upon cooperation. In terms of development, states 
require credibility to construct the fiscal institutions necessary to fund the incorporation 
of large and obvious externalities (e.g. through the provision of public goods with high 
positive externalities and action to minimise negative externalities). State credibility and 
ensuing fiscal institutions are thus necessary to incorporate externalities and promote 
development. In fact a state that lacks, or experiences a decline in, credibility and 
ensuing fiscal institutions will likely aggravate negative externalities in a scramble for 
resources, especially the use of seigniorage. Extensive seigniorage clearly increases 
inflation, further destabilising the economy and fiscal institutions, encouraging even 
greater use of seigniorage, and opening up the possibility of a vicious cycle. States with 
limited or declining fiscal institutions may also add to negative externalities via the 
monopolisation of essential public goods for development that are not actually provided 
(or that are provided inefficiently). State credibility is crucial to fiscal institutions, 
which in turn enable state capacity for collective action and the incorporation of 
externalities, which in turn is crucial for development.  
 
Collective Action and the State 
 
The state is primarily an organization, one that provides public goods for its citizens.36 
The general purpose of public goods is to enhance positive externalities (e.g. security) 
and minimise negative externalities (e.g. pollution). They are goods and services 
provided via the state on behalf of society, and address collective action problems that 
are often entwined with issues of natural monopoly. Some concrete examples are 
railways, roads, education, and utilities, but there are less tangible examples such as 
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stable money and property rights. As public goods face a significant free rider problem 
(i.e. they are non-excludable), markets alone will not provide them sufficiently. The 
state can rectify this by providing public goods and services directly, on behalf of 
society and for society’s greater benefit. Developed and strong states have increasingly 
moved to provide them via (likely more efficient) regulation. The provision of public 
goods via the state (whether by direct provision or regulation) ameliorates the free rider 
problem by using taxation to increase everyone’s well-being, but the state must 
overcome the collective action problem to do so.  
 
Olson highlights the collective action problem, illustrating how the rational individual 
interest is not equivalent to the social or collective interest.37 In general the larger a 
group, the harder it is to achieve an optimal supply of collective goods.38 Collective 
goods are those goods achieved by a group. At the level of society as a whole they are 
public goods, but groups within society often seek collective goods that are not public 
goods. Indeed smaller groups typically seek collective goods that are rent-seeking, 
benefiting only their particular group. This combines with the greater ability of smaller 
groups to coordinate collective action, as it is only when groups are quite small (or 
individuals are coerced) that the rational individual interest will match the collective 
interest. In small groups individual interests are little separate from those of the group 
and one individual’s efforts can make a visible difference, which means collective 
goods are easier to achieve. As the size of the group increases, so does the disparity 
between the individual’s cost/benefit ratio and that of the group’s. Homogeneity can 
increase the ability to achieve collective action, as it facilitates consensus.39 Ideology 
can also help achieve homogeneity. For example nationalism has often been used to 
create a common tribal identity. Olson also illustrates the situation of groups that 
contain a large degree of inequality, where the minor members exploit the wealthy 
members, the ‘great’.40 This occurs because the wealthy members expect the benefits 
from collective action to exceed the cost of providing that good, even if they have to 
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pay the entire cost of provision. Thus the incorporation of the ‘great’ into a state’s 
institutional structure should increase the provision of public goods. The probability of a 
group achieving a collective good depends on the group’s size, homogeneity, ideology, 
degree of inequality, and the value of the collective good. Collective action at the level 
of the state thus faces a number of difficult hurdles, as the group’s size is typically very 
large, homogeneity may need to be manufactured, there may be a lack of unifying 
ideology, and the ‘great’ may lack political power. Public goods should be difficult to 
achieve even when they are valuable to society.  
 
Olson shows that small groups’ better odds of achieving collective action can often be 
to society’s detriment. As small groups are better able to act collectively, they can 
achieve a disproportionate power relative to the number of individuals they represent. 
As a result small groups are more inclined towards rent seeking than larger groups.41 
Collective goods that are rent seeking and redistributive are more favorable to the small 
group, as the overall loss in societal output due to rent seeking has to be astonishingly 
large before it will impact the small group. Most organizations in society are small and 
naturally inclined towards rent seeking and redistribution, rather than greater 
production. This also means that as small groups (each representing their own special 
interests) become more important, politics becomes more conflictive.42 Conflict over 
distribution can destabilize the political sphere and ultimately make society 
ungovernable. If society is to achieve public goods, it must find a means of achieving 
collective action on a large scale. More encompassing organizations for collective 
action, such as the state, are more likely to act in the broader social interest.43 If 
productive paths are to be achieved and sustained, the natural bias of small groups 
towards rent seeking must be counterpoised within a larger collective action orientated 
towards productive activity. The state is ideally situated to represent such larger 
collective action. If a society cannot construct such a state, it will remain at the mercy of 
primarily rent seeking small groups.  
 
                                                 
41 Olson, M. (1982). The rise and decline of nations: economic growth, stagflation, and social rigidities. 
New Haven, Yale University Press., p.41-4 
42 Ibid., p.47 
43 Ibid., p.52 
 26
The spread of small groups is thus detrimental to economic efficiency and growth, and 
this can be greatly compounded by political instability.44 Powerful small groups 
encourage a misallocation of resources through their natural penchant for rent seeking 
collective goods, and political instability discourages long-term investment. Olson 
identifies an important negative path dependency for development, i.e. a vicious cycle, 
that can emerge from the greater capacity of small groups to prosper in unstable 
societies.45 Unstable societies can be doubly burdened. Not only are their states more 
prone to small group pressures for redistribution, but also their instability discourages 
long-term investment. Small groups will work hard to perpetuate a path that offers 
reliable rents, and political instability makes it difficult for the state to counterpoise 
these small groups within a larger collective action orientated towards productive 
activity. Once such an arrangement is entered into it should be highly path dependent, 
locking out the prospect for much productive activity. A rent seeking path dependency 
of powerful small groups within unstable societies can be self-sustaining. If a society 
fails to erect larger, more encompassing groups capable of providing public goods and 
encouraging productive activity, or these groups fail, that society could enter a period of 
instability that is maintained by self-interested small groups within it. This potential 
negative path dependency illustrates the importance of the state in development, 
particularly the capacity of the state for collective action.  
 
The capacity of a state to provide public goods is ultimately a success in overcoming the 
collective action problem. The difficulty of overcoming the collective action problem is 
an important aspect of an institutional perspective. As Bates points out, NIE faces an 
inherent collective action problem. Individuals provide institutions in order to overcome 
social dilemmas, but in doing so they may also provide public goods that face a free 
rider problem.46 From an individual perspective, the demand for institutions does not 
mean that they will be supplied. Bates finds this to be a basic contradiction of NIE, but 
it is one that is easily overcome. NIE does not state that all institutions are public goods 
meant to overcome social dilemmas. Indeed it makes the explicit case that many 
institutions could have a selfish, rent seeking basis. From an NIE perspective, the ability 
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of the state to provide an efficient institutional structure that promotes productive 
activity and development is the primary concern. The provision of public goods through 
the state is a primary means for establishing a more productive development path via 
the reduction of externalities. Collective action is thus important to NIE, as it is crucial 
to the state being able to achieve an efficient institutional structure that promotes 
development.  
 
Argentina and Australia both constructed states that were capable of providing a basic 
level of public goods by the late nineteenth century, sufficient to enable considerable 
development. Yet the Australian state became increasingly strong and capable over the 
twentieth century, whereas the relative strength and capability of the Argentine state 
declined. By the late twentieth century the capacity of the Argentine state to provide any 
public goods, along with state credibility, was much reduced. The Australian state 
clearly chose a path that reinforced not only state strength and credibility, but also the 
underlying wealth of the country. The Argentine state largely took the opposite path, 
one where society was both unstable and the state was seemingly unable to act on behalf 
of society.  
 
The Comparative Method  
 
As the thesis employs the comparative method, it is important to assess the validity of 
the approach. The comparative method can be seen as a form of experimental logic 
where controlled experiments are impossible. It is an attempt to simulate experiments in 
the social sciences, based on the experimental ideal of “all other factors being equal”.47 
Therein also lies the problem with the comparative approach. History is always unique, 
and the natural science ideal of a laboratory experiment is unattainable. As Crafts 
warns, we should not expect ‘too much from comparative history.’48 Yet as he also 
points out, it is the questions asked of comparative history that need to be careful. The 
extent that error and chance play in history is always unclear and unknowable. For 
instance, what would have occurred had Argentina possessed Australian institutions? 
How large was the role of chance in Australian and Argentine history? Yet the 
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similarities in Australian and Argentine geography and contexts for development stand 
in such stark contrast to their different outcomes that the comparison is reasonable. 
Argentina and Australia were European settler societies established to achieve progress 
at distant locations from world markets, with like factor endowments, concentrated land 
tenure, spectacular success in development until the mid twentieth century, and 
dramatic divergence in the post World War II period. What roles did geography and 
institutions play in divergence, and why? How could such similar geography lead to 
such ultimately different experiences of development? These are reasonable and 
important questions to ask of potentially highly similar countries.  
 
The comparative method, if properly framed, can be a particularly useful tool for 
assessing variables of causation. For instance a theory that inequitable distribution of 
land is to blame for later development problems may be difficult to deny through one 
country’s particular history alone. If a similar country with a similarly inequitable land 
distribution is found to have avoided such development problems, it is prima facie 
evidence that the theory is flawed and that land tenure is only a proximate cause.49 The 
comparative method can test theories that might otherwise seem secure from the 
perspective of only one setting.50 Finally the question of whether to use the comparative 
method or not is largely a hypothetical one. The comparative method is implicit in 
almost all research, as it is difficult to be completely ignorant of how things operate 
elsewhere.51 Even the most particular research problems are ultimately framed 
implicitly by knowledge beyond the specific case.  
 
II Geographic Themes in Comparative Literature52 
 
A number of guiding theories have previously been used to explain the comparison of 
Australian and Argentine development paths. All of them posit a predominance of 
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causation to geographic factors, but none of them fully and sufficiently explain postwar 
divergence.53  
 
Factor Endowments and Staple Theory 
 
Staple theory was an early explanation for Argentine and Australian convergence in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The theory emerged in the mid twentieth 
century and is based on comparative advantage. It attempts to explain the development 
trajectories of the settler economies, or countries of recent (European) settlement. These 
countries include Canada, the United States, Argentina, Australia, New Zealand, 
Uruguay, South Africa, and others. Settler economies are usually defined as land rich 
but initially labour and capital poor, being settled by large migrations of immigrants. 
Ideally the settler economies lacked restraining traditions.54 In order to develop they 
imported labour and capital, developing staple exports (such as cattle, sheep, and wheat) 
to pay for these imports and continue the process. About two thirds of British foreign 
investment in the half century prior to 1914 was invested into settler economies, equal 
to about 4% of British national income.55 Argentina and Australia easily fit the staple 
model in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as they were land rich and 
imported large amounts of capital and labour, developing primary staples for export. 
Staple theory appears able to explain Argentina and Australia’s initial convergence, but 
confuses causation in seeing the nature of the staple export, rather than institutions, as 
the primary cause of development.  
 
Staple theory’s fundamental assumption is that commodity exports were the leading 
sector of the economy and determined growth. As domestic markets were limited, 
comparative advantage resided in resource intensive exports, or staples for the 
international market. Development was a result of diversification around the commodity 
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export base.56 It occurred via the spread of income through linkage effects, primarily 
backward and forward linkages (also a final demand linkage). Backward linkage is 
investment in the domestic production of inputs, including capital goods, for the staple 
export, e.g. railways. Forward linkage is investment in domestic industries that use the 
staple as an input, i.e. value adding to the staple export. Per capita income is ultimately 
dependent on the staple’s productivity, with income distribution dependent on the 
nature of the staple’s production function.57 It thus assumes that there is only one 
potential production function. A later linkage in the literatures is ‘fiscal linkage’, which 
helps validate the research approach taken here. Fiscal linkage is the idea that the 
connection between staple export development and fiscal institutions is important to 
development. The state captures resources from staple exports directly and/or indirectly 
to facilitate the provision of public goods, which can potentially engender more 
widespread development.58 This varies from the deterministic focus of staple theory, as 
the same staple can support two completely different uses of fiscal linkage.59 Staple 
theory gives a minor role to private and public entrepreneurship, which is seen to 
depend upon institutions and societal values. Sustainable growth requires that at some 
point staple export societies shift towards new foreign or domestic markets.60 This 
requires institutional flexibility, but institutions are seen as the result of the staple(s) a 
country has specialised in, which is determined by the fortune of factor endowments. 
Ultimately the nature of the staple(s) controls prosperity and development, as it dictates 
the nature of institutions.  
 
Staple theory appears to be the intellectual heritage behind Engerman and Sokoloff’s 
more recent factor endowments theory.61 Factor endowments theory argues that the 
                                                 
56 Watkins, M. H. (1963). "A Staple Theory of Economic Growth." The Canadian Journal of Economics 
and Political Science XXIX(2)., p.144-5 
57 Ibid., p.146-7 
58 Hirschman, A. O. (1992). Rival views of market society and other recent essays. Cambridge, Mass., 
Harvard University Press., pp.67-9; & Hirschman, A. O. (1981). Essays in trespassing : economics to 
politics and beyond. Cambridge [Eng.] ; New York, Cambridge University Press., p.71 
59 Hirschman, A. O. (1981). Essays in trespassing : economics to politics and beyond. Cambridge [Eng.] ; 
New York, Cambridge University Press., p.96 
60 Watkins, M. H. (1963). "A Staple Theory of Economic Growth." The Canadian Journal of Economics 
and Political Science XXIX(2)., p. 151 
61 Engerman, S. L. and K. L. Sokoloff (2002). "Factor Endowments, Inequality, and Paths of 
Development among New World Economies." National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 
9259. & Engerman, S. L. and K. L. Sokoloff (1997). Factor Endowments, Institutions, and Differential 
Paths of Economic Growth Among New World Economies: A View from Economic Historians of the 
United States. How Latin America fell behind : essays on the economic histories of Brazil and Mexico, 
1800-1914. S. H. Haber. Stanford, Calif., Stanford Unviversity Press: xi, 315 p. 
 31
nature of staples influences institutions through their production functions, e.g. slave 
plantations lead to dictatorial institutions whereas small farms lead to democracy. As in 
staple theory, the staple’s production function determines institutions. Engerman and 
Sokoloff compare development in North and South America and conclude that North 
America was ultimately more successful due to factor endowments (especially the 
staple of grain) that encouraged small farms. Small, family-sized farms in the northern 
colonies of North America (with climates favouring temperate foodstuffs, limited 
economies of scale, and no slaves) meant relatively equal distributions of human capital 
and wealth, and thus a productive development path.62 Yet Argentina shared these same 
factor endowments. If the staple production function determines institutions, Argentine 
factor endowments should also have resulted in small farms and more equitable 
democracy. Instead Argentina exploited factor endowments via large estates. As a result 
Argentina was less successful in development as it encouraged the wrong kinds of 
institutions.63 The Argentine example thus exposes an inherent self-contradiction to the 
factor endowments argument, as very similar endowments led to different institutional 
environments. Even if the self-contradiction is accepted, it fails to hold when the 
comparison is extended to Australia. Inequitable land tenure alone does not necessarily 
determine poor institutions as Australia also had highly inequitable land tenure and still 
achieved successful, equitable, and democratic institutions.64  
 
Staple theory is unable to explain the Argentine and Australian experience of 
divergence in the latter half of the twentieth century. The theory postulates that settler 
economies can fall into a “staple trap” whereby they fail to use the original opportunity 
of staple exports to diversify beyond them. Staple theory appears to assume that in order 
to develop economies must go through Rostow’s stages of economic development, 
leaping from primary exports into industrialisation.65 This idea is largely refuted by the 
Australian experience. Australia has long been one of the world’s wealthiest countries, 
but has almost always lacked a substantial manufacturing sector.66 Instead Australia has 
                                                 
62 Engerman, S. L. and K. L. Sokoloff (2002). "Factor Endowments, Inequality, and Paths of 
Development among New World Economies." National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 
9259., p.4 
63 Ibid., p.15 
64 See next subsection for further discussion. 
65 Rostow, W. W. (1960). The stages of economic growth, a non-Communist manifesto. Cambridge 
[Eng.], University Press. 
66 Manufacturing reached an historical but brief high of 29% of GDP in 1960. By 1997 manufacturing 
had returned to a more historically normal level of 13% of GDP, equal to that in 1911. See Statistics, A. 
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usually relied upon primary exports for much development. In the latter half of the 
twentieth century Australia greatly diversified the range of potential staple exports, 
especially in mining. Attempts to industrialise through import substitution were also 
made, but this policy and much of the resulting industry were later abandoned. This 
‘inward-orientated strategy’ was introduced in the early twentieth century and lasted 
until the 1960s.67 Australia has long been an undeniably developed country with a 
highly urbanised population and the majority of its economy in the tertiary sector. 
Australia largely skipped the ‘take off’ stage into industrialisation, but nonetheless 
avoided falling into the staple trap predicted by staple theory. Argentina on the other 
hand acted more in accord with staple theory and more fully devoted itself to the leap 
into industrialisation and diversification out of primary exports, evidenced in the great 
decline of its primary exports and increase in import substitution industrialisation. 
Ultimately staple theory is unable to provide either an explanation for Argentine 
divergence or an explanation for Australia’s continued success in the latter half of the 
twentieth century.  
 
A version of staple theory called ‘super staple theory’ largely overcomes the lack of 
entrepreneurial space in staple theory.68 It enlarges the role for entrepreneurship in 
staple development, allowing for a more diverse range of production functions. 
Entrepreneurs are seen to have developed certain staples to a high degree of quality, 
becoming world leaders in them. Examples are Canadian wheat, Australian wool, New 
Zealand lamb, and Argentine beef.69 These staples led rapid transformations of their 
respective economies. In contrast to staple theory, the development of these super 
staples was not only a response to demand conditions, but was also a means of creating 
demand.70 In this sense super staples were little different than the manufactures of the 
British Industrial Revolution. The differing experiences of Argentina, Australia and 
Canada suggest that supply rather than demand alone needs to be incorporated into 
                                                                                                                                               
B. o. (2001). Manufacturing from settlement to the start of the new century. Year Book Australia, 2001. 
A. B. o. Statistics. Canberra, Australian Bureau of Statistics. 
67 The strategy included the White Australia Policy, tariff protection to foster manufacturing, and 
assistance to exporters in state-subsidised production and marketing arrangements. McLean, I. W. and A. 
M. Taylor (2001). "Australian Growth: A California Perspective." NBER Working Paper Series Working 
Paper 8408: 30., p.9 
68 Fogarty, J. (1985). Staples, Super-Staples and the Limits of Staple Theory: the Experiences of 
Argentina, Australia and Canada Compared. Argentina, Australia, and Canada - Studies in Comparative 
Development 1870-1965. D. C. M. Platt and G. Di Tella. Oxford, Macmillan. 
69 Ibid., p.22 
70 Ibid., p.22 
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staple theory. Supply is not only a response to demand, and the supply curve’s shape 
and position is often determined by variables specific to each region.71 The simple 
import of labour and capital was enough to create growth in these countries, but not 
development. Development required the receipt of labour and capital into an open, 
creative and flexible environment. Institutions and the entrepreneurs they encouraged or 
discouraged were required for success.72 Super staple theory thus turns the original 
staple theory on its head, and is ultimately an argument for institutions, as 
entrepreneurship is a result of the institutional environment. Super staple theory 
overcomes the inability of staple theory to explain why the same staple is not the same 
everywhere. It also greatly helps to explain why Australia was able to continue its 
success throughout the twentieth century. Yet super staple theory diverges substantially 
from staple theory in seeing the ultimate causation in institutions rather than factor 
endowments.  
 
A major problem of staple and factor endowments theory is the assumption that the 
same staples are equal everywhere. Yet there is not necessarily only one production 
function for a staple. For example Canada produced wheat with small family farms 
while Argentina used tenancy contracts. Canadian wheat was of a higher quality than in 
Argentina, despite Canada’s less favourable climate. Another example is wool. 
Australian wool, for no obvious reasons of factor endowments, was much cleaner than 
that of Argentine wool, obtaining higher prices.73 Not only did production functions of 
the same staples differ, but so did the timing of their exploitation. Staple theory offers 
little explanation for the questions of: why certain staples had a variety of production 
functions, why some staples were developed but not others, and for the timing of 
exploitation. Institutions determined the answers to these questions.  
 
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries Argentina appeared far better placed 
to succeed within the factor endowments (or staple theory) model than Australia, as it 
                                                 
71 Ibid., p.30 
72 Ibid., p.24 
73 An important work on the early Argentine wool industry is Sabato, H. (1990). Agrarian capitalism and 
the world market : Buenos Aires in the pastoral age, 1840-1890. Albuquerque, University of New Mexico 
Press. See also Hora, R. (2001). The landowners of the Argentine Pampas : a social and political history, 
1860-1945. Oxford , New York, Clarendon Press Oxford University Press. There are many works on 
Australian wool, but an important one is McMichael, P. (1984). Settlers and the agrarian question : 
foundations of capitalism in colonial Australia. Cambridge [Cambridgeshire] ; New York, Cambridge 
University Press. 
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had a much more flexible and diversified export bill.74 In contrast, Australia remained 
largely dependent on wool for the bulk of its foreign exchange. Gold was also an 
important, but erratic and unreliable source of Australian export earnings.75 Argentina 
excelled to a very similar extent as Australia in attracting foreign investment (primarily 
British) to develop its staple exports; despite its later start in development and that it 
was not a British colony.76 The interest rate on Argentine government bonds converged 
upon that of Australia by the beginning of the twentieth century, was roughly equal by 
1913, and was lower by the 1920s.77 Argentina and Australia both attracted large 
amounts of capital on similar terms in order to develop their factor endowments. 
Argentina also attracted much more immigrant labour than Australia. Staple theory thus 
strongly supports an argument for Argentina’s rapid convergence in the latter half of the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, but is unable to explain why this did not occur 
from an earlier date. Why were Argentina’s considerable factor endowments, obvious 
from the early nineteenth century, left unexploited for so long? Argentina had an 
obviously greater variety of staple exports, at least until the 1960s-70s, but has had 
more problematic development than Australia. Factor endowments are an insufficient 
explanation for Argentina’s late economic growth and its later switch to a less 
productive development path.  
 
The differing experiences of wool in Argentina and Australia highlight the role that 
institutions played in determining factor endowments. Spanish merino sheep were 
imported into both New South Wales and Argentina in the same year. British capital 
was available in both areas, and factor endowments were similar.78 Yet Australian wool 
                                                 
74 Díaz Alejandro, C. F. and A. Velasco (1988). Trade, development, and the world economy : selected 
essays of Carlos F. Diaz-Alejandro. Oxford, UK ; New York, NY, USA, B. Blackwell., p.233 
75 Schedvin, C. B. (1990). "Staples and Regions of Pax Britannica." The Economic History Review 43(4): 
533-59., p.545 
76 Between 1865 and 1914 Argentina and Australia each attracted a total British investment of 
£349,243,000 and £339,001,000 respectively. Stone, I. (1999). The global export of capital from Great 
Britain, 1865-1914 : a statistical survey. New York, St. Martin's Press., pp.62-71. By 1930 the proportion 
of British investment in Argentina and Australia was 12% and 13% respectively. Díaz Alejandro, C. F. 
and A. Velasco (1988). Trade, development, and the world economy : selected essays of Carlos F. Diaz-
Alejandro. Oxford, UK ; New York, NY, USA, B. Blackwell., p.238 
77 See subsection two of Chapter Four for more detail. For Argentina see Della Paolera, G. and A. M. 
Taylor (2003). A new economic history of Argentina. Cambridge ; New York, Cambridge University 
Press. For Australia see Vamplew, W. (1987). Australians: historical statistics. Broadway, NSW, Fairfax 
Syme & Weldon. 
78 Fogarty, J. (1985). Staples, Super-Staples and the Limits of Staple Theory: the Experiences of 
Argentina, Australia and Canada Compared. Argentina, Australia, and Canada - Studies in Comparative 
Development 1870-1965. D. C. M. Platt and G. Di Tella. Oxford, Macmillan., p.24-5 
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growing proved far more dynamic and entrepreneurial than in Argentina. In 1885 
Australia and Argentina had approximately equal numbers of sheep, but Argentina’s 
wool clip was worth £3.5, while Australia’s was worth £6.79 Australian pastoral 
entrepreneurs singularly focused upon wool. Yet a high proportion of Australia’s 
forward linkages from wool production were transferred directly to Britain and 
Europe.80 This suggests that wool was by no means an ideal staple for development, at 
least according to staple theory. Backward linkages to domestic suppliers of producer 
goods were also weak because input requirements were so modest. Final demand 
linkages though were more powerful and extensive, especially in finance. Institutional 
reasons in Argentina, especially the lack of stability until the latter half of the nineteenth 
century, likely explains the less intensive development of wool there. The Argentine 
sheep industry had highly favourable factor endowments, but was less successful than in 
Australia.81  
 
A comparison of the experiences in wheat is also indicative.82 The Argentine state did 
not support research and extension services on anything like the scale of Canada or 
Australia.83 Wheat was an important staple in Argentina, but remained at a relatively 
primitive level of development. Absolute advantage may have been a long-run 
impediment, as the ease with which wheat could be grown in Argentina enabled it to 
greatly expand production without innovation or government assistance.84 Poorer factor 
endowments meant this was not possible in Canada and Australia.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
79 Ibid., p.25 
80 Schedvin, C. B. (1990). "Staples and Regions of Pax Britannica." The Economic History Review 43(4): 
533-59., p.544 
81 See Chapter Two for a fuller discussion. 
82 For a comparison of the Argentine and Canadian wheat experiences see: Adelman, J. (1994). Frontier 
development : land, labour, and capital on the wheatlands of Argentina and Canada, 1890-1914. Oxford ; 
New York, Oxford University Press. 
83 Fogarty, J. (1985). Staples, Super-Staples and the Limits of Staple Theory: the Experiences of 
Argentina, Australia and Canada Compared. Argentina, Australia, and Canada - Studies in Comparative 
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Figure 1.1 
A 'Persian Gulf' State? - Australian Exports by Value
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Source: See Statistical Appendix, Table 1.1 
 
A major criticism of the Argentine-Australian comparison made on the basis of factor 
endowments is that Australia was born ‘the lucky country’.85 In this misguided vein 
Díaz-Alejandro alleges that ‘Australia was born rich’ with vast mineral resources and a 
low population, making it a ‘Persian Gulf’ state of the latter nineteenth century.86 He 
suggests that Australian development was relatively easy, waiting to be plucked, 
whereas Argentina’s was more difficult. This not only misunderstands Australian 
economic history, but also the nature of development. If factor endowments (e.g. 
mineral resources) were all that is required for development, Nigeria and the Congo 
would be some of the world’s most developed regions. The natural resource curse upon 
development is now better understood.87 Minerals require institutions that direct 
investment towards their development, and which are capable of reasonably and 
credibly dividing their spoils in order to sustain political stability. In fact minerals failed 
                                                 
85 The original phrase, from where the expression was coined, is by Donald Horne: ‘Australia is a lucky 
country, run by second-rate people who share its luck.’ See (2005). The Lucky Country, Australian 
Government Department of Communications, Information Technology and the Arts.; 
http://www.acn.net.au/articles/luckycountry/ 
86 Díaz Alejandro, C. F. and A. Velasco (1988). Trade, development, and the world economy : selected 
essays of Carlos F. Diaz-Alejandro. Oxford, UK ; New York, NY, USA, B. Blackwell., p.232 
87 See Mehlum, H., K. Moene, et al. (2006). "Institutions and the Resource Curse." The Economic Journal 
116(508): 1-20. 
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to play a reliable economic role in Australia until the 1970s, well after Argentina 
diverged. Australian factor endowments were not evidently greater than in Argentina. 
On the contrary, Australia’s limited options for development can be seen in Figure 1.1 
above, where wool rarely accounts for less than a third, and often closer to half, of 
export revenues until the late 1960s. Considering agricultural exports as a whole (wool 
plus agricultural and pastoral exports), Australian dependence upon commodity exports 
for export revenue is stark. Agricultural exports typically accounted for 70-90% of total 
export earnings until the late 1960s.88 Prior to the 1970s, gold and mining were only of 
importance in the 1850-60s and at the turn of the twentieth century. This does not 
equate to ‘Persian Gulf’ status. The development of Australian mining in the 1960s and 
1970s was different from the previous erratic gold booms in that it depended on a high 
level of foreign investment and technical knowledge.89 Australian development required 
institutions capable of developing limited factor endowments from the world’s poorest 
and driest soils, located at the ends of the earth.90 In contrast Argentina’s slow postwar 
development can hardly be blamed on rich factor endowments (not even the resource 
curse applies, as their development waned). Cavallo, Domenech, and Mundlak confirm 
the validity of the Argentine-Australian comparison in terms of factor endowments. 
They strongly argue that Argentina could have continued convergence with Australia 
from 1930 onwards if development of factor endowments had continued.91 Factor 
endowments were not the problem, and were evidently insufficient for development on 
their own.  
 
Land tenure 
 
Inequitable land tenure has long been a popular explanation for Argentine divergence.92 
Carter Goodrich notes the inability of land tenure to explain Argentina’s problematic 
                                                 
88 The accounts are not disaggregated prior to 1900, but the trend appears to be roughly similar asides 
from the brief gold boom at the turn of the twentieth century in Western Australia.  
89 Pinkstone, B., D. Meredith, et al. (1992). Global connections : a history of exports and the Australian 
economy. Canberra, AGPS Press., p.212 
90 Tim Flannery details Australia’s geographical isolation, which has left it undisturbed by volcanoes, 
mountain building or ice ages for hundreds of millions of years. As a result Australian soils are old, 
leeched, exhausted, and largely sand. Flannery, T. F. (1995). The future eaters : an ecological history of 
the Australasian lands and people. New York, G. Braziller. 
91 Cavallo, D., R. Domenech, et al. (1989). Agriculture and economic growth in Argentina, 1913-84. 
Washington, D.C., USA, International Food Policy Research Institute., pp.9, 121 
92 A classic version of this argument is: Díaz Alejandro, C. F. (1970). Essays on the economic history of 
the Argentine Republic. New Haven,, Yale University Press., p.157-9 A more recent example is: 
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development in an early comparison with Australia.93 He observes that land tenure in 
New Zealand (until the end of the nineteenth century) and in Australia was that of a 
“big-man’s frontier”, dominated by the great pastoralist or squatter. Economic 
geography dictated such a situation, as Australia’s location and relative lack of rainfall 
meant sheep raising in large land holdings had great advantages over agriculture.94 The 
economic geography of Argentina and Uruguay closely resembled Australia’s, as they 
also had comparative advantages in stock raising over agriculture that favoured large 
land holdings. Argentina’s land was not distributed on the basis of equity or small 
farms, asides from some provincial government schemes. It was predominantly 
distributed to large pastoralists. Australia’s land was also predominantly distributed on 
an inequitable basis to large pastoralists. The production function of Argentine and 
Australian staple exports, especially pastoral staples, encouraged extensive land tenure. 
Land was the only relatively abundant factor of production in both countries. So its 
distribution should have been important for development, but the inequity does not 
appear to have impeded productive development. Indeed Olson observes that a small 
group of landed families will have individual interests that coincide well with those of a 
developing primary exporting economy, as their individual factors of production largely 
coincide with those of the society’s economy.95 This suggests that landed capitalists will 
not necessarily encourage rent seeking and economically inefficient policies, at least if 
they have access to political power. In light of the comparison with Australia, it is 
unlikely that Argentine divergence in the latter half of the twentieth century can be 
explained by the inequitable land tenure of the nineteenth century.  
 
The pattern of land tenure in Argentina and Australia was roughly similar in that large 
properties were predominant. Argentina initially attempted to distribute land equitably 
and retain state ownership of the land through the law of emphyteusis (i.e. leasing the 
land), but this largely resulted in the land remaining unexploited.96 In 1840 the state 
resorted to giving the land away in order to bring it into production and incorporate it 
                                                                                                                                               
Engerman, S. L. and K. L. Sokoloff (2002). "Factor Endowments, Inequality, and Paths of Development 
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94 Ibid., p.76-7 
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into the economy. Australian properties were often very large, being up to 400,000 
hectares with sheep flocks of up to two hundred thousand.97 In the mid nineteenth 
century a mere 42 squatters held almost a fifth of the total occupied land in the 
Australian colony of New South Wales (NSW). The concentration of land was little 
changed by the 1880s when 500 holdings represented about half the alienated land in 
NSW, and a mere ten families owned 0.8 million hectares in the colony of Victoria.98 
Originally Britain attempted to limit settlement in Australia to the coastal area near 
Sydney, but this proved unenforceable. Squatters went well beyond this limit, 
occupying large areas of crown land, improving their properties and eventually 
obtaining legal backing via crown leaseholds at low annual rents. These leaseholds were 
the rough equivalent of title, as the difference between leasehold and freehold was 
largely a matter of legal form.99 Australian pastoral leaseholders effectively had full 
property rights even when their lands were leased from the crown, as their leases were 
long, fairly automatic, and not open to competitive tendering.  
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Figure 1.2 
Proportion of Total Land Area according to Holding 
Size, 1910-11 Australia, 1914 Argentina-Pampa
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Sources: See Statistical Appendix, Table 1.2 
Figure 1.3 
Proportion of Total Land Holdings according to Holding 
Size, 1910-11 for Australia, 1914 for Argentina
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Sources: See Statistical Appendix, Table 1.3 
 
The concentration of landownership in Argentina (1914) and Australia (1910-11) was 
roughly similar on the grounds of both the proportion of land area and the number of 
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land titles relative to holding size. The overall trajectories are very similar, but there are 
some problems of comparison. One problem is that the figures for Australia are based 
on the area of land actually in use, whereas the figures for Argentina are based on the 
total area of land. In an attempt to balance for this the Argentine figures reflect only the 
Pampas (the most valuable and intensively used lands), as the vast majority of these 
lands would likely have been in use. Another problem is that the size of holdings are not 
directly comparable, making the comparison of the trajectories only an approximate of 
general trends. Nonetheless the trajectories are quite similar, and reveal that both 
countries had highly concentrated land tenure in the early twentieth century.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.4 
Concentration of Land Ownership in Buenos Aires 
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Source: See Statistical Appendix, Table 1.4 
 
Another problem with blaming the later failure of Argentine development on 
concentrated land tenure is that land tenure became increasingly dynamic and less 
 42
concentrated over the nineteenth century, as can be seen in Figure 1.4 above. Such de-
concentration of land ownership would be expected with the emergence of a land 
market and an increase in land values. This likely reflected an increasing allocation of 
land to more productive agents as land use became more complex. An implicit 
assumption of the argument that inequitable land tenure was to blame for later 
divergence is that land tenure was static. The opposite appears true. The initial seeds of 
inequity sown in the first half of the nineteenth century were significantly weeded out 
over the second half of the nineteenth century. The de-concentration of land tenure 
continued in the first half of the twentieth century, when there was a large shift to 
smaller land holdings between 1914 and 1960.100 Increasing equity in land tenure over 
the latter half of the nineteenth century and first half of the twentieth century stands in 
contradiction to the argument that inequitable land tenure was to blame for divergence 
in the latter half of the twentieth century.  
 
It has been argued that the potentially negative impact of Australia’s inequitable land 
distribution on long-term development was limited by the relative inability of 
Australia’s large landowners to translate land tenure into political power, whereas 
Argentina’s large landowners were able to do so.101 In fact the opposite appears to be 
true. Not only did Australian large landowners have considerable political power, but 
large Argentine landowners had great difficulties accessing political power.102 Hora 
persuasively discredits the popular and largely unexamined belief that large Argentine 
landowners dominated political power during the long oligarchy of the Partido 
Autonomista Nacional (PAN) in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Later 
attempts by the landowners to form an electable Conservative party (the rough 
equivalent to Australia’s successful Country Party) were also a complete failure.103 A 
more convincing explanation for the differing impact of inequitable land tenure on 
Argentine and Australian development paths was the ability of institutions to politically 
incorporate large landowners. Such incorporation was important for the state to find 
                                                 
100 Díaz Alejandro, C. F. (1970). Essays on the economic history of the Argentine Republic. New Haven,, 
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Oxford , New York, Clarendon Press Oxford University Press. 
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cooperative means of encouraging the fullest use of land, the major original factor 
endowment in each country. Inequality of incomes should increase the state’s ability to 
provide public goods, as long as those who receive greater distributions are politically 
incorporated.104 The incorporation of large landowners into the state should thus enable 
a greater provision of public goods. Argentine political institutions generally did not 
incorporate large landowners, and the friction between society and landowners notably 
increased from 1912 onwards.105 The inability of Argentine institutions to accommodate 
conflict between landowners and society led to later development problems, not 
inequitable land tenure per se. Australian institutions in contrast found means to appease 
both the democratic masses and large landowners. In the twentieth century Australian 
institutions managed the feat of maintaining a high level of primary exports while also 
funding an expensive and inefficient experiment in import substitution.106 The ability of 
underlying political institutions to incorporate landowners determined the level of social 
harmony and consequent development.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
104 As those with lower distributions are able to exploit those with greater distributions. Olson, M. (1971). 
The logic of collective action; public goods and the theory of groups. Cambridge, Mass.,, Harvard 
University Press., p.33-35 
105 Hora, R. (2001). The landowners of the Argentine Pampas : a social and political history, 1860-1945. 
Oxford , New York, Clarendon Press Oxford University Press., p.133 
106 The peculiarity of the ‘Australian compact’ or ‘compromise’ is examined in Lloyd, C. (2003). 
Economic policy and Australian state building: from labourist-protectionism to globalisation. Nation, 
state, and the economy in history. A. Teichova and H. Matis. Cambridge ; New York, Cambridge 
University Press: xvi, 450 p. & Lloyd, C. (2002). "Regime Change in Australian Capitalism: Towards a 
Historical Political Economy of Regulation." Australian Economic History Review 42(3): 238-266. 
 44
III Overview of Divergence and Convergence 
Figure 1.5 
Argentine GDP per capita and Population relative to 
Australia, 1870-2001
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Note: The trend line for GDP per capita above is a five-year moving average.  
Source: See Statistical Appendix, Table 1.5 
 
As Figure 1.5 demonstrates, Argentina clearly confirmed an ability to achieve a high 
level of development, evidenced by sustained growth in GDP per capita, in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This was a period of unprecedented and 
prolonged development in Argentina. Argentina never fully converged with Australia 
by this measure, but came very close. The relative achievement was outstanding when 
consideration is made for the parallel and far higher growth in Argentine population 
relative to Australia. This hides the extent of convergence visible in a per capita 
measure, as Argentina’s population grew almost twice as quickly as Australia’s. 
Australia was one of the wealthiest countries in the world in terms of GDP per capita in 
the early twentieth century, and the wealthiest in the late nineteenth century. Yet 
Argentine GDP per capita managed to converge from about 40% of Australia’s in 1870 
to 87% in 1930. Over the same period both countries began with almost equal 
populations, but Argentina’s population was almost double Australia’s in 1930 
(187%).107 Australia faced economic difficulties from the late nineteenth century, falling 
                                                 
107 All these figures are from Maddison, A. (2003). The World Economy: Historical Statistics. Paris, 
OECD Development Centre. 2005. 
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into a long, hard depression from 1891.108 It was not until after World War II that 
Australia recovered the economic buoyancy of the 1851-91 period.109 Nonetheless 
Australia remained one of the world’s wealthiest countries throughout 1870-2001 in per 
capita terms. Argentine GDP per capita also includes the relatively undeveloped 
northwest region, which had no parallel in Australia. Australia had a significant head 
start over Argentina, as the Australian colonies began to strongly develop from the 
1820s with the expansion of the pastoral industry.110 In Argentina the 1820s marked the 
beginning of three decades of warfare that long delayed development. Nonetheless 
Argentina established itself as a member of the developed country club by 1930.  
 
The more rapid Argentine population growth during convergence, shown in Figure 1.5, 
was fuelled by much higher net immigration.111 This was an early goal of the Argentine 
state, which believed that a steady flow of cheap labour was necessary for 
development.112 As the founder of Argentina’s constitution, Juan Bautista Alberdi, 
proclaimed in 1852: ‘Gobernar es poblar’ - to govern is to populate.113 Accordingly 
Argentina instituted liberal immigration policies from the 1850s, and in 1876 legislation 
opened Argentina to all but the most obvious undesirables. In 1914, 29.9% of 
Argentina’s total population had been born abroad, rising to 49.4% in the city of Buenos 
Aires. Argentina then had the highest proportion of immigrants to total population in the 
world.114 This adds further detail to how successful the period of convergence was. The 
Australian stance on immigration contrasted starkly with Argentina, and was based on 
the exclusionary, openly racist White Australia Policy of 1901. Actual policy may not 
have had much impact though, as immigrants probably found Australia less attractive 
                                                 
108 McLean argues that the 1890s depression was even worse than the 1930s. McLean, I. W. (1996). 
"Recovery from the Depression: Australia in an Argentine Mirror." Unpublished., p.3-4 
109 Blainey, G. (1980). A Land Half Won. Adelaide, Macmillan., p.318 
110 Fogarty, J. (1985). The Role of the Export Sector in Industrialisation: The Australian and Argentine 
Experience Compared. Argentina and Australia, Essays in comparative economic development. A. E. 
Dingle and D. T. Merrett, Economic History Society of Australia and New Zealand, Monash University. 
Occasional Papers No. 1., p.22 
111 See immigration figures in: Scobie, J. R. (1967). Revolution on the Pampas; a social history of 
Argentine wheat, 1860-1910. Austin,, Published for the Institute of Latin American Studies by the 
University of Texas Press.; Díaz Alejandro, C. F. and A. Velasco (1988). Trade, development, and the 
world economy : selected essays of Carlos F. Diaz-Alejandro. Oxford, UK ; New York, NY, USA, B. 
Blackwell.; and Statistics, A. B. o. (2005). 
112 Solberg, C. E. (1970). Immigration and nationalism, Argentina and Chile, 1890-1914. Austin,, 
Published for the Institute of Latin American Studies by the University of Texas Press., p.7-8 
113 Alberdi, J. B. and F. Cruz (1915). Bases y puntos de partida para la organización política de la 
República argentina. Buenos Aires,, La Cultura argentina. 
114 Solberg, C. E. (1970). Immigration and nationalism, Argentina and Chile, 1890-1914. Austin,, 
Published for the Institute of Latin American Studies by the University of Texas Press., p.33-6 
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than Argentina, where opportunities for social and economic mobility were probably 
better.115 Australia may have had a higher GDP per capita but the economy was 
stagnant compared to the dynamism of Argentina, implying that there were greater 
opportunities for immigrants in Argentina.  
 
Dating Divergence 
 
When did Argentina and Australia begin to diverge? For many historians the when 
equates with the why. Based on GDP per capita alone, several dates for divergence are 
possible. Figure 1.5 dates divergence from the beginning of the postwar period, but 
dates before and after this point are conceivable. The year 1950 is chosen above as 
divergence then emerges as a distinct trend, but the date could be pushed back as early 
as the peak of convergence in 1930. To do so would disregard the prior period of 1900-
30 when similar oscillations occurred. The five-year moving average oscillates around 
70% from about 1900 until the early 1950s, when a distinct break begins. Global trends 
must also be considered. The interwar period was highly unusual and variable, and 
placing too much emphasis upon this period would be precarious. The post World War 
II order was much more stable and persistent.  
 
The NIE perspective suggests that the when does not closely correlate with the why. 
Path dependency allows the when and the why to be distinct. A shift in institutional 
environments would likely precede divergence. Argentina clearly converged with 
Australia until 1930, which has often been identified as a turning point in the 
literature.116 Yet Argentine divergence with Australia remained unclear until the early 
1950s. By dating the peak of convergence as 1930, and evident divergence from 1950, 
the implication is that the shift in institutional environments occurred during the 1930-
50 period. The roots of divergence thus lie within the ‘década infame’ dictatorship of 
the 1930s and the following Peronist administration of 1946-55. During this period a 
shift in institutional environments occurred that was soon followed by divergence. From 
the mid 1970s divergence greatly accelerated, coinciding with the second Peronist 
                                                 
115 Moran, T. H. (1970). "The "Development" of Argentina and Australia: The Radical Party of Argentina 
and the Labor Party of Australia in the Process of Economic and Political Development." Comparative 
Politics 3(1): 71-92., p.84-5 
116 See: Díaz Alejandro, C. F. (1970). Essays on the economic history of the Argentine Republic. New 
Haven,, Yale University Press. & Cavallo, D., R. Domenech, et al. (1989). Agriculture and economic 
growth in Argentina, 1913-84. Washington, D.C., USA, International Food Policy Research Institute. 
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administration of 1973-76 and the ensuing military dictatorship of 1976-83. The periods 
of 1930 to the early 1950s and the 1970s to the early 1980s were exceptional for their 
high levels of conflict and lack of consensus in Argentine society, which included the 
slaughter of up to 30,000 people during the 1976-83 military dictatorship.117  
 
                                                 
117 This Figure is an approximate from Amnesty International, which finds a suitable approximation to be 
15 to 30 thousand people. See Arriaga, A. D. o. G. R., Amnesty International USA (2003). The Fight 
Against Impunity in Argentina; Congressional Human Rights Caucus Briefing. Internet, Amnesty 
International USA. 
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A Half Century Membership of the Developed Club 
Figure 1.6 
Argentine GDP per capita (100% line) in 1990$US relative to other countries, 1900-2001
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A More Permanent Member? 
Figure 1.7 
Australian GDP per capita (100% line) in 1990$US relative to selected countries, 1870-2001
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How do Argentine and Australian economic performance measure relative to the rest of 
the world? Figures 1.6 and 1.7 above begin an answer to this question. It is important to 
broaden the comparison beyond Argentina and Australia to see if the convergence and 
divergence story holds. Did Australia and/or Argentina take an unusual path? The 
Figures above place Argentine and Australian GDP per capita within a much wider 
perspective, and include the world’s leading economies and relevant comparators.  
 
Figure 1.6 compares Argentina’s performance relative to both developed and 
developing countries from 1900-2001. In sum it shows a Latin Americanisation of 
Argentine GDP per capita and development over the twentieth century, moving from a 
developed country in the early twentieth century to trailing behind the Latin American 
leader of Chile by the end of the twentieth century.118 By the early twentieth century 
Argentina had clearly converged with many of the world’s most developed countries, 
exceeding France and Germany for much of the period, and converging strongly with 
the UK during the 1920s. The beginning of divergence is less clear in a comparison 
with so many countries. Nonetheless 1950 appears again as a reasonable beginning of 
divergence, one that accelerates in the 1970s. The comparison with Japan considerably 
reinforces 1950 as a turning point. By the late 1980s Argentina had considerably 
converged with the large Latin American countries, and during the 1990s Argentina was 
replaced by Chile as the Latin American leader in development.119 In sum the timing of 
Argentine convergence and divergence is very similar to that found in comparison with 
Australia alone. Convergence peaked during the first half of the twentieth century and 
was followed by divergence in the postwar period.  
 
Figure 1.7 looks at the relative performance of Australian GDP per capita from 1870-
2001. It shows that Australia lost the position of world’s wealthiest country, richer than 
the UK and the US in the late nineteenth century, but retained the status of a developed, 
wealthy country through the end of the twentieth century. Australia lost considerable 
relative ground to the US in the mid twentieth century, a distance that remains 
                                                 
118 Chile had the highest GDP per capita in Latin America in 2001, asides from the clear exceptions of 
Puerto Rico (part of the US) and Trinidad and Tobago (oil rich Caribbean islands). 
119 Argentina lost the lead in GDP per capita to Venezuela at an earlier date, but Venezuela’s oil rich 
nature and extreme income inequality hardly commend the use of GDP per capita as a comparable 
indicator of development. 
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remarkably constant throughout the post World War II period. By the early 1970s 
Australian GDP per capita was most comparable to France, Germany, the UK, and 
Japan, and was somewhat distant to the US. What is clear from Australia’s relative GDP 
per capita from 1870 to 2001 is that Australia was always a member of the developed 
world club, but was not the leading performer. Argentina also appears as a member of 
the developed club in the first half of the twentieth century, but then moved to join Latin 
America in the latter half of the twentieth century. The only pause in this movement 
was the period of Convertibility (1990-2001), when the hands of seigniorage (but not 
externally funded public debt) were briefly tied. The Argentine-Australian comparison 
is reasonable, as Australian GDP per capita performed below that of the US and was 
closer to that of Europe, but with much less volatility.  
 
Figure 1.8 
Growth in GDP per capita, compound interest rates
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Figure 1.8 above allows a more simplistic sketch of relative GDP per capita. The key 
periods identified are: 1) successful development and convergence from 1870 to 1950; 
2) divergence in the postwar period (1950-90); and 3) brief resurgence during the 
Convertibility period (1990-2001). Using these periods as a guide, Argentine 
divergence in terms of GDP per capita growth in the 1950-90 period is especially clear. 
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The 1950-90 era shows how exceptionally low growth in Argentine GDP per capita was 
in the postwar period.  
 
Exports and timing of Divergence 
Figure 1.9 
Exports/GDP, 1900-96
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Figure 1.10 
Argentine Exports relative to Australian Exports per 
capita in US$, 1948-2002
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Exports are a means for further investigating the timing of divergence. The different 
development paths of the postwar period were a combination of Australian resurgence 
in a period of dramatic world growth and Argentine stagnation in spite of it. The key 
proximate reason for this divergence was Argentina’s shift away from export 
production. Argentina and Australia were both settler economies whose development 
was largely based upon primary exports. Figures 1.9 and 1.10 show a major postwar 
divergence in Argentina’s ability to export relative to Australia. Argentina’s high export 
to GDP ratio dramatically declined in the late 1930s due to the external circumstances 
of the Great Depression and WWII. Contrary to the Australian experience, this 
considerably accelerated in the late 1940s and was sustained until the late 1970s. The 
primary reason for the decline in Argentine exports in the postwar period was stagnation 
in rural production. From 1940-72 Argentine agricultural production grew at a meagre 
1.4% per annum.120 Previously it regularly achieved 4% per annum.121 Argentine 
exports only returned to Australian proportions in terms of GDP by 1989, but on the 
                                                 
120 Cavallo, D. and Y. Mundlak (1982). Agriculture and economic growth in an open economy--the case 
of Argentina. Washington, D.C., International Food Policy Research Institute., p.13 
121 Díaz Alejandro, C. F. (1970). Essays on the economic history of the Argentine Republic. New Haven,, 
Yale University Press., p.142-3 
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basis of a much smaller relative economy. Figure 1.10 shows that this recovery was 
illusory. Australian postwar export performance was actually quite poor by international 
standards, and Australian exports failed to grow as quickly as world trade. From 1953-
73 Australian exports quadrupled in value, while world exports grew by sevenfold.122 In 
fact Australia is unique amongst countries of similar population and living standards in 
having such a low proportion of exports to GDP.123 Argentine postwar export failure is 
thus relative to a poor export performer. The poor performance of Argentine exports in 
the postwar period is most stark when exports are compared in US$ per capita. By 1989 
the value of Argentine exports per capita was only 13% of that in Australia. 
Unfortunately the IMF data does not stretch before 1948, but in conjunction with 
exports/GDP, it can be assumed that the value of Argentine exports per capita used to 
be at least equal to, if not greater than, in Australia. The decline in the ability to export 
is an important proximate reason for divergence.  
 
A major consequence of Argentina’s decline in exports was the constraint it placed 
upon the potential for economic growth via the balance of payments. From 1930 
onwards the Argentine economy was constrained by a lack of foreign exchange due to 
the decline in agricultural exports.124 This decline was initially due to the restrictive 
international trade policies of the Great Depression. Through the 1930s Argentina 
succeeded somewhat in maintaining previous achievements in traditional exports as 
measured by their historical shares of international trade.125 The 1940s was a different 
story, as Argentine agricultural exports declined due to difficulties of domestic supply, 
not lack of foreign demand.126 Australia also experienced a decline in rural exports in 
the immediate postwar period, when a more aggressive attempt to construct an 
internally driven economy was made. This was reversed in 1952 when the rural export 
sector resumed a high priority status with the boom in commodity prices. Australia 
began to once again believe that exports of low value-added primary products could be 
relied upon for development.127 This shift in attitude led to rapid results, and within a 
                                                 
122 Pinkstone, B., D. Meredith, et al. (1992). Global connections : a history of exports and the Australian 
economy. Canberra, AGPS Press., p.167 
123 Ibid., p.323 
124 Díaz Alejandro, C. F. (1970). Essays on the economic history of the Argentine Republic. New Haven,, 
Yale University Press., p.78-85 
125 Ibid., p.99-100 
126 Ibid., p.201-2 
127 Pinkstone, B., D. Meredith, et al. (1992). Global connections : a history of exports and the Australian 
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decade the quantity of Australian rural production increased by 50%.128 Argentina 
similarly tried to reverse the decline of the rural export sector in the early 1950s, but 
was much less successful. This was partly because the decline had been far more 
dramatic. By 1960-64 the quantity of Argentine exports was still below that achieved in 
1925-29.129 In the 1950s and early 1960s both Argentina and Australia regularly found 
themselves in balance of payments crises, but Australia removed itself from this 
situation by increasing the productivity of rural export industries.130 This allowed 
Australia to pay the costs of import substitution industrialisation. Over the twentieth 
century the contribution of the rural sector to GDP declined in both countries, but both 
continued to rely heavily on the rural sector for foreign exchange, especially Argentina. 
In 1978 Argentina depended upon the rural sector for 73% of export income, whereas 
the rural sector accounted for 47% of Australian export income.131 The dramatic 
postwar decrease in Argentina’s ability to export damaged the ability to earn foreign 
exchange and thereby constrained the potential for economic growth.  
 
The drop in export production has often been cited as the key reason for Argentina’s 
relative economic decline, but it is a proximate not a fundamental reason for divergence. 
Diaz Alejandro finds that if more favourable policies had been followed towards 
Argentina’s export sector in the postwar period, GDP in 1960-64 would have been at 
least 29% higher.132 Similarly Cavallo et al find that if Argentina had followed more 
desirable economic policies towards agriculture and elsewhere from 1930-85, levels of 
income, consumption, and investment would have been 63%, 70%, and 112% higher 
respectively.133 The decline in Argentine agricultural exports was only a proximate 
cause of postwar divergence, as the opportunities and geographic contexts for 
development in Argentina and Australia were very similar. The more fundamental 
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reason for divergence was the decline in Argentine state credibility that occurred as 
social conflict broadened, and one result of this was a large decrease in exports.  
 
IV Fiscal Institutions 
 
Differing experiences of state credibility were responsible for divergence in Argentine 
and Australian development. An important result of state credibility is fiscal institutions, 
which can be compared and contrasted over long periods of time. A primary focus of 
the research is thus a comparison of fiscal institutions. Della Paolera and Taylor observe 
that a key macroeconomic challenge for a small open economy is the construction of 
institutions and commitments that support stable fiscal and monetary policies.134 Long-
run price stability and the resulting benefits of financial markets are only possible if a 
country is successful in constructing such supporting institutions. If a small open 
economy is unsuccessful it risks volatile inflation, leading to increased financial 
instability, and banking and currency crises. Yet how does a society construct the 
institutions and commitments necessary for stable fiscal and monetary policies? Fiscal 
institutions are the basis upon which all macroeconomic institutions are built. Monetary 
institutions require solid fiscal institutions to be sustainable.135 Otherwise the primary 
role of a country’s currency will likely be as a source of seigniorage (i.e. inflation 
taxation), which will undermine the development of monetary and financial institutions. 
Fiscal institutions are the immediate and investigable result of state credibility. They are 
also a proximate cause of further macroeconomic institutional development. As such 
they are an ideal focus for the comparative investigation of state credibility. State 
credibility and ensuing fiscal institutions are the foundation upon which efficient 
institutions that engender development are built.  
 
The idea of investigating fiscal institutions is suggested in some classic works. Newton 
and Llerena were Argentines commissioned by the Buenos Aires government in the late 
nineteenth century to explore England, the US, and Australia for insights into the causes 
                                                 
134 Della Paolera, G. and A. M. Taylor (2001). Straining at the anchor : the Argentine Currency Board and 
the search for macroeconomic stability, 1880-1935. Chicago, University of Chicago Press., p.10 
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of development. They realised the importance of fiscal institutions as long ago as 1882. 
Australian fiscal institutions particularly impressed them. They note that:  
‘The fiscal revenues of all the [Australian] colonies is much greater than that of 
the Empire of Brazil, whose income doesn’t reach 100 million patacones, in 
spite of its more extensive, fertile and watered lands, and a population four times 
greater. Is the difference due to character or institutions?’ (Newton and Llerena 
1882), Vol. 6, p.350  
They identify three elements often noted in discussions of what determines 
development: factor endowments, character or culture, and institutions. A defining mark 
of success in development, even in 1882, was the achievement of lucrative fiscal 
institutions.  
 
Another classic work that suggests the importance of fiscal institutions is by Díaz 
Alejandro, who proposes that Argentina failed to make the transition to a ‘sophisticated’ 
fiscal policy in the 1930s and 1940s.136 Such a sophisticated fiscal policy would have 
better reconciled long run economic efficiency with popular income distribution. He 
identifies the later emergence of a ‘sharp conflict’ between economic efficiency and a 
fair income distribution in 1955-66, alongside the manifestation of a ‘latent civil 
war’.137 Fiscal institutions began to weaken just as the need for them to reconcile the 
goals of efficiency and income distribution became more intense. Díaz Alejandro thus 
identifies fiscal institutions (he uses the term ‘fiscal system’) as a crucial element in 
what became an increasingly problematic political economy in mid twentieth century 
Argentina. In contrast Australia appears to have achieved such a ‘sophisticated’ fiscal 
policy early in the twentieth century, which was able to reconcile efficiency and popular 
income distribution. This was the Australian ‘compromise’ or ‘settlement’, which 
became the nation building ideology in the early twentieth century.138  
 
                                                 
136 Díaz Alejandro, C. F. (1970). Essays on the economic history of the Argentine Republic. New Haven,, 
Yale University Press., p.65 
137 Ibid., p.129-132 
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Australian state building: from labourist-protectionism to globalisation. Nation, state, and the economy in 
history. A. Teichova and H. Matis. Cambridge ; New York, Cambridge University Press: xvi, 450 p., 
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Cavallo, Domenech, and Mundlak, in their comparison of Argentina with Australia and 
elsewhere, also suggest the importance of fiscal institutions in divergence. They find 
that the normal roles assigned to prices and fiscal policy were reversed in Argentina 
from Perón onwards.139 Prices were distorted to redistribute income rather than signal 
efficient resource allocation, while fiscal policy was used to influence resource 
allocation rather than be an instrument of redistribution. Díaz-Alejandro also finds that 
Perón’s first government used prices to redistribute income rather than allocate 
resources.140 Fiscal institutions are again identified as a crucial element in the 
deterioration of Argentine political economy. Cavallo, Domenech, and Mundlak find 
that the Argentine state began to follow disadvantageous economic policies from the 
1930s and 1940s, but they fail to provide explanations for why these policies were 
followed. Their counterfactual finds that factor endowments did not prevent Argentina 
from continuing along a development path similar to Australia.141 Rather, the 
institutions required for Argentina to follow a more successful development path were 
lacking.142 Yet they neglect to investigate this observation further. They demonstrate 
why the policies actually followed in Argentina were inferior to geographically viable 
alternatives, but not why Argentine institutions were unsuccessful in adopting better 
policies. A comparison of fiscal institutions should answer some of the “Whys?” left 
dangling by these classic works.  
 
Argentine and Australian fiscal and monetary institutions were similar in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. They both relied on indirect taxes on trade for 
the bulk of their fiscal revenue. Their monetary institutions were both founded upon the 
gold standard. Australian fiscal institutions became evidently more capable from World 
War I (WWI) onwards with the successful introduction of federal income taxation. 
Argentine fiscal institutions remained less developed until 1932 when federal income 
taxation was successfully introduced. An Argentine central bank was created in 1935 to 
reform both monetary and banking institutions. Yet these reforms occurred during the 
‘década infame’, a period of illegitimate government that followed the 1930 military 
                                                 
139 Cavallo, D., R. Domenech, et al. (1989). Agriculture and economic growth in Argentina, 1913-84. 
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coup. This may have robbed the reforms of a greater legitimacy they would have had 
under a more democratic setting, one that reflected greater social consensus. Greater 
political legitimacy returned with the democratic election of Perón in 1945, but he also 
represented a widening radicalisation of Argentine political economy (along with 
macroeconomic institutions). Fiscal institutions became entwined within the ‘latent civil 
war’ for power, resources and influence. As the state’s credibility declined in the 
postwar period, so did its fiscal institutions.143 Political struggle and declining 
credibility were reflected in greater budget deficits, which were increasingly financed 
by seigniorage.144 What society refused to fund the state extracted by reneging on 
money, however inefficient and damaging in the long-run. In contrast other developed 
countries, including Australia, experienced a dramatic expansion of their fiscal 
institutions in the postwar period, which was ultimately crucial to divergence.  
 
Conclusion  
 
It is now difficult to believe that Argentina and Australia were at similar levels of 
development as recently as the 1920s to 1940s. Perhaps Australian success in 
development in the postwar period has been as remarkable as Argentina’s difficulties. 
Yet Australia was not a postwar economic miracle. Rather Australia achieved a modest, 
continuous development over time. From the late nineteenth to the late twentieth 
centuries Australia lost its leading status in terms of GDP per capita, falling some way 
behind the United States and being converged upon by Europe. Perhaps Australian 
development could have been greater had more efficient means been found to more 
quickly reconcile popular but inefficient policies (such as an extensive inward 
orientated development strategy). Yet these economic compromises paid off in their 
ability to maintain social consensus. The potential costs of not maintaining social 
consensus might be measured by the extent of Argentina’s divergence. In light of 
Australia’s unspectacular postwar growth, Argentina’s divergence appears more 
spectacular. Argentine development moved from a level greater than many European 
countries for much of the first half of the twentieth century, to Latin American levels by 
the end of the twentieth century. Had Argentina continued its previous trend, it could 
well be more successful than Australia is today. The question of what role differing 
                                                 
143 Later chapters delve into this in much more detail. 
144 Díaz Alejandro, C. F. (1970). Essays on the economic history of the Argentine Republic. New Haven,, 
Yale University Press., p.134 
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institutional environments played in divergence is a pertinent question in need of an 
answer. The comparison of Argentina and Australia has not been fully explored, and a 
lasting explanation for their divergence has yet to be told.  
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The following chapter reviews the political and economic histories of Argentina and 
Australia. The first part compares state formation, describing Australian and Argentine 
institutional legacies. In order to achieve substantial development, the basic public good 
of peaceful order had to be established. Argentine and Australian histories are quite 
different in this respect. Argentina was influenced by a Spanish institutional legacy, but 
this was thoroughly reshaped through the experience of at least half a century of 
disorder and warfare. Australia began as a very long distance British penal colony, an 
experience that also reshaped the British institutional legacy. The first part is concerned 
with the consequences of state formation for state credibility, particularly the quality of 
order and institutions. The second part compares the formation of factor markets in 
labour, capital and land in order to analyse the roles played by institutions and 
geography. This chapter provides an historical review of the roles played by geography 
and institutions in development, and the consequences these left for state credibility.  
 
I Constitutional Trajectories – Quality of National Order and Development 
 
The Argentine and Australian histories of nation-state building were little alike. The 
Argentine path to consolidating a national order was long and arduous, plagued by civil 
war. A nation-state did not automatically emerge in Argentina from a colonial state.145 
The process began in 1810 with a revolution for independence and lasted for much of 
the century, ending decisively in 1880 when the nation-state was consolidated. This left 
a legacy where the achievement of order itself was highly valued, but this meant there 
was less concern for the quality of order. Uncooperative elements were to be defeated, 
not negotiated. Democracy was an afterthought, an aspiration, not a proven political 
means. Australia in contrast consolidated a national order peacefully, quickly and easily. 
The six Australian colonies emerged over the nineteenth century as semi-independent 
polities under British guidance. Serious efforts to unite them into a single nation-state 
began in 1890, culminating in the peaceful adoption of a federal constitution in 1901. 
This was a considerable achievement, as each colony was previously independent and 
self-governing, territorially proud, and conscious of potential future wealth.146 The 
Australian national state was not predestined, and the process of achieving it was 
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cooperative and democratic. The only battles were electoral, as the federal constitution 
had to be approved by referenda in each and every colony. This cooperative legacy 
provided a promising basis for the construction of future national institutions. Argentine 
and Australian state credibilities were founded upon quite different legacies of state 
formation.  
 
The achievement of national order did not mark the beginning of state credibility and 
development in Argentina and Australia, but was important to them nonetheless. In 
Argentina national state consolidation marked the beginning of a long period of more 
substantial development. In Australia the push towards national order may have been 
part of an effort to renew development, which stalled considerably from 1890. The 
ability to extract taxation increases as a state forms. If these greater resources are 
directed to public goods, especially order in the initial stages, the construction of the 
state will further consolidate and extractive powers further increase. Upon more 
substantial fiscal powers the state’s powers to issue debt and money will also increase, 
which if used to provide wider public goods will advance the state’s powers. War and 
ideology have often been crucial to the process of state formation. North & Thomas 
argue that nation-state formation in Western Europe was driven by fiscal needs created 
by warfare.147 Yet the timing of war is potentially crucial. If war occurs too early the 
process of state formation can be greatly prolonged and/or destroyed by pushing the 
state into a desperate scramble for resources that undermines credibility. If war occurs 
once the state is more established, state construction and credibility can be accelerated 
via a unifying ideology. Early Argentine nation-state formation was destroyed by war in 
the 1820s, meaning the achievement of order per se became the most fundamental 
objective. The wars emanating from the Latin American revolution of independence led 
to states of ‘blood and debt’ rather than states of ‘blood and iron’.148 Similarly Newton 
and Llerena, two Argentines observers, remark in 1882 that: ‘The majority of countries 
have debts whose capital was dissipated in the smoke of battle.’149 In contrast the World 
Wars served as almost ideal opportunities for the new Australian nation-state to 
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consolidate and strengthen credibility. The wars were expensive in terms of expenditure 
and human lives, but they were opportune to unify a new nation ideologically. Around 
this time the Australian ‘compromise’ came into being.150 Even in older nations such as 
Britain, the World Wars served as opportunities to generate a large degree of social and 
political harmony.151 The following section analyses the consequences of state 
formation for state credibility, the embedded institutional environments left by history.  
 
Argentina 
 
The first priority in the construction of Latin American nation-states was ‘order’.152 The 
focus was institutions that consolidated and legitimated central power (e.g. constitution, 
militias, opening and improvement of means of communication, and the development 
and regulation of judicial mechanisms). In Argentina this was reflected in the high 
degree of national expenditure upon the military once the genesis of a nation-state 
began to form, being almost always over half the total from 1864 to 1879.153 ‘Order’ 
was the dominant question in establishing the Argentine national state, and included the 
exclusion of anything that might obstruct ‘progress’. Only if order were achieved would 
it be possible to obtain foreign confidence, which would bring the necessary capital and 
immigrants for progress. An expression of Alberdi, the author of the Argentine national 
constitution, was ‘to govern is to populate’.154 Nothing can be done with idle lands 
without a workforce. Argentine society could not emerge from the traditional, mediocre 
level of material existence until labour and capital flowed to exploit the land, populate 
the cities, and construct the physical infrastructure that tied the stages of economic 
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development.155 ‘Progress’ and ‘order’ were thereby mutually self-reinforcing, and it 
was thought that ‘order’ preceded ‘progress’, and that both depended upon a certain 
level of state ‘presence’.156 The Argentine national constitution of 1853 was the 
normative of this conception. The distance between the utopia of ‘progress’ and the 
reality of backwardness and chaos was seen as the distance between the formal 
constitution of the ‘nation’ and the effective existence of a national state.157  
 
The definitive construction of the nation-state in 1880 achieved an order that facilitated 
a fuller engagement with global economic opportunities. Argentina experienced rapid 
economic growth upon the credibility of the new national order, initiated by large 
imports of capital and labour. This period of increased growth and development lasted 
about half a century. How did this order support such a long period of productive 
economic organisation, but later falter in the ability to maintain stability and credibility? 
Half a century should have been ample opportunity to embed the nation-state with 
greater capacity and credibility. Why was the institutional order unable to avert the 
emergence of a ‘latent civil war’ from 1930-83? To answer such questions, it is 
necessary to examine the nature of the original order established.  
 
Brief Historical Overview 
 
War with Brazil in 1826-28 crucially disrupted early state formation, as the Buenos 
Aires export sector was not yet strong enough to sustain the young state’s fiscal 
institutions, which collapsed.158 The revolution and aftermath of civil wars destroyed 
the foundations of property and social hierarchy, and divided society.159 The institutions 
and credibility of the old regime were destroyed, but legitimate new institutions were 
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not created. The former public law regime was ruined, eventually leaving an unstable 
order held by the very imperfect rule of caudillos in its wake.160  
 
At least the first four decades of Argentine independence were a constant struggle 
between states’ rights to economic self-defence and centralisation.161 From 1829-32 and 
from 1835-52, the key province of Buenos Aires was ruled by the caudillo Juan Manuel 
de Rosas.162 The order he established was highly unstable and based upon ‘quasi-law’, 
lacking a stable constitutional order.163 It was only from the early 1860s that a 
legitimate national order began to be achieved.164 Yet a major conflict remained, as 
Buenos Aires had yet to be federalised.165 This meant the emerging nation-state was 
captive to the political forces of Buenos Aires, dependent upon it for institutions and 
finances. The period from 1862 to 1880 was one of a nation-state in the making.166 A 
national monopoly of violence was not achieved until 1876. Until then the national 
Army had to coexist with provincial national guards and was not powerful enough to 
subjugate provincial autonomy.167 The last contestation of the new constitutional order 
occurred in 1880 when a rebellious Buenos Aires was defeated. This is recognised as 
the final consolidation of the Argentine nation-state.168 The city of Buenos Aires was 
then federalised as the nation’s Capital, and the provinces were prohibited from holding 
any military force.169 The conflict between Buenos Aires and the Interior provinces was 
finally internalised.170 From 1880-1890 the new oligarchial ‘conservative order’, the 
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PAN (Partido Autonomista Nacional), consolidated control over political succession.171 
It was almost the exclusive political protagonist. From 1890 the Radical party emerged, 
which held a principle of legitimacy in contradiction to that founded in 1880. 1890 
marked the start of the fight for democratisation and social reform, when the ‘order’ 
established in 1880 began to contradict the ‘progress’ it commenced.172 The rupture of 
1890 was concerned with the quality of the order established, not the need for order 
alone. The Radical party finally gained control democratically in 1916.  
 
Powerful President 
 
The Argentine national order was founded upon the ideas of Juan Bautista Alberdi. His 
book Bases y puntos de partida para la organización política de la república Argentina 
includes a constitutional draft that was widely circulated among the framers of the 
constitution.173 This constitution was the ‘prescriptive formula’ for the Argentine 
nation-state.174 Alberdi brought together contemporary legal sentiment and shaped it 
into a workable formula for a state. The constitutional framers were remarkably unified 
in their approval of Alberdi’s constitution, barely discussing the articles. Alberdi’s 
constitution blended US, Chilean, and Swiss charters into one document, and was 
approved without serious amendment.  
 
The Argentine constitution that resulted supported a powerful executive branch to 
maintain the stability of the union, and was suspicious of legislative assemblies.175 The 
President enjoyed extensive powers to rule by decree in an emergency. For Alberdi the 
President should be both the rational control of the law and the symbol of dominance 
and sovereignty. He was to materialise the central power, but without holding an 
irresponsible control over society in despotism. Yet the President was not to derive 
legitimacy from the intrinsic quality of his government, but by the superiority of his 
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post.176 The Presidency of Avellaneda (1874-80) marked an increase in executive 
power. He was the first President able to impose his successor, thereby consolidating a 
mechanism where the executive power could secure continuance.177 The emerging order 
was thus one based on the dominance of the executive. From 1880-1916 the Presidency 
(including the Vice-President) was the highest stratum of the governing class, followed 
by a lower stratum of posts in the Governor, the Minister of National Executive Power, 
the National Senator, and the National Deputy.178 The President’s power was 
augmented by a charade of democracy.179 The framers’ first priority was an effective 
government that centralised the nation’s electoral authority.180 For Alberdi the challenge 
of unifying powers and concentrating national control was more important than limiting 
and democratising government. The charade of democracy did not augur well for 
constructing state credibility, as credibility requires negotiation and compromise 
between state and society.  
 
The constitution’s preoccupation with the need to establish order meant the judiciary 
was assigned a weak and servile role, incapable of checking executive power. The 1853 
Constitution holds that the law should not be exposed to the judiciary’s subjective and 
arbitrary whims.181 The constitutional framers had little time for checks and balances on 
state authority, preferring a nation-state that was free of discretion, and holding back 
little power from the executive. The judiciary’s design to reflect the executive’s will 
meant the Supreme Court rarely held the executive to be ultra vires, usually finding that 
provincial interventions and roughshod treatment of Congress were permissible by the 
Constitution. The judiciary’s original design was evident when the Supreme Court 
supported the ultimately disastrous 1930 military coup.182 This support realised what the 
original constitutional framers had intended.  
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Oligarchy 
 
The period of 1880 to 1916 was one of oligarchial domination in accordance with the 
centralised structure inherited from Alberdi’s formula. Alberdi ruled out genuinely 
representative democracy as being too risky. The public could not be entirely trusted. 
The nation-state could not be burdened with obstacles to decisive action in case external 
or internal threats arose.  Fear of the public resonates throughout his book.183 
Nonetheless universal male suffrage was long established in Argentina, from as early as 
1821 in Buenos Aires, and was adopted by the 1853 constitution for the nation as a 
whole.184 Unlike Australia, suffrage was not qualified by income, property, or literacy. 
So how was the contradiction of distrust for democracy and elections based on universal 
male suffrage resolved? The answer was that open elections had little real power. 
Presidents and Senators were indirectly elected via an Electoral College system, within 
which political liberty was strictly reserved for responsible citizens.185 This also 
immunised the polity from potential Congressional disobedience.186 It became the basis 
for the emergence of a conservative oligarchy that ruled Argentina from 1880 to 1916. 
The Electoral College had two purposes: 1) it gave a group of chosen citizens the right 
to elect the President; and 2) it maintained a delicate equilibrium between the nation and 
the provinces.187 The oligarchy was able to control political succession by concentrating 
on the production of suffrage through fraud, firmly resisting the revolutionary 
challenges of the 1890s.188 Electoral fraud was enabled by the ability to designate the 
members of the registry commission. In the early twentieth century the traditional 
methods of electoral fraud (intimidation, violence, and double counting) were replaced 
by the business of buying votes.189 Political succession was exercised through: 1) 
excluding opposition considered dangerous to the maintenance of the regime; and 2) co-
opting the moderate opposition. Succession was not a simple bureaucratic process 
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where the named successor was put in place without criticism and obeyed orders.190 
Alberdi’s formula for the consolidation of a nation-state meant the responsibility for 
managing the fate of the people would be left in the hands of a small and privileged 
elite.191 “Governments of family” developed, in which control came to depend upon the 
relationships between certain families.192 Botana outlines a direct line of causation 
between Alberdi’s centralisation of order and the emergence of an oligarchy.  
 
Alberdi’s formula called for divisions within and between the Electoral Committees that 
would contribute to nationalising the Presidential election, resulting in two or more 
candidates and sharing different currents of opinion. In practice though, at least from 
1880 to 1910, a coalition of nine provinces formed to lend support to the victorious 
President, against which there was no effective opposition.193 This coalition was 
sufficiently powerful to control unruly provinces and did not include the most powerful 
single province of Buenos Aires, which was also the province most persistently opposed 
to the coalition. The coalition did not achieve a majority (only 42% from the 1898 
election onwards), but could rely on the indiscipline of the other provinces, resulting in 
majorities of no less than 69%.194 The oligarchy was composed of many competing 
provincial interests, but displayed a stability guided by the internal logic of the 
coalition. The combination of a centralised nation-state controlled by a coalition of 
provinces may have been the informal institution that increased the quality of order 
established in 1880. The coalition did not survive the democratic reforms that led to the 
Radical Party’s victory in 1916. The informal institutions that developed under the rule 
of the PAN, during which Argentina became a developed country, and allowed for 
compromise may not have survived the transition to democracy in 1916.  
 
Centralisation 
 
The Argentine federal system was quite centralised by the late nineteenth century.195 
The nation-state was to be a centralised federation guided by a powerful president in 
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order to maintain order, peace and instil respect for the rule of law. The Argentine 
framers thereby avoided putting extensive private rights into the Constitution.196 
Between the state’s direct public powers and individual rights, only the individual 
freedoms to worship and to private property were conceded, being considered necessary 
for development.197 The nation-state was entrusted to preserve harmony and domestic 
peace within the country as a whole. It was thereby given the power to ‘intervene’ in 
provincial affairs to defend ‘republican principles’ with little explanation of what these 
principles might mean.198 The power to intervene was widely defined as to repel 
invasions and ‘to guarantee the Republican form of Government’, a sweeping 
concession to central power in practice.199 The framers feared regional insurrection or 
outright secession, and the power came to be repeatedly used to dismantle 
uncooperative provincial governments.  
 
Table 2.1 
Use of the Federal Intervention Clause:200 
Period Number of Interventions Interventions per year 
1854-1880 (pre-PAN) 40 1.5 
1880-1916 (PAN) 40 1.1 
1916-1922 (Radicals) 20 3.3 
1922-1930 (Radicals) 14 1.75 
 
The intervention clause potentially allowed the will of the national executive to be 
imposed on the nation, allowing the Congress and the President, or the President alone, 
to remove the officers of a provincial government and hold elections for new provincial 
authorities. If applied ruthlessly and thoroughly, the clause could completely remake the 
political composition of the nation according to the federal executive will.201 
Intervention was thus a potentially powerful tool for centralisation. Intervention was 
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both a repressive and an incorporative institution under the PAN.202 It developed into an 
invaluable instrument of the oligarchy, destroying everything in the way of 
concentrating and centralising power. Intervention introduced changes or readjustments 
within the regimes of the provincial governing classes.203 Botana divides the use of 
intervention into two periods. From 1854-80 it put a legal cloak over the imposition of 
order, when there were 40 interventions in 26 years (35 by Presidential decree and 5 by 
the National Congress). From 1880-1916 it shifted from an instrument in the struggle 
for political unity to a means of conserving the regime, when there were 40 
interventions in 36 years (15 by Presidential decree and 25 by the National 
Congress).204 Intervention was a means for controlling emerging oppositions inside and 
outside the regime. Almost all 14 provinces were intervened in at least once in the 
1880-1916 period, with only one escaping any intervention (Salta). The most intervened 
group of provinces (4-6 times) included Buenos Aires.205 There is some correlation 
between the number of interventions and membership of the coalition of nine provinces 
that represented the oligarchy, as the four least intervened provinces were members of 
the coalition. From 1880-1916 intervention coupled a centralised nation-state with a 
periphery coalition. Argentina was thus a more federal and decentralised state from 
1880-1916 than before or after.  
 
Under the Partido Autonomista Nacional (PAN) from 1880-1916, intervention was used 
to introduce changes or readjustments in local groups within the party.206 It was not 
used to undermine their authority. The leaders of the PAN were careful to maintain a 
balance between the prerogatives of the Presidency, provincial governments’ autonomy, 
and the representation of provincial interests in national decisions.207 The introduction 
of fuller democracy broke both the informal institutions of the coalition and the 
moderate use of intervention. Radical presidents applied the intervention clause much 
more ruthlessly, remaking the political composition of Argentina. As can be seen in the 
table above, the number of annual interventions tripled in Yrigoyen’s first Presidency of 
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1916-22, compared to the previous period. To be fair, the Radicals could not afford to 
respect the former informal rules of the game as the provinces remained largely under 
PAN’s control after Yrigoyen’s election in 1916. This made it difficult for the Radicals 
to respect pre-existing norms of national-provincial relations, as these would have 
compelled Radical governments to accept PAN’s veto power over decisions. President 
Yrigoyen therefore altered the national-provincial equilibrium by centralising authority 
in the Presidency through the intervention clause.208 This points to serious flaws in the 
institutional legacy that encouraged instability after 1916.  
 
The Senate was meant to play a key role, part of a ‘federative solution’ to the insertion 
of the provinces into a national political system. Sovereignty was meant to be a pluralist 
fragmentation between a central power and a group of geographically local units.209 The 
Senate was an Executive Board equipped with powers over the judiciary, religious 
power, and the highest levels of the bureaucratic system.210 As both the Senate and the 
President were elected indirectly, they were encouraged to form a conservative 
collegiate. From 1880-1916 almost half of the Senate was composed of ex-Presidents 
and Governors, at 46% of Senators.211 The Senate assisted the oligarchy and sheltered it 
with the guarantee of an extensive and renewable mandate. The Senate did not fulfil the 
intended federal role. Rather than being a force for federalism and a balance against 
excessive central power, it became a conservative institution of the oligarchy.  
 
The Argentine political system created order, but did not incorporate political pluralism. 
The state could quash dissent, but could not deal with future opposition movements.212 
Any class or sector that expressed dissent was immediately painted as a threat to the 
Republic itself. The Argentine oligarchy was a system of governmental hegemony 
without established rules to guarantee the right of an opposition to passively succeed 
those in government.213 Eventually the oligarchy was worn out by an intransigent 
opposition, the Radicals, that refused to accept incorporation. By the 1930s the national 
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order was in a crisis of legitimacy, unable to respect its own internal formal controls or 
embrace the emerging popular demands for new rights.214 The inability to incorporate 
political pluralism was the Achilles heel of the Argentine institutional legacy, hindering 
the state’s ability to achieve compromise and negotiation, and overcome during the 
oligarchy of the PAN through the informal institutions of a coalition of provinces. The 
coalition moderated the overly centralised formal institutions embodied in Alberdi’s 
constitution until 1916. In the transition to democracy the coalition did not survive, and 
Argentine political economy became prone to a winner take all mentality, with little 
space for compromise. This institutional legacy meant the first democracy of 1916-30 
did not successfully check social conflict, and when democracy re-emerged again under 
Perón the populist and confrontational tone had increased. Large sections of society 
were deliberately excluded. Increasingly fractious politics made development ever more 
problematic, and the progressively more violent spiral of conflict ended in exhaustion in 
the early 1980s.  
 
Australia 
 
The construction of an Australian nation-state in 1901 consolidated and furthered a 
process that had been underway for almost a century. Taken as a whole, Australia was 
the world’s wealthiest country from the early 1870s to the early 1890s in terms of GDP 
per capita, well before federation occurred.215 Federation into a nation-state was not 
about establishing order per se, as high quality orders that could foster development had 
clearly already been achieved by the individual colonies. The continuation of such 
development became a concern in the 1890s, and future success appeared more difficult 
than in the past. The formal document of the Australian constitution does not easily 
belie the intentions of those who crafted it, the language of which is formal and perhaps 
deliberately obscure.216 The driving forces behind federation were economic issues, 
emergent nationalism, British encouragement, and defence concerns. At the time the 
most commonly cited benefits were: the advantages of removing inter-colonial 
tariff barriers; the need for a united and strong defence; and the need to keep the country 
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racially white by means of uniform immigration laws.217 The Australian colonies 
desired to construct a nation-state that could tackle such wider collective action 
problems.  
 
The greatest concern of the Australian electorate during the referenda for federation was 
likely economic growth and development. The 1890s depression may be the worst 
economic crisis Australia has ever experienced.218 By May 1893 most banks had either 
ran out of cash or closed their doors and there was widespread labour unrest.219 
Recovery in the mid 1890s faltered as severe drought set in from 1895 to 1903.220 
Federation was partly the result of Australia’s “humbling” in the face of this prolonged 
economic downturn. The parallel between federation’s success and the Australian 
colonies’ darkest economic decade suggests economic considerations played a key role. 
Academic debate over why Australia federated begins with Parker and Blainey.221 
Parker argues that Australian federation was largely due to economic reasons. 
Federation meant intercolonial union to the colonial electorates, who judged federation 
in terms of regional economic interest (not on a class nor a states’ rights 
basis).222 Blainey responds that much of the voting for federation was not determined by 
economics alone, particularly in a few significant electorates, but he does not 
successfully discard economics as an important variable. The border areas of each 
colony (except for the Riverina area) were frequently much less in favour of federation 
than regions with no obvious economic interests in federation.223 Yet Blainey does not 
consider the idea that these electorates might have feared federation for precisely 
economic reasons. They may have seen themselves as having the most to lose from 
federation, which ended their economic status as frontiers. The general trends of voting, 
at the level of each colony and between large divisions within a colony, closely 
                                                 
217 Bennett, S. C. (1975). Federation. Melbourne, Cassell Australia., p.3 
218 McLean, I. W. (1996). "Recovery from the Depression: Australia in an Argentine Mirror." 
Unpublished., p.3 
219 Martin, G. (2001). Australia, New Zealand, and federation, 1883-1901. London, Menzies Centre for 
Australian Studies, King's College, London., pp.52-60 
220 Blainey, G. (1980). A Land Half Won. Adelaide, Macmillan., pp.347,358 
221 This debate is often referred to in the literature. Parker’s original paper and Blainey’s response are in: 
Eastwood, J. J. and F. B. Smith (1967). Historical studies; selected articles, first series. [Carlton, Vic.] 
London, New York,, Melbourne University Press; Cambridge University Press.  
222 Parker, R. S. (1967). Australian Federation: the Influence of Economic Interests and Political 
Pressures. Historical studies; selected articles, first series. J. J. Eastwood and F. B. Smith. [Carlton, Vic.] 
London, New York,, Melbourne University Press; Cambridge University Press: vii, 225 p., p.164 
223 Blainey, G. Ibid.The Role of Economic Interests in Australian Federation., p.192-3 
 76
corresponded to federation’s expected economic effects.224 Thus New South Wales 
(NSW), where the economic benefits of federation were most open to debate, was the 
least pro-federal. Economic reasons were the most important single factor behind 
federation.  
 
The most obvious and direct economic advantage of federation was the removal of 
customs barriers and the creation of a single national market. Intercolonial free trade 
was entrenched in the constitution via sections 88 and 92, and is considered federation’s 
leading goal.225 Norris finds that the reaction to intercolonial free trade was the single 
largest variable in explaining the variation in referenda on federation.226  The latent 
desire for federation by the smaller colonies might be explained by their fear that NSW 
might one day become protectionist. Previous to federation the colonies had proven 
unable to coordinate tariff policies, and all attempts to agree on a uniform set of tariffs 
had broken down.227 There was an obvious need to end barriers to trade in light of the 
1890s Depression. Debate over customs union revealed a fundamental difference 
between the larger and smaller colonies.228 NSW debated whether it could afford to 
federate considering the loss of control over revenue. The smaller colonies of South 
Australia, Tasmania, and later Queensland and Western Australia debated whether they 
could afford not to federate, as being locked out of customs union could have been 
economically disastrous.  
 
The achievement of Australian federation should not be underestimated due to the lack 
of open conflict. The Australian colonies were self-contained entities, each with their 
own relationship with Great Britain, but without any formal relationships with each 
other.229 The need for common policies in response to issues that were common to all of 
the Australasian colonies had been increasingly required, and a system of intercolonial 
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conferences had somewhat successfully handled such matters prior to federation.230 It 
may not have been necessary to create a new nation-state. The formation of a nation-
state was at least partly due to good luck and timing, as well as the persistence and hard 
work of key individuals.  
 
Despite the fusion of written and unwritten constitutions in Australia, the national order 
established by the national constitution has proven remarkably successful in fostering 
stability and development. The whole has been greater than the parts, and the success of 
the Australian nation-state has likely generated greater development than would have 
otherwise been possible. For instance the new Australian nation-state enabled a unified 
national market and currency, with all their attendant benefits. By WWII the public 
good of security was very important considering the potential for Japanese invasion, and 
the Australian federal state played a fundamental role in coordinating successful 
collective action for defence. The Australian federal state also succeeded in transiting 
from more basic fiscal institutions of indirect taxation to more lucrative direct taxation. 
This underwrote the federal state’s solvency, and hence the ability to overcome large 
national collective action problems. As demands for collective action increased over the 
twentieth century, the new nation-state was able to increase credibility accordingly, and 
without the emergence of latent civil wars or major disruptions to productive activity.  
 
Brief Historical Overview 
 
Early Australian states were founded upon a somewhat exclusive aristocratic vision, 
being supported by pastoral (wool) capitalists rather than an electorate. The original 
order established by Britain in Australia was autocratic. The state was founded upon 
overt military power and ruled by a Governor who had sole executive and legislative 
authority until the 1820s.231 This began to change in 1823 with the British 
Parliamentary Act, establishing a Legislative Council and a Supreme Court with limited 
powers. The 1820s reforms rationalized, rather than liberalized, the colonial regime. 
They gave a limited public scrutiny to the Governor’s legislative procedures and 
provided some checks on his authority. With the economic transformations of the 1830s 
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new social forces emerged to propose a broader, more liberal conception.232 The 
original colony of NSW gained a larger Legislative Council in 1842, with two-thirds of 
members being elected. The colonies of NSW, Victoria, South Australia, and Tasmania 
drew up their own constitutions in 1852, which were approved by the British 
Parliament. Similar constitutions were approved for Queensland in 1859 and Western 
Australia in 1890. These constitutions provided for bicameral parliaments whose 
members were largely elected by a franchise based on varying property qualifications 
(higher for upper houses or councils, and lower for lower houses or assemblies). The 
executive power of each colony was held by a Premier and a Cabinet (or Council of 
Ministers) who were required to maintain the support of the lower house. Elections 
were held by secret ballot. The Australian colonies slowly developed democratic 
institutions over the nineteenth century based upon the British tradition, which would be 
the basis for the Australian nation-state.  
 
Decentralised Foundations 
 
The Australian nation-state began as a relatively decentralised federation in 1901, but 
evolved into a more centralised federation over the twentieth century. The written 
constitution was adopted in 1901, the result of over a decade of meetings, negotiations 
and conventions. This process represents an institutional legacy of compromise and 
negotiation. The new federal constitution attempted to establish an order where the 
inherited British Westminster system was joined to the federal model of the United 
States (whereby all undeclared powers were reserved to the individual colonies). The 
United States was seen as the best example of a working federation, enjoying a limited 
central government and a decentralized system preserving the theory of residual State 
sovereignty.233 This stands in direct and obvious contrast to the centralised goals of 
Argentina. A convention in 1891 established the foundations for Australia’s written 
constitution, where it was agreed that it: should include a bicameral parliament with 
equal representation of the colonies in a Senate; the power to initiate money bills (i.e. to 
raise taxation and spend it) would reside in a popularly elected lower house; a judiciary 
would be Australia’s final court of appeal; and the executive must possess the 
                                                 
232 Ibid., pp.83-84 
233 Norris, R. (1975). The emergent Commonwealth : Australian federation, expectations and fulfilment 
1889-1910. Carlton, Vic., Melbourne University Press., p.200 
 79
confidence of the House of Representatives.234 It was also decided that the colonies’ 
(now the States) powers would remain intact except where specifically modified by the 
federal constitution; that trade and interaction between the federated colonies would be 
absolutely free; and that authority over customs duties, military and naval defence 
would rest in the federal parliament. This clearly built upon the colonies’ British 
institutional heritage, coupling it to a US style of federation.  
 
The Australian constitutional framers generally favoured a maximum safeguard of the 
former colonies’ privileges and a minimum surrender of their powers to the new nation-
state.235 The range of powers delegated to the new federal state was severely 
constrained. The constitutional framers firmly rejected the Canadian model of 
delegating powers to the Provinces (the equivalent of the new Australian States), and 
leaving the remainder to the federal state. They did give the highly important powers of 
taxation and defence (sections 51 (ii) and (vi), 68, and 69 of the constitution) to the 
federal state, as it appeared dangerous to leave the federal state totally dependent upon a 
proportion of customs revenue alone, and the national power over defence was 
considered necessary in case of national emergency.236 These two powers soon proved 
to be the building blocks for a much stronger federal state from World War I onwards. 
For instance in the 1920s and 1930s the federal state slowly monopolised public credit, 
as well as usurping the individual States’ fiscal powers.237 The Australian Loan Council 
was established in 1928 to coordinate the borrowing of all the States, but with the 
federal state undertaking the actual borrowing. Not only did the States become 
dependent upon the federal state for the majority of their revenues in the interwar 
period, but they also became unable to borrow on their own.238 Another strengthening of 
the federal state occurred in 1933 when the Commonwealth Grants Commission was 
created. This institution considered applications for special financial assistance from the 
States, but was ultimately responsible to the federal state. Fiscal and monetary 
institutions quickly became centralised under the federal state during the extraordinary 
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experiences of the World Wars and the interwar period. The slow process of 
centralisation under the pressures of legitimate national needs probably endowed 
centralisation with greater legitimacy than in Argentina, where centralisation was 
imposed from the beginning.  
 
The federal state’s power was clearly restricted by the High Court and the Senate. The 
model taken for the High Court was the US Supreme Court, and included the doctrine 
of judicial review. The High Court was expected to function as an independent brake on 
federal power, preventing excesses.239 The Senate was intended to be a powerful body 
that acted in the interests of the States and be a house of review, but Senators aligned 
along political party lines instead, signalling the legitimacy of national power. The 
Senate provoked the sharpest debates amongst the framers, especially on the question of 
Senate power to veto proposed legislation, particularly money bills.240 The last major 
stumbling block faced by the constitutional framers was how to find a just and equitable 
distribution of the revenue. The solution agreed upon came to be known as the ‘Braddon 
Blot’, and limited the federal state’s share of customs’ revenue for the first ten years, 
obligating the federal state to return 75% of net customs revenue to the individual 
States.241 The Australian framers went through complex and lengthy negotiations over 
how power would be shared in their new federal state. In contrast the Argentine 
constitutional framers lacked dispute over the few articles they even discussed.242 A 
successful conclusion to a greater debate undoubtedly lent the Australian constitution 
greater credibility and wider acceptance, ensuring a higher quality of order.  
 
Argentine and Australian Political History Compared 
 
North, Summerhill, and Weingast propose that the quality of public order achieved by 
the state is related to the quality of economic development, especially in regards to the 
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degree of centralisation.243 In a comparison of North and South America they find that 
Brazil and Chile’s lack of success relative to the United States was due to their ‘heavily 
centralized’ states. A successful constitution is one that limits the political stakes. How 
does this hypothesis hold in the comparison of Argentina and Australia? The initial 
federal state in Australia was not heavily centralised and operated under extremely 
powerful constitutional constraints.244 It had less centralised control than the Argentine 
federal state.245 It would thus appear that the comparison of federal institutions between 
Argentina and Australia supports North, Summerhill, and Weingast’s theory to some 
extent, as after 1916 the Argentine constitution failed to limit the political stakes. The 
following comparative studies of Argentine and Australian political environments in the 
early twentieth century add further support.  
 
Moran argues that the different positions taken by the Australian Labor party and the 
Argentine Radical party between 1890 and 1930 on tariff protection and the support of 
national industry were crucial to the subsequent course of economic development and 
political integration.246 Protection gave the Australian Labor party a political centre 
around which old and new groups could be integrated. The ability for political 
integration was crucial to Australia’s productive development path, an integration that 
Argentine institutions proved incapable of. Instead of integration Argentina found itself 
on a path of ‘political revenge’.247 The lower stakes of Australian political institutions 
may have better enabled integration, whereas Argentina’s higher stakes were less 
conducive. For instance the Argentine Radical party, once in power, completely 
excluded any political opposition, preventing the political integration of the landed 
classes. The Radicals excluded the two great antagonists of Argentina’s future latent 
civil war, mass labour and landed wealth.248 In contrast the landed classes were 
successfully incorporated into Australian federal politics via the success of the Country 
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party in the 1920s, i.e. through a legitimate democratic process. Like their counterparts 
in Argentina, the main interest of the Australian landed class had always been free trade, 
but they compromised this interest for a share of political power by joining the business 
interests and the middle classes in the Nationalist party in 1923.249 The differing 
abilities of Argentine and Australian institutions to achieve negotiation and compromise 
were important effects of their institutional legacies.  
 
Duncan & Fogarty also compare Argentine and Australian domestic political culture. 
They find that the lack of a traditional loyal opposition in Argentina is particularly 
important in explaining their different development paths.250 The weakness of Argentine 
mediating institutions and the lack of institutional checks are striking features of a 
comparison with Australia.251 Argentine oppositions could not play a role as an 
alternative government due to the power of the Presidency to exclude them. Australia 
has no equivalent to the Argentine Presidency, as the Prime Minister is ultimately 
responsible to the Crown. This helped reduce Australian political stakes as State and 
federal legislatures could be dissolved according to procedural rather than political 
ends.252 In contrast Argentina’s 1853 constitution vested vast powers in the national 
executive, as oppositions and provinces had been historically prone to violence. For 
instance unsuccessful but significant attacks were made against Argentine governments 
in 1874, 1880, 1890, 1891, 1893, and 1894.253 Australia’s less centralised, lower stakes’ 
political system resulted in a far more successful party system.254 The Australian 
political system transited from factions to mass based parties in the late nineteenth 
century, lending institutional character to sectional boundaries of political identification. 
As a result an institutionalised, loyal opposition became embedded.255 Argentina’s 
centralist federal structure bestowed an exclusive flavour to politics, whereas 
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Australia’s decentralized federal structure left an inclusive flavour.256 The relatively 
exclusive nature of Argentine politics ultimately fed into development, with Argentina 
experiencing long phases of success and frustration, while Australia experienced a 
steady, if at times mediocre continuity of growth.257  
 
Gibson compares the Argentine experience of a political party system with other Latin 
American countries, reinforcing the Duncan and Fogarty point above. Strong party 
systems within Latin America historically led to stable democracy and incorporated the 
socially privileged strata of society, or conservative parties. The political integration of 
conservative parties increases their ability to influence political outcomes through the 
democratic process.258 The failure to evolve a strong party system in Argentina began 
with the transition to a regime of universal male suffrage in 1912, which was 
accompanied by a huge failure of conservative party organization.259 Regional divisions 
within Argentina’s upper social strata obstructed the development of a national 
conservative party.260 From 1912 onwards, conservative parties could only aspire to 
political power via electoral fraud, coercion, and military government. The first 
conservative coup in 1930 began a long pattern of conflict and authoritarianism that 
lasted until 1983. The incorporation of Latin American conservative parties has usually 
resulted in more stable democracies. Those Latin American countries with viable and 
competitive national conservative parties in place at the start of democratic politics 
experienced far greater stability in the twentieth century than those that did not.261 In 
Argentina the conservatives have never won a cleanly held presidential election since 
the loss to the Radicals in 1916.262 The political regime built by the Generation of 1880 
failed to build the institutional foundations of a national competitive political party 
system.263 Argentina’s overly centralised federal institutions encouraged the lack of a 
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strong party system as executive decree appeared easier than negotiation, resulting in 
eventual instability.  
 
Potter analyses the role of institutions and centralisation during the Radicals’ rule of 
1916-30. She also finds that Argentina’s political history was notable for the lack of a 
viable opposition and conservative party. Oppositions require a ‘political space’ that 
offers some hope of attaining office if democracy is to be sustainable.264 Argentine 
institutions failed to satisfy such a political space by 1930, and all opposition parties 
feared for their existence, generating the conditions for the 1930 coup. This situation 
was made possible by the centralised institutional structure. By the 1930 coup the 
institutions of national governance were weak, ineffective, and in deadlock.265 
The Radicals’ solidarity and vast majority in the House of Deputies allowed them to 
legislate at will, without concern for minorities. Most minority members of Congress 
were actively involved in the coup. The Argentine vertical distribution of power 
appeared to be a decentralised federal system from 1912-30, as each province had 
significant resources and Congress was made up of elected representatives from each 
federal unit.266 Yet this federal structure was attenuated by the President’s power of 
intervention. The Radicals’ use of intervention destroyed any possibility for cooperation 
with the conservatives, who saw their provincial power bases attacked and destroyed. 
This led the conservatives to resort to extralegal and illegal forms of political struggle. 
The 1930 coup was thus the result of a legitimacy crisis created by an increase of the 
political stakes. By 1930 the Radicals controlled all but two provincial governments, 
and there was little prospect for change.267 Potter identifies the two key institutional 
features that allowed the Radicals to concentrate and centralise power as: 1) the 
separation of powers and the fixed presidential term; and 2) the federal system and 
the power of intervention.268 Taken together they allowed a situation where the 
President could deny all political space to opposing parties or movements.  
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Conclusion to Argentine and Australian Political History 
 
Australia’s decentralised federation and constrained executive stand in clear contrast to 
Argentina. This is not to argue that more decentralised federations always work better 
than more centralised federations.269 On the contrary, the impressive centralisation of 
the Australian federal nation-state over the twentieth century may have been necessary 
for Australia’s continued success, and stands in the way of such a simplistic conclusion; 
as does the more than half century of Argentine success from 1880 onwards. 
Undoubtedly this is a major reason why North, Summerhill, and Weingast prefer to 
focus on Brazil and Chile than Argentina. Nonetheless it may have been important to 
get the order of centralisation right, building state credibility and cooperation over time, 
i.e. moving cooperatively towards a centralised federation rather than imposing one 
from the start. A slower negotiated construction should endow the resulting structure 
with deeper long run credibility. Yet the initial need to establish order per se was so 
compelling in Argentina that such issues could not be afforded. Once order and basic 
development began to be achieved, it might have been possible to return to the issues of 
compromise and negotiation. In contrast Australia could afford to negotiate the 
construction of the nation-state, lending the initial structure more credibility and depth. 
This was heightened by each and every colony having to approve the new federal state 
by democratic referenda.  
 
The Australian colonies were largely functioning democracies prior to federation. This 
was crucial to achieving the peaceful, successful transition to a credible nation-state. In 
Argentina federation was achieved after a long experience of war, with Buenos Aires’s 
ultimately successful domination of the process. The primary concern in Argentina was 
to end half a century of war and disorder. Australia built a nation-state cooperatively 
upon formerly established and legitimate colonial orders, rather than through conflict 
and exhaustion. Argentina established a nation-state earlier, in 1880, but it was a nation-
state that had yet to establish credibility through negotiation. The constructed nation-
state later proved unable to transit to a more credible and democratic order in the early 
twentieth century, partly due to the heritage of the institutional structure. The Argentine 
constitution perceived flexibility and compromise as weaknesses that might lead to 
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breakdowns in order. Australia was not so burdened. The Australian nation-state was 
the culmination of a process of negotiation, compromise and democracy. The role that 
state credibility played in the establishment of nation-states was thus quite different. In 
Australia the process of establishing a nation-state was a matter of continuing to build 
credibility, represented in the previous success of the individual colonies. In Argentina 
establishing a nation-state was integral to achieving the public good of order so that 
development and the construction of state credibility could finally begin. Argentina 
established a highly centralised federation based on an all-powerful executive that paid 
only lip service to democracy. The Australian national order evolved from a long period 
of increasingly independent and democratic individual states, which established a 
decentralised federation with an executive balanced and checked by an effective 
legislature and judiciary. The pre-existence of credible individual colonial orders meant 
the focus for establishing a national order could be its quality, rather than its 
establishment. Argentine and Australian histories were not necessarily pre-determined 
by the quality of their original national orders, as their historical paths could have 
followed a number of different evolutions. Nonetheless the original quality of 
Australia’s national order was higher, as evidenced by the ability to incorporate checks 
and balances to the executive and to further underlying democratic traditions. These 
were obstacles that remained to be overcome in the Argentine national order. 
Argentina’s latent civil war of 1930-83 could be interpreted as a consequence of later 
attempts to overcome them.  
 
Geography may have contributed to a more peaceful and decentralised federation in 
Australia, as no one province or colony monopolised international trade and customs 
revenue (then the basis of fiscal institutions) due to geographic luck. All Australian 
colonies developed their own international trade links alongside intra-colonial trade, as 
each had a seaport and hinterland. No one colony exercised a monopoly over fiscal 
resources. Argentina and Australia both had one dominant province or colony, Buenos 
Aires and New South Wales respectively, but a major factor in favour of a more 
decentralised Australian nation-state was that NSW had more even competition than 
Buenos Aires did. Buenos Aires monopolised taxation on trans-Atlantic trade and had 
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no incentive to forfeit this power.270 Buenos Aires could easily control access to the Rio 
de la Plata, whereas NSW could not easily hold the other colonies to ransom due to such 
geographic luck. New South Wales was crucial to the success of a future Australian 
nation-state, but had it chosen to opt out, a smaller nation-state may have been viable. 
Such an alternative may later have been attractive for NSW to join. This scenario was 
simply not possible in Argentina, as Buenos Aires controlled access to world markets 
and dominated customs revenue via geographic position. The Confederation’s attempt 
to federate without Buenos Aires ended in frustration and bankruptcy. There was no 
viable Argentine nation-state without Buenos Aires, giving Buenos Aires a huge 
disincentive to compromise. New South Wales neither conquered the nation-state (as 
Buenos Aires did in the early 1860s), nor was conquered by it (as Buenos Aires was in 
1880). On the other hand a national Australian market required deliberate construction 
in 1901, as Australia had several railway hubs radiating from different colonial capitals 
and ports on different gauges.271 In contrast Buenos Aires’ position as the primary 
railway hub and port made the formation of a national market relatively easy. The more 
even balance of power between the Australian colonies could also have impeded the 
formation of an Australian nation-state, as several nations were possible, and indeed 
New Zealand is a separate nation today. Geography contributed to more peaceful and 
decentralised federation, but could also have discouraged Australian federation from 
occurring as each colony had a viable and independent fiscal base. In contrast 
geography was more conducive to forcing Argentina together whether the provinces 
liked it or not. The geographic concentration of fiscal power in Buenos Aires made it 
more likely for power to be centralised there, whereas Australia could entertain more 
decentralised options. Nonetheless geography was only one factor and did not 
determine the results.  
 
II Brief Economic History of Development 
 
Institutions and geography played important roles in Argentine and Australian 
development in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.272 Similar pastoral and 
agricultural staple exports were the original basis for development in both. Argentina 
                                                 
270 Adelman, J. (1999). Republic of capital : Buenos Aires and the legal transformation of the Atlantic 
world. Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press., p.221-2 
271 Schedvin, C. B. (1990). "Staples and Regions of Pax Britannica." The Economic History Review 
43(4): 533-59., p.550 
272 See subsection two of Chapter One for a theoretical grounding of this section. 
 88
and Australia fulfilled the ‘settler economy’ model, as new European immigrant 
societies that were land rich and labour poor. Their lands were largely emptied of 
indigenous peoples to make way for projects of progress. Both developed niches in 
particular staples whose development was not a simple response to international 
demand, but also an entrepreneurial process partly shaped by local institutions. 
Development was not simply a matter of plugging into the international market, and 
required appropriate institutional environments backed by credible states. Argentina was 
better endowed than Australia in terms of the potential range and fertility of staple 
exports, which may partly explain why convergence was so rapid when it finally 
occurred. Yet it does not explain why convergence was so long delayed, or why 
divergence later occurred. The predominant role played by institutions can better 
explain both the delay in convergence and later divergence.  
 
A comparison of sheep productivity shows the inability of geography alone to explain 
divergence. Argentina was much better endowed than Australia in sheep, despite wool 
being Australia’s leading staple. In Buenos Aires province the natural carrying capacity 
was about 1.6 sheep per acre, compared to only 0.15 in Australia (0.5 after fencing).273 
Argentina’s higher carrying capacity also meant labour could be used more intensively. 
After the introduction of fencing, the ratio of sheep to one shepherd was about 1,000 in 
Australia and 2,000 in Argentina, twice as intensive.274 Partly as a result labour 
comprised about 60% of Argentine costs and 90% of Australian costs.275 The effect of 
endowments on profitability was thus substantial. Despite Australia’s absolute 
disadvantage in sheep relative to Argentina, Australia was almost singularly dependent 
upon wool as the primary staple export from the early nineteenth century until the mid 
twentieth century.276 This was largely because there were few other options. By the late 
1940s rabbit plagues ravaged the Australian sheep industry, having continually 
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decreased profitability since the late nineteenth century.277 In Argentina sheep was the 
primary staple industry for a much shorter period, from the mid to the late nineteenth 
century. Argentine factor endowments were so abundant that the sheep industry was 
merely a staple leader, enabling the rise of even more profitable staples in cattle and 
agriculture.278 Australia had less obvious endowments to turn to. As a result Australian 
institutions had to be more capable from an earlier date if development was to occur 
than Argentine institutions did. Institutions were also important in Argentina, especially 
in the need to establish public order, but more capable institutions would not become 
essential to continued development until the twentieth century.  
 
At a basic level, the achievement of public order allowed staple development. The 
stability that flowed from public order facilitated investment and more intensive staple 
development. For instance the development of Argentina’s high quality beef industry 
was not due to rich factor endowments alone. High quality beef production also 
required the rise of an entrepreneurial class to lead development. The role this class 
played can be illustrated by comparison with Uruguay, which had similar endowments 
but did not develop into a low cost, efficient producer of high quality beef as Argentina 
did.279 In 1913 Uruguay still processed almost three quarters of cattle into low quality 
hides, jerked beef, and extract, much as Argentina did in the early nineteenth century. 
The emergence of high quality beef required the emergence of a pastoral Argentine 
entrepreneurial class, much as Australia’s emergence as a leader in high quality wool 
did in the early nineteenth century. The timing of the emergence of an Argentine 
entrepreneurial class occurred shortly after the emergence of a fully consolidated and 
stable institutional order in 1880. This suggests that it was only when a stable and 
credible institutional environment emerged that an entrepreneurial class could appear 
and intensively develop the most impressive factor endowments. From the 1920s the 
further development of the Argentine cattle industry became problematic, as 
entrepreneurs became increasingly aware of their vulnerable political position; which 
coupled with resentment against the frigorificos (the meat packers) and a government 
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seen as ineffectual.280 The institutional environment that prompted the rise of an 
entrepreneurial class behind cattle and agriculture proved increasingly unable to sustain 
development as the twentieth century progressed.  
 
Another important staple in which Argentina had superior endowments was wheat. 
Wheat began to develop rapidly from the late nineteenth century, when Argentina 
became the world’s third-largest exporter.281 The fertility of land and availability of 
dependable water were far greater in Argentina than Australia, which was reflected in 
productivity. Argentina produced 12.7 bushels per acre in 1900, well above 8.6 bushels 
in Australia.282 Only with scientific development, largely sponsored by the state, could 
Australia overcome lesser factor endowments and achieve surplus exportable 
production. As a result of such institutional support, Australia converged on Argentine 
wheat yields by 1910. The Australian state strongly sponsored agricultural development 
from the 1890s in the provision of land grants, finance, transportation, and scientific 
programs.283 In contrast the Argentine state had almost no effective interest or role in 
agricultural development. The Argentine state created a Department of Agriculture in 
1872, but the budget was so miserly that little could be achieved. In 1879 the budget 
was about 9,000 pesos, which compared to a budget of 600,000 pesos for agriculture in 
the single Australian colony of Victoria.284 In 1891 the Argentine budget was still only 
9,000 pesos, when the US state spent 2 million pesos on agriculture, Germany spent 3 
million, Austria spent 4 million, and France spent 8 million. The great wealth produced 
by wheat was not seen as requiring or deserving official attention in Argentina, as the 
Department of Agriculture was one of the poorest ministries.285 The fact that Argentina 
was a leader in agriculture despite an almost complete lack of institutional support 
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attested to how wealthy its endowments were, and initial agricultural development 
required little more than stability and basic public order.  
 
Argentina diversified into a wide range of pastoral and agricultural staples from the late 
nineteenth century. Australia had a much lower rate of diversification, being more 
limited by endowments. More limited endowments meant more significant collective 
action was required for export led development in Australia. The Australian state 
became the leading investor in scientific research to overcome problems related to low 
soil fertility, persistent drought, and plagues. The federal state established the Council 
for Scientific and Industrial Research (later the CSIRO) in 1926, which led to a 
revolution in agricultural technology.286 This was preceded by significant state 
sponsored research in the individual colonies from the nineteenth century. In contrast 
Argentine public research and extension services were nonexistent until 1956, with the 
creation of the Instituto Nacional de Tecnologia Agropecuaria (INTA).287 As export led 
development fell into decline from WWI onwards, both countries sought alternative 
development paths via protectionism and import-substitution industrialisation. These 
required institutional capacity for collective action, and hence more capable institutions. 
When the international market re-emerged as an opportunity for growth after WWII, 
Argentina failed to reengage it. The export opportunity differed from that prior to WWI 
in requiring rapid growth in production and productivity, and thus much greater 
capacity for collective action. Factor endowments alone were less valuable after WWII. 
Global technological change in agriculture led to apparently declining terms of trade, 
resulting in a dramatic increase in the global supply of agricultural goods.288 Australia 
overcame the high postwar tariff barriers to agricultural exports by greatly increasing 
production.289 The emphasis in the 1950s was to grow more via state assistance in 
infrastructure, research, regulation, and subsidy.290 A similar process occurred in North 
America and Western Europe, where technological advances and improvements in rural 
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inputs accounted for the majority of rural output increases from 1940-70.291 Argentina’s 
relative lack of postwar scientific research was symptomatic of the institutional 
environment. Despite a lack of state sponsored research, Argentina should have been 
able to free ride off many foreign technological advances, but the decreasing ability of 
the institutional environment to provide order also discouraged the necessary 
investment. Postwar opportunities for development generally required more capable 
institutions, in which Argentina had little experience and success. This section broadly 
compares Argentine and Australian economic histories to analyse the roles played by 
institutions and geography in the formation of markets.  
 
National Market Construction 
 
Engagement with the international market through staple exports encouraged the 
construction of national markets, a fundamental basis for national development. The 
process was reciprocal, as engagement demanded infrastructure that facilitated the 
construction of national markets, and their construction facilitated an expansion of that 
engagement. The sheep industry was the first significant engagement with the 
international market in both countries. In Argentina it led to capital accumulation, the 
creation of land and labour markets, the spread of the sheep estancia as a capitalist 
model, and the establishment of a capitalist-landlord class.292 A similar process occurred 
earlier in Australia. Australia began to develop high quality wool from the 1810s, but 
Argentina did not until the 1850s.293 Wool only became Argentina’s leading staple 
export from the 1860s, despite profitable opportunities for sheep rearing being evident 
since the 1820s.294 The poor quality of public order was the cause of delay. Prior to the 
sheep industry, Argentina pursued the more basic and little profitable staples of cattle 
hides and jerked beef for the Brazilian slave market. Earlier development of the sheep 
industry would have been a more profitable use of resources, but required more stable 
institutions to support the necessary imports and investments in capital and labour. 
Jerked beef and hides were low value, low investment staples that required little 
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entrepreneurialism, little labour, and garnered little return.295 The sheep industry 
required more complex organisation and more demanding use of capital and labour.296 
Argentina’s late ability to pursue the more complex and valuable staple exports of the 
sheep industry coincided with the introduction of a more stable institutional order. 
Development was long delayed in Argentina by the lack of the basic necessary 
institutional environment.  
 
An important result of the development of national markets was the concurrent decrease 
in costs, facilitating further development. For instance the introduction of railways in 
Argentina in the late 1860s reduced transport costs to a twelfth of what they were under 
the former oxcart system.297 Valuable engagement with the international market and the 
formation of national markets were made possible by institutional development. State 
institutions provided the necessary stability for national market construction, and the 
development of national markets reinforced state institutions through an increase in 
fiscal resources. Only when credible state institutions had formed was it possible to 
fully take advantage of international opportunities and form national markets. In 
Australia the early colonial state directly encouraged the formation of a market 
economy by establishing a guaranteed market for agricultural goods.298 In Argentina the 
long struggle to erect credible state institutions postponed the ability to take advantage 
of opportunities for development and form national markets until the latter half of the 
nineteenth century. A brief illustration of the process, emanating from credible state 
institutions and ultimately reinforcing them, is drawn below:  
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 1) Credible State Institutions/Order         International Opportunity (e.g. wool) 
 
    Creation of Fiscal Resources                  National Market Formation 
 
The following compares the formation of national markets in labour, capital, and land to 
show some of the roles that institutions and geography played in their development.  
 
Labour market 
 
The sheep industries in both countries suffered from tight labour markets, which were 
reflected in relatively high wages. This was due to a lack of local labour and the 
industry’s labour-intensive nature prior to fencing and more intensive development. The 
industry adapted to high wages by using large flock to labour ratios, which saved on 
labour but could be detrimental to fleece quality. So a balance had to be found that was 
partly determined by underlying factor endowments (e.g. Argentina could have a larger 
flock to labour ratio due to the land’s higher carrying capacity). As the labour supply 
increased via immigration, and local capital markets and more secure property rights 
developed, it became increasingly possible to alleviate the expense of labour through 
capital investment, especially fencing. Immigration was made possible by the 
establishment of institutions that could provide a peaceful order. The wool industry’s 
demands for labour began the process of more extensive immigration into each country. 
These demands were later overwhelmed by more attractive lures such as gold in 
Australia and beef and agriculture in Argentina. Yet the sheep industry began the 
construction of labour markets.  
 
Argentine Labour Market 
 
A major complaint of Argentine sheep raisers in the 1870s and early 1880s was a 
shortage of labour.299 The formation of an Argentine labour market faced a significant 
hurdle in that a relatively high standard of living could still be obtained locally through 
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a largely subsistence lifestyle. The sheep industry had to compete with the attractions of 
an open and well stocked frontier. As a result the local labour supply was erratic and 
fairly unresponsive to demand.300 The previously predominant cattle industry (prior to 
1850) had little need for a regular labour market due to the intensive use of land, relying 
on semi-wild cattle. Yet even this primitive cattle industry had resorted to coercion to 
obtain labour.301 The state began using coercive legislation from 1815 to try and form a 
labour force, culminating in the Rural Code of 1865 that stipulated that any man without 
legal property and an established job, and without a passport or papeleta, could be 
arrested and sent to the army for a few years.302 Such legislation was eliminated in the 
1870s and 1880s. A labour market could not be formed through coercion alone, and 
would require the formation of incentives (such as high wages made possible by the 
prosperity of the wool industry) that would attract immigrants less accustomed to 
subsistence. This could only be achieved on the basis of sufficient public order.  
 
As the sheep industry began to develop from the mid-nineteenth century, the demand 
for labour greatly increased, rising by a factor of ten in thirty years.303 Not only did the 
sheep industry need more workers (both permanent and seasonal), but it also needed 
workers with skills that were unknown locally. The sheep industry’s labour demands 
could become desperate, as supply rarely met demand. The formation of a stable and 
predictable labour supply became a primary objective of the industry. Immigrants began 
to arrive in significant numbers in the mid-nineteenth century attracted by relatively 
high wages and were the main source of labour.304 Labourers initially achieved very 
favourable terms, such as becoming a business partner if they brought some capital. 
Such terms were available until the mid-1860s, and attracted many Irish, Scottish and 
Basque immigrants.305 Argentine rural wages were the highest in Latin America, eight 
to ten times more than in Chile.306 Such high wages meant a considerable proportion of 
the rural sector’s prosperity must have filtered down to the labouring class. Constant 
wars and epidemics helped maintain high wages into the early 1880s by draining the 
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labour supply.307 In the late 1880s wages decreased significantly as labour scarcity was 
relieved by: a massive increase in immigration; technical innovations that reduced the 
sheep industry’s demand for labour; the end of wars after national consolidation in 
1880; and the enforcement of property rights as law and order were established. The 
labour market was constructed between the mid nineteenth century and the 1880s, and 
was made possible by a massive increase in immigration facilitated by the achievement 
of consolidating a national order.  
 
Australian Labour Market 
 
The Australian labour market was still undeveloped at the start of the nineteenth 
century. At this time Australia, or New South Wales in particular, was a British penal 
colony and the bulk of the labour supply was assigned convict labour outside the 
market. The British state increased Australia’s convict labour supply after the 
Napoleonic wars by expanding convict transportation due to economic and social 
pressures in Britain.308 Originally the colonial state assigned each officer ten convicts, 
who were free farm labour maintained at state expense.309 Convicts were allowed 
to work overtime for wages, which was the first wage labour. In 1819 the colonial state 
determined that convict labour would be used to sponsor the pastoral industry. Convict 
labour was increasingly popular as a source of labour as the wool industry expanded in 
the 1830s, making up more than two thirds of the labour force.310 Convicts received 
only subsistence for their labour, but convict labour was not slave labour as the state 
administered convict labour on behalf of the Crown, i.e. it was not privately regulated. 
A problem encountered with convict labour was that it could not be induced by higher 
wages as free labour could.311 Thus labour productivity was probably low. On the other 
hand, convict labour was cheap and reliable. This was especially valuable in isolated 
squatting districts that would have had great difficulty attracting free labour. As one 
prominent squatter (Wentworth) pointed out, the wages of convicts were only £14 
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annually per worker, slightly less than two thirds of a free labourer.312 The gains in 
productivity from free labour may not have offset this difference. The Australian labour 
market was originally facilitated by the state and motivated by the development of the 
wool industry, which was also dependent on the provision of order.  
 
A more fully capitalist labour market began to emerge in the mid 1840s as a rural labour 
force of small farmers, landlords and tenants became established in settled and squatting 
areas.313 There were many complaints by the wool industry, as in Argentina, of labour 
shortage. Labour was the main cost of wool production. Squatters had to offer 
increasingly high wages as the pastoral frontier expanded into more remote areas. They 
faced a constant problem of securing enough shepherds, and had to offer wages high 
enough to attract new settlers away from small farming.314 Australian pastoralists also 
pursued immigration to resolve labour shortages. They offered high wages relative to 
England, and in the settled districts were also able to offer provisions for labourers to 
settle as tenants.315 Pastoralists also tried to increase the labour supply via a bounty 
system, where immigrants were privately contracted and the state paid for their 
transport out of a land fund (from land sales). The state once again played a direct role. 
This began in the latter half of the 1830s and operated erratically until the 1850s, being 
most significant in 1840 and 1841 when 6,675 and 20,103 immigrants respectively were 
brought in.316 The bounty system was justified upon the Wakefield principle that land 
should be priced in order to generate a labour force to serve the land, but was not of 
lasting significance. The widespread practice of squatting undermined the Wakefield 
principle as squatting did not involve the purchase of land.317 Prior to the 1850s 
immigration was not able to resolve the labour shortage, but the state had displayed an 
active and direct role in forming a labour market, which was seen as a public good.  
 
Convict transportation to the eastern colonies ended in 1853, shortly after the gold rush 
began. The closing of convict labour meant rural wages rose, being the highest on the 
isolated squatting frontier, and a fully free labour market finally came into being. 
Labour then became so expensive that the cost deterred further investment in the wool 
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industry.318 In the short run the 1850s gold rush worsened the labour shortage as many 
potential shepherds flocked to the gold fields instead, but in the long run the gold rush 
increased labour supply by attracting a large surge of immigration. More intensive 
capital investment in fencing also greatly reduced labour costs.319 Fencing was first 
introduced in Australia in the 1840s, greatly expanding in the 1850s. It resulted in a 
great increase in the quantity and quality of sheep, increasing the land’s carrying 
capacity by as much as 50%, helping resolve the long-running labour shortage. As a 
result of fencing, the permanent labour force became more settled, resulting in greater 
rural social stability. Convict labour may have been analogous to a state subsidy of the 
Australian wool industry in the first half of the nineteenth century. As convict labour 
came to an end with the gold rush, the wool industry could resort to more intensive 
capital investment in fencing and an increasingly large labour supply from free 
immigration. The Australian labour market developed beyond an initially subsidized 
and coerced labour supply into a fully capitalistic one based on immigration. In 
Argentina the creation of a labour market was enabled by the increasing provision of 
public order that facilitated development. In Australia the British state went a step 
further by facilitating an initial labour market via convict labour and subsidised 
immigration. Institutions played a greater role in the establishment of a labour market in 
Australia than in Argentina, but the encouragement of large-scale immigration 
ultimately generated labour markets in both countries.  
 
Capital Market Construction 
 
The expansion of staple exports entailed a growing need for capital markets. Initially 
this was due to the potentially long lag between production, sale and remittance, which 
necessitated capital markets if staple exports were to expand beyond a few wealthy 
producers. Capital markets were further encouraged as staple export industries became 
more capital intensive. For instance when the sheep industry invested in fencing, which 
expanded the capital market via loans on pastoral production.320 Fencing began in the 
1840s in Australia, but was not significant in Argentina until the 1880s.321 Capital 
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investment in more permanent brick housing on Argentine sheep estancias also 
increased in the late 1870s and early 1880s.322 The move to more capital-intensive 
development awaited the development of capital markets, which required a more stable 
institutional environment. The delay in establishing order in Argentina likely explains 
the long lag between Australia and Argentina in developing capital markets. Capital 
markets emerged in response to the demands of staple export industries, especially the 
sheep industry, but as the nineteenth century continued important differences appeared 
between Argentina and Australia. The Australian capital market developed earlier, and 
was increasingly strong and diverse, founded upon well-respected property rights. 
Argentina did not develop a similarly strong capital market, which remained relatively 
immature in comparison with Australia.  
 
Argentine Capital Market 
 
The Argentine sheep industry did not initially demand much in the way of capital 
services that could not be obtained from old merchant networks. Merchants and Buenos 
Aires’ import-export firms originally supplied credit to producers. The expansion of the 
industry in the 1840s and 1850s made increasing demands upon these primitive 
financial networks. This led to specialization as new agents dedicated to the wool trade 
emerged.323 Nonetheless a lingering problem for the industry was that capital could 
suddenly become scarce and expensive. For example speculation led to a great increase 
in interest rates in the mid-1860s, reaching 30% per annum.324 The initial development 
of the Argentine capital market was a response to the needs of the sheep industry.  
 
Banks and other specialized credit agencies first appeared in the early 1850s, becoming 
more numerous after 1870. As a result of the state’s inflationary financing, Buenos 
Aires lacked institutions of financial intermediation from 1836 (when Rosas abolished 
the sole existing bank) until 1867.325 The only bank prior to the 1850s was the Banco de 
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la Provincia de Buenos Aires.326 Originally banks were orientated towards providing 
short and occasionally medium term credit to pastoralists in the form of a line of credit, 
which was the first form of institutional credit. Lines of credit were popular with small 
pastoralists, providing an alternative to merchants and middlemen. Pastoralists obtained 
short-term lines of credit by discounting fictitious bills. Lines of credit became quasi 
long-term loans via successive renewals, but were not a secure form of long-term credit. 
They were dangerous in times of volatility as renewal was not guaranteed and interest 
rates could change. Nonetheless lines of credit were an important source of capital for 
the pastoral industry’s development. The number of ninety-day lines of credit surged 
from 1864 to 1875, continued to expand until 1880, and levelled out in 1885.327 Long-
term credit needs continued to be unmet, and was desirable to fund the industry’s 
transition to more intensive capital development and expansion. The Banco de la 
Provincia de Buenos Aires eventually provided medium term credit, which greatly 
expanded after 1860, but declined by the end of that decade. The bank was ill prepared 
for the high demand. This led to the creation of the Banco Hipotecario de la Provincia 
de Buenos Aires in 1871 to supply mortgage credit.328 This Bank began to issue 
mortgages in 1872, which were largely medium-term until 1880. It issued cédulas or 
bonds to mortgagors in lieu of cash, which could then be sold in the market. The 
emergence of such longer-term credit soon ended spectacularly in the speculative 
bubble of the late 1880s that led to the Baring Crisis. Yet most pastoralists were unable 
to take advantage of cédulas’ brief appearance.  
 
In 1883 Argentina began an attempt at a mixed specie and fiduciary regime where the 
paper peso exchanged at par with the gold peso.329 This standard was unusual in being 
very decentralised, as there was no national monetary authority, and control over note 
convertibility was left to the five banks of issue. The state took a very laissez-faire 
approach. Convertibility only lasted seventeen months, when the banks of issue refused 
to exchange gold at par for notes.330 The system’s need for good regulation was not met, 
and was worsened from 1887 with the poor regulation of the Law of National 
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Guaranteed Banks. This law led more or less directly to the Baring Crisis of 1890 by 
establishing an informal system where the Argentine state was the major beneficiary of 
bank lending, and thus had no incentive to limit lending.331 The Law of National 
Guaranteed Banks was meant to create a national banking system such as had occurred 
in the US with the National Currency Act of 1867.332 It failed because it diverged from 
the US bill in important and fundamental respects. At best the law created considerable 
new public debt to fund an ambitious financial development strategy, and at worst it 
created a highly leveraged state sponsored pyramid scheme.333 An inept institutional 
environment was an impediment to better capital markets and greater financial 
intermediation.  
 
Cédulas were an important source of pastoral capital for some large pastoralists, and 
were quoted on the stock market. They bore interest rates of 6-8% and were redeemable 
at 1-2% per annum. The bank operated as a middleman, being a debtor to those who 
held the cédulas, and a creditor to those who mortgaged their property.334 Mortgagors 
sold cédulas on the open market to obtain the investment funds for fencing, improved 
pasturage, and new land. Cédulas were a means by which Argentine pastoralists could 
attempt to match the great increase in capital investment previously undertaken by 
Australian pastoralists.335 Ultimately cédulas shielded pastoralists from bankruptcy via 
foreign creditors, who were unwittingly exposed to a change in the exchange rate 
regime when Argentina suddenly abandoned the gold standard, as cédulas were 
contracted in paper pesos. The Banco Hipotecario initially took a cautious approach to 
cédulas from 1872-80, but then began a policy of expansion. Cédulas quickly became a 
major vehicle for speculation due to the gap between real and assessed property values. 
The bursting of the cédula bubble contributed greatly to the 1890 Baring crisis, by 
which time state owned Argentine banks had sold about £34 million of cédulas largely 
to British investors.336 The formation of this bubble was greatly assisted by the Law of 
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Guaranteed Banks, which allowed banks to issue paper pesos backed by a gold reserve. 
This legislation was unmonitored and cédulas were issued without specie backing. The 
crisis was triggered by the state’s failure to maintain the commitment to the gold 
standard, revealing a gross incompetence in the institutional environment. The state 
decided to default on external debt in 1889 by paying in paper rather than gold pesos, 
but then intervened in the foreign exchange market to guarantee the value of paper 
pesos.337 The Baring Crisis, along with the collapse of Argentine financial and monetary 
institutions it entailed, were a direct result of gross institutional mismanagement.338 The 
large pastoralists who had been able to access cédulas were shielded from bankruptcy, 
but at the potential cost of the capital market’s long-run development.  
 
Considering the damage cédula speculation caused to the credibility of Argentine credit, 
they were unlikely in the collective long-term interest. More meaningful long-term 
credit began to develop in the 1890s, but remained secondary to short and medium term 
credit.339 The Argentine credit market remained strongly biased towards short and 
medium-term credit, generally favouring larger producers and merchants. The 
Argentine credit market provided the necessary flow of capital for the pastoral industry, 
but a volatile one that likely failed to provide the stability required for long-term capital 
investment. An Argentine capital market emerged to a limited extent, but was not as full 
as it might have been, which may have limited production. For example, national and 
provincial banks did not consider extending loans to Argentine wheat farmers until 
1910, helping entrench wheat farmers’ vulnerable economic position. Instead 
agricultural development relied on the credit of the country storekeeper or local 
merchant.340 The creation of a stable and efficient capital market was a key 
developmental problem in Buenos Aires.341 Low state credibility limited the 
development of a fuller capital market through the state’s relatively constant use of 
seigniorage for financing through much of the nineteenth century.342 Only from the 
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1890s did Argentina begin to credibly commit to the gold standard and prevent 
seigniorage, but this only lasted until the 1930s.  
 
The Baring Crisis was an opportunity to establish new, clear, and comprehensive 
banking regulations, but the state failed to achieve these.343 The Baring Crisis virtually 
eradicated domestic banks, which regrouped and expanded from the 1890s until 1914, 
joined by an expanding group of foreign banks.344 The major state bank in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was the Banco de la Nacion, which was the 
fiscal agent of the federal government.345 It emerged as Argentina’s most 
important commercial bank in the 1890s. From 1910 to 1930 the Banco de la Nacion’s 
share of loans increased from 28 to 45 percent.346 In short the state bank increasingly 
dominated the capital market. After the Baring crisis, strict policies were instituted to 
restrain the Banco de la Nacion. These were abandoned in 1914 with the emergency 
rediscount law. The rediscount law authorised the Banco de la Nacion to act as a lender 
of last resort, and gave the Conversion Office (which guaranteed the gold standard) the 
power to finance such lending by printing inconvertible money. Only the Banco de la 
Nacion exercised the new powers.347 After 1914 the Banco de la Nacion changed from 
being a very conservative bank to being a prop of the private banking system.348 
Between 1914 and 1927 the state bank accumulated many bad debts offloaded by the 
private banks. The Banco de la Nacion was weakly regulated, and eventually bailed out 
almost the entire financial system, destroying its balance sheet in the process. In turn the 
Banco de la Nacion was bailed out by the Conversion Office. Bad institutions drove out 
good institutions. The 1914 rediscount law provided private banks with highly 
subsidised, if not free, banking insurance. This policy choice reveals much about the 
machinations inside the Argentine corridors of power.349 Rich and powerful interests 
desperately needed cover from their risks, which included bad loans to themselves. The 
new central bank provided a major bailout of the banks in 1935 to prevent an insolvency 
crisis arising from decades of bad loans.350  
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The state was effectively captured by a narrow set of interests who provided collective 
goods to themselves at massive expense to society. After the gold standard was 
suspended in 1929 the state depreciated the exchange rate, leading to large seigniorage 
profits.351 Seigniorage profits amounted to 701 million paper pesos, but between 390 
and 553 million of these, or between 4 to 5.5 percent of GDP, were used to bail out bad 
private bank lending.352 This was a very large capture of state resources by a small 
already wealthy collective group, and considerably substantiates the popular 
contemporary lack of faith in the 1930s military regime, which was widely seen as 
corrupt. Unlike Australia, which refused to be swayed by the collective interests of 
debtors in the Baring Crisis, the Argentine state was captured by such collective 
interests and bailed out a select and wealthy few at incredible expense to society. This 
greatly damaged both state credibility and the development of the Argentine capital 
market. A better institutional environment could have resulted in a more efficient and 
productive capital market, which would have been more beneficial to development.  
 
Australian Capital Market 
 
The development of the Australian wool industry combined with the continent’s 
exceptional physical distance from world markets to foster a strong demand for a local 
capital market. The initial delay between production and receipt of payment was about 
two years, of which one year was due to transportation.353 The wool industry originally 
emerged in the absence of a capital market, which meant only the wealthiest 
entrepreneurs could participate. As these pioneers proved wool was profitable, the high 
barrier to entry posed by the two-year delay between production and receipts became 
apparent. This began to be overcome in the 1830s as colonial merchants started to 
provide capital so producers could obtain payment when their wool reached Sydney, 
reducing the delay to one year and facilitating the entry of smaller producers.354 Credit 
quickly became pervasive in the Australian wool industry, and wool bills became a 
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common form of currency, especially in the interior.355 Merchants used these for foreign 
exchange and to settle accounts with English creditors. The emergence of a basic credit 
market increased production by encouraging economies of scale, as large pastoralists 
were better able to reduce marketing expenses (such as merchant commissions and 
interest) via larger scale production.356 In the 1840s economic crisis drew attention to 
the wool industry’s dependency upon insecure forms of credit and the insufficiencies of 
the early capital market.357 The majority of producers were still unable to borrow 
directly from banks or access longer-term loans, which deterred fixed capital 
investment. Legislative efforts were made to establish more forms of credit, such as 
liens on wool and mortgages on livestock. Liens on wool formalized the practice 
between merchants and pastoral capital, providing legal security. Both liens and 
mortgages revived pastoral capital in the latter 1840s. The institutional environment 
thus supported the evolution of a better capital market. The Australian wool industry, 
much like in Argentina, originally developed without much of a capital market and 
similarly depended upon merchants for the original supply of capital, but the state 
played a more active role in fostering capital market development.  
 
Banks developed early in Australia. The first bank was the Bank of New South Wales, 
founded in 1817 by government officials and private traders.358 Governor Macquarie 
originally attempted to construct a purely government bank, but this was not approved 
by Britain. He eventually engineered the formation of the Bank of New South Wales.359 
The President of the Bank of NSW was also the Governor of NSW, but control was 
vested in a board appointed by the state. The state thus played a direct role in 
establishing a capital market. Banks multiplied after the formation of the Bank of New 
South Wales in the early nineteenth century. They raised capital in Britain and via local 
deposits, supplying pastoralists with capital indirectly by discounting merchants’ bills of 
exchange. They avoided direct loans to pastoralists as the risks were seen as too high 
when pastoral capital was not secure.360 Banks lent to merchants at lower rates than 
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merchants lent to pastoralists. As most bank directors were also merchants, this suggests 
merchant-bankers extracted some rent from pastoralists.361 From the 1820s British 
capital entered Australia via the formation of land companies for wool production; 
directly through private investment agents, joint stock companies (mortgage and trading 
companies), and especially via the three imperial banks: Bank of Australasia (1834-
1951), Union Bank (1837-1951), and Bank of South Australia (1835-92).362 This 
competition provided some constraint upon the power and rent seeking of Australian 
merchant bankers. The great pastoral boom of the 1830s was largely financed by British 
capital, funding a massive increase in squatting.363 The 1830s boom led to a great 
increase in the number of banks and transformed the banking system. From a previous 
few, small and localised banks emerged a number of large banks. The Australian 
colonial banks greatly expanded and engaged in aggressive competition for deposits, 
greatly increasing deposit interest rates and establishing deposit banking as the standard 
practice.364  
 
On the eve of the 1850s gold boom, there were eight trading banks in Australia.365 Of 
these, three were British corporations with London head offices whose local general 
managers had wide discretion due to communication distances. The British banks were 
established in the 1830s with British capital, holding their reserves in London.366  None 
of the five colonial banks had a London office, and the three British banks dominated 
foreign exchange business. The entry of British banks in the 1830s led to rapid growth 
in the Australian capital market, demonstrated by the increased quantity of loans and 
competition. The British banks were market leaders in deposit banking, compelling 
Australian banks to switch from shareholder capital to deposit banking by the mid 
1830s.367 The extension of British capital into Australia also fostered colonial state 
formation, as colonial governments were able to borrow heavily from Britain to finance 
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the infrastructure required for commercial expansion.368 The interaction and competition 
between British and Australian capital markets fostered significant development in the 
capital market. The primary interest of the local banks was financing external trade 
(especially wool) and the urban commerce largely derived from the wool trade. The 
1850s gold boom engendered another major change in the banking system, which 
greatly expanded. By the late 1850s Australia had 15 banks, and the number of branches 
had increased from 24 in 1850 to 197 in 1860.369 The spread of branches in South 
Australia, where there was no gold, showed that any developing centre would attract a 
bank branch as soon as local business could pay its costs.  
 
Unconventional financial institutions greatly expanded in the 1860s. These included 
building societies for housing, and financing companies to service the pastoral industry, 
especially improvements such as fencing and the conversion of leasehold to freehold.370 
These companies were only marginally competitive with the trading banks, but legal 
restrictions on bank lending on land meant bankers were reluctant to lend long-term. 
Most pastoralists could only offer leasehold land (not freehold) and liens on wool and 
sheep. Bankers thus preferred to lend indirectly to pastoralists through a merchant.  
 
Savings banks grew rapidly with population growth from 1850 to 1870. By 1871 there 
were nine savings banks, at least one in each colony. They largely adopted the model of 
post office savings banks, and were usually under direct government control.371 
Concurrent to the growth of savings banks was an increase in government securities, 
which were their most important investment of the savings banks. The savings banks 
offered the colonial states a steady source of funds at moderate interest rates, 
less subject to parliamentary supervision than conventional borrowing.372  
 
Mortgages on leasehold land emerged in 1847 with the final establishment of long-term 
squatting leases. This led to a slow shift from bill discounting to mortgage financing, 
encouraging longer-term investment. Yet squatters, as leaseholders, remained dependent 
on wool and stock collateral for the majority of their credit until the 1870s, when there 
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was a switch to long-term loans based on mortgages of freehold land.373 The land 
legislation of the 1860s pushed squatters into the capital market, as they sought to 
preserve their leased lands through purchase. This transition was financed by 
mortgages, which promoted a quantitative and qualitative expansion of the wool 
industry.374 The increase in capital supply enlarged the area of exploitable land, as the 
minimum necessary quality of land could be reduced through capital investment (e.g. by 
developing water resources). In effect the growth of the capital market in Australia, 
especially the ability to provide longer-term credit, helped overcome limited factor 
endowments. Capital investment also increased the wool industry’s productivity 
through fencing, washing facilities and electric shearing equipment; resulting in almost 
a tripling of the number of sheep, from 40 million in 1871 to 106 million in 1891. The 
wool yield more than tripled in the same period, from 208 million pounds to 634 million 
pounds, suggesting an even greater growth in productivity.375 The expansion of capital 
caused by the development of long-term credit in mortgages was facilitated by the 
institutional environment, and allowed a dramatic increase in development.  
 
The Australian capital market benefited from the influence of the British capital market 
and institutions. As Australia was a group of British colonies subject to British law, the 
London capital market held a clear hold over property rights within Australia. Property 
rights were not initially dependent upon the capabilities of local institutional 
environments, and could free ride off the long and highly credible achievements of the 
British state to protect property rights. The primacy of property rights within British 
institutions, especially in the financial sector, made it more likely this would be 
embedded in Australia.376 British heritage thus gave Australia an institutional 
advantage, as initial property rights were free (i.e. Australia did not have to construct a 
credible state first). Nonetheless later institutional environments were important for 
property rights to remain embedded. For instance the 1890s depression followed a 
period of heavy speculation in Australia in the 1880s, as occurred in Argentina. 
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Financial collapse took place in the early 1890s, provoked by a contraction of British 
capital.377 About £1.14 million returned from Australia to Britain between 1890 and 
1892. Nonetheless the colonial states continued to uphold British property rights and 
adhere to sterling. Local debtors were not able to avert bankruptcy through an undue 
influence in the state. As a result British finance companies inherited numerous 
foreclosed properties from local landowners forced into bankruptcy.378 A similar 
upholding of property rights in the capital market did not occur in Argentina in the 
1890s or in the 1930s. The growth of long-term credit in the Australian capital market 
led to a transformation in the structure of land ownership, and the number of pastoral 
leases held by individuals continually decreased in the latter half of the nineteenth 
century, with a corresponding increase in the number held by banks and companies.379 
The Baring Crisis accelerated this process. The development of the capital market not 
only increased production and productivity, but also facilitated a transformation in land 
ownership that legitimately reduced the economic power of a small elite, reducing the 
potential for later conflict. Australian landowners were defeated by their creditors.380 In 
contrast Argentine institutions sheltered landowners from bankruptcy during the Baring 
Crisis, preserving their relative economic power, and depriving Argentina from the 
benefits of a fuller capital market. Australian institutions fostered a fuller capital market 
than Argentine institutions.  
 
Land Market Construction 
 
Land markets emerged in Argentina and Australia over the nineteenth century, 
alongside the development of valuable staple exports that used large amounts of land. 
The success of staple exports gave the land a much greater market value than previously 
by dramatically increasing its ability to create wealth. Large landholdings prevailed in 
Argentina and Australia as a result of the original extensive production functions of 
their staple exports. Such extensive production took advantage of initially free or cheap 
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land, using scale to reduce costs. Originally it made little sense for producers to 
intensify production via labour and capital investment, when both were expensive or 
unavailable. The Argentine state had little positive influence on the development of the 
land market, as it proved unable to rent land and had difficultly even selling land. Much 
Argentine public land was simply given away. The Australian state had a much larger 
influence on the development of the land market. It shaped the land market through 
legislation, which despite a prevalence of large landholdings, ultimately resulted in the 
landed class having to share economic power. The state retained ownership of the land 
while it was brought into production, enabling the state to realise a much higher price 
when the land was later sold. The British state enforced ownership over crown lands in 
Australia, whereas the Argentine state proved unable to.381 The development of land 
markets once again shows the effects of differing institutional environments on 
development.  
 
Argentine Land Market 
 
The original foundations of the Argentine land market were laid by the state, with 
similar initial intentions as in Australia. The first law of enfiteusis was passed in 1824, 
which held that public lands could not be sold and would be leased by the state for 
twenty-year periods.382 The main objective was to prevent public lands from being 
privatised, with the state monopolising the supply of land in the public interest. It was 
also meant to be a basis for the construction of state credibility, as land was meant to 
serve as collateral for loans that would be serviced by lease revenue. Unfortunately 
enfiteusis did not provide a fiscal base as quickly as required, partly due to the eruption 
of war with Brazil in the 1820s. Had enfiteusis been successful, the Argentine national 
state might have realised a similar result as Australia, where the Australian colonial 
states shared in a greater realisation of land’s potential value.  
 
The immediate fiscal demands of war with Brazil in the 1820s combined with the 
following rule of Rosas to undermine public ownership in land. Rosas sought to 
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encourage the expansion of the primitive cattle industry which needed large 
landholdings. Under him the state opted for the immediate fiscal revenues from selling 
land.383 Nonetheless the supply of land to be privatised was such that it was well beyond 
the immediate local demand and/or ability to pay. As a result land prices were very low, 
and the state even accepted payment in cattle. It was likely that such a policy was 
continued less for fiscal reasons and more as a means to garner Rosas personal political 
patronage. His personal use of land policy to garner political support can be seen in the 
large number of boletos de premio (rights to land) that were given out, amounting to 
about 8,500 boletos representing almost 2.5 million hectares.384 These were a form of 
political currency, and many remained unused or were sold to established estancieros or 
speculators. By the end of Rosas’ regime in 1852, only 0.57 of the 2.5 million hectares 
(less than a quarter) had actually been registered. So the damage done by Rosas was 
potentially quite limited. In 1858 all the land grants made by Rosas between December 
1829 and February 1852 were annulled, except those that had received their lands due to 
participation in the wars against indigenous tribes (amounting to another 0.4 million 
hectares).385 Ultimately the direct legacy of Rosas on the privatisation of land tenure 
was about a million hectares. Considering Argentina’s arable production area of almost 
33 million hectares, this direct effect was small, about 3% of arable land.386 The key 
province of Buenos Aires was still thinly populated with many hectares of public land 
in the late 1840s.387 Enfiteusis remained an important part of land tenure in the 1850s, 
and the number of leaseholders in 1854 still exceeded landowners.388 The Argentine 
state was still not necessarily bound by history in the 1850s to a policy of land 
privatisation, but continued this policy nonetheless. War with Brazil and Rosas set a 
precedent for land privatisation, but the majority of land was privatised in the third 
quarter of the nineteenth century.  
 
The premature privatisation of land continued under successive governments. Many 
important and influential politicians in the post-Rosas period (such as Avellaneda, 
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Sarmiento, Varela and Casares) strongly believed in the need for a large public role in 
land.389 Yet land policy continued to be dictated by immediate fiscal needs, leading to 
poorly prepared and hurried land sales. The state proved incapable of managing land as 
a long-term fiscal resource. It also proved inept at properly valuing the land available to 
sell, valuing the land only on the basis of two variables: if it was within or beyond the 
frontier, and the distance from Buenos Aires.390 Undoubtedly these variables were 
chosen for administrative simplicity, as they only required a map. They did partly 
reflect the land’s value, but no attempt was made to account for soil quality or water 
resources. The state had little idea of the land it was actually selling. The state was thus 
inept at ascertaining the full value of its assets, as well as usually being a distressed 
seller. When a consolidated institutional order finally emerged after 1880, most of the 
public lands were gone. Competent, capable and credible state institutions were required 
for enfiteusis to be a viable policy that realised a fuller amount of the land’s value. As it 
turned out, the best the Argentine state could manage was to sell or give land away. At 
least the land could then be brought into production, from which fiscal resources could 
indirectly be realised through customs. The land policy first established by Rosas of 
giving public land away became the norm, as it was the least complex to manage.  
 
The expansion of the sheep industry from the 1850s caused a steady increase in land 
values.391 This led to the emergence of a land market, evidenced by the amount of land 
transference that occurred. In sixteen counties of Buenos Aires province, less than a 
fifth of the land held in 1836 was still held by the same family in 1864. From 1864 to 
1890 almost half the land in this area was transferred again. This suggests the 
emergence of a relatively open land market.392 The emergence of a land market can also 
be seen in the increase in land’s relative value, e.g. as a proportion of the start up costs 
of a typical sheep operation. In 1850 land represented only about a quarter of start up 
capital requirements, but by 1880 accounted for almost three quarters.393 It is important 
to recall that Argentine land was always employed capitalistically.394 This meant that as 
a land market emerged there should have been an eventual correction of any initial over-
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concentration or misallocation of land ownership.395 More productive agents should 
have eventually bought out the initially lucky and less capable. The evidence suggests 
this occurred, as the original distribution of land holdings was diluted over time. This 
may have been counterbalanced to some extent by land’s role as one of the few secure, 
long-term investments available.396 This was largely due to low state credibility, 
expressed in a penchant for seigniorage and resulting chronic inflation. To whatever 
extent this was the case, the non-dilution of land ownership was a result of a poor 
institutional environment. Argentina credibly committed to the gold standard from the 
1890s to the early 1930s, which meant this should not have been the case at least during 
this period.  
 
The Argentine land policy of selling land at very low prices and/or giving it away had 
repercussions on the development of the Argentine capital market. As Argentine 
landowners largely avoided the need to pay the future potential value of land, they also 
avoided the need for borrowing and the greater possibility of bankruptcy, as occurred in 
Australia in the 1890s.397 Australian landowners were forced by legislation to buy their 
lands at relatively high prices in the 1860s, after much of the land’s value had been 
realised. They were only able to buy their lands at the high prices then on offer through 
extensive borrowing on the capital market, which was able to provide long-term 
mortgages. Argentine landowners had less need to borrow asides from more intensive 
development, and the little long-term debt some large landowners held was in cédulas 
rather than in mortgages.398 These bonds were greatly devalued by the Argentine state in 
1890 when the gold standard was abandoned. As Argentine landowners were either 
little indebted, or had their debts greatly reduced by the state, the land market was not 
forced by the capital market to redistribute land to potentially more productive agents. 
The Argentine institutional environment thus helped undermine how well the land 
market allocated land to most efficient and productive uses.  
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Australian Land Market 
 
The foundations of the Australian land market were laid by the British state, in 
particular the Colonial Office. The British state began by legally stripping the land from 
the native Aborigines by claiming sovereignty over it. Initially the penal colony pursued 
a goal of economic self-sufficiency, and land grants were seen as a way of promoting 
this. Land was distributed according to class, and amounts were granted accordingly. 
The ranking of those granted land descended from the few free settlers, to officers, to 
soldiers and finally to convict-emancipists. Land policy shifted in the mid 1820s from 
the goal of trying to settle an emancipist small-farming population to supporting large 
pastoral landholdings.399 The shift in policy arose from the high demand for fresh 
pastures. Land was granted to a maximum of 1036 hectares, with an option to buy or 
rent adjacent public land. Land grants in the 1822-28 period were quadruple those of 
1788-1821, and were primarily large sheep runs that expanded the wool-growing 
frontier.400 The British state originally encouraged a land market based on class and 
self-sufficiency, and shifted to large pastoral landholdings from the 1820s.  
 
In 1831 the Colonial Office moved from land grants to selling land at fixed and 
increasing prices with the Ripon Regulations.401 These regulations attempted to price 
land high enough to promote a local labour supply by preventing labourers from 
becoming landowners too quickly. Land sales would also provide fiscal revenue and 
concentrate settlement. Over time land prices were progressively increased, from 5s 
(shillings) per acre to 12s in 1838, and to £1 in 1842, indicating the state’s legal control 
over the land. Some of the revenue from land sales was to be used to assist free 
immigration in order to increase the labour supply, somewhat offsetting the end of 
transportation.402 As has been seen, this policy was only briefly successful in the early 
1840s. The state also tried to incorporate the squatting runs, over which it originally 
lacked control. The demand by the Australian wool industry for ever-larger amounts of 
land led to the emergence of squatting. Squatting was the movement of pastoralists 
beyond the official legal boundaries and ‘squatting’ on crown lands. The ‘squatting age’ 
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began in 1829 and continued until the 1840s. Squatters initially paid nothing for the use 
of land, but it is important to point out that it was not illegal, as grazing was not 
prohibited outside the counties.403 The state simply refused to sell crown land there. The 
squatters greatly increased the value of land, the colonial states’ primary potential 
resource. The squatting expansion transformed crown lands into valuable assets, which 
ultimately remained under the control of the state. In the 1830s a Crown land 
Commission was established to regulate squatting via a licensing system. In 1847 the 
state attempted to incorporate squatting lands by transforming them into freehold, with 
an order in council that allowed squatters to pre-emptively purchase their land at £1 per 
acre.404 The squatters eventually had to be dealt with, which ultimately meant the 
privatisation of land and the construction of a land market.  
 
Land Acts were introduced in the 1860s to try and correct the concentration of land 
ownership. Their intention was to open public lands to small farmers by creating land 
markets in areas dominated by the squatters.405 The Acts were a political result of the 
1850s gold rush, as a surplus of unemployed miners agitated for land reform after the 
gold rush. The Acts allowed leased land to be purchased, and it was expected that the 
unemployed would establish family farms reducing urban unemployment. Instead 
squatters used the Land Acts to gain more secure title over the lands they had been 
leasing. The squatters also prevented reforms of the Land Acts to make them more 
favourable to smallholders through their domination of the colonial legislatures’ upper 
houses.406 The Land Acts failed to encourage the development of small farming as they 
ignored the practical means of realizing their aim (such as credit, viable markets and 
transportation). The squatters used the Acts to occupy the best lands through their better 
access to capital.407 Nonetheless the Acts forced the squatters to pay significant 
borrowed sums for their land, greatly expanding the land and capital markets. The Land 
Acts did not fulfil their original aims, serving to consolidate pastoralism and the land 
monopoly, with the possible exception of South Australia. Land policy to create land 
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markets was thus not a complete success story in Australia, but this was at least partly 
due to economic realities. Australia was ill suited to becoming a large agricultural 
producer until the twentieth century, lacking both factor endowments and large local 
markets. Had the Land Acts succeeded in transferring the land from large pastoralists to 
small farmers, it is by no means clear this would have been in the collective economic 
interest. The Land Acts were successful in that they created land markets, whose 
unintended long-term side-effect was to initially consolidate the original concentration 
of land tenure. The creation of land markets was nonetheless important for the 
development of the capital market and an ultimately more efficient long-term allocation 
of resources. These long-term benefits were a result of the institutional environments 
within which the Land Acts were enacted.  
 
The creation of land markets transformed the rural economy by making land into a 
commodity. Squatters purchased land defensively through credit, some of which was 
also used for investment in water conservation and fencing.408 The squatters’ land 
purchases on credit made them dependent on the capital market, as their land was 
collateral. Squatters purchased about 10 million hectares in the 1870s with £55 million 
of borrowed funds secured by mortgages.409 The significant fiscal revenue from land 
sales was used to service foreign debts that built the railways and other public goods. 
The creation of land markets was also the creation of a significant fiscal resource for 
much of the latter half of the nineteenth century. This was especially true in the key 
colony of New South Wales where land revenue was the primary fiscal resource. 
Victoria, the second most important colony, had to supplement land revenue with tariffs 
on manufactured imports.410 The development of railways fed the process by enlarging 
the potential land area for grazing, opening more land for sale and raising the value of 
adjacent lands. Obviously this could not go on forever. For a time the Land Acts formed 
something of a virtuous cycle by forcing pastoralists to buy land from the state; the 
revenue from which serviced debt incurred to build railroads; and these railroads opened 
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up new lands, whose sale was used to borrow more money to continue the cycle.411 The 
foundation of this cycle was the price of wool, which fell in the 1880s. Debt servicing 
then increased as a proportion of pastoralists’ costs, from 20% of production value in 
1881 to 40% in 1887. Banks and land finance firms were increasingly forced to 
foreclose, and Australian pastoralism was transformed from an individual to a corporate 
operation.412 The ability of the colonial states to exact high prices for their land (and 
thus for property rights) shows they had developed a high level of credibility. Otherwise 
neither the squatters would have been willing to buy the land, nor the banks willing to 
lend upon land as collateral. Both squatters and creditors had to believe in land and the 
property rights behind it, which was ultimately determined by state credibility. 
Australian institutions were especially important to fostering deeper land and capital 
markets and thus greater development.  
 
Conclusion to Economic History 
 
The institutional environment can clearly be seen in the impact on the development of 
markets for factors of production, especially capital and land markets. Australian 
institutions eventually guided the development of markets in land and capital to desired 
ends, enhancing state credibility and protecting property rights. This resulted in a slow 
and peaceful evolution from potentially socially divisive land concentration, to more 
efficient land use and a deeper capital market. A result of a deeper capital market is 
more entrepreneurialism can occur, as a deeper capital market reduces the need for 
those best able to produce wealth to have the luck of inheriting it. In Argentina a 
shallower capital market emerged, one less capable of redistributing land to those best 
able to produce. The Argentine institutional environment proved less competent at 
promoting deeper land and capital markets, and this should have led to less production 
than otherwise possible. On two occasions, the 1890s Baring Crisis and the Great 
Depression of the early 1930s, the Argentine state appears to have been somewhat 
captured by a narrow economic elite, decreasing state credibility and hindering the 
capital market. Argentine institutions ultimately proved incapable of maintaining their 
initial primary function of establishing and maintaining order, largely because they 
failed to continue the means of maintaining that order, i.e. fostering state credibility and 
                                                 
411 Schwartz, H. (1989). "Foreign Creditors and the Politics of Development in Australia and Argentina, 
1880-1913." International Studies Quarterly 33(3): 281-301., p.286 
412 Ibid., p.286-7 
 118
delivering development. Australian institutions could afford to be less concerned about 
order and make development their primary goal.  
 
Argentina and Australia differed significantly in the economic histories of their 
development due to a divergence in geography and institutional environments. Factor 
endowments were a relatively given item of geography that had to be worked with, or 
around. Argentine factor endowments were (and are) impressively wealthy. In general 
Argentine lands are rich, fertile, and well-watered (or with access to water). Argentine 
geography is also well suited to a relatively easy expansion of railways and roads. 
Australia in contrast is the world’s driest populated continent with some of the world’s 
poorest and oldest soils. Yet in institutions, Australia had an easier setting from which 
to construct credible institutions more conducive to development. Australian institutions 
evolved peacefully within the shelter of strong and credible British institutions. These 
evolved into very similar institutions across the Australian colonies, whose remarkable 
success is confirmed by the high early GDP per capita.413 By the late nineteenth century 
Australian GDP per capita was even higher than the mother colony of Britain. The 
Australian institutional environment proved instrumental in fostering the collective 
action necessary for development and in overcoming relatively poor endowments. The 
evolution of the Argentine institutional environment stands in stark contrast, being born 
into a vacuum of disorder resulting from sudden independence from Spain in the early 
nineteenth century. An institutional environment capable of providing order emerged 
over half a century of civil wars and disorder. The primary focus of this environment 
was the re-establishment of order, with development as a secondary goal. The 
establishment of order combined with Argentina’s outstanding factor endowments to 
carry Argentina through about half a century of rapid development, a window in which 
more capable institutions could have been constructed. Argentine factor endowments 
were so rich, and the resulting development so apparently simple, that it was not easy to 
see the need for this. An overall comparison of Argentine and Australian economic 
histories shows the preponderant influence of institutions in their long-term 
development.  
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‘In Australia, the state is not as simple as that of the Metropolis, and the Colonial State 
assumes many functions that the English State lacks. The advantages of Victoria [now a 
State of Australia, but then a British colony] all emanate from the most legitimate 
sources of taxation. … All the Australian colonies can flaunt a beautiful list of 
remunerative public works … The colony [of Victoria] could pay the entire public debt 
in one payment if it sold its remunerative public works. How many public debts could 
offer the same guarantee? The majority of countries have debts whose capital was 
dissipated in the smoke of battle. The living are condemned to pay the debts of the dead! 
Death is not a redemption!’ (Newton and Llerena 1882), Volume VIII, pp.112-115 
 
‘The budget is a law in form, … But in fact the budget is not a law. It is a programme of 
government.’ (Jèze 1923), p.52  
 
One of the certain causes of the deficit in Argentina is the insufficiency of the taxation 
system; not the only, but one of the principal causes. The national fiscal system in 
Argentina is bad; all Argentines recognise this. It lacks all the essential conditions of a 
good system of taxation. (Jèze 1923), pp.80-81 
 
‘In the most advanced nations the budget constitutes the most serious act of political 
and economic life … However in Argentina … there is increasing indifference to its 
study’ (Avellaneda 1928), pp.19-20 
 
Mr King O’Malley - ‘The people of Australia are shareholders in the Commonwealth, 
and are entitled to know how the enterprise is being operated.’ (Hansard), 1/5/1914, 
V.73, p.514 
 
[Italics and translations in quotations above are mine.] 
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This chapter begins a comparison of Argentine and Australian fiscal institutions upon 
the theoretical foundations outlined previously. A broad picture of fiscal institutions is 
painted over about a century, circa 1880 to 1980. The task is to reveal the political 
economy expressed so directly by fiscal institutions, i.e. who paid and who received. 
The answers to these questions reveal a frank and comparable expression of political 
economy over time, as fiscal institutions express actual long-term distribution policies. 
What types of public goods were achieved, and for whom? Who captured the state’s 
fiscal revenues? After a theoretical preamble the chapter is divided into four sections: a 
general historical overview of fiscal institutions; a broad comparison of state capture 
and penetration; a comparison of indirect and direct taxation; and finally an overview of 
who paid and who received. Fiscal comparison over a long period of time allows the 
identification of similarities, differences, and salient features to be investigated further.  
 
Preamble on the Importance of Public Goods to Development 
 
State credibility is a determining factor in a society’s ability to develop; at least to the 
extent that development depends on collective action. This is a logical deduction if state 
credibility is necessary to enable lucrative fiscal institutions, the resources from which 
are necessary for collective action, and collective action is necessary for development. 
Little economic growth occurred before state formation, and what did occur was likely 
due to the success of groups to act collectively and achieve sufficient public order. As 
Hobbes observes: ‘during the time men live without a common power to keep them all 
in awe, they are in that condition which is called war; … In such condition there is no 
place for industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain.’414 State credibility is largely 
derived from a state’s will and ability to provide public goods. Public goods should 
enhance positive externalities (e.g. security) and minimise negative externalities (e.g. 
pollution). They are widely defined as goods and services provided via the state that 
address collective action problems, often being entwined with issues of natural 
monopoly. Some concrete examples are railways, roads, education, and utilities, but less 
tangible examples are order, property rights, free markets, and a stable national 
currency. Public goods are typically fundamental to development. The state can provide 
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such goods and services directly, but developed states increasingly provide them 
through (likely more efficient) regulation of the market. Whether provided directly or 
indirectly, states require credibility to provide public goods efficiently. States without 
credibility will be little able to prevent the natural monopolies of many public goods 
from being captured by small rent-seeking groups who can potentially reduce their 
benefits to less than nothing.  
 
One way of depicting the links between the state, fiscal institutions, credibility, and 
public goods is to view the state as a firm. In this view the state provides society (its 
taxpayers/shareholders/citizens) with public goods in return for taxation. This was a 
view taken by a number of Australian politicians in the early twentieth century, well 
illustrated by Mr King O’Malley’s statement above that Australians are ‘shareholders in 
the Commonwealth.’415 The state usually monopolises the broadest potential field for 
collective action, holding a unique capability to overcome the problem of collective 
action as many public goods are natural monopolies. Yet the state as a firm view is 
limited by who controls the state. Olson illustrates this succinctly: the Hobessian 
anarchy of ‘roving bandits’ destroys all incentives to invest and produce; ‘stationary 
bandits’ or dictators are an improvement as they begin to provide public goods, 
particularly peaceful order; and democracy best engenders development by increasing 
the incentives to invest and produce via greater public goods provision.416 In a similar 
vein Grossman observes: ‘If for the state to act as if it were an agent of its citizens is 
necessary and sufficient for the incumbent ruling elite to have a high survival 
probability, then characterizing the state as an agent of its citizens provides a useful “as 
if” framework for positive analysis of economic policy.’417 This ceases to be true if the 
ruling elite’s survival probability is unavoidably low, or high and largely independent of 
the state’s policies. In either extreme the state maximizes the ruling elite’s wealth. Thus 
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for the state as a firm view to be useful, there is an implicit assumption that control of 
the state significantly depends upon the support of substantial segments of society. The 
state as a firm view means the state must provide society with a return on taxation if 
fiscal institutions are to become or remain a substantial resource. If the state provides a 
high level of desired public goods, it can achieve something of a virtuous cycle as many 
public goods foster the development ultimately necessary to expand both the tax base 
and state credibility. Taxpayers are likely to recognise the return on taxation implied by 
development through greater cooperation.  
 
What determines a state’s credibility? There is a strong interrelation between a state’s 
credibility, the strength of its fiscal institutions, and the ability to provide public goods. 
At first glance the reasoning is rather circular. If the state is never given the credibility 
and financing that flows from it, public goods will remain outside the state’s 
capabilities. As the provision of public goods ultimately underlies the state’s credibility, 
a possibly permanent vicious cycle of a lack of credibility and a lack of public goods 
could be entered. The existence of many developed and credible states that provide a 
high level of public goods shows that such a vicious cycle can either be escaped and/or 
avoided. Yet it may explain why, once a vicious cycle is entered into, it is difficult for a 
state to escape and gain sufficient credibility to enter a positive cycle of high credibility 
and high public goods provision. Such cycles are akin to path dependencies but are open 
to change (for better and for worse) via historical opportunities.  
 
In one sense the state always provides goods for somebody. It would have no reason to 
exist otherwise. The question is: What type of goods and for whom? A distinction can 
be made between public and collective goods. Collective goods are provided for 
powerful groups within society, whereas public goods are provided for society in 
general. The same good can be a collective good in one society and a public good in 
another. For instance property rights might be accessible only to members of powerful 
groups in one society, making them a collective good. Where property rights are widely 
accessible, they are public goods. De Soto observes from numerous investigations of the 
developing world that extralegality is normal outside the developed world, and legality 
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‘is marginal’.418 Property rights are often a collective good in the developing world. 
Collective goods provided on behalf of powerful groups do not usually coincide with 
society’s wider interests, as they are more often rent seeking than productive. All states 
typically provide a mix of public and collective goods. States lacking credibility 
typically provide little if any public goods, whereas credible states provide a significant 
level of public goods. Path dependency may explain the somewhat self-sustaining 
nature of the balances achieved.  
 
Fiscal institutions in themselves do not determine whether a significant and sufficient 
level of public goods will be achieved, but they do determine the state’s solvency and 
potential to deliver public goods. They are highly valuable and potent sources of 
distributive power. As a result powerful groups seek to capture and control them. The 
long-term policies followed by fiscal institutions, and the resulting level of public 
goods, are a measurement of the underlying will of a society’s powerful groups. 
Societal distribution is not an accidental process, at least over the long term. Groups 
determine distribution via political power and influence over institutions.419 An 
historical problem may be that the powerful groups involved did not clearly outline their 
distributive goals. Indeed there is usually an incentive to conceal and distort such 
intentions. The self-declared historical record of distribution may be misleading, but 
actions speak louder than words. The long-term distributions that resulted must have 
been to some degree intentional, or at least they became so as the groups they benefited 
gained power. The long-term distributive results of fiscal institutions have historical 
meaning. Chaos theory may also help explain why long periods of stability can be 
followed by periods of sudden and dramatic change, i.e. path dependencies are not 
necessarily permanent.420 Of course history can never be a complete break with the past. 
It appears logical that the equilibrium of a low and insufficient level of public goods, 
and a relatively high level of collective goods, is more likely than the opposite, as it 
encounters a much smaller collective action problem. It is worth recalling that the 
modern developed state, with its high level of public goods and credibility, is a recent 
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and possibly fragile invention. It is not the historical norm. A state’s credibility 
determines both fiscal institutions and the ability to provide public goods. In a state 
captured by powerful groups pursuing collective goods at society’s expense, the flow 
from financing the state will be pilfered, and the state’s credibility will either remain 
low or decline. This negative more probable path dependency is illustrated below:  
 
High level of Collective Goods/Insufficient Public Goods      Credibility        Finance 
 
(Ability to provide Public Goods cut off)                  Unrepresentative Power Groups 
 
If on the other hand society has faith in the state’s will and ability to provide public 
goods, resulting in a more significant level of public goods, state credibility and 
society’s willingness to finance the state will increase, and the state will become 
increasingly able to provide public goods (further increasing or maintaining credibility). 
This positive path dependency is illustrated below:  
 
         Significant Level of Public Goods               Credibility                Finance 
 
                                           Ability to Provide Public Goods 
 
How do Argentina and Australia compare in light of the theoretical links between state 
credibility, fiscal institutions, and public goods provision? What were their path 
dependencies? This chapter begins such a comparison.  
 
I Brief Historical Overview of Fiscal Institutions 
 
The phenomenon of a large state providing extensive public goods is quite a recent 
phenomenon, mainly due to an historical paucity of fiscal institutions. In the Europe of 
1815 only Britain had emerged as a ‘fiscal’ state, i.e. a state that had developed fiscal 
institutions to the point where it could borrow credibly.421 Fiscal institutional history, to 
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an important extent, is recent history. In much of the developed world today, states 
simply did not have the fiscal institutions necessary to provide significant levels of 
public goods before the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.  
 
A starting point for comparing Argentine and Australian fiscal history emerges from the 
mid nineteenth century. In the case of Australia, Britain surrendered virtually all fiscal 
authority in 1855 with the transfer of title in Crown lands to the colonial governments. 
By this time the transportation of convicts had ended and British subsidies had largely 
been withdrawn.422 The Australian colonies had little to gain fiscally from Britain as the 
gold rush gained momentum in the 1850s, and Australian fiscal institutions became 
increasingly independent. Argentina in contrast gained clear independence from Spain 
in the early nineteenth century, but then struggled to form a coherent state capable of 
providing order for another half century. It was not until the 1860s that a clear set of 
national economic institutions began to emerge, consolidating in 1880.423 Until the 
1860s Argentine state structures were weak at all levels; a good bureaucracy was 
secondary to a good army; and fiscal policy amounted to little more than inflation 
taxation.424 It was only from the 1860s that Argentine fiscal institutions could begin to 
switch from constant civil war to nation building. A relevant comparison of Australian 
and Argentine fiscal institutions can thus begin from the 1860s, and more certainly from 
1880.  
 
The suggested end point of the comparison is within the latter half of the twentieth 
century. As will be seen, Argentine and Australian fiscal institutions began a clear 
process of divergence from World War Two (WWII) onwards. This matches their 
                                                 
422 Obviously this ignores the minor case of Western Australia, which changed from a free to a penal 
colony in 1850, and ended convict transportation by 1868. Butlin, N. G. (1985). What a way to run an 
empire, fiscally. Working papers in economic history ; no.55. Canberra, Australian National University: 
68., p.19, 25 
423 Both Botana and Oszlak identify 1880 as the crucial date: Botana, N. R. (1994). El orden conservador : 
la política argentina entre 1880 y 1916. Buenos Aires, Editorial Sudamericana., p. 9-11; Oszlak, O., A. 
Fontana, et al. (1982). La formación del estado argentino. Buenos Aires, Republica Argentina, Editorial 
de Belgrano., p.106 
424 Della Paolera, G. and A. M. Taylor (2001). Straining at the anchor : the Argentine Currency Board and 
the search for macroeconomic stability, 1880-1935. Chicago, University of Chicago Press., p.12-15. See 
also: Irigoin, M. A. (2003). Macroeconomic aspects of Spanish American Independence: The effects of 
fiscal and currency fragmentation, 1800s-1850s. The 63rd Annual Meeting of Economic History 
Association, Nashville, Tennessee.; Irigoin, M. A. (2000). "Finance, Politics and Economics in Buenos 
Aires, 1820s-1860s: The Political Economy of Currency Stabilisation."; & Amaral, S. (1998). The rise of 
capitalism on the pampas : the estancias of Buenos Aires, 1785-1870. Cambridge, UK ; New York, 
Cambridge University Press. 
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timing of divergence in development. A potential problem for comparison emerges 
from the 1960/70s when Australia began to develop substantial mineral resources. This 
does not change the basic argument because it is an example of better institutions 
leading to enhanced factor endowments, as Argentina’s relative lack of a mining sector 
is not likely due to a lack of mineral resources.425 Rather it has been a missed 
opportunity. For instance only 3% of Argentine territory (whose Andean cordillera lies 
parallel to Chile’s) has been explored in any depth, whereas about 80% of Chilean 
territory has been explored.426 As a result Chile side of the Andes has large proven 
mineral resources and the Argentine side does not. Nonetheless the last quarter of the 
twentieth century emerges as a rough ending point, as Argentine and Australian fiscal 
institutions and development no longer had much in common.  
 
Argentina 
 
The early foundation of Argentine fiscal institutions, especially outside Buenos Aires, 
was the alcabala. In practice this was a tax on the entry and exit of merchandise. It 
resulted in very high prices, contraband, and multiple protests and conflicts. Initially the 
alcabala was likely an efficient tax, prior to the development of agriculture and while 
the ranching industry was difficult to evaluate and tax.427 In time the alcabala came to 
restrict the formation of a national market and national development by significantly 
increasing the costs of trade.  
 
A major difficulty of Argentine national political consolidation was the relative fiscal 
weight of Buenos Aires. Buenos Aires’ fiscal resources greatly outweighed those of the 
other provinces due to the luck of geographic circumstance, as the physical location of 
Buenos Aires gave easy control over the main ports and their duties. This meant the 
total of all other provinces’ fiscal revenues did not match that of Buenos Aires. The 
                                                 
425 There is also the resource-curse argument to consider, as resource booms are only beneficial to 
development in states with reasonably good institutions. See: Mehlum, H., K. Moene, et al. (2006). 
"Institutions and the Resource Curse." The Economic Journal 116(508): 1-20. See also discussion in 
Chapter One. 
426 These figures are from an interview in January 2005 with Carlos Saravia Frías, the Argentine 
Undersecretary of Mining in Fernando de la Rúa’s government from 1999-2001. 
427 Cortés Conde, R. and G. T. McCandless (2001). Argentina: From Colony to Nation - Fiscal and 
Monetary Experience of the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries. Transferring wealth and power from 
the old to the new world : monetary and fiscal institutions in the 17th through the 19th century. M. D. 
Bordo and R. Cortés Conde. Cambridge, UK ; New York, Cambridge University Press: x, 482 p., pp.380-
387 
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Constitution of 1853 and the Pact of San Nicólas (1853-61) introduced fundamental 
reforms in the nation’s finances, and were essential in making the Argentine nation-state 
a viable project.428 The Pact converted the Buenos Aires customs house into national 
property and abolished the alcabalas. These reforms were delayed until 1862 by the 
rebellion of Buenos Aires.429 Experience quickly proved that only the revenue of the 
Buenos Aires’ Customs House was capable of providing a solid enough base for 
financing national government.  
 
Table 3.1 
War Expenditure of the first three national Argentine administrations: 
Presidency % of Income % of Expenditure 
Mitre, 1860-68 70 58 
Sarmiento, 1869-74 55 38 
Avellaneda, 1875-80 53 42 
(Cortés Conde and McCandless 2001), p.397 
 
Nonetheless consolidation was an ongoing process, one that was not complete until 
1880. The lack of final consolidation in the institutional environment by the early 1860s 
can be seen in heavy ongoing war expenditures. War continued to be the dominant 
expenditure of the new federal state, and it was not until the post 1880 period that these 
could be brought down to a more reasonable level.430 The first national administrations 
were constrained by the sheer expense of attempting to establish order, along with 
settling debt from previous wars. As Newton and Llerena observe in 1882: ‘The 
majority of countries have debts whose capital was dissipated in the smoke of battle. 
The living are condemned to pay the debts of the dead! Death is not a redemption!’431 
Newton and Llerena were Argentines who were amazed by the ability of the Australian 
colonies to use public credit for the provision of public goods, as in their Argentine 
experience public credit had only been a tool for waging war. The difficulties of 
                                                 
428 Ibid., pp.392-397; Oszlak, O., A. Fontana, et al. (1982). La formación del estado argentino. Buenos 
Aires, Republica Argentina, Editorial de Belgrano., pp.71-84. See also Halperín Donghi, T. (1982). 
Guerra y finanzas en los orígenes del estado argentino (1791-1850). Buenos Aires, República Argentina, 
Editorial de Belgrano. 
429 See Chapter Two for greater detail. 
430 For further detail see Section IV under ‘Who Received?’. 
431 Newton, R. and J. Llerena (1882). Viajes y Estudios de la Comisión Argentina sobre la Agricultura, 
Ganadería, Organización y Economía Rural en Inglaterra, Estados-Unidos y Australia., Comisionados por 
el Exmo. Gobierno de Buenos Aires., Vol. VIII, pp.112-5 
 129
achieving national consolidation and order made it hard to build the new nation-state’s 
credibility and fiscal institutions. Only when the initial public good of peaceful order 
was achieved could the state afford to provide greater public goods and begin to build 
credibility.432  
 
An early and unfortunate feature of Argentine fiscal institutions was a persistent 
recourse to seigniorage as a fiscal resource, or inflation taxation, which often 
undermined Argentine state credibility. It emerged as early as 1826 as the primary 
means for financing fiscal deficits in Buenos Aires.433 Inflation taxation was both cause 
and effect of a lack of state credibility from the early nineteenth century, and was not 
fully extinguished as a fiscal resource until the early 1890s, in the aftermath of the 
Baring Crisis. The Baring Crisis was sparked by a sudden change in the Argentine fiscal 
regime in 1889, when the state effectively defaulted on its debt by paying part of the 
gold denominated debt with paper pesos. Paolera and Taylor find it difficult to find any 
economic rationale for this decision, and that the state acted irrationally.434 The Baring 
Crisis was a watershed for Argentine fiscal institutions, and over the following half 
century Argentina maintained orthodox fiscal policies of budget balance as part of an 
adherence to the gold standard.435 This period inspired the title of Della Paolera & 
Taylor’s book Straining at the Anchor, to describe the end of seigniorage as a fiscal 
resource. This was also the period when Argentina converged upon the then developed 
world. Seigniorage re-emerged as a fiscal resource in the 1940s, enabled by the end of 
the gold standard and institutional changes in the 1930s.  
 
Argentine fiscal institutions remained relatively undeveloped in the early twentieth 
century, despite the end of seigniorage as a fiscal institution and a long period of 
considerable economic development. They were little developed for the level of 
progress that Argentina had achieved economically, as Jèze observes in 1923 near the 
                                                 
432 The difficulties of establishing a peaceful national order can be seen in the ongoing post-Iraq war 
situation. The US, with seemingly unlimited resources, may still not succeed in establishing a peaceful 
national order there after many years of effort and vast expenditure. 
433 Irigoin, M. A. (2003). Macroeconomic aspects of Spanish American Independence: The effects of 
fiscal and currency fragmentation, 1800s-1850s. The 63rd Annual Meeting of Economic History 
Association, Nashville, Tennessee., p.25-6 See also Amaral, S. (1988). "El descubrimiento de la 
financiación inflacionaria. Buenos Aires, 1790-1830." Investigaciones y Ensayos 37: 379-418. 
434 Della Paolera, G. and A. M. Taylor (2001). Straining at the anchor : the Argentine Currency Board and 
the search for macroeconomic stability, 1880-1935. Chicago, University of Chicago Press., p.90, 94 
435 Ibid., pp.193-195 
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peak of convergence: ‘the [Argentine] Republic does not have finances that reflect its 
national economy. There is a profound and radical opposition and contrast between 
Argentina’s economic “prosperity” and the chaos of its public finances.’436 The 
Argentine state had yet to realise that ‘the budget … is a programme of government.’437 
As a result Argentine fiscal institutions were feeble, which was the principal cause of 
persistent budget deficits. Jèze sums up: ‘The national fiscal system in Argentina is bad 
… It lacks all the essential conditions of a good system of taxation.’438 Avellaneda also 
observes in 1928 that ‘In the most advanced nations the budget constitutes the most 
serious act of political and economic life … However in Argentina … there is 
increasing indifference to its study.’439 In the early twentieth century Argentine public 
finances marched ‘to the randomness of events, without calculations or precautions for 
the future.’440 Fiscal revenues were largely secured from excise taxes that fell mainly on 
urban consumers.441 Argentine fiscal institutions remained almost entirely dependent 
upon regressive indirect taxation until the early 1930s, when they began to develop a 
more sophisticated and lucrative base on the basis of income taxation (introduced in 
1932).442 There was then a rapid shift from a dependence upon regressive indirect 
taxation to more progressive direct taxation. Rock calls the period between 1930 and 
1946 a ‘fiscal revolution’.443 This revolution ultimately proved unsustainable and 
Argentine fiscal institutions moved in the opposite direction in the postwar period.  
 
Australia 
 
Contrary to what might be argued from a deterministic point of view, Australian fiscal 
history is not simply a continuation of seemingly “superior” British institutions. Its 
fiscal institutions are also a product of a unique history. British fiscal control was loose 
                                                 
436 Jèze, G. (1923). Las Finanzas Públicas de la Republica Argentina, La Facultad de Ciencias 
Económicas de la Universidad de Buenos Aires y en el Instituto Popular de Conferencias de "La Prensa" 
bajo los auspicios del Instituto de la Universidad de París en Buenos Aires., p.19 
437 Ibid., p.52 
438 Ibid., pp.80-1 
439 Avellaneda, N. A. s. o. P. N. A., 1874-80) (1928). Discurso de Presentación por el Académico Doctor 
Pedro Olaechea y Alcorta. Conferencia de Nuevo Académico Doctor Nicolas A Avellaneda en el acto de 
su recepción, Buenos Aires, Academia Nacional de Ciencias Económicas., pp.19-20 
440 Mexía, E. R. (1913). Un Plan de Obras Públicas y de Finanzas. Buenos Aires, Librería Nacional., 
p.170 
441 Rock, D. (1975). Politics in Argentina, 1890-1930 : the rise and fall of radicalism. Cambridge, Eng., 
Cambridge University Press., p.4 
442 See Chapter Five for greater detail. 
443 Rock, D. (1987). Argentina, 1516-1987 : from Spanish colonization to Alfonsín. Berkeley, University 
of California Press., p.222 
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from the beginning. Britain never established firm fiscal control in Australia, and it is 
highly unlikely that the British Treasury or Parliament ever knew what the rate of return 
was for establishing the colony of NSW.444 Despite the establishment of the colony of 
NSW in 1788, it was not until 1819 that the British Parliament finally legalised taxation 
in NSW. This was almost twenty years after such taxes had actually been introduced.445 
Nonetheless Australia did not face the obstacles that Argentina did in having to develop 
both state credibility and fiscal institutions largely from scratch in an atmosphere of 
civil war and disorder. British institutions played an important role in the examples they 
set (e.g. the establishment of income taxation over the first half of the nineteenth 
century), and were clear and obvious role models for Australian institutions. Yet it 
would be a mistake to see the success of Australian institutions as being determined 
simply by their British inheritance. Australian fiscal institutions developed within an 
environment quite different to Britain.  
 
As a convict colony, Australia initially lacked a taxation base as the state appropriated 
all production, controlled all imports, and gave all needed supplies to soldiers and 
prisoners. Taxable wealth did not begin to appear until the end of the eighteenth 
century. The first tax was a Gaol Fund to finance a new prison, as the former one had 
burned down. When voluntary contributions proved insufficient the Governor resorted 
to an import tax (largely on alcohol).446 Shortly afterwards an Orphan Fund was 
introduced, also heavily reliant on taxing alcohol, to fund an orphanage for the colony’s 
many abandoned children. These temporary taxes long outlasted their original purposes; 
the Gaol Fund was converted into the Police Fund and the Orphan Fund into a fund for 
education and relief.447 The first Australian taxes were indirect funds explicitly 
earmarked for the provision of specific goods but quickly evolved into taxes for more 
general public goods (i.e. from the construction of a prison to law and order, and from 
building an orphanage to education and relief). The first Australian taxes quickly 
became explicitly limited to the provision of basic public goods. Indirect taxation in 
customs and excises continued to expand and was the predominant source of taxation 
                                                 
444 Butlin, N. G. (1985). What a way to run an empire, fiscally. Working papers in economic history ; 
no.55. Canberra, Australian National University: 68., pp. 3, 8, 39-41 
445 Smith, J. (1993). Taxing Popularity - The Story of Taxation in Australia. Canberra, Federalism 
Research Centre, The Australian National University., p.2 
446 Ibid., p.3 
447 Ibid., see endnote on p.12 
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until at least World War I (WWI). Such taxation was largely regressive in nature, with 
much of the burden borne by the workers’ pleasures of alcohol and tobacco.448  
 
Australian fiscal institutions underwent a crucial period of change in the first half of the 
twentieth century, moving from indirect and regressive taxation to direct and 
progressive taxation, better capable of delivering greater revenue more equitably and 
elastically. Important innovations were made in Australian fiscal institutions in the 
1930s, which moved the long run revenue base away from indirect taxation on trade to 
direct taxation of income.449 The change that occurred in Australian fiscal institutions 
during the interwar period can be seen in the different ways the two World Wars were 
financed. World War I was financed primarily through debt, which increased the tax 
burden indirectly. World War II (WWII) was much more dependent on taxation and an 
increase in federal taxation powers.450 The 1930s Depression led to a widespread 
recognition in Australia that market forces alone had failed to correct themselves, an 
attitude that was maintained into the postwar period.451 Australian fiscal institutions also 
became increasingly centralised over the first half of the twentieth century. Federation 
in 1901 meant the individual colonies (now States) lost their powers of taxation over 
customs and excise, the most significant sources of revenue. This trend of fiscal 
centralisation continued when the states also lost their ability to raise income taxation 
from 1943.452  
 
The shift from indirect to direct taxation succeeded and expanded via the ideology of 
nationalism and national emergency represented by the World Wars, and the traumatic 
experience of the Great Depression. These events were manipulated to justify the 
concurrent shift in fiscal institutions. Australia had both a traumatic experience of the 
Great Depression, as well as direct and large participations in the World Wars. The 
World Wars provided a particularly large ideological base of nationalism to overcome 
any remaining barriers to collective action via the state. They served to strengthen state 
                                                 
448 Ibid., p.5-6 
449 Barnard, A. (1985). Australian Government Finances: A Statistical Overview, 1850-1982. Working 
Papers in Economic History; no.59. Canberra, Australian National University: 48., p.34-6 
450 Ibid., p.2 
451 Groenewegen, P. D. and B. J. McFarlane (1990). A history of Australian economic thought. London ; 
New York, Routledge., p.130 
452 Barnard, A. (1985). Australian Government Finances: A Statistical Overview, 1850-1982. Working 
Papers in Economic History; no.59. Canberra, Australian National University: 48., p.32, 37 
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credibility and fiscal institutions, rather than weaken them. In this regard it was 
convenient that the World Wars were mostly located overseas. These experiences led to 
a considerable and widely accepted increase in the scale of Australian state economic 
involvement, as they did elsewhere. The experience of other developed countries was a 
similar dramatic increase in state extractive power on like ideological bases. These 
events combined with the increasing acceptance of Keynesian ideas, legitimating the 
state’s much larger economic role. As Argentina did not participate in the World Wars, 
and its experience of the Great Depression was exceptionally mild, the opportunities to 
greatly increase the state’s economic role might have been more limited. Nonetheless 
the Argentine state was successful in increasing the state’s economic role in this period, 
and Peronism was a national ideological phenomenon that could have been used to 
transform fiscal institutions more positively. The Argentine state’s economic role and 
extractive power began to increase in the 1930s, gaining considerable pace under Perón 
in the 1940s and 1950s. Argentina and Australia both experienced a shift in their fiscal 
institutions from indirect to direct taxation, but Argentina failed to sustain this shift, 
driving much of the postwar divergence in both fiscal institutions and development.  
 
II Broad Brushstrokes – State Capture and Penetration of the Economy 
 
An indicator of state credibility is the size of fiscal institutions relative to the economy. 
Weiss and Hobson find that an index for state strength (or capacity) is the ability to tax, 
not the ability to spend.453 They link state strength to development, defining state power 
as the possession of infrastructural power (the ability to penetrate and extract resources 
from society and allocate them to desired ends). State strength and capacity should 
correlate with state credibility, as a stronger more capable state is necessary, if not 
sufficient, for credibility. State strength and capacity does not sufficiently explain path 
dependency, as it misses the crucial nexus of collective action between state and 
society. The analysis of fiscal revenue alone lacks the depth of societal expectations 
captured by including expenditure discussed below. A strong state is also defined as the 
ability to extract high amounts of taxation relative to non-tax revenues.454 A key 
difference between strong (developed) and weak (developing) states is their ‘extractive 
                                                 
453 Weiss, L. and J. M. Hobson (1995). States and economic development : a comparative historical 
analysis. Cambridge, MA, Polity Press., p.4-5 
454 Hobson, J. M. (1997). The wealth of states : a comparative sociology of international economic and 
political change. Cambridge ; New York, Cambridge University Press., p.234 
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power’, the proportion of society’s resources they can extract.455 A first indicator of 
state capacity, and broadly of state credibility, should then be the proportion of revenue 
to GDP. An increase in this ratio should correlate with an increase in state capacity and 
credibility. It is important to qualify the historical value of fiscal revenue to GDP, as 
both the nature and the standard of state interaction in the economy have changed over 
time. For instance, in the late twentieth century strong/developed states increasingly 
chose to interact more indirectly with the economy via regulation. This is especially true 
since 1970, when a new period of state strength emerged where a strong state is one 
able to ‘govern the market’.456 State power has become not only the ability to intervene, 
but also the ability to pick and choose when and how to engage.457 The utility of 
revenue to GDP as an indicator of state credibility declined in the late twentieth century, 
but as this is the tail end of the comparison it is of little concern. Of more concern is the 
transformation that occurred in the first half of the twentieth century, when the global 
(or developed world) standard for state economic interaction increased dramatically. As 
a result the standard proportion of revenue to GDP for developed countries also 
increased, which makes the ratio problematic as an indicator of credibility over time.  
 
Snider outlines a potentially useful guideline for the proportion of state revenue to GDP 
to be expected by the 1980s. He finds that developed countries in the 1980s collected an 
average of about 30% of GNP in taxation, whereas developing countries collected about 
13-14%.458 This correlates intriguingly with O’Brien’s finding that the British state 
captured about 15% of national income in 1700, rising to around 30% by 1810.459 This 
was about the time that Britain became the first fiscal state in Europe, as noted 
previously. By at least the 1980s, and arguably since WWII when the standard for state 
economic involvement changed, the guidelines appear to be a minimum of 13-14% of 
revenue to GDP for weak states with low fiscal credibility, and around 30% for stronger 
                                                 
455 Snider, L. M. (1987). "Identifying the Elements of State Power - Where Do We Begin?" Comparative 
Political Studies 20(3): 314-356., p.325 
456 Weiss, L. and J. M. Hobson (1995). States and economic development : a comparative historical 
analysis. Cambridge, MA, Polity Press., p.4-7 
457 Snider, L. M. (1987). "Identifying the Elements of State Power - Where Do We Begin?" Comparative 
Political Studies 20(3): 314-356., p.321-2 
458 Ibid., p.325 
459 O'Brien, P. K. (1988). "The Political Economy of British Taxation, 1660-1815." The Economic 
History Review 41(1): 1-32., p.6 
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states with credible fiscal institutions.460 Prior to WWII it is less clear what the 
expectations should be.  
Figure 3.1 
Federal Revenue to GDP, 1884-1982
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Note: The trend lines above are five-year moving averages.  
Sources: See Statistical Appendix, Table 3.1a 
 
Argentina and Australia were similar in terms of state credibility until the early 1930s, 
as measured by the proportion of federal revenue to GDP. World War I began a slow 
increase in Australian revenue to GDP, and a period of transition is clear from the early 
1930s, but the commencement of WWII was when dramatic increase occurred. This 
trend was not followed by Argentina, which remained at historical levels. Which trend 
was unusual? The Australian increase in revenue to GDP during WWII was 
accompanied by a large change in the global standard for state economic involvement 
that began in the late 1930s with the rise of Keynesian ideas and the experience of the 
Great Depression. The global standard for state extractive power rose considerably in 
the mid twentieth century as macroeconomic policies became increasingly 
acknowledged as legitimate tools of state economic management in the public interest. 
The Australian increase thus reflects, at least partly, maintenance of the norm of 
developed states’ extractive power. This change in standard also occurred in Argentina, 
                                                 
460 GNP and GDP are slightly different, but the statistics for comparing GNP are unavailable. 
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especially with the popularisation of Peronist ideas that promoted intensive state 
economic interaction from 1946 onwards. Yet this was not reflected in a dramatic 
increase in the extractive power of the Argentine state, despite a dramatic increase in 
state activity. This will be seen in the comparison of expenditure to GDP below. The 
inflexibility of Argentine extractive power in spite of a global increase in the standard 
for extractive power suggests a decline in state credibility at this time, rather than 
maintenance. Another substantial decline in Argentine extractive power occurs from the 
mid 1960s to mid 1970s, to levels unseen since WWI. This decrease n absolute 
extractive power indicates a further decline in state credibility.  
 
In Australia the postwar period was one of consolidating dramatic gains in extractive 
power made in WWII. In Argentina the ratio of fiscal revenue to GDP did not break the 
10% barrier and move into the 10-15% range until the military dictatorship of the 
1970s, approximating Snider’s 1987 standard for a weak state-developing country. This 
limited increase was difficult judged by the amount of volatility and was partly due to 
the introduction of an important regressive indirect tax, the value added tax (VAT) in 
1973.461 The change in the global standard of state economic participation in WWII 
muddies the interpretation, but the timing of divergence in fiscal institutions is clear. 
Argentina was widely considered one of the world’s most developed countries prior to 
WWII, but by the 1980s (if not earlier) the Argentine state’s ‘extractive power’ was 
similar to the average developing country. The postwar period was also one of 
divergence in development, when Argentina moved increasingly closer to a developing 
country standard of development. The contrast from WWII onwards suggests a clear 
point of divergence between Argentine and Australian fiscal institutions, when 
Argentine fiscal institutions began to fall behind the increasing global standard of state 
credibility, one that Australia followed and Argentina did not. For much of the twentieth 
century Argentine fiscal institutions actually struggled to maintain the level of 
extractive power achieved in the late nineteenth century, when the standard for state 
economic involvement was much lower.  
 
 
 
                                                 
461 Eaton, K. (2001). "Decentralisation, Democratisation and Liberalisation: The History of Revenue 
Sharing in Argentina, 1934–1999." Journal of Latin American Studies 33(1): 1-28. 
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Figure 3.2 
Total Government Expenditure to GDP, 1884-1982
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Note: The Argentine and Australian lines above are five-year moving averages.  
Sources: See Statistical Appendix, Table 3.2 
 
A comparison of state expenditure to GDP portrays a different picture. The proportion 
of state expenditure to GDP is less strong as an indicator of state credibility than state 
revenue. Nonetheless it can be considered an indication of the expectations for state 
economic involvement and is thus important to state credibility. In this regard the 
divergence between Argentina and Australia is more episodic. The interwar period from 
WWI to WWII emerges as a crucial period, as judged by the level of difference between 
them (see Figure 3.2). The difference in expectations for state economic interaction 
before WWI and after WWII is fairly constant and similar, and both countries demand 
more state economic participation after WWII than before. The emergence of Peronism 
in Argentina leads to a sustained rise in state expenditure to GDP that decreases the 
difference to roughly what it was before WWI (~10%). Argentine state expenditure was 
remarkably stable throughout the postwar period at around 20-30% of GDP. Australia 
entered a similarly stable trend of 30-40%. This should be kept in mind when later 
comparisons show a strong divergence in fiscal institutions and public credit throughout 
the postwar period. The divergence in the power of fiscal institutions was not matched 
by a divergence in expectations of state expenditure. The dramatic rise in Australian 
revenue during WWII was made necessary by the previous increase in expenditure from 
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WWI. Argentine revenue in contrast did not adjust to postwar expenditure, maintaining 
a long period of high and persistent budget deficits instead. The stability of Argentine 
state expenditure is remarkable considering the lack of underlying extractive power, and 
is a strong suggestion of how extensively the Argentine state exploited seigniorage to 
finance the difference.462 Australians experienced a much higher level of state 
expenditure than Argentines, but they were also more willing to pay for it. From the 
perspective of state expenditure the differences between Argentina and Australia do not 
appear very large, and there is no indication of the dramatic divergence in development 
that occurred from WWII onwards.  
 
The proportion of the budget deficit to GDP neatly combines the ratios of revenue and 
expenditure to GDP analysed independently above. The size of the budget deficit to 
GDP provides a deeper insight into state credibility. The ratio indicates how much 
credibility a state lacks within society, and avoids some of the problems inherent in each 
measure outlined above. The ratio avoids the need for different standards of state 
economic participation over time, as seen in revenue to GDP. It also avoids the need to 
adjust for different societies’ expectations of state economic participation. In terms of 
credibility, an increase or decrease in the standard of the state’s economic involvement 
is less important than a society’s willingness to pay for that involvement. The budget 
deficit to GDP ratio neatly contrasts society’s demands upon the state (expenditure to 
GDP) with society’s willingness to pay (revenue to GDP), indicating the quality of the 
contract between state and society.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
462 See Chapter Four. 
 139
Figure 3.3 
Budget Deficits/GDP, 1884-1988
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Note: The lines above are five-year moving averages.  
Sources See Statistical Appendix, Table 3.3 
 
Figure 3.3 begins to illustrate the postwar failure of Argentine state credibility, 
evidenced by long periods of a high and sustained budget deficit to GDP.463 Within the 
postwar period the Argentine budget deficit was brought down to reasonable levels only 
from 1959-72, and further investigation in Chapter Four reveals that this may be 
understated by a factor of two to three times during this period. Postwar divergence in 
budget deficits corresponds with the dramatic postwar divergence in Argentine and 
Australian development. Prior to WWI there is little difference between the budget 
deficits of Argentina and Australia, which could support an argument that state 
credibility in both was not significantly dissimilar. In fact from WWI until the mid 
1930s, Argentine state credibility appears consistently better than in Australia, when 
Australia struggled with the expenditure and indebtedness of WWI. The Australian 
deficit to GDP ratio was remarkably stable throughout the postwar period, averaging 
just under 5% of GDP until 1975-79, when it jumped to about 6.5%, a period of minor 
fiscal crisis in Australia.464 Disregarding the period of 1959-72, the Argentine budget 
                                                 
463 See Chapter Four for a more detailed discussion of budget deficits as an indicator of divergent state 
credibility. 
464 See Chapter Five for further discussion. 
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deficit averaged over 10% throughout the postwar period, and almost 8% for the entire 
postwar period. In other words the Argentine budget deficit averaged above the level 
that caused fiscal crisis in Australia in 1975-79 throughout the entire postwar period. 
The periods before and after 1959-72 emerge as particularly bad for state credibility, 
when the state spent well beyond the ability to tax. Juan Perón’s presidency of 1946-55 
appears as a breaking point with the past, and the beginning of a major failure of 
Argentine fiscal institutions.465 This marked the beginning of a negative path 
dependency in terms of state credibility. Even more disastrous was the period after 
1972, which corresponds with the second Perón administration of 1973-76 and the 
military dictatorship of 1976-83. While Argentina moved to a negative path dependency 
of state credibility in the postwar period, Australia moved to a positive path dependency 
of sustained surplus and minor deficits. Judging by the budget deficit, Argentina and 
Australia diverged in the postwar period in terms of fiscal institutions and state 
credibility.  
 
Export Taxation 
 
The history of export taxation is useful to illustrate the experience of crises within 
Argentine fiscal institutions. This subsection discusses export taxation as a broad 
measure of state credibility, rather than as an indirect tax per se. During crises in public 
finance, Argentina has regularly resorted to taxing exports. Such taxation is highly 
detrimental to an open economy as it discourages export production and reduces foreign 
exchange earnings.466 Furthermore direct taxation of exports, in contrast to their indirect 
taxation via the imports they generate and allow, has proven more likely to generate 
poor public goods provision.467 As a result direct export taxation is likely a highly 
inefficient tax. Australia never explicitly resorted to taxing exports, despite its long 
period of protectionism in the twentieth century. In contrast Argentina has often 
                                                 
465 Reutz notes the remarkable increase in budget deficits during the first Perón administration. Reutz, T. 
(1991). "Ilusiones Fiscales, dimensión y método de financiamiento del déficit fiscal del gobierno, 1928-
1972." Ciclos (año 1) - Instituto de Investigaciones de Historia Económica y Social, Facultad de Ciencias 
Económicas, Universidad de Buenos Aires 1(1)., pp.117-118 
466 This assumes that exporters are price takers (i.e. the exporting country does not have a very high 
proportion of world supply), which is a fair assumption for all important Argentine exports over time. As 
a result export taxation directly reduces export profits and thereby discourages their production. 
467 Hirschman, A. O. (1992). Rival views of market society and other recent essays. Cambridge, Mass., 
Harvard University Press., pp.68-9 
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resorted to export taxation as a stopgap to relieve immediate fiscal emergencies. The 
history of Argentine export taxation is thus a history of Argentine state and fiscal crisis.  
Figure 3.4 
Argentine Resort to Export taxation, % of federal revenue, 1864-
1993
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A benefit of the Argentine and Australian fiscal comparison is the possibility for greater 
objectivity than is possible by looking at each alone. This is sometimes lacking in the 
literature. For instance Paolera and Taylor find Argentina’s low and intermittent export 
taxation to be an implicit tax loophole for the export industry. They find the absence of 
export taxation to be an unnecessary narrowing of the tax base, a result of the export 
industry’s politically favored treatment.468 This ignores not only the highly detrimental 
economic effects of export taxation in an economy that was then as open as Argentina’s, 
but also misses the role that export taxation actually played. The resort to export 
taxation did not signal periods of fiscal fairness and compromise in more equal taxation, 
but rather a failure to find more sustainable and less distorting sources of revenue. A 
comparison between Argentina and Australia shows that Paolera & Taylor’s analysis is 
misleading. Australia’s consistent aversion to export taxation may have been a British 
                                                 
468 Della Paolera, G. and A. M. Taylor (2001). Straining at the anchor : the Argentine Currency Board and 
the search for macroeconomic stability, 1880-1935. Chicago, University of Chicago Press., p.82 
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institutional legacy, as Britain ceased taxing exports from 1722 onwards.469 Yet it 
would be hard to argue that Australia’s continuing lack of export taxation over the 
twentieth century was due to the export industry’s domination of the political system, as 
the Australian Labor party regularly shared control of government from the early 
twentieth century. Instead of the Paolera-Taylor conspiracy, the periodic resort to export 
taxation in Argentina reflected not only the underlying political weakness of Argentine 
exporters, but also the weakness of Argentine fiscal institutions. Figure 3.4 also greatly 
understates effective Argentine export taxation from the mid 1940s to mid 1950s, when 
IAPI used multiple exchange rates and price controls to extract effectively heavy export 
taxation. Figure 3.4 shows the coincidence between export taxation and Argentine fiscal 
crises. Almost the entire postwar period emerges as a long fiscal crisis.  
 
Exports were highly taxed at various times in Argentine history. The periods of export 
taxation were all periods of fiscal stress. Four crisis periods emerge in particular: 1) 
prior to full state consolidation in 1880; 2) the Baring Crisis in the early 1890s; 3) from 
1917 to the mid 1920s (WWI and initial Radical rule); 4) from the mid-1940s until 
convertibility in 1990, with a brief respite during the military dictatorship of 1976-83. 
These periods were all periods of fiscal crisis and/or weak fiscal institutions. Prior to the 
state’s full consolidation there was often a scramble for resources. The Baring Crisis 
introduced sudden demands for revenue as public credit suddenly became unavailable. 
World War I introduced a major fiscal challenge, as the backbone of Argentine fiscal 
institutions (customs duties on imports) suddenly and dramatically decreased as a 
consequence of declining trade. The resort to export taxation begun in 1918 was due to 
the immediate failure of the government to introduce income taxation.470 This was 
followed by fiscal infighting through the 1920s, when the government was unable to 
introduce income taxation or successfully pass a new budget from 1923 until 1930.471 
The first military coup in 1930, and the restoration of the ability to pass budgets, as well 
as the introduction of income taxation in 1932, quickly saw an end to export taxation. 
The fourth period begins in the mid 1940s with the heavy indirect export taxation via 
IAPI’s monopoly buying board. This initially began as part of a deliberate import 
                                                 
469 O'Brien, P. K. (1988). "The Political Economy of British Taxation, 1660-1815." The Economic 
History Review 41(1): 1-32., p.24 
470 Montequin, A. (1995). "Sector publico y sistema tributario argentino, 1914-1932." Ciclos (año 5) - 
Instituto de Investigaciones de Historia Económica y Social, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, 
Universidad de Buenos Aires 5(9)., pp.148-151 
471 See later chapters for further discussion. 
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substitution strategy whereby exporters were to fund the transition to greater autarchy. 
By the mid 1950s export taxation likely reflected wider fiscal crisis, as income taxation 
became increasingly less viable. The military dictatorship of 1976-83, which intended to 
increase export production, was nonetheless unable to completely remove the stumbling 
block of export taxation. It was not until the early 1990s when dramatic economic 
reforms were enacted that export taxation was finally removed, but this has proven a 
brief respite. Export taxation was re-introduced in 2002 in the wake of another fiscal 
crisis, when the state was cut off from external public credit. Export taxation has been 
an excellent indicator of Argentine fiscal stress and weakness. In 1891 export taxation 
was introduced as a “temporary” measure. The failure of Argentine fiscal institutions 
has become ever deeper in the interim. The “temporary” export tax introduced in 2002 
was recently reported to represent the entire fiscal surplus.472  
 
III Indirect and Direct Taxation 
 
Indirect taxation is relatively easy to collect and enforce, and does not require a high 
level of state competence nor credibility. Customs (or taxation on trade) is one of the 
most basic revenue sources that a state can access. The ideal conditions for a high level 
of customs taxation are a high level of foreign trade and a limited number of waterborne 
ports, as this means transaction costs of collection are low.473 Both Argentina and 
Australia in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries had such ideal conditions. Yet 
indirect taxation is ultimately limited as a source of revenue and is potentially 
problematic, as it tends to be both socially regressive and positively correlated with the 
business cycle. Indirect taxation tends to be regressive as the majority of the burden 
usually falls upon necessities. The ability of indirect taxation to raise revenue is most 
effective on goods with low price elasticities of demand (i.e. necessities) and high-
income elasticities (i.e. goods consumed by the poor).474 Indirect taxation typically falls 
most heavily upon the less fortunate. In both Argentina and Australia this regressive 
tendency was further exaggerated by the extensive exceptions granted to relatively 
                                                 
472 Seifert, R. (2005). Sugieren medidas para el campo - Las opiniones de la UCR, ARI, y Recrear. La 
Nación. Buenos Aires: 1, 16. 
473 North, D. C. and R. P. Thomas (1973). The rise of the Western world : a new economic history. 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press., p.99 
474 Capie, F. (2001). The Origins and Development of Stable Fiscal and Monetary institutions in England. 
Transferring wealth and power from the old to the new world : monetary and fiscal institutions in the 17th 
through the 19th century. M. D. Bordo and R. Cortés Conde. Cambridge, UK ; New York, Cambridge 
University Press: x, 482 p., p.29-30 
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wealthy primary producers for imported goods related to production. O’Brien argues 
that indirect taxation is not necessarily regressive.475 The incidence and effects of 
indirect taxation depend upon its design. Unfortunately a non-socially regressive design 
of indirect taxation is more difficult to administer, requiring a higher level of state 
credibility and competence. For instance the Australian federal state attempted to 
increase the progressive nature of Australian indirect taxation in 1940 by introducing a 
three-tier system of sales taxation that exempted essential items such as food, and taxed 
luxuries more heavily.476 In practice this meant sales taxation became incredibly 
complex and difficult to administer within a very short period of time. This attempt at 
more progressive indirect taxation was eventually abandoned. The idea that indirect 
taxation can be a progressive fiscal tool appears more theoretical than practical. Direct 
taxation is an easier vehicle for progressive taxation, and became the main focus of 
fiscal reform in the early twentieth century.  
 
Another problem of indirect taxation is the potentially strong correlation with the 
business cycle. In a boom indirect taxation is typically high, as the expenditures on 
which indirect taxation is levied are also high. This encourages an increase in state 
expenditure that typically reinforces the boom, at a time when state expenditure is likely 
to crowd out private expenditure. In a recession the opposite occurs, and states are 
typically deprived of resources when their expenditure is most required. Once again this 
depends upon the design of indirect taxation, as the exact relationship with the business 
cycle is determined by the administrative details.477 Yet the difficulty experienced by 
even the most credible states of saving in the present for future expenditure suggests 
that de-linking the effects of indirect taxation from the correlation with the business 
cycle may also be more theoretical than practical. The correlation between indirect 
taxation and the business cycle generally hinders a state’s ability to positively interact in 
the economy, especially if the state is largely dependent upon it.  
 
The primary advantages of direct taxation are that it largely avoids the two main 
problems of indirect taxation outlined above: 1) it has greater potential to be socially 
                                                 
475O'Brien, P. K. (1988). "The Political Economy of British Taxation, 1660-1815." The Economic History 
Review 41(1): 1-32., p.12 
476 Smith, J. (1993). Taxing Popularity - The Story of Taxation in Australia. Canberra, Federalism 
Research Centre, The Australian National University., p.69 
477 Daunton, M. J. (2001). Trusting Leviathan : the politics of taxation in Britain, 1799-1914. Cambridge, 
UK ; New York, NY, Cambridge University Press., p. 13 
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progressive, i.e. fairer; and 2) it is less directly linked to the business cycle, better 
enabling the state to positively interact in the economy. The primary example of direct 
taxation is income taxation, which is typically designed to be socially progressive so 
that taxpayers pay an increasing proportion of their income in tax as their income 
increases. If effective, the wealthy pay a larger proportion of their incomes in taxation. 
As the wealthy gain from state collective action that fosters development, and their 
marginal value of wealth is the lowest, such progressive taxation appeals to equity and 
economic efficiency. The better ability of progressive taxation to tax wealth of low 
marginal value contrasts with regressive indirect taxation, which often taxes wealth of 
high marginal value. The greater constancy of direct taxation also enables the state to 
better plan revenues and expenditures. The primary disadvantages of direct taxation are 
that it is much more dependent: 1) upon the cooperative will of the population to pay, 
and thus upon state credibility; and 2) upon the administrative capabilities of the state to 
assess and collect direct taxation and punish nonpayers. These disadvantages are largely 
overcome as state credibility increases. Direct taxation is more difficult for a state to 
achieve, but once achieved direct taxation helps states more positively interact in the 
economy, further increasing their credibility.  
 
And Democracy … 
 
The two problems of indirect taxation become increasingly difficult to bear as 
democracy increases. The first problem is the regressive tendency. As institutions 
become more democratic, the power over fiscal institutions increasingly passes to the 
poorer masses. They will likely favour a redistribution of the fiscal burden away from 
themselves and onto the wealthy minority, which they should be able to achieve through 
greater democracy. The clearest way of passing their high fiscal burden in indirect 
taxation is via direct taxation of that wealthy minority. As long as the affluent classes 
continue to respect democracy, perhaps via a reasonable stake in it, this should increase 
the amount of social consensus and further development through a more lucrative state. 
The second problem of indirect taxation is the strong correlation with the business 
cycle. As democracy increases, the masses tend to demand that the state moderate the 
business cycle in order to provide fuller employment. Democracy may lead to popular 
calls for greater state economic interaction, and thus greater expenditure. In the first half 
of the twentieth century this was paralleled by the rise of Keynesianism. If the state is to 
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manage the economy and moderate the business cycle so as to provide maximum 
employment and ameliorate recessions (typically highly desired public goods), it 
requires more reliable sources of revenue than indirect taxation. The state’s fiscal 
institutions cannot remain dependent upon the whims of indirect taxation, which usually 
reduce the state’s ability to act during a recession. Increasing democracy should thus 
lead away from indirect to direct taxation. Democracy itself should reinforce the process 
as it is usually positively associated with state credibility, as more democratic 
institutions are more likely to adjust revenue and expenditure to society’s desires.  
 
The ideas that indirect taxation is regressive and incompatible with democracy, and that 
taxation should be just are not new. An example below is from Gaston Jèze, a well-
respected political economist of the early 1920s, who observes the undemocratic, unjust 
and regressive nature of Argentine fiscal institutions that were based upon indirect 
taxation. He presciently predicts that a continued reliance upon indirect taxation could 
ultimately undermine Argentine state credibility:  
‘Not only does the Argentine fiscal system lack elasticity, but it is also in 
contradiction with the ideal of “justice” that prevails in democratic states. As a 
whole and in detail, it is “antidemocratic”. Consumption taxes [i.e. indirect 
taxation] fall heavily on the poorest classes of the nation. … [The Argentine 
fiscal system] favours the rich and wears out the least fortunate. … If the ideal of 
social democratic justice is not observed, the Argentine Republic will experience 
political shakeups; at the current time it is not possible to deny the ideals of 
democratic justice without provoking socially grave disturbances.’ (Jèze 1923), 
pp.80-83  
Argentine democracy failed to fulfil ‘the ideal of social democratic justice’ and establish 
direct progressive taxation before experiencing the ‘political shakeup’ of a military coup 
in 1930 that was to have long-term ‘socially grave’ consequences.  
 
& Reality … 
 
Figures 3.5 and 3.6 compare the historical experiences of direct and indirect taxation in 
Argentina and Australia, and were constructed from a wide variety of sources.  
 
 
 147
 
Figures 3.5 and 3.6 
Direct Taxation as a % of State Revenue, 1880-1982
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Sources: See Statistical Appendix, Tables 3.7 and 3.8 
 
Argentina and Australia were new and burgeoning democracies in the early twentieth 
century. Australia federated as a democratic state in 1901 and shortly became one of the 
first countries to elect a Labor government in 1904. Argentina also moved to a fuller 
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democracy with the democratic reform of Sáenz Peña in 1912, which became effective 
from 1916. Argentina and Australia should thus have increasingly moved from indirect 
to direct taxation as they developed their economies and fiscal institutions. As can be 
seen above, this was the general trend until the mid twentieth century, continuing in 
Australia but reversing in Argentina. The dividing line used in each Figure is 1955. 
Argentina conforms to expectations except for the period from the early 1930s to the 
mid 1950s when direct taxation dramatically increased despite a long period of 
democratic failure. Argentina adopted income taxation in 1932 shortly after the military 
coup, but late adoption was not due to a lack of prior effort. During the democratic 
period of 1916-30 numerous attempts were made to introduce income taxation. The 
revolutionary government of the 1930s also had a solid realisation of the need to 
provide public works and regulate public finances in order to foster credibility and 
develop fiscal institutions.478 Yet the lack of democratic credentials ultimately hindered 
an ability to foster credibility. The 1930s regime was proud of the public works 
achieved, and conscious of the need to publicise them. Yet the lack of greater 
democratic institutions meant the shift to direct taxation was not embedded and was 
prone to reversal.479 Figures 3.5 and 3.6 suggest Argentina suffered such a reversal from 
around the mid 1950s. This followed the highly socially conflictive democracy of Perón 
from 1945-55, which was accompanied by the re-emergence of seigniorage as a fiscal 
institution after a long absence. The reversal from a dependence upon direct back to 
indirect taxation paralleled divergence in development.  
 
The rise and decline of direct and indirect taxation did not exactly coincide with the rise 
and decline of Argentine democracy, as income taxation succeeded shortly after 
democracy began to fail. Yet the lack of democracy made it more difficult to sustain 
success in direct taxation. The postwar decline in Argentine fiscal institutions led to 
increasing budget deficits as the state’s ability to tax deteriorated.480 Argentine state 
credibility more closely coincides with the rise and fall of fiscal institutions than with 
democratic institutions. The dramatic fiscal shift from the mid 1950s was preceded by a 
decline in state credibility during the increasingly socially conflictive era of 1930 (the 
first military coup) to 1955 (the second military coup). Argentina’s postwar return to 
                                                 
478 See discussion in next chapter. 
479 See Chapter Five for a discussion on income taxation in this regard. 
480 Díaz Alejandro, C. F. (1970). Essays on the economic history of the Argentine Republic. New Haven,, 
Yale University Press., p.134 
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indirect taxation was less auspicious than the former dependence upon indirect taxation, 
as Argentina had become a much less open economy in the meantime. This meant the 
return to indirect taxation was less efficient than before, as trade provided fewer 
opportunities for indirect taxation. The Argentine shift back to indirect taxation made it 
more difficult to raise adequate fiscal revenue and thereby provide sufficient public 
goods.481 This shift signalled a postwar move to a negative path dependency of state 
credibility. Australian fiscal institutions in contrast made a long-term transition to a 
positive path dependency of high credibility during WWII, greatly assisted by the 
nationalist ideology of the World Wars and greater public goods provision. This enabled 
a seemingly permanent shift to successful direct taxation and all of its benefits.  
 
                                                 
481 See following chapter for a detailed history of public goods provision. 
 150
IV Revenue Base Development 
 
Who Paid? 
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Figure 3.7 
Argentine Revenue Sources, 1864-1993
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Sources: See Statistical Appendix, Table 3.7 
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Figure 3.8 
Australia Taxation Sources, 1850-1982
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The historical trajectories of Argentine and Australian fiscal revenues give some 
indication of who paid. They are remarkably similar from the latter third of the 
nineteenth century to the outbreak of WWI. Both countries were heavily reliant upon 
indirect taxation, especially customs duties. The key difference in the period prior to 
WWI is Australia’s early development of income taxation in the late nineteenth century 
(by the individual colonies), which became a significant source of revenue from WWI 
when the federal state also introduced income taxation. This was part of a slow 
transition from indirect to direct taxation that began in the late nineteenth century. 
Argentina also introduced some direct taxation in the late nineteenth century (including 
the contribución directa and a variety of taxes on property and patents), but direct 
taxation was insignificant until the introduction of income taxation in 1932. Argentina’s 
higher volatility prior to 1889 is partly due to the Barings Crisis, but also due to the lack 
of specificity in the statistical source for the period 1864-89. From 1864-1914 the 
average Australian dependence on indirect taxation was about 78% of taxation, which 
compared to about 85% in Argentina.482 In the early twentieth century both were 
similarly dependent upon indirect taxation, especially customs duties, as their main 
source of revenue.  
 
The shift from dependence on indirect to more progressive direct taxation begins with 
WWI in Australia (marked by the line in Figure 3.8). Australia’s direct participation in 
WWI resulted in great fiscal pressure to seek new sources of revenue in what quickly 
emerged as a fiscal emergency.483 By the end of the war public finances were so poor 
that the acting Prime Minister and Treasurer, Mr. Watt, was ready to force Australians 
to lend. He stated in September, 1918 that:  
‘The Government has … decided to introduce legislation requiring all persons to 
subscribe to war loans in proportion to their means. … it has been determined 
                                                 
482 For Australia this is the average percentage of total taxation and was calculated from: Vamplew, W. 
(1987). Australians: historical statistics. Broadway, NSW, Fairfax Syme & Weldon., pp. 254-85. For 
Argentina this is the average percentage of federal taxation and was calculated from a compilation of 
sources: Cortés Conde, R. (1989). Dinero, deuda y crisis : evolución fiscal y monetaria en la Argentina, 
1862-1890. Buenos Aires, Editorial Sudamericana, Instituto Torcuato di Tella.; Della Paolera, G. (1988). 
How the Argentine economy performed during the international gold standard : a reexamination: viii, 199 
leaves.; & Vazquez-Presedo, V. (1971). Estadísticas historicas argentinas (comparadas). Buenos Aires,, 
Ediciones Macchi. 
483 For instance: Mr Joseph Cook (Prime Minister) – ‘no financial genius in the world could carry on the 
commitments of this Government … out of the revenue of this country, without further heavy taxation of 
the people.’ Hansard Australian Parliamentary Debates, Parliament of Australia., 11/6/1914, p.2048, V.74 
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that in so far as subscriptions to any war loan fall short of the amount required, 
resort must be made to compulsion.’ (Hansard), 25/9/1918, V.85, p.6336. 
Fortunately the Australian federal state never had to resort to compulsion and could 
increasingly turn to the new federal income tax. The equalising ideology of nationalism 
that was part of Australia’s WWI participation should have greatly helped the shift to 
income tax.484 Income taxes quickly became the second most important source of 
revenue during WWI, but indirect taxation remained the most important until WWII. In 
Argentina the shift from indirect to more progressive direct taxation did not occur until 
the early 1930s (marked by the first line in Figure 3.7). Argentina remained heavily 
reliant upon customs duties despite the experience of WWI, when duties dramatically 
declined with international trade. Argentine policymakers long saw the need for an 
income tax, but proved unable to achieve one until 1932.485 Once Argentina achieved, 
income taxation quickly became a highly important fiscal institution. By the end of 
WWII in 1945, Argentina and Australia converged in terms of direct taxation as a 
proportion of revenue. Yet the sources of their direct taxation were not quite the same. 
Almost all Australian direct taxation was explicitly progressive income taxation, 
whereas Argentine direct taxation was a mixture of taxes; including taxes on income, 
inheritance, and social contributions. Of these only income tax was both progressive 
and significant. Argentine income taxation reached a peak in terms of overall revenue of 
29% in 1944. The Argentine shift to progressive income taxation lacked a unifying 
ideology. On the contrary the década infame of the 1930s and early 1940s was highly 
socially divisive, as was the democratic populist period under Perón. It is nonetheless 
possible to imagine a different postwar period for Argentine fiscal institutions of 
continuing convergence, where income taxation continued to increase. As explained 
previously, income taxation is a good tax for credibility due to a more progressive 
nature that best fulfils ‘the ideal of social democratic justice.’486 Over the latter half of 
the interwar period Argentina succeeded in closing much of the direct fiscal gap with 
Australia, and on a largely similar basis of progressive income taxation, but this proved 
                                                 
484 An example of such ‘equalising’ ideology is: Mr. Hughes (Prime Minister) – ‘The Government is a 
War Government. … it will do whatever is necessary to help win the war. It is not a rich man’s 
Government, or a poor man’s Government: it is the people’s Government; not a Government for some 
people, but for all people. … The Government stands for the development of Australian national spirit on 
the foundation of Imperial ideals.’, Ibid. 22/2/1917, p.10573, V.81 
485 See Chapter Five for detailed discussion. 
486 Jèze, G. (1923). Las Finanzas Públicas de la Republica Argentina, La Facultad de Ciencias 
Económicas de la Universidad de Buenos Aires y en el Instituto Popular de Conferencias de "La Prensa" 
bajo los auspicios del Instituto de la Universidad de París en Buenos Aires., pp.83-5 
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short-lived. The postwar period might have been one of continuing Argentine 
convergence, but this would have required more successful facilitation of compromise 
between state and society.  
 
The postwar period emerges as one of clear divergence in fiscal institutions and 
development. In the latter half of the 1950s Argentina began a remarkable deterioration 
in fiscal institutions, marked by the second line in Figure 3.7. This reflected a major 
decline in state credibility and correlates with a general decrease in direct taxation, 
especially income taxation. In contrast Australia consolidated the success of fiscal 
development in the immediate postwar period of the mid 1940s to the early 1960s, when 
direct taxation once again began to increase. This consolidation was built upon income 
taxation, reflecting high state credibility. The purpose of this chapter is to reveal the 
political economy expressed so frankly by fiscal institutions by painting a broad fiscal 
comparison over a long period of time. This has allowed the identification of 
similarities, differences, and salient features. The key similarity between Argentine and 
Australian fiscal institutions is the dependence upon indirect taxation prior to WWI, 
which shows that convergence in development was matched by broadly similar 
underlying fiscal institutions. Differences in fiscal institutions began to emerge over the 
interwar period, as Australian federal income tax was successful earlier, but Argentina 
managed to close the gap in terms of direct and indirect taxation by WWII. In doing so 
Argentine income taxation was never as important as in Australia, but there appears to 
be no prima facie reason that it could not have become so in time. A salient feature that 
merits much further investigation in explaining divergence in development from a fiscal 
institutional perspective is the postwar failure of Argentine income taxation. This was 
the only significant progressive and socially just Argentine fiscal institution, and 
thereby a major indicator of state credibility. The divergence in income taxation is 
investigated much further in Chapter Five.  
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Who received? 
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Figure 3.9 
Argentine Expenditure as a % of Total, 1863-1993
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Sources: See Statistical Appendix, Table 3.9 
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Figure 3.10 
Australian Expenditure as a % of Total, 1850-1982
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Figures 3.9 and 3.10 demonstrate the major trends in expenditure from the mid 
nineteenth century to the late twentieth century in Argentina and Australia. They 
attempt to portray who received state expenditure, but at a necessarily broad level. 
Figure 3.9 was constructed from a wide variety of sources and represents the longest 
known unified composition of disaggregated Argentine public expenditure. Figure 3.10 
represents a novel interpretation of the data so that a comparison could be made with 
Argentina. A large gap remains in the data for much of the Argentine period between 
1914 and 1960. Nonetheless there are some points of knowledge within this period to 
indicate an overall trend. Recalling the theoretical preamble to the chapter, a high level 
of expenditure on public goods is expected to positively correlate with state credibility, 
and ultimately enable the collective action upon which development depends. How does 
this fit with the reality of Argentina and Australia?  
 
In Australia public goods expenditure was consistently the major end of state 
expenditure from 1850-1982 and is represented by the ‘largely PG’ line in Figure 
3.10.487 The only interruptions to this trend were the World Wars. Until the mid 
twentieth century, the bulk of Australian public goods expenditure went towards 
enterprises operated by the state, especially railways, roads, and bridges; plus a 
significant proportion dedicated to social goods such as education. Railway construction 
was a major focus, as development was widely seen to depend on it. The colonial states 
constructed and operated railways, postal and telegraph services based on cheap British 
loans, especially from the early 1870s.488 Social expenditure (represented by ‘social’ in 
Figure 3.10 and disaggregated from ‘largely public goods’) began to increase in the 
interwar period, and rapidly increased in the postwar period to become the predominant 
public good; while overall expenditure on public goods remained relatively similar to 
historical norms in terms of total expenditure. This represented a shift towards the wider 
urban population in the orientation of public goods expenditure, reflecting the shift in 
development models then occurring. Increasing social expenditure also reflected a slow 
move away from state enterprises, which had largely fulfilled their role in enabling 
                                                 
487 The definition of ‘largely public goods’ in Australia consists of the following categories: State 
Enterprise expenditures/capital outlays; social expenditure; primary industries, and other public works. 
These categories are taken from: Barnard, A. (1985). Australian Government Finances: A Statistical 
Overview, 1850-1982. Working Papers in Economic History; no.59. Canberra, Australian National 
University: 48. 
488 Ibid., p.7 
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initial development. The shift accorded with the expectations of a highly urbanised 
society in a fuller democratic setting. Australian state expenditure fulfils the 
expectations of a positive path dependency outlined previously, as significant public 
goods provision fed into state credibility, enabling more lucrative fiscal institutions and 
an even greater ability to provide public goods. Overall the Australian state faithfully 
provided a return to society and taxpayers.  
 
Figure 3.11 
Australian Public Capital Expenditure, 1860-1975
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Source: (Vamplew 1987) 
 
The location of public goods expenditure, especially in large federal democracies, 
should influence state credibility. Figure 3.11 discerns the destination of Australian 
public goods, between rural and urban public goods.489 As Australian democracy 
expanded and shifted in the early twentieth century to the increasingly urban masses, 
there should have been a corresponding shift in the provision of public goods. Such a 
shift would have augmented state credibility. Figure 3.11 shows that rural public goods’ 
expenditure clearly dominated until the turn of the century, followed by a mixed period 
                                                 
489 The rural categories are: Railways; Ports, Harbours, and Sea Transport; Agriculture, Forestry, and 
Lands. The urban categories are: Commonwealth Broadcasting, Urban Transit, Housing, Electricity & 
Gas, Education, Water & Sewerage, Public Buildings, and Miscellaneous (predominantly public buildings 
and recreation). See Butlin in Vamplew, W. (1987). Australians: historical statistics. Broadway, NSW, 
Fairfax Syme & Weldon.  
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until WWII, and then a clear dominance of urban public goods in the postwar period. A 
1926 report on ‘Australian Finance’ notes the contemporary shift to urban public 
goods.490 The move from rural to urban likely resulted in a considerable increase in state 
credibility amongst the majority of highly urbanised taxpayers, helping pave the way for 
further direct taxation. The increased focus on urban public goods was somewhat 
diminished by the high levels of debt servicing in the 1920-30s, but this was 
ameliorated by a concurrent increase in social expenditures. The cities grew rapidly 
during the 1920s and absorbed much new investment. Public funds were heavily 
directed towards urban suburbs in roads, power lines, water and waste disposal.491 
Social public goods expanded significantly in the 1930s, and dramatically in the 
postwar period such that they were the dominant component of public goods by the 
early 1960s. In the postwar period increasing public expenditure could easily expand, as 
increases in taxation met little electoral opposition.492 This suggests the state achieved a 
high level of credibility, sufficient to push Australia along a positive path dependency 
of state credibility and development. The Australian experience conforms to theoretical 
expectations. Originally Australia was based on rural primary exports, upon which the 
economy and tax revenues were based, and towards which the state directed public 
goods expenditure. As Australian democracy became more established and the 
population became more urbanised, the revenue base shifted towards the urban 
democratic base, along with more social public goods provision. The shift in public 
goods provision helped consolidate high state credibility.  
 
The Argentine experience of state expenditure contrasts starkly with Australia. The 
Argentine state only periodically spent a large proportion of expenditure on public 
goods, and this was rarely predominant.493 Prior to the early 1880s the process of state 
                                                 
490 Cooke, S. R. and E. H. Davenport (1926). Australian Finance, Dedicated to the Imperial Conference 
1926, Pelican Press., pp.19-21 
491 Macintyre, S. (2004). A concise history of Australia. Cambridge, UK ; New York, Cambridge 
University Press., p.171 
492 Barnard, A. (1985). Australian Government Finances: A Statistical Overview, 1850-1982. Working 
Papers in Economic History; no.59. Canberra, Australian National University: 48., p.42-3 
493 The definition of what is considered ‘largely public goods’ in Argentina varies. For 1863-90 it is the 
Interior Ministry and Public Education. See Oszlak, O. (2004). La formación del Estado argentino - 
Orden, progreso y organización nacional. Buenos Aires, Ariel. For 1891-1913 it is the expenditure of the 
Interior Ministry. See Della Paolera, G. (1988). How the Argentine economy performed during the 
international gold standard : a reexamination: viii, 199 leaves. From 1920 onwards it includes: education, 
health, social security, welfare, housing, employment, agriculture, public buildings, and infrastructure. 
See Veganzones, M.-A. and C. Winograd (1997). Argentina in the 20th century : an account of long-
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consolidation is clearly visible, with security as the leading expenditure due to the clear 
and immediate need to establish public order. Debt servicing was also high, but much of 
this was actually delayed security expenditure as a great deal of debt had been 
contracted for that purpose. Thereafter a short period of high public goods expenditure 
emerged until the Barings Crisis of the early 1890s. Security and debt servicing then 
predominated until the early twentieth century when public goods expenditure once 
again took the lead. This period may last until about the mid 1940s, but the few points 
of data show that public goods competed closely with security, a surprisingly high 
priority for a country not at war.494  
 
Sometime between 1940 and 1960 there was a very large decline in public goods 
expenditure and a great increase in unknown ‘other’ expenditure. As the experience of 
direct and indirect taxation showed previously, there was a concurrent decline in fiscal 
institutions from the mid 1950s. The increase in unknown ‘other’ expenditure suggests 
that public goods provision declined in quantity and/or quality, which would have 
undermined state credibility and fuelled fiscal decline. First hand observers describe 
such an occurrence. In 1955 Raúl Prebisch describes a major decline in the quantity and 
quality of public goods, especially roads, sanitary works, and ports.495 The Argentine 
state even resorted to legislating ‘secret expenditures’ in 1956 (no. 5315, March 22, 
1956).496 This could have only further undermined state credibility, as secret 
expenditures contradict the most basic principles of a public budget, let alone republican 
government. The ‘Planes de Trabajos Publicos’ provide another source of evidence. 
They were carefully planned and annually published from 1935-45, but then suffered a 
considerable decline. After publishing a plan in 1947 there was a move to five-year 
plans, but these were much lower in quality despite their five-year trajectory. It is 
reasonable to assume that the quality of public goods, judged by the decline in their 
planning, should also have decreased after 1945. Argentine public goods provision 
                                                                                                                                               
awaited growth. Paris, Development Centre of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development. 
494 According to Potash, the armed forces accounted for 43.3% of total expenditure in 1945. Argentina’s 
military outlays in 1945 exceeded the combined total of Chile, Columbia, Peru, Venezuela and Brazil. 
Potash, R. A. (1980). The Army & Politics in Argentina 1945-1962, Perón to Frondizi. London, The 
Athlone Press., p.4 
495 See the various reports attached to: Prebisch, R. (1955). Informe Preliminar acerca de la Situación 
Económica. Buenos Aires, La Secretaría de Prensa y Actividades Culturales de la Presidencia de la 
Nación. 
496 Bolivar, M. Á. (1996). "Los Gastos Públicos Secretos." Boletín de Lecturas Sociales y Económicas, 
Pontificia Universidad Católica Argentina (Buenos Aires)., pp.53-55 
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illustrates a difficult construction of state credibility followed by postwar decline, 
suggesting a negative postwar path dependency.  
 
Argentine expenditure from 1960 onwards shows that public expenditure did little to 
increase state credibility, judged by public goods, until at least the military dictatorship 
of 1976-83. From 1960-76 ‘other’ expenditures predominated, which is to say that little 
is known about the majority of public expenditure. Worse, small unrepresentative rent-
seeking groups likely captured the expenditure earmarked for public goods.497 Public 
goods grew slowly over this period, decisively regaining their predominance during the 
1976-83 military dictatorship when ‘other’ expenditures dramatically declined. This 
shift may reflect little more than an improvement in the management of public finances, 
and strongly suggests that public finances were poorly maintained previously. This 
would have damaged credibility, and suggests that public expenditure was poorly 
planned on an impressive scale. The Argentine state spent a considerable sum upon 
public goods provision at various times, but the productivity of this expenditure is 
questionable. Not all expenditure is equal, and management is decisive. Political over 
economic considerations, incompetence, and poor incentive structures can enfeeble the 
ability to allocate resources well. The lack of planning in regards to public goods 
provision suggests that the quality of public goods expenditure was less than it could 
have been. From 1983 Argentina has upheld a more viable democracy and greatly 
expanded public goods expenditure. This period has been the only one in Argentina 
when more than one party has been able to hold and exchange political power 
peacefully, a feat the first democracy of 1916-30 failed to achieve. The category of 
‘other’ expenditure continued to decline from 1983-93, suggesting the quality of public 
financial management continued to improve. Public goods also became the primary 
purpose of state expenditure, for the first time since the early twentieth century. The 
failure of public goods provision to clearly predominate was less important when state 
expenditure and taxation were relatively small. As the economic role of the Argentine 
state expanded from the 1930s onwards, so did expenditure and the need for greater 
revenues. Such an expansion required greater state credibility, backed by public goods 
provision. Yet the Argentine state failed in this regard. Taxpayers were not endeared to 
                                                 
497 For instance labour expenditure quickly came to dominate expenditure on public goods in the postwar 
period, at the expense of capital expenditure. See Chapter Four for further discussion and Prebisch, R. 
(1955). Informe Preliminar acerca de la Situación Económica. Buenos Aires, La Secretaría de Prensa y 
Actividades Culturales de la Presidencia de la Nación. 
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the state as an insufficient level of public goods was provided, resulting in a failure to 
generate credibility and lucrative public finances. Rent-seeking groups within the state 
may have captured what was spent on public goods. In contrast to Australia, the 
Argentine state did not consistently provide a return of public goods to society and 
taxpayers.498 Postwar public expenditure is likely crucial to explaining the decline of 
Argentine fiscal institutions, state credibility, and divergence.  
 
Conclusion 
 
In the first half of the twentieth century Argentina and Australia achieved success in 
shifting their fiscal institutions from regressive indirect taxation to more progressive and 
lucrative direct taxation. Australia had long succeeded in achieving a predominance of 
public goods in expenditure, and began to shift public goods from rural exporters to 
urban democratic masses from the early twentieth century. Argentina also managed to 
achieve a predominance of public goods in expenditure from the early twentieth 
century. Shifts to direct taxation and greater public goods provision should have built 
state credibility, reinforcing positive path dependencies more conducive to 
development. Yet in spite of Argentina’s increasing convergence with Australia, 
democratic institutions proved unsustainable from 1930 onwards. This played an 
initially indeterminate role in state credibility, but should have weakened credibility in 
the long run by reducing the scope for communication and compromise between state 
and society. Argentina’s shift to more successful direct taxation was led by the 
introduction of income taxation from 1932. This process began to fail sometime during 
and after the populist Peronist democracy of 1945-55. More successful democratic 
institutions might have engendered earlier success in direct taxation and sustained it. 
Considering public goods provision, the postwar period was one of declining Argentine 
state credibility. Postwar Argentina made a dramatic deterioration in public goods 
expenditure, fiscal institutions, and state credibility. Argentina switched to a negative 
path dependency, reflected in low public goods capacity and constrained fiscal 
institutions, and ultimately in divergent development. In contrast Australia managed to 
sustain and then increase a shift from indirect to direct taxation in the postwar period, as 
well as continue a shift in public goods provision towards the democratic urban base. 
                                                 
498 See next chapter for greater detail. 
 165
This should have consolidated a positive path dependency in state credibility, fostering 
development.  
 
Australia may serve as a counterfactual to Argentina in the development of fiscal 
institutions under greater democracy. In the long run more democratic institutions 
meant Australia’s positive path dependency of high state credibility was more 
entrenched. The development of Argentine fiscal institutions from 1930 onwards lacked 
full political legitimacy and integrity due to the absence of democratic institutions that 
could have allowed for greater communication and compromise between state and 
society. This lack of democracy meant the successes achieved in direct taxation and 
public goods provision were more vulnerable to reversal, as society had no democratic 
ownership over them. If true, the cost of Argentina’s failure to maintain and deepen the 
democracy of 1916-30 was very expensive indeed, ultimately eroding the state’s 
credibility along with development. In the postwar period fiscal institutions and public 
goods became centred within an increasingly violent political struggle over distribution, 
and Argentina became entrapped in a vicious path dependency of low state credibility 
that has yet to be escaped. This negative path dependency helped maintain an 
increasingly unstable and violent political economy of flux between dictatorship and 
democracy that emerged from 1930 until 1983. The Argentine state failed to reverse the 
decline of credibility and fiscal institutions during the postwar period, and Argentina 
slowly slipped from a developed to a developing country. Australian political economy 
was relatively stable in contrast, and political institutions remained immune to open 
conflict. The postwar divergence in Argentine and Australian state credibility, reflected 
in fiscal institutions and public goods provision, appears to have engendered their 
divergence in development.  
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‘The chronic deficit, which is the greatest ill of Argentina’s public finances, has an 
undeniable consequence: Argentina lacks public credit.’ (Jèze 1923), p.64 
  
‘From a financial point of view, public credit assumes the recognition of the 
fundamental principle that taxation is the principal source of public resources; … [A 
condition for public credit is] the will and the capacity of the country to pay all its 
taxes, as large as they may be, that are necessary to service the debt. … A country 
hounded by chronic deficits cannot enjoy public credit. The confidence necessary for 
public credit is not born out of a decree, it has to be deserved. Public credit follows the 
budget balance, and never precedes it. … Public credit is a recent occurrence, for 
example England and France.’ (Jèze 1923), pp.67-68 
 
Mr. Charlton – ‘Parliament was responsible for committing the country to the war debt. 
That debt has to be carried, and, whatever else happens, it must be met. If it is necessary 
to impose additional taxation for the purpose of meeting it, the burden must be borne.’ 
(Hansard), 19/10/1921, p.12016, V.97 
 
Mr. Bruce (as Prime Minister) – ‘Our business is to satisfy the people that this borrowed 
money is being expended wisely and usefully for the development of the country, … the 
great majority of public works in course of construction in Australia will make it 
possible for private enterprise to invest its capital in productive undertakings.’ 
(Hansard), 12/6/1928, p.5915, V.119  
 
The lender is not indifferent to the borrower’s intended use of the loan. Credit is much 
cheaper and easier to obtain for sensible and prudent investments. Well-managed 
countries, which know the destination of their finances and methodically order them, 
enjoy a good credit. Nations that march to the luck of events, with neither calculations 
nor forecasts for the future, lack good credit. (Mexía 1913), p.170 
 
[Italics and translations in quotations above are mine.] 
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This chapter continues the broad comparison of Argentine and Australian state 
credibility begun in the previous chapter by investigating public goods provision and 
public credit. As mentioned in the introduction, fairly direct measurements of state 
credibility are fiscal institutions, the provision of public goods, and public credit. Public 
goods and public credit are linked, as the main purpose of public credit should be to 
facilitate public goods provision. Public credit should largely be invested to be 
sustainable. The importance of public goods in determining path dependencies of state 
credibility and development has already been illustrated. An historical comparison of 
public goods provision is undertaken here to further substantiate this idea. Public credit, 
considered an extension of fiscal institutions, is also compared to give a fuller portrait of 
state credibility and reveal further insights into the underlying political economies of 
Argentina and Australia. Budget deficits, which are seen to neatly express state 
credibility in Chapter Three, are investigated and contrasted in greater detail. The 
budget deficit is important to public credit as ‘public credit follows the budget balance, 
and never precedes it.’499 After a theoretical preamble on the links between public credit 
and state credibility the chapter is divided into three sections: a history of public goods 
provision; a broad portrait of public credit, and a more detailed investigation of budget 
deficits as a reflection of state credibility. Taken as a whole, this chapter furthers the 
investigation of state credibility and divergence, completing the broad picture begun in 
Chapter Three.  
 
Preamble on Public Credit and State Credibility 
 
Public credit is based on the will and capacity of society to pay taxes and service 
government debts as Jèze illustrates above, but will is likely the more important 
factor.500 Public credit is defined as the enduring ability to borrow significantly on 
reasonable terms. The will to service debts is the essence of public credit, and a clear 
indication of state credibility. Public credit ultimately represents the faith a society has 
in the state. If a society trusts the state to safeguard the value of the currency and repay 
loans (much the same thing), public credit is generated. If a society does not trust the 
                                                 
499 Jèze, G. (1923). Las Finanzas Públicas de la Republica Argentina, La Facultad de Ciencias 
Económicas de la Universidad de Buenos Aires y en el Instituto Popular de Conferencias de "La Prensa" 
bajo los auspicios del Instituto de la Universidad de París en Buenos Aires., pp.67-8 
500 Ibid., pp.67-8 
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state to safeguard the currency or repay loans, public credit declines. A state might 
bypass a lack of local faith by borrowing abroad, but affordable and sustainable public 
credit ultimately requires credibility from the society a state is embedded within, as 
citizens shoulder the taxation that ultimately services all public credit. Lack of public 
credit demonstrates that a state has not achieved the feat of credible fiscal institutions 
that must stand behind public credit, as public credit is nothing more than a promise to 
pay in the future. In order to fulfil such a promise states must be able to earn appropriate 
revenues, and can only do so on a substantial scale with lucrative fiscal institutions. 
Credible fiscal institutions are necessary to establish a lasting ability to borrow 
substantially on inexpensive terms. States lacking public credit are much less capable of 
overcoming collective action problems, as solvency is limited, and generating the 
resources necessary to achieve the common good is more difficult. Public credit 
increases the state’s capacity and flexibility to act, as well as reflecting society’s faith, 
and should be a useful means for measuring and comparing credibility between states 
over time.  
 
Public credit and state credibility are something of a Catch 22. States need to foster 
public credit in order to attain solvency and thereby credibility, but they also need to be 
credible in order to attain public credit. This argument may be important in explaining 
the existence of path dependencies, as public credit not only requires credibility but also 
feeds back into credibility via solvency and flexibility. As Snider observes, flexibility 
enhances state power.501 The construction of public credit in Britain is a leading 
historical example. Britain’s relatively high ability to borrow (and hence public credit) 
was fundamental to becoming the hegemonic western power in the nineteenth century, 
as British fiscal institutions alone were neither sufficiently elastic nor reliable to finance 
abrupt transitions from peace to wartime expenditure.502 Public credit provided the 
necessary flexibility, and was a means of deferring taxation. Yet the British example 
shows that causation ultimately runs from state credibility to public credit, despite the 
feedback into credibility. As Jèze observes above: ‘public credit follows the budget 
balance’. The capacity to foster public credit ultimately lies within states and their 
ability to manage public finances. Such a capacity is not easy to achieve, but the 
                                                 
501 Snider, L. M. (1987). "Identifying the Elements of State Power - Where Do We Begin?" Comparative 
Political Studies 20(3): 314-356., p.333 
502 O'Brien, P. K. (1988). "The Political Economy of British Taxation, 1660-1815." The Economic 
History Review 41(1): 1-32., p.2 
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existence of credible states with ample public credit clearly shows that a potentially 
vicious cycle of low public credit and credibility is either avoidable and/or escapable. 
Ultimately public credit depends upon both the ability to tax and the credible 
maintenance of public finances.  
 
The provision of public goods for development was essential to the construction of 
more positive path dependencies in public credit. In 1882 Argentines marvelled at what 
Australia had achieved in public goods provided by the state via well-invested public 
credit.503 They perceived the links between credibility, public credit, and public goods 
provision. In the early 1920s Gaston Jèze similarly observes that the proper destination 
for public credit is public goods provision: ‘The only expenses that should be covered 
by the emission of internal debt are “investment expenditure”; in trains and in things of 
strictly national utility.’504 The provision of public goods is crucial to state credibility 
and the ability to tax, and is also the proper destination of public credit.  
 
Public credit feeds back into credibility via the flexibility of solvency and the ability to 
provide public goods. A means of building credibility, as discussed in the previous 
chapter, is the provision of public goods to promote development. If such public goods 
succeed in fostering development, they also enhance fiscal institutions via potentially 
greater fiscal revenues (and hence a greater ability to repay public borrowing). Many 
public goods that foster development (e.g. infrastructure) require large amounts of 
capital over a long period of time before they provide a profitable return. They may be 
desirable from a societal point of view, but be difficult or inefficient for private markets 
to provide on their own, leaving the state as the sole potential provider. Such projects 
could provide society with significant savings and development than would otherwise 
be possible but require public credit. A means of viewing the relationships and feedback 
between public credit and state credibility is path dependency. The path dependencies 
below extend those from Chapter Three, which outlined how to achieve credible fiscal 
institutions via public goods provision, and detail the link between public credit and 
                                                 
503 See the opening quote from the previous chapter. Newton, R. and J. Llerena (1882). Viajes y Estudios 
de la Comisión Argentina sobre la Agricultura, Ganadería, Organización y Economía Rural en Inglaterra, 
Estados-Unidos y Australia., Comisionados por el Exmo. Gobierno de Buenos Aires., Vol.8, pp.114-115 
504 Jèze, G. (1923). Las Finanzas Públicas de la Republica Argentina, La Facultad de Ciencias 
Económicas de la Universidad de Buenos Aires y en el Instituto Popular de Conferencias de "La Prensa" 
bajo los auspicios del Instituto de la Universidad de París en Buenos Aires., pp.73-4 
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credibility. An illustration of a positive path dependency between public credit and state 
credibility is:  
 
      Credible Fiscal Institutions & Public Finances            Public Credit Generation 
 
          State Credibility              Greater Public Goods            State Flexibility & Power 
 
An illustration of a negative path dependency of public credit is: 
 
      Uncredible Fiscal Institutions & Public Finances           Failing Public Credit 
 
        Low State Credibility         Few Public Goods        Low State Flexibility/Power 
 
As depicted above, low state credibility can create a somewhat self-fulfilling cycle 
where the state likely remains small and potentially destructive due to a scramble for 
resources. Some common examples of the destructive effects of scrambling for 
resources are: excessive external borrowing on unreasonable terms (i.e. unsustainable 
and expensive), inflationary financing via seigniorage, and the monopolisation of 
necessary public goods that fail to be provided. In order to escape such a negative path 
dependency and generate public credit, a state must build credibility via capable 
management of public finances. The key variables in the determination of public credit 
in both path dependencies are credible fiscal institutions (i.e. the ability to tax) and the 
management of public finances.  
 
          Public Goods Provision               State Credibility/Fiscal Institutions 
 
                                        Public Credit/Ability to Borrow 
 
The crucial test of whether a state has achieved public credit is if it can enduringly 
borrow on sustainable terms from domestic society, i.e. inexpensive local credit. A 
further test could be how much external debt can be issued in the native currency. The 
issue of internal versus external debt clarifies what is meant by the achievement of 
public credit. Even if a state is on a negative path dependency of public credit, there 
may be periods when significant external loans can be obtained, even if these are 
 172
denominated in a foreign currency. Such external loans can dramatically reinforce a 
negative path dependency of public credit if they lead to external default and financial 
crisis. Poorly invested (if not stolen) external loans raised on unsustainable terms lend 
credence to a society’s later refusal to repay them, especially in an undemocratic polity. 
After all the same society likely refused to lend freely to the state, and a state’s own 
citizens are best placed to judge credibility. Yet access to external credit might also be a 
golden opportunity to generate credibility and escape a negative path dependency. The 
role that external debt plays is largely dependent upon the borrower. If external credit is 
the predominant source of public credit, it often signals an underlying lack of state 
credibility. It begs the question: why can’t the state locally obtain the funds required at a 
reasonable cost?  
 
I Brief History of Public Goods Provision 
 
Public goods are fundamental to development, not least in Argentina and Australia. 
Argentina originally provided significant public goods by fostering private foreign 
investment, which required that the state achieve sufficient credibility to establish order 
and protect and enforce property rights. The Australian colonies borrowed directly from 
Britain to directly provide the vast majority of public goods. Argentina also borrowed 
directly to provide substantial public goods in the 1880s (and via normal expenditure in 
the 1900s) as seen in Figure 3.9, but less consistently and on a smaller scale than in 
Australia. Over the first half of the twentieth century the Argentine state became a 
significant direct provider of public goods, but this was increasingly problematic. Hence 
the following section on Argentina is divided into two subsections: an overview of 
public goods delivery and a discussion of the increasing failure to deliver substantial 
public goods despite considerable expense.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 173
Argentina 
 
Facilitator of Public Goods to Direct Provider 
 
Prior to independence from the Spanish Empire there was no development of public 
works, an important public good for development, in the Argentine.505 Little attention 
was paid to their development other than the very minimum until the battle of Caseros 
in 1852. After 1852 the need for public works became clearer as the country began to 
organise politically and fix its attention on economic development. The Argentine state 
desired to provide public works to promote development, and tried to use the resources 
within its power to do so; including ordinary expenditure, borrowing, land grants to 
stimulate railway construction, and guaranteeing interest rates.506 This led to the 
construction of railways, bridges, roads, public buildings, the improvement of shipping 
lanes, telegraph lines, etc. One early public work in the Argentine was the water works 
of 1870 for the city of Buenos Aires.507 As the most basic public good of peaceful order 
was not achieved until the last quarter of the nineteenth century, it is unsurprising that 
not many other public goods were achieved until then.508 The construction of national 
institutions to consolidate order began in the 1860s and was completed from 1880 
onwards. Three institutions were crucial: 1) the Ministry of War and Navy – the state’s 
repressive apparatus; 2) the Ministry of the Interior – to establish relations between the 
national state and the provinces, and assume all activities not delegated to other 
Ministries; and 3) the Ministry of Justice, Culture, and Public Education.509 Order was 
the fundamental public good provided by the Argentine state and included a national 
military, courts, and education to unify a new nation.  
 
The first national law of public works was in 1876.510 Yet it was not until 1898 that a 
Ministry of Public Works was created, much later than other Ministries.511 In the last 
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quarter of the nineteenth century the Ministry of Interior played the vital role in 
providing public goods. It included the Department of Agriculture (created in 1871) and 
the Department of Civil Engineers (created in 1875), which were made into their own 
Ministries in 1898.512 In the early 1870s President Sarmiento desired to construct as 
many public works as possible, but was considerably restrained by insufficient fiscal 
revenues. The Argentine state had to escape the lingering effects of low credibility 
stemming from a long history of civil warfare in order to access substantial, largely 
foreign, public credit. Public goods provision was a continuing political goal. The 
generation of 1880 sought the construction of large, reproductive public works to 
promote development.513 Under the Presidency of Roca (1881-86), the emphasis of 
public expenditure finally switched from consolidating “order” to fomenting “progress” 
through the construction of necessary physical infrastructure. Instead of borrowing for 
the military, the state began to borrow to construct railways and other public 
infrastructure. Unfortunately much of this public expenditure was wasteful.514 By the 
late 1880s the state’s roles as a borrower, constructor, and guarantor of public works 
and services went beyond the ability to extract genuine resources. From 1890 foreign 
capital found direct investment more attractive than public debt, and no new loans were 
made to the national government until 1914.515 Expenditure on public goods expanded 
in the 1880s and 1900s, but only on the basis of public credit in the 1880s. Many of the 
late nineteenth century public works were constructed privately. The state’s contribution 
was largely limited to establishing an institutional environment that was stable and 
secure enough to enable the large flows of capital and labour required to construct them.  
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Figure 4.1 
Argentine Railway Mileage, 1857-1910
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Source: (Scobie 1967), p.171 
Figure 4.2 
Open Railway Track in kms, 1871-1911
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Source: (Schedvin 1990), p.549 
 
The key role of the Argentine state in providing greater public goods was the 
achievement of order and institutional stability, which enabled a massive expansion in 
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public goods. The expansion in public goods was often provided privately and backed 
by state subsidies and guarantees. An important example of public works enabled by the 
achievement of order is railways, which were the public work par excellence of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.516 Railways were essential to the development 
of staple exports. The final consolidation of the institutional environment in 1880 marks 
a turning point in railway construction, and shortly led to a massive expansion. This 
turning point is clear in Figure 4.1. Figure 4.2 shows the relative success of Argentine 
railway construction to Australia. In Argentina railways were largely built privately 
with state guarantees and subsidies, whereas in Australia the state directly built and 
operated almost all railways.517 The two different strategies led to similar levels of 
construction in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  
 
The Ministry of Public Works directed public works from 1898, overseeing the study 
and realisation of everything related to means of communication, hydraulic 
construction, and architecture. The Ministry’s internal division in 1906 reflected its 
priorities: 1) railways; 2) hydraulic works; 3) bridges, roads, and telegraphs; 4) 
irrigation; 5) architectural works; and 6) accountability and control.518 The first priority 
was clearly public goods of an infrastructural nature to promote development. Water 
works expanded significantly in the early twentieth century, contributing much to public 
health. Between 1904 and 1911 water works were provided to 14 provincial capitals, 
including sewerage works in four of these; and by 1925 almost the entire federal capital 
was provided with potable running water.519 In the early twentieth century the Argentine 
state shifted to developing infrastructure that the private sector had neglected, and 
making modern, competitive investments.520 The prevailing liberal conception of the 
time meant the state was limited to those areas where the private sector was reluctant to 
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invest.521 For instance the state constructed railways to develop under populated and 
distant regions of the country, and explored for oil. The state also continued in more 
familiar areas, such as the construction of ports, bridges and roads.  
 
World War I saw the state continue to increase a more direct role in providing public 
works, and the beginning of a conversion into a large direct provider of industries and 
services in areas previously supplied by the private sector. This followed the example of 
European states, which played an important role in the reconstruction of public works 
after the War and in reducing unemployment. The Argentine state’s growing direct role 
in public goods was reflected in the budget. In 1923 public works had a budget of about 
64 million pesos, but this more than doubled to 163 million in 1930.522 The change in 
the state’s remit from WWI onwards was paralleled by the introduction of democracy in 
1916. The first elected President, Yrigoyen, made an early but largely unsuccessful 
attempt to greatly increase the state’s economic responsibilities. He proposed a large 
series of economic projects in 1916-17 that included the state’s direct provision of: 
agricultural colonies, a national agricultural bank, a merchant marine, oil exploitation, 
and a Bank of the Republic.523 These proposals were not successful at first, but they 
show an early desire by a more democratic polity for the state to take on a larger and 
more direct economic role.  
 
State expenditure rapidly increased in the 1920s under the new democracy. Much of this 
was spent on political patronage, as the Radicals sought to secure their popular 
following by enlarging government bureaucracy and increasing salaries.524 The Radicals 
extended political patronage to the middle classes, and to such a large extent that jobs 
were reported as being sold on the open market in June 1929.525 Upon Yrigoyen’s return 
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to power in 1928, the state soon became a vast employment agency for political ends.526 
The extent of populism can be gauged by the estimated 20,000 government employees 
who were dismissed in Buenos Aires alone in 1930-31 in the immediate wake of the 
military coup.527 Such populist state expenditure were not legitimated by an increase in 
public goods, asides from the brief Presidency of Alvear in 1922-28, and suggest a 
decline in state credibility. At this time Australia was making an increasingly successful 
transition from indirect taxation on trade to direct taxation on incomes. Argentine 
attempts to make a similar shift failed in the 1920s.528 The populist nature of state 
expenditure also made the landed class increasingly hostile towards the Radicals in the 
1920s.529 So it is unsurprising that an expansion of direct taxation would have been 
difficult.530 State expenditure rapidly increased under the last Presidency of Yrigoyen 
from 1928-30, dramatically more quickly than revenue and largely for populist 
purposes.531 The great increase in politicised expenditure combined with the 
landowners’ increased feeling of political isolation. Increasingly popular attacks against 
landowners in the 1920s never became outright, but they caused fear and resentment 
amongst the landowners. The military coup and ensuing ‘decada infame’ of the 1930s 
was at least partly the result of the landed class’ political isolation.532 Despite the 
landowners’ partial role in the 1930 coup, the majority of them favoured a return to 
constitutional rule, but one without the worst vices of popular democracy.533 Their 
participation in the coup was a response to Yrigoyen’s demagoguery, not a promotion 
of authoritarianism. The great increase in state expenditure without a matching increase 
in public goods provision was a trend that would strongly remerge under the populism 
of Perón.  
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The year 1930 marked the end of democracy, but also the beginning of a major change 
in the state’s role in public goods provision.534 Elections were rigged throughout the 
1930s but this was also a period of substantial reform.535 The state began to take on a 
much larger direct economic role. From 1935 to 1945 Argentine public works clearly 
began to be rationally planned public investments, which was reflected in detailed 
annual ‘Planes de Trabajos Publicos’. The number of public works undertaken in the 
1930s and early 1940s greatly increased, taking over from private investment.536 This 
built upon earlier precedents. For instance the military had begun to produce basic 
industrial goods in the late 1910s. The state made important economic contributions in 
the 1930-43 period by constructing roads and founding a Merchant Marine.537 In 1932 
the National Direction of Roads was created to define the trunk network of roads and 
begin their construction.538 From 1939-42 public works were grouped into a system of 
plans.539 The 1930s regime was very proud of the public works provided, publishing a 
detailed ten volume set aimed at educating the general public of what had been 
achieved. The stated goal of the publication was to ‘make known to the whole country 
the work realised by the present Government … that are unfamiliar due to the lack of 
publicity … emphasising the most notable progresses made in public works.’540 The 
titles of the volumes display the priorities. Volume I is devoted to the Treasury, 
demonstrating the priority of improving the administration of public finances. The 
remaining volumes are dedicated to more specific public works: national roads; public 
works; petroleum; police & fire-fighters; the army and state railways; marina, post & 
telegraphs; external relations and culture; justice, public education, and the interior; 
agriculture and sanitary works. Public goods began to move beyond the goals of 
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infrastructure and development to include employment, health care, and other social 
public goods. The predominant theme nonetheless remained the provision of public 
goods to foster development. A sad irony is that the regime that did so much to damage 
Argentine democratic institutions understood so presciently other aspects of state 
credibility, i.e. public goods provision and sound public finance. As public goods were 
provided on a much greater scale than previously, the 1930-45 period should have been 
one of increasing state credibility, but instead credibility was handicapped by 
undemocratic political institutions.  
 
From the 1930s state enterprises were an increasingly important means for providing 
public goods. They began as “Independent Agencies” administered by the federal state; 
and prior to 1930 included state banks, railways, national sanitary works, and petroleum 
(YPF).541 These became an ever larger element of state expenditure in the 1930s, 
growing from 18.7% of total federal expenditure in 1930 to 27.6% in 1942. This 
increased further in the 1940s, reaching almost half (48.5%) of federal expenditure in 
1950.542 State enterprises represented a considerable decentralisation and fragmentation 
of the budget. Their expenditure focussed upon the production of goods and services, an 
arena formerly left to private enterprise.543 The legacy of extensive state enterprises 
continued until the 1980s. In 1983 Argentina had 353 state enterprises, and despite the 
extensive inflation and economic difficulties of the 1980s there were still 305 in 1987. 
Provincial and municipal governments owned a slight majority of them.544 In the 
quantity and diversity of state enterprises in the postwar period, Argentina was only 
comparable to Italy, India, and the communist states. State enterprises had an 
unfortunate legacy upon public expenditure explored further in the following section, 
but generally represented an increasing sloppiness and loss of control of the budget.  
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Figure 4.3 
New Argentine Road Construction, kilometres 
constructed per annum, 1933-68
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Source: (Fiorito 1969), p.527 
 
The state’s direct provision of public goods further expanded under the first Perón 
government of 1945-55, which saw the state nationalise most public services; increase 
production of goods and services; build low-cost housing, hospitals, water and sewerage 
systems; and increase social security coverage.545 Public goods expanded rapidly in the 
1943-55 period, especially during Perón’s two Five Year Plans (1947-51 and 1952-56). 
Yet these did not contribute sufficiently to the need for investment in key areas for 
development, especially transport, energy and heavy industry.546 The quality of public 
goods provision deteriorated markedly from the early 1940s, reaching a nadir in the 
1943-55 period, as resources became assigned to political rather than economic ends.547 
Public investment was high as a proportion of total expenditure, but productivity was 
exceptionally low. The preponderance of investment went to the National Direction of 
Architecture for the construction of housing, tourist hotels, etc, damaging the realisation 
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of basic public infrastructure required for development.548 For instance new road 
construction greatly declined during Perón’s administration, as can be seen above, 
despite the importance for development. The first five year plan was not actually a plan 
of public works, as it did not include realistic plans or budgeting. The second five year 
plan was guided not by public works but the containment of debt expenditure.549 Those 
new public works initiated reflected political interests. Perón proposed the myth that his 
was the first government to provide planned public works.550 In fact the opposite was 
true. The Five Year plans were considerably poorer in detail than the previous decade or 
so of annual plans. Regulating employment became a primary aim. This goal had 
existed previously, evident in the annual plans of 1941 and 1938, but became overriding 
under Perón. In 1956 Raúl Prebisch observed a recent major deterioration in the 
provision of Argentine public works.551 He partly attributes this to the considerable 
increase in labour expenditure, which came to represent almost the entire public works 
expenditure. There was a shift within public goods from capital expenditure on 
investment to current expenditure on salaries. Perón expanded expenditure upon public 
goods, but so extensively used them for redistribution that the actual provision of public 
goods significantly diminished.  
 
Public investment became more dynamic again in the late 1950s and 1960s, when 
energy and industrial projects were given priority. Road construction also began to 
increase again. Nonetheless Argentine state enterprises had become characterised by 
inefficiency. By the late 1960s the state monopolised large sectors of the economy 
including: railways, telecommunications, electricity, gas, coal, large banks, oil, and food 
processing.552 The state nationalised enterprises that foreign firms were often happy to 
relinquish, especially in public services (e.g. gas, telephones, and railways). The level 
and quality of infrastructure was lower than in industrialised countries, and worsened 
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considerably in the 1960s due to poor investment planning and management.553 This led 
to a great deterioration in infrastructure due to a lack of maintenance, and the adequacy 
and quality of infrastructure worsened. This had predictably negative consequences for 
development. Poor management of state enterprises, inadequate economic planning and 
lack of investment led to a quantitative and qualitative deterioration of state services and 
an increase in production costs.554 This was especially true in transport and 
telecommunications, but energy was also affected. Ultimately the Argentine state came 
to obstruct development, as the qualitative and quantitative inadequacies of the 
infrastructure it monopolised were so extensive as to limit the potential growth of the 
private sector.  
 
Much Expenditure, but Failure to Deliver 
 
The historical summary of Argentine public goods provision above points to a large and 
dramatic increase in the state’s role in directly providing public goods. This grew from 
one of limited supervision in the early twentieth century to one of monopolistic 
provision from the mid twentieth century. Despite the increase in the state’s role and 
expenditure as a direct provider of public goods, there was an increasing failure to 
deliver. The Argentine state’s transformation into a monopolistic provider of public 
goods ultimately failed, ending in hyperinflation in the late 1980s. The failure to deliver 
was by then complete, and privatisation of state enterprises in the 1990s was widely 
supported and popular due to the spectacularly poor quality of goods and services.555 
For much of the postwar period, the state impeded development by asserting its 
domination over public goods provision but delivering little of what was required. The 
postwar period was also when Argentine divergence in development occurred. What 
went wrong and why? The following historical summary of problematic Argentine 
public finances and management in relation to public goods provision will attempt an 
answer.  
 
Lack of clarity and financial planning were clearly norms of Argentine governance by 
the late nineteenth century, which was little important as long as the state remained 
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small. An early example from 1885 is when the Minister of the Treasury found it 
necessary to write a special chapter in the Memoria of the Treasury to clarify what the 
public debt actually was. His report revealed that it had recently grown very rapidly, and 
without a plan of investment to direct borrowing.556 The traditional lack of financial and 
public works planning suggests that both the borrowing and use of public money were 
inefficient. British investors perceived Argentine public credit as a poor investment 
from an early date.557 The provision of a large quantity of public works logically 
requires a uniform process; from the contracting of work, to execution and payment. 
This process didn’t occur in Argentina. On the contrary, a wide variety of procedures 
and norms were used, and no system for regulating the contraction of public works had 
arisen by 1940.558 The state continued a tradition of haphazard financial planning for 
public goods in the early twentieth century, despite the state’s increasing role in direct 
provision. Public goods were financed by irregular special laws and budget inclusions 
effected directly by the Executive, often attending to local needs with political ends.559 
Their late inclusion into the budget was only completed in order to authorise the 
emission of bonds to obtain the necessary funds. The state made no overall studies as to 
what public works were necessary, nor how to finance them. This had predictable 
consequences for state credibility, let alone efficiency, and had to be addressed if the 
state was to become the major provider of public goods without disastrous 
consequences for development.  
 
The emergence of public works as a major state priority did not involve a parallel 
emergence of a well-administered system of public works that responded to the needs of 
the Argentine economy. In 1913, shortly after the creation of the Ministry of Public 
Works, the former Minister Ramos Mexía wrote a book expounding the need for a 
much better administration of public works.560 He finds that public works were neither 
well planned nor well financed. The financing of public works was largely dependent 
upon the whims of what was available in the annual budget. He describes how public 
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works would often grind to a halt for a sudden lack of resources, due to their low 
priority in the budget. He argues that public works needed to be financed outside annual 
budgets in order to provide stable financing.561 He also notes the necessity of linking 
public goods’ provision to public credit:  
‘The product of loans has to be exclusively destined to reproductive public 
works, which will remain the property of the government.’ (Mexía 1913), p.50 
The public goods necessary for development had to be funded by long-term public 
credit in order to lift ‘the weight off the present generation’, and the necessary public 
credit could only be found in the federal state.562 He acutely observes the link between 
public credit, public goods and state credibility:  
‘The lender is not indifferent to the borrower’s intended use of the loan. Credit is 
much cheaper and easier to obtain for sensible and prudent investments. Well-
managed countries, which know the destination of their finances and 
methodically order them, enjoy a good credit. Nations that march to the luck of 
events, with neither calculations nor forecasts for the future, lack good credit.’ 
(Mexía 1913), p.170 
Finally Ramos Mexía observes that the provision of public works was already 
‘absolutely insufficient for the fast material progress that the republic desires’.563 This 
was reinforced geographically, as the provincial governments required financial 
assistance from the national state in order to provide more public works that were 
necessary for development.564 Unfortunately little heed was paid to Ramos Mexía’s 
advice, and public goods and finance continued on haphazard trajectories.  
 
Ramos Mexía’s early twentieth century concern that public credit be directed towards 
reproductive public goods was ignored. It was still observed in 1929 that the 
accumulated public debt had largely been spent on fiscal deficits.565 An Argentine study 
of public credit and public goods provision in 1934 judges the public debt as too large 
considering the lack of underlying investment in public goods. The study compares the 
use of public credit with the provision of public goods over the period 1910-31, and 
concludes that public credit was used poorly asides from the presidency of Alvear in 
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1922-28.566 Under Alvear there was a great increase in public works alongside a 
considerable improvement in public finances that included rationalisation of public 
credit. Unconsolidated debt became consolidated at this time via external loans and 
increased taxation.567 Unfortunately the Alvear presidency appears to have been unique 
in fostering credibility via the provision of public goods and competent financial 
management. Another study of public works in 1941, undertaken by the state, finds 
(once again) that the coordination of public works is ‘anarchic’; that there is a lack of 
knowledge of what public works are being undertaken; and that there is a need to 
harmonise the diverse public works embarked on.568 The listed consequences of this 
‘anarchy’ are numerous, but are primarily the inability to manage the nation’s resources 
well and the impossibility of prioritising public works.  
 
During the period of 1918-39 the need to approve budgets prior to beginning, 
continuing, or increasing public works was recognised but little practised.569 The 
Executive continued to use arbitrary powers to authorise public works, and there 
continued to be a lack of knowledge of the true technical, social, and economic 
necessities of public works. This was a poor institutional foundation upon which to 
increase the state’s role in public goods provision. In 1942-43, modifications were made 
in the financial control and accountability of public works. Yet the state continued to 
fail to construct an institution that would study and investigate public works, one 
capable of effecting general coordination. The system for providing public works until 
1942 was imperfect, but nonetheless productive of successive legislative improvements 
in 1917, 1938 and 1942. This system was abandoned in 1943, when the de facto 
government began a disastrous policy of unilaterally assigning Ministries enormous 
sums, based upon quickly drawn up programs that lacked concrete plans of realisation 
and annual developments.570 What little institutional evolution had occurred in the first 
half of the twentieth century was jettisoned, and the state became even less capable of 
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managing public finances and providing public goods. The economic role of the state 
greatly expanded in the first half of the twentieth century, but did so without expanding 
the capabilities necessary for such a role.  
 
Argentine democratic institutions began to flourish in the period of 1916-30, when the 
Radical Party dominated the state. Unfortunately the Radical Party under the 
Presidencies of Yrigoyen (1916-22 and 1928-30) also pioneered the extension of a 
patronage system to consolidate a political clientele.571 This was done by using 
employment in state bureaucracy as a means for consolidating political support, as 
discussed in the previous subsection. The opening of democracy in 1916 quickly led to 
a competition between political parties fought via increasing state expenditure.572 The 
Radical period was not a complete disaster from a public finance perspective, as the 
Alvear Presidency in the 1920s was a period of improvement in public goods and 
finances. Nonetheless the increase in state patronage was tied to the nature of Argentine 
democratic institutions, and had two main effects on public accounts: 1) an increase in 
public expenditure; and 2) a redistribution of expenditure towards administration, 
salaries, and pensions in detriment to public works.573 This trend continued throughout 
the twentieth century, impeding a more efficient use of resources that might have 
provided much greater public goods. Such clientelism greatly increased again during the 
Perón administration.  
 
The undemocratic decada infame of the 1930s succeeded in imposing stricter public 
finances after the Radical experience of democracy, but financial orthodoxy was 
completely abandoned when democracy returned under Perón, when the state became 
the leading developmental actor and the deficit greatly increased.574 The Peronist state’s 
approach was that expenditure would generate its own income. The state’s new role 
generated enduring responsibilities for expenditure that would slowly spiral out of state 
control over the twentieth century. State bureaucracy greatly expanded in the 1943-55 
                                                 
571 Montequin, A. (1995). "Sector publico y sistema tributario argentino, 1914-1932." Ciclos (año 5) - 
Instituto de Investigaciones de Historia Económica y Social, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, 
Universidad de Buenos Aires 5(9)., p.145 
572 Ibid., p.150 
573 Ibid., p.163 
574 Veganzones, M.-A. and C. Winograd (1997). Argentina in the 20th century : an account of long-
awaited growth. Paris, Development Centre of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development., pp.127-9 
 188
period, with a great increase in the number of civil servants.575 The number of public 
employees more than doubled from 1943 to 1955, partly due to the extension of public 
activities, but also due to political patronage.576 This combined with low salaries to 
conspire against efficiency. As has been seen, the first Perón government of 1945-55 
witnessed a great decline in the quality of state expenditure, especially in terms of 
public goods and investment.577 This was a marked change from earlier in the twentieth 
century when state expenditure could be dynamic, profitable, and technologically 
advanced (even if haphazard and erratically planned).578 The proliferation in public 
administration and bureaucracy, coupled with budgetary fragmentation, were major 
reasons for decline in the quality of state expenditure, especially after 1946. A sustained 
increase in the number of state employees occurred at all levels of government as public 
employment became increasingly political.579 Resources were increasingly assigned to 
salaries with the great increase in civil servants.580 The weight of public expenditures 
shifted from capital to current (or consumption) expenditure, even as total expenditure 
decreased. In the 1950-56 period, for instance, consumption expenditure was 
maintained while investment expenditure greatly declined.581 The Peronist period 
initiated a long and disastrous period for public goods and finance.  
 
Perón’s two five-year plans foresaw a great expansion in expenditure, but did not 
increase taxation sufficiently to fund that expansion. The problem was not the 
increasing degree of state intervention, but the manner in which intervention was done. 
For instance Prebisch is in favour of a larger state economic role, which he sees as 
‘indispensable’ to accelerating development and imparting it with a social sense. Yet he 
finds that state intervention under Perón’s government was excessive, disordered, badly 
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directed, and the cause of inflation.582 He calls for a rational planning of public works as 
a form of investment, which had not occurred despite the two recent five year plans. 
The inefficiency of Argentine public goods provision in the mid twentieth century was 
exceptional even by Latin American and other developing country standards. Of eleven 
Latin American countries, Argentina had one of the highest formations of capital but 
one of the lowest rates of economic growth.583 In the period 1950-66, the Argentine 
relationship between capital and economic growth was the least favourable not only in 
Latin America, but of all developing countries that submitted statistics to the United 
Nations. Public investment was poorly managed on a colossal scale.  
Figure 4.4 
Loss on Argentine State Enterprises as a proportion of 
the Federal Deficit, 1950-61
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Figure 4.5 
State Enterprises as a proportion of total state 
expenditure in Argentina, 1960-88
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Note: Quasi-fiscal is expenditure outside of normal fiscal definitions. 
Source: (Latinoamericanas 1991), p.20 
 
The major reason for the increase in expenditure without a corresponding increase in 
public goods provision was the lack of financial control over state enterprises. From 
WWII onwards, Argentine state enterprises made a huge uncontrolled, and often 
unknown and unknowable, contribution to the public deficit. This was largely due to 
gross inefficiency that was greatly encouraged by the state’s lack of control. This lack 
of control was so extensive that state enterprises did not even furnish the state with 
accounts. From the 1960s the financial condition of state enterprises was particularly 
poor, and often accounted for over 80% of the total public deficit.584 As can be seen 
above, they accounted for a very large part of the federal deficit and total state 
expenditure by the late 1950s and early 1960s. These state enterprises, continuing a long 
Argentine institutional tradition, lacked investment planning, implying that a much 
better allocation of resources could have been made. State enterprises simply lacked 
incentives to save or invest in improving productivity due to the lack of any constraints 
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on their financing or results.585 State enterprises were very important in socio-economic 
policy by the 1950s.586 Yet their large and uncontrollable expenditures helped 
undermine Argentine public finances.  
 
The budget was briefly restored to sustainability in the 1960s, after many failed 
attempts. Yet the deterioration of Argentine fiscal institutions continued without any 
serious response.587 Investment in public goods also recovered to a certain degree in the 
1960s, partly correcting the sustained and persistent decline that had occurred since 
1943 due to the shift towards consumption expenditure.588 This consumption 
expenditure was successfully reduced in the 1957-60 period, and investment 
expenditure slightly recovered. Yet investment expenditure began to decline again in 
1962-65, while consumption expenditure was maintained or increased from 1960-67. 
From WWII until at least the late 1960s, state expenditure shifted increasingly away 
from public investment towards salaries. The amounts budgeted for investment were 
larger than those actually expended throughout this period, as investment expenditure 
was easier to reduce than salaries.589 From 1956 to 1965, the amount budgeted for 
investment exceeded actual expenditure by almost a third (31.6%). This led to dramatic 
under-investment. For instance the railways, then entirely state owned, required an 
investment of US$915 million in the period 1958-67, but only a fifth of this was 
achieved.590 Lack of investment led to a great decline in the quality of public goods and 
services by the 1970s and 1980s.591 Perón’s return to government in 1973 fuelled 
another upsurge in public expenditure, and the emergence of a new phenomenon from 
1975 where inflation produced considerable declines in fiscal revenue (due to the delay 
in collecting income and inheritance taxes). This continued until the hyperinflationary 
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collapse of public finance in 1990.592 Most Argentines were grateful for the 
privatisations of the 1990s as they meant necessary goods and services previously 
“supplied” by the state might once again become attainable.  
 
Australia 
 
The Australian experience of public goods provision (both as formerly individual 
colonial states and as a federal nation state from 1901) stands in contrast to Argentina. 
The role of the state as a significant direct provider of public goods was established 
early in Australia, in the latter half of the nineteenth century. The Australian colonial 
states developed an early and exceptional ability to directly provide extensive public 
goods, especially reproductive public works for infrastructure considered necessary for 
development. This stood in contrast to the norms of the state in the colonial founder, 
Britain, which saw public goods as being best provided by the market until the twentieth 
century. The Australian state provision of public works was necessarily linked to the 
cultivation of public credit from an early date. Government securities became regularly 
available from the 1860s, were considered relatively safe, and provided a certain 
income.593 The colonial states acted as middlemen, obtaining British financing 
relatively inexpensively and channelling it directly to public works via state enterprises. 
These state enterprises had a significant degree of natural or artificial monopoly.594 
Periods of high public borrowing were periods of high public goods investment by state 
enterprises. If this public borrowing were reasonably well invested, it would make 
public credit more credible, reinforcing a positive path dependency. Taxpayers, directly 
benefiting from state borrowing via the provision of desirable public goods, were more 
likely to be willing to service public debts with future taxation. Barnard identifies the 
periods of high public borrowing and public goods investment in Australia as the late 
1850s, the late 1870s-1880s, 1910-16, the 1920s, and the first half of the 1950s.595 Only 
the last period occurred after the widespread emergence of Keynesianism and wider 
acceptability of direct state economic involvement. The Australian colonial states were 
                                                 
592 Ibid., pp.130-1 
593 Butlin, S. J. (1986). The Australian monetary system, 1851 to 1914. [s.l], J.F. Butlin., p.69 
594 Butlin, N. G., A. Barnard, et al. (1982). Government and capitalism : public and private choice in 
twentieth century Australia. Sydney ; Boston, Allen & Unwin., p.13 
595 Barnard, A. (1985). Australian Government Finances: A Statistical Overview, 1850-1982. Working 
Papers in Economic History; no.59. Canberra, Australian National University: 48., p.11, 16 
 193
leaders in the field, developing both the credibility to expand the role of the state and 
the capacity to deliver public goods.  
 
Australian capitalism has been described as being born through the state.596 About 70 
percent of all Australian borrowing in London was borrowed by the colonial states, and 
public debt soared from £11 million in 1861 to £155 million in 1891. Almost all of this 
went to the provision of public goods, about two-thirds to railways and the remainder to 
telegraphs, tramways, water and sewerage.597 Australian colonial states were not 
laissez-faire in character. Their interaction with the economy in the nineteenth century 
was one of ‘colonial socialism’, a large and direct economic participation to bring 
capital and labour from abroad to increase economic growth.598 Yet the Australian 
colonial states were also committed to the rules of the market. The Australian states 
played a fundamental role in the successful development of export industries.599 The 
roots of public goods provision via the state, tailored to fostering development, extend 
back to the governorship of Macquarie in 1810-21. His policy was to promote, by 
authoritarian means if necessary, the welfare of convicts and colonists.600 He was an 
ambitious builder of public works in buildings, roads, and communications. By the eve 
of federation in 1900, the Australian colonial states owned roughly half the country’s 
total fixed capital (excluding land) and operated the economy’s largest enterprises, 
absorbing about 5% of the total workforce and generating about 6% of GDP.601 The 
long experience of building and operating large enterprises such as railways perfected 
methods of public administration in Australia by the early twentieth century.602 The 
management of Australia’s natural or artificial monopolies as state enterprises also 
largely eliminated a significant potential source of social conflict between public and 
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private interests.603 The strategy of providing public goods directly through the state on 
the basis of public loans was highly successful until at least the late nineteenth century. 
It was also a logical strategy considering the nature of the economy as a settler economy 
with limited initial factor endowments. Contemporary studies find it unlikely that 
railways would have been privately built on any considerable scale due to Australian 
geography, as Australian railways suffered from a large mileage relative to business and 
a lack of through freight.604 The state was clearly essential to development in Australia.  
 
By the early twentieth century the role of the state in fostering development via the 
provision of public goods financed by public credit was well established. Prime 
Minister Bruce made a clear statement of the extraordinary role played by the 
Australian state in providing public goods for development via public credit:  
‘It is to be remembered that certain works that are carried out by Australian 
governments would be carried out by private enterprise in other countries. … 
Our business is to satisfy the people that this borrowed money is being expended 
wisely and usefully for the development of the country, and that the interest 
payments are not to be regarded as a millstone hung round the neck of the 
people. … It is said that we do not encourage private enterprise as much as we 
should do; … As a matter of fact, the great majority of public works in course of 
construction in Australia will make it possible for private enterprise to invest its 
capital in productive undertakings.’(Hansard), 12/6/1928, Vol. 119, p.5915  
The Australian attitude towards public credit and expenditure was also well expressed 
by Dr Earle Page as Treasurer. He states that:  
‘Australia cannot progress, however, without a certain amount of overseas 
borrowing. The savings of the people of Australia are not yet sufficient to enable 
us to carry out a policy of development as rapidly as we could wish. If we relied 
entirely upon the people’s savings for the development of this country it would 
progress slowly.’ (Hansard), 22-23/7/1926, Vol. 114, p.4535  
Mr Fisher, as opposition leader and future Prime Minister, also summarised well the 
developmental role of the Australian state, public goods, and public credit:  
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‘The opening up of Australia from north to south, and from east to west, whether 
by water or by land, is a national duty, and the mere fact that we expend a few 
millions on such work does not matter. The credit of the country can be safely 
pledged, because, not only does the railway represent an asset for the actual 
amount expended, but that asset increases in value as the years go by’. 
(Hansard), 11/6/1914, Vol. 74, p.2047  
The role of the Australian state in directly providing reproductive public goods was 
accepted across the political spectrum, and can be seen in a 1914 exchange between the 
Liberal Treasurer, Sir John Forrest, and opposition leader, Mr. Fisher.605 Nonetheless 
Australian public works provision directly via the state was not a complete success. MP 
Richard Foster observes in 1915:  
‘Over and over again we have had indisputable evidence as to shocking 
extravagance and waste in our public works due to inefficiency and very largely 
to inexperience and irresponsibility. Yet there is no attempt to remedy this 
condition of affairs. … When are taxpayers to receive consideration?’ (Hansard), 
29/10/1915, Vol. 79, pp.7053-7054  
The role of the state in providing public goods on the basis of public credit was clear 
and little questioned by the Australian state in the early twentieth century.  
 
The crucial step between public credit and state credibility is that the destination of 
public credit should be the provision of widely accepted public goods. In the context of 
nineteenth and early twentieth century Australia, such widely accepted public goods 
were reproductive public works that fostered development. The high provision of public 
goods by the Australian colonial states was reflected in their fiscal structures. As a 
whole the Australian colonial states reaped high fiscal returns from the use and sale of 
crown lands from primary exporters, which vied for being the single most important 
source of fiscal revenue until the 1880s.606 In return for these land revenues the 
Australian colonial states provided primary exporters with large state enterprises that 
constructed and operated the railways and utilities. The Australian state acted much like 
a firm, directly providing public goods to primary exporters on the basis of inexpensive 
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public credit in return for revenue.607 The successful operation of such an arrangement 
should have greatly increased both state credibility and public credit.  
 
 
 
                                                 
607 See preamble in Chapter Three. 
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Figure 4.6 
Australian Revenue Sources (Total), 1850-1962
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Source: See Statistical Appendix, Table 4.6
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Figure 4.7 
Public Goods Provision, Australian Primary Producers and the 
State
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Note: The revenue/subsidy line above is obtained by adding land revenue to state enterprise revenue. Both lines are a proportion of 
total public revenue. Source: See Statistical Appendix, table 4.6. 
 
Australian primary producers appear to have been heavily subsidised by the state for 
much of the nineteenth century, judging simply by the continual losses incurred by state 
enterprises in terms of fiscal revenue alone. A different picture emerges when these 
losses are balanced by the land revenues paid by primary producers. A line in Figure 4.7 
represents the balance and shows that, asides from a few brief periods, primary 
producers more than repaid the subsidy they received from state enterprises via land 
payments. Furthermore primary producers clearly did not fully capture all the benefits 
provided by state enterprises.  
 
Three broad trends emerge in the Figures above that extend the discussion of who 
received public goods from Chapter Three. These trends are: the latter half of the 
nineteenth century until the 1890s depression; a mixed transition period from the 1890s 
until the 1940s; and a postwar period. The first is largely a period of highly loss making 
state enterprises more than balanced by extraordinarily high land revenues. With the 
1890s depression this approach lost sustainability, as land revenues began a large and 
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irreversible decline, and state enterprises began an unheralded period of profitability.608 
This was likely due to the sudden inability to access external public credit imposed by 
the Barings crisis. From 1850-90, the average positive balance between losses on state 
enterprises and revenue from land was about 13% of total fiscal revenue. There was 
thus a large and mutually beneficial relationship between the state and Australian 
primary producers in this period. Primary producers paid the state more than they 
received, but in turn received public goods that might not have been provided otherwise. 
The second period of transition sees a continual decline of land revenues to almost total 
insignificance, paralleled by the increasing importance of taxation. State enterprises 
return to making losses with economic recovery from 1910, and again during the 1920s. 
The return of depression in the 1930s sees their forced return to profitability. As seen in 
Chapter Three, the destination of Australian public goods changed in the early twentieth 
century, from the provision of rural public goods for primary producers to more urban 
and social public goods for the democratic masses. In the postwar period taxation is 
almost the sole source of revenue, as land revenue disappears and state enterprises 
maintain small and stable losses. These periods reflect large underlying changes in 
Australian political economy. The successful relationship between the state and primary 
producers should have greatly increased state credibility amongst at least the primary 
producers until the early twentieth century, when the model began to decline. The first 
period, the latter half of the nineteenth century to the 1890s, was important to 
developing initial public credit and an institutional ability to run state enterprises. The 
Australian state went above and beyond providing the important basic public good of 
order, directly providing public goods such as railways that might not otherwise have 
been built. In contrast the Argentine state did not go much beyond the public good of 
order and stability, and this did not hamper the ability to foster key public goods for 
development, at least measured by railways as seen in Figure 4.2. This meant the 
Argentine state did not build public credit to fund the direct provision of public goods 
on a significant scale, as will be seen below; nor did the Argentine state begin to 
develop an institutional ability to run state enterprises until the 1930s.  
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Australia began to fall behind economically from the turn of the twentieth century, as 
the 1890s depression proved longer and deeper than elsewhere.609 The state adjusted by 
moving to more indirect means of intervention, and eventually to macroeconomic 
management.610 The great expansion in public debt that occurred with WWI created 
great problems, as the state acquired large debts from non-reproductive expenditure. As 
MP Sampson noted in 1915:  
‘all our borrowings have been in respect of public works, public institutions, and 
public trading operations, and that until the outbreak of this war we had no 
national debt in the ordinary sense of the term as understood in Europe.’ 
(Hansard), 25/8/1915, Vol. 78, p.6093  
It took some time for the impact of WWI to sink in. For instance one MP (Kerby) 
argued in 1920 that the state could continue its developmental role despite the large 
recent accumulation of debt:  
‘Immense loans are outstanding, and there are great public works which should 
be undertaken, and for the carrying out of which the Government must provide 
financial assistance. … The development of Australia … must not be kept back’. 
(Hansard), 26/2/1920, Vol. 91, p.52  
Dr Earle Page argued for a stall in expenditure, but did not challenge the validity of the 
model itself:  
‘we ought seriously to consider whether it is proper to revert to the old-time 
policy [of public works]. … with money only procurable at about 8 per cent … 
it is a very open question whether a big public works policy should be entered 
upon by the Government in view of the fact that money is so dear at the present 
time. … The maintenance of public works should be provided out of revenue, 
and not out of loan account, at this stage of our history.’ (Hansard), 13/10/1920, 
p.5564  
The model of public goods directly provided by state enterprises lingered until 1930, as 
it required access to foreign capital. From 1930 Australia found external loans could not 
be obtained, severely constraining the ability to continue the model.611 A revaluation of 
the state’s developmental role followed, and the state moved towards more indirect 
                                                 
609 An interesting article in this regard is: McLean, I. W. and A. M. Taylor (2001). "Australian Growth: A 
California Perspective." NBER Working Paper Series Working Paper 8408: 30. 
610 Butlin, N. G., A. Barnard, et al. (1982). Government and capitalism : public and private choice in 
twentieth century Australia. Sydney ; Boston, Allen & Unwin., p.10 
611 Ibid., pp.321-324 
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methods of intervention such as fostering the development of human capital in 
education and immigration. This was preceded to some extent by growing concern over 
the Australian model by British lenders. For instance a British Economic Mission in 
1927 blamed Australia’s economic difficulties upon extensive state economic 
intervention; specifically the high extent of public ownership, excessive tariffs, and the 
use of an arbitration system for determining wages.612 The Mission also expressed 
concern over the size of Australia’s public debt. Another 1926 report for British 
investors asked ‘Is Australian finance sound?’ and saw the Australian federal state as a 
‘voracious borrower’ with unsustainable debts spent on loss-making state enterprises.613 
After 1950 state enterprises were increasingly run for profit, which coincided with their 
decline as the economy’s leading investors and producers, and an increase in regulatory 
authority over private decision-making.614 The Australian state shifted away from direct 
public goods’ provision via state enterprises towards indirect provision via market 
regulation in the postwar period. This was the opposite trajectory of the Argentine state.  
 
In the twentieth century less tangible public goods such as welfare became increasingly 
important. These were indirectly important to fostering development by increasing 
domestic demand and minimising social conflict. Australia began the shift to a welfare 
state early, from 1894 to 1914 through the introduction of State-backed industrial 
tribunals that brought many areas of employment under minimum-wage rules. Prior to 
1914, arbitration was used primarily to support the trade unions’ bargaining power, 
increase wages to minimum levels, and encourage the development of federal unions.615 
The basic wage was introduced in 1907 and became widespread by the early 1920s, an 
almost unique achievement. Similar was the adoption and spread of old-age pensions, 
along with maternity and invalid pensions, from 1908.616 By 1914 the Australian state 
was establishing floors to incomes and consumption, well in advance of other countries. 
Welfare further expanded in the interwar period to cover the war-wounded and bereft, 
as well as poverty relief due to unemployment. This was funded by a large extension of 
                                                 
612 Groenewegen, P. D. and B. J. McFarlane (1990). A history of Australian economic thought. London ; 
New York, Routledge., p.124 
613 Cooke, S. R. and E. H. Davenport (1926). Australian Finance, Dedicated to the Imperial Conference 
1926, Pelican Press. 
614 Butlin, N. G., A. Barnard, et al. (1982). Government and capitalism : public and private choice in 
twentieth century Australia. Sydney ; Boston, Allen & Unwin., p.320 
615 Ibid., p.150-1, 328-9 
616 Ibid., p.337 
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income tax to include 60-70 percent of the workforce.617 During WWII the Australian 
state prepared for postwar reconstruction by planning a comprehensive system of social 
security and welfare, with full employment as the main goal.618 The development of this 
broad welfare program met little opposition, partly due to the policy of protectionism. 
Protectionism had become the basis for the idea that the relationship between 
manufacturers, rural producers and wage earners was symbiotic.619 The achievement of 
such a unifying ideology was highly significant in reducing the potential for destructive 
social conflict. Prior to 1949, the state was largely limited to replacing those welfare 
services previously supplied privately, but after 1949 it consciously shifted to providing 
welfare via the market.620 From 1949-66 welfare policy shifted from a goal of poverty 
alleviation to one of assisting middle and upper income groups. Australian welfare in 
the postwar period was relatively ungenerous in regards to poverty relief, evidenced by 
the substantial capture of benefits by the middleclass.621 This was logical considering 
the coinciding shift in the state’s fiscal base towards a more urban and democratic base.  
 
II Broad Brushstrokes in Public Credit 
 
Public credit originally played an important role in the construction of fiscal institutions 
in Western Europe. Regular warfare resulted in an accumulation of public debt, forcing 
states to better develop their fiscal institutions in order to service and repay it. In Britain 
war and public debt combined to achieve the introduction of income tax, which was 
previously strongly resisted.622 The British history of fiscal institutions and public credit 
provides guidance as to how states can enter a positive path dependency of public 
credit. Britain’s shift from a feudal demesne state to one based on taxation was soon 
followed by a dramatic increase in public debt in the late seventeenth century, as 
Parliament established dominance over the Crown through control over finance.623 
Public debt rose from almost nothing in the reign of Charles II to a nominal Figure of 
                                                 
617 Ibid., p.172-3 
618 Ibid., p.192-3 
619 Ibid., pp.330-332 
620 Ibid., p.193-4 
621 Ibid., p.196-7 
622 O'Brien, P. K. (1988). "The Political Economy of British Taxation, 1660-1815." The Economic 
History Review 41(1): 1-32., pp.17-22 
623 Capie, F. (2001). The Origins and Development of Stable Fiscal and Monetary institutions in England. 
Transferring wealth and power from the old to the new world : monetary and fiscal institutions in the 17th 
through the 19th century. M. D. Bordo and R. Cortés Conde. Cambridge, UK ; New York, Cambridge 
University Press: x, 482 p., p.25 
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£823 million by the accession of George IV.624 This public debt boom reflected a 
dramatic increase in the credibility of the British state, opening an opportunity for a 
virtuous cycle of increased state power. The growth and success of public credit allowed 
an expansion of financial intermediation and financial institutions, and the proper 
emergence of the stock market.625 The rise of the financial services industry was 
arguably the power behind the rise of the British Empire.626 The British example shows 
that the establishment of public credit upon achievements in state credibility can have 
large positive externalities, such as financial markets.  
 
Figure 4.8 
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Sources: See Statistical Appendix, Table 4.8 
 
How did public credit develop in Argentina and Australia over time? A simple starting 
point is the amount of public debt each accumulated and sustained over time in per 
capita terms. As public credit develops, the potential amount of sustainable debt 
increases. Of course actual debt per capita is not equal to the maximum sustainable debt, 
                                                 
624 O'Brien, P. K. (1988). "The Political Economy of British Taxation, 1660-1815." The Economic 
History Review 41(1): 1-32., p.26 
625 Capie, F. (2001). The Origins and Development of Stable Fiscal and Monetary institutions in England. 
Transferring wealth and power from the old to the new world : monetary and fiscal institutions in the 17th 
through the 19th century. M. D. Bordo and R. Cortés Conde. Cambridge, UK ; New York, Cambridge 
University Press: x, 482 p., p.39-43, 49-50 
626 See Cain, P. J. and A. G. Hopkins (2001). British imperialism, 1688-2000. New York, Longman. 
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but an historical context gives some idea. Figure 4.8 compares the nominal levels of 
total debt per capita in US$. Argentine debt per capita is consistently low, whereas 
Australian debt per capita grew over time, increasing dramatically during the World 
Wars. Was Argentine credibility too low to borrow significantly? Did Argentina lose an 
opportunity to build greater public credit and credibility via public goods provision? 
The Argentine state took a commanding economic role in the postwar period, but this is 
invisible from the record of debt per capita until the 1970s. Argentine debt rose 
significantly in the late 1970s at the height of the latent civil war, almost all of which 
was external. Argentine public debt quickly proved unsustainable, and Argentina 
defaulted along with many other Latin American countries in the early 1980s. In 
contrast, Australia’s strong and sustained growth in debt per capita over the twentieth 
century shows that state credibility and public credit were relatively high. Despite 
persistently higher public debt per capita, there was never any real threat of default as 
debt servicing was equal or easier than in Argentina. Australia’s increasingly high 
national debt per capita suggests a concurrent increase in state credibility. Considering 
the state’s extensive postwar economic role, Argentina’s low public debt per capita 
suggests credibility was low. Why wasn’t increasing public goods provision funded 
through greater public credit? The quick default on public debt in the early 1980s shows 
that the Argentine state possessed little credibility and credit by this time.  
 
Divergence in public credit began in the interwar period. The World Wars helped 
achieve a cohesive nationalist ideology that gave credibility to greater collective action 
by the Australian state. As the tap of external credit dried in WWI, the Australian state 
began to successfully cultivate an internal market for public credit that had previously 
not existed. WWII developed this further, and was financed by a mixture of domestic 
loans and increased taxation.627 As a result external public debt actually declined by 
12.3% during WWII, by £79 million from 1938/39 to 1945/46. WWII was also an 
opportunity for Australia to foster closer relations with the US, the centre of the postwar 
world economy.628 Argentina took a different trajectory. The Argentine experience of 
WWII was relatively easy and profitable, but with less opportunity to build a unifying 
                                                 
627 Pinkstone, B., D. Meredith, et al. (1992). Global connections : a history of exports and the Australian 
economy. Canberra, AGPS Press., p.144-5 
628 Due to Australia’s cooperation with the US in the War of the Pacific, it obtained a subsidy of roughly 
US$0.5 billion from the US government. This benefit should be balanced against the considerable costs of 
war. Ibid., p.144-5 
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nationalist ideology; one that might have cut through class divisions and achieved a 
greater capacity for collective action. Argentina also played an extremely poor 
diplomatic hand during WWII by supporting the Axis, emerging in a highly 
acrimonious position with the US in the postwar period.  
 
Figure 4.9 
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Sources: See Statistical Appendix, Table 4.9 
 
Another way to compare public credit over time is public debt to GDP, which indicates 
the sustainability of public debt and how much public credit the state has achieved, at 
least in times of crisis. The greater a state’s credibility, the greater the proportion of 
resources the state can command. As public credit develops, the sustainable level of 
public debt/GDP should thus increase. Of course the actual level of public debt/GDP is 
usually less than the maximum sustainable, but historical trends give some indication 
within context. Recall that it is the will of society to pay, not the capacity to pay, that 
ultimately determines public credit. What is initially striking is how much less burdened 
Argentina was by public debt than Australia. Argentina made little use of public credit 
asides from the late nineteenth century, which was the high point of Argentine public 
credit. Argentina and Australia sustained similarly high debt ratios during the Baring 
Crisis. This suggests they then possessed similar levels of public credit. Neither 
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Argentina nor Australia technically defaulted on their public debt at this time.629 
Australia was less successful in reducing public debt to GDP after the Baring crisis due 
to a long economic depression (unlike Argentina). Despite Australia’s high debt ratio at 
the start of WWI, the state could sustain a further large increase in public debt, which 
peaked in 1932 at 205% of GDP, and continued at a remarkably high level into the late 
1940s. That Australia did not default despite the extraordinarily high ratio of debt to 
GDP strongly suggests high underlying credibility. ‘The will and the capacity of the 
country to pay all its taxes, as large as they may be’ was very high in Australia.630 
Australians were remarkably willing to sustain their state’s credit for the common 
interest. The World Wars revealed how high Australian public credit had become. The 
relative lack of Argentine public debt suggests much lower public credit. Just how low 
became clear in the late 1970s and early 1980s, when Argentina defaulted on public 
debt despite only reaching 60% of GDP.631 By the early 1980s Argentine public credit 
had seriously declined since 1899, when a public debt of 89% of GDP was sustained 
without default. Argentine taxpayers were unwilling to finance their state’s relatively 
small public debt by the early 1980s, which may have been a reasonable response.632 
Success in fostering state credibility and public credit should be mirrored in a rise in the 
sustainable proportion of public debt to GDP, which will only become truly known 
during a crisis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
629 Argentina only managed this with the assistance of the Bank of England, but it did not technically 
default according to Della Paolera, G. and A. M. Taylor (2001). Straining at the anchor : the Argentine 
Currency Board and the search for macroeconomic stability, 1880-1935. Chicago, University of Chicago 
Press., p.225 
630 Quotation from: Jèze, G. (1923). Las Finanzas Públicas de la Republica Argentina, La Facultad de 
Ciencias Económicas de la Universidad de Buenos Aires y en el Instituto Popular de Conferencias de "La 
Prensa" bajo los auspicios del Instituto de la Universidad de París en Buenos Aires., pp.67-8 
631 Dornbusch, R. and J. C. d. Pablo (1987). "Argentina: Debt and Macroeconomic Stability." NBER 
Working Paper Series(2378). 
632 The public debt greatly expanded under the 1976-83 military dictatorship. By and large the funds were 
either not invested well or were stolen. One source claims that US$4.2 billion of loans simply went 
missing in the 1970s. See: Adams, P. (2004). Odious Debts - Loose Lending, Corruption, And the Third 
World's Environmental Legacy, Probe International. 2005: Electronically published book., Chapter 12 
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Figure 4.10 
Debt Servicing/Expenditure, 1863-1971
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Sources: See Statistical Appendix, Table 4.10 
 
A state’s ability to sustain public debt is reflected in the ratio of debt servicing to 
expenditure. The higher the ratio of debt servicing to expenditure, the more constrained 
and less flexible a state’s options are, and thereby the lower a state’s power. The ratio is 
inversely correlated with state flexibility and power. Argentine debt servicing in Figure 
4.10 reflects servicing relative to federal expenditure, whereas Australian debt servicing 
reflects total debt servicing to total expenditure. A third line of Australian federal debt 
servicing to federal expenditure has been included but is less illustrative as the federal 
state only came into being in 1901. What is striking about the comparison is that 
Argentina’s ratio of debt servicing was higher in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries than in Australia, despite Argentina’s lower levels of debt relative to GDP. 
Only from 1921 to 1931 did Australian federal debt servicing, not total, exceed that of 
Argentina. The higher Argentine ratio of debt servicing in the nineteenth century, 
despite lower debt to GDP, shows that Argentine public credit and credibility were 
lower. This gap narrowed considerably in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. It is remarkable how Australia, on the whole, could greatly increase public 
debt in the interwar period without similarly increasing debt servicing. This shows the 
increasing strength of Australian fiscal institutions, which must have more than 
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accommodated the need for greater debt servicing. Both Argentina and Australia freed 
themselves from debt servicing by the early postwar period, but this was for different 
reasons. Argentina’s high trade surplus over WWII led to a large accumulation of 
external credit, allowing an eradication of public debt. The Argentine debt decline did 
not reflect a corresponding increase in fiscal capacity. Australia could always maintain a 
reasonable level of debt servicing to expenditure, about 15-25%, despite a dramatic 
increase in debt to GDP. Higher credibility meant the Australian state could borrow a 
significant proportion of the economy cheaply and easily.  
 
External Public Credit & Exports 
Figure 4.11 
External Debt to Exports, 1900-71
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Sources: See Statistical Appendix, Table 4.11 
 
Another indication of an ability to sustain public credit is the level of external public 
debt to exports. Until the first half of the twentieth century this indication works well 
for Argentina and Australia, as both were dependent on foreign loans for their public 
credit. Exports indicate a country’s ability to earn foreign currency, and external debt is 
usually contracted in foreign currency. The ratio can thus indicate the sustainability of 
public credit, as the greater the ratio of external debt to exports, the lower the ability to 
repay in foreign currency. The ratio of public external debt to exports indicates a state’s 
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vulnerability to foreign creditors. In a crisis external creditors might refuse to roll over 
loans, deepening the situation. Figure 4.11 shows that Argentine and Australian states 
had very high levels of external debt to exports as they moved out of the Baring Crisis 
at the start of the twentieth century. This recovery was short-lived for Australia, as 
WWI greatly increased external debt while decreasing the ability to export. In contrast 
Argentina successfully reduced external debt until the late 1920s when it surged again 
with the populist expenditure of Yrigoyen.633 Australia must have successfully inspired 
continued foreign creditor confidence, as the Australian state was highly exposed to 
external debt measured by exports. In the 1930s the Australian state must have had 
sufficient credibility (and/or was a sufficiently large borrower) to coax foreign lenders 
into continually rolling over external loans, as the ratio of external public debt to 
exports soared well above the immediate ability to pay. The strategy employed was to 
move as much of this debt to domestic creditors as possible. By the postwar period 
Argentina and Australia had greatly diminished their levels of external debt. Australia 
did so by developing a strong internal credit market, reflected in the rapidly declining 
ratio of external debt to exports and increasing debt per capita.634 The decline in 
external debt to exports thus reflects a dramatic success in internal credit. In contrast 
Argentina used the opportunity of WWII to accumulate a large external credit, later 
used to eliminate external debt by 1952-53. Argentina did not develop a corresponding 
internal credit market. Argentine public credit, in a sense, disappeared for much of the 
postwar period. When public credit reappeared in the 1970s, state credibility was too 
low for internal credit, and external debt quickly proved unsustainable.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
633 See brief history above for further detail. 
634 See the next subsection for a greater discussion of internal public credit. 
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Figure 4.12 
Real Government Bond Yields, 1900-72
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Note: The difference line above is a three-year moving average. 
Sources: See Statistical Appendix, Table 4.12 
 
Perón’s first government of 1945-55 made the elimination of public foreign debt a 
major priority, part of a nationalist ideology to recover national wealth.635 Foreign debt 
was seen as a rapacious intrusion upon national pride and independence. Its 
disappearance in 1952-53 removed the ability to measure public credit, but did not 
necessarily indicate an improvement in public credit. Public credit represents the faith 
of creditors in the state, and an absence of external debt does not necessarily say 
anything in this regard. By 1961 Argentina had already begun to seek foreign public 
loans again, to fund the nationalisation of the Electrical Services Company of Greater 
Buenos Aires (SEGBA).636 Public credit was not significant in state financing until the 
1960s, largely due to a lack of demand from the state. Yet it is unlikely that there would 
have been much willing supply from creditors in light of Figure 4.12. The emergence of 
persistent inflation meant public debt was an evidently poor investment, as bonds 
quickly eroded in value (they were not guaranteed against monetary depreciation). 
Figure 4.12 compares real bond yields, an evident means of comparing state 
                                                 
635 Vizcaíno, J. G. (1972). La Deuda Publica Nacional. Buenos Aires, EUDEBA - Editorial Universitaria 
de Buenos Aires., pp.168-174 
636 Ibid., p.176 
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credibility.637 The trend is one of relative convergence previous to 1945, when 
Argentina offered slightly higher real bond yields than Australia. This is further 
confirmed in Figure 4.17 that compares bond spreads between 1870 and 1935. After 
1945 a long period of divergence begins, when Argentina offers a large and constant 
negative rate. Argentine public debt would have been an amazingly poor investment 
throughout the postwar period. One 1967 source speculates that even if the state had 
tried to emit public debt guaranteed against inflation (e.g. at a set interest rate plus 
inflation), there would have been little interest, as state guarantees were not credible. 
Previously the state had reneged on debts with just such a guarantee (July 9 bonds).638 
The lack of Argentine public debt in the postwar period was not due to sound 
management of public finance, but because the Argentine state persistently chose 
seigniorage financing. External credit suddenly became abundantly available to 
Argentina in the 1970s with the surge in petrodollars. State credibility was little 
considered and the Argentine state did not invest the newly available funds well. From 
1975 to 1985 the military dictatorship increased the foreign debt massively, by 300% in 
real terms.639 The default on external public credit in the early 1980s revealed a 
deepening crisis of state credibility.  
 
A major contrast between Argentina and Australia in the postwar period was their 
differing abilities to export.640 In the late postwar period Argentina became prone to 
external debt related financial crises, such as in the early 1980s and in 2002. This was 
despite the relatively low ratio of public debt to GDP. Australia did not experience any 
such crises, even though public debt to GDP reached much higher proportions. 
Argentina’s ability to export declined dramatically in the postwar period, and did not 
begin to recover its ability to export until the military dictatorship of 1976-83, but this 
recovery was exaggerated by economic decline. Nonetheless Argentine exports doubled 
in real terms between 1976 and 1990. Yet the ratio of exports to GDP was still well 
                                                 
637 Capie, F. (2001). The Origins and Development of Stable Fiscal and Monetary institutions in England. 
Transferring wealth and power from the old to the new world : monetary and fiscal institutions in the 17th 
through the 19th century. M. D. Bordo and R. Cortés Conde. Cambridge, UK ; New York, Cambridge 
University Press: x, 482 p., p.55 
638 Secretaria del Consejo Nacional de Desarrollo, S. P. E. N. (1967). Estudios de Política Fiscal en la 
Argentina (Versión Preliminar), Republica Argentina, Presidencia de la Nación., Vol. 7, pp.18-20 
639 Veganzones, M.-A. and C. Winograd (1997). Argentina in the 20th century : an account of long-
awaited growth. Paris, Development Centre of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development., p.220 
640 See Figures 1.9 and 1.10 in the subsection of Chapter One on Exports and Timing of Divergence. 
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below the norm before the Great Depression. Prior to the late 1930s the ratio of exports 
to GDP was significantly higher than in Australia despite then similar GDP per capita. 
This suggests Argentina had more to lose by moving away from an export led model. 
Australia’s remarkably constant ratio of exports to GDP explains the greater capacity to 
engage with external credit, even if there was a preference for internal over external 
credit. Argentina’s move to lower postwar exports helps explain the lower capacity to 
borrow externally, asides from the question of state credibility.  
 
Internal Public Credit 
 
Internal public debt over time represents a state’s ability to achieve deeper and more 
meaningful public credit from a state credibility perspective. For a state to achieve 
significant internal public credit requires the faith of society, which is best placed to 
judge the state’s credibility as a borrower. Argentina and Australia both showed a major 
decline in their levels of external debt financing, but for different reasons. It is also 
worth recalling that external debt markets were largely closed for new lending from 
WWI until the 1970s, with the brief exception of the 1920s. External debt should have 
declined from the interwar period due to limited supply. Public credit was increasingly 
forced onto an internal basis from WWI onwards.  
Figure 4.13 
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Sources: See Statistical Appendix, Table 4.13 
 
Figure 4.13 shows a deceptive convergence in trends until the late 1950s, but this 
convergence was for different reasons. Australia managed to greatly increase overall 
public credit via a large increase in internal public credit, while Argentina increased the 
proportion of internal public credit by eliminating external debt. The amount of internal 
public credit Argentina generated was insignificant, and the success above is illusory. 
Previous to 1933 all Argentine debt is considered external, despite a considerable 
amount of debt labelled as ‘internal’. Reliable contemporary sources (the most credible 
in 1923, and the last in 1932) make it clear that internal debt was typically held 
overseas, as internal debt was allowed to pay higher interest than external debt.641 
Argentines may have purchased Argentine public debt, but they did so largely on 
overseas markets in foreign currencies.  
 
Unconsolidated public credit in Argentina was a mixture of internal and external credit, 
and emerged from 1914.642 It consisted of immediate short-term loans to cover budget 
deficits, and was from a large variety of sources including large domestic banks, foreign 
banks, and ‘various [unspecified] creditors’. By nature unconsolidated debt was a 
symptom of fiscal distress, but it is unclear how much more expensive unconsolidated 
debt was relative to consolidated debt. Unconsolidated debt quickly evolved into largely 
internal public credit over the 1920s.643 Unconsolidated debt quickly became a financial 
crutch of the Radicals during the 1920s, when passing budgets was difficult, but it was 
never regarded as a desirable form of public credit. President Alvear’s (1922-28) 
successful efforts to transform unconsolidated into consolidated debt are clear in Figure 
4.13. Then in the late 1950s unconsolidated debt increased dramatically alongside 
external debt, evidence of a more desperate scramble for resources. Recalling how low 
total Argentine public debt then was, it is extraordinary that the state could not seek 
                                                 
641 ‘To say the truth, Argentina has no internal public debt, … the national public debt labelled as being 
“internal” is in the hands of foreigners.’ Jèze, G. (1923). Las Finanzas Públicas de la Republica 
Argentina, La Facultad de Ciencias Económicas de la Universidad de Buenos Aires y en el Instituto 
Popular de Conferencias de "La Prensa" bajo los auspicios del Instituto de la Universidad de París en 
Buenos Aires., p.64. This idea is repeated in: Trevisán, E. (1932). Reforma del Régimen Rentístico 
Argentina. Buenos Aires, Talleres S A Casa Jacobo Peuser. 
642 Luisi, D. E. (1934). "Estado de la deuda publica por Presidencia, 1910-1931." La Revista de Ciencias 
Económicas Ano 22(154): 363-79. 
643 The external proportion of the unconsolidated debt was roughly: 52% in 1916, 18% in 1922, 10% in 
1928, 22% in 1930, and 13% in 1931. This is based on my own calculations and only includes debt that 
can easily be definitely as external. Ibid., p.364 
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more credible means of borrowing. The proportion of unconsolidated debt reached 78% 
of public debt by 1967. Unconsolidated debt was popular likely because it was a means 
for delaying the inflationary effects of seigniorage via “loans” from the central bank. 
The trend in unconsolidated debt shows that the decline in Argentine public credit 
occurred from the late 1950s, similar in timing with the decline of state credibility by 
other measures.  
 
It is not clear that Argentina ever developed internal public credit to any significant 
degree. Australia was initially forced to foster internal public credit during WWI.644 
Australia found public credit to be the easiest means for raising the necessary, sudden 
financing required. This was a silver lining to the expense of war, by forcing the 
beginning of more meaningful and varied internal public credit, as well as providing an 
ideology to achieve it. Nonetheless nationalism alone was insufficient for internal 
credit’s long-term success, which ultimately required sound financial management to be 
sustainable. The postwar period was one of continuing success in Australian public 
credit, as internal public debt grew faster than public debt such that the vast majority of 
public credit was internal by 1971. In contrast Argentine public credit clearly declined 
from the 1950s, experiencing a first collapse in the default of the early 1980s.  
 
British Investment and Public Credit 
 
As detailed above, Argentine and Australian public credit were centred on external 
credit from the nineteenth century into the first half of the twentieth century. The global 
capital market at this time was based in London, and the majority of external credit was 
traded there. A comparison of the nature of British investment in Argentina and 
Australia may reveal their perceived credibility overseas.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
644 This was novel at the federal level, and the internal debt of the States was relatively small.  
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Figure 4.14 
Total Annual British Investment flows (£'000), 1865-1914
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Source: Derived from (Stone 1999), pp.62-71 
 
Argentina and Australia were strikingly similar in their ability to attract similar sums of 
British investment prior to WWI. Australia attracted more consistent British capital 
flows, but Argentina periodically exceeded these. The total amount invested per capita 
from 1880-1914 was £73.4 in Argentina and £90.7 in Australia, which is to say that 
Argentina, an independent and clearly sovereign nation, achieved 81% of the British 
investment that Australia, a British colony, did in per capita terms. Total British 
investment into Argentina from 1880-1914 was higher than into Australia, at about 
£329 million versus £298 million.645 The property rights of British investment were less 
secure in Argentina than in Australia. All else being equal, British investment capital 
should have favoured Australia. That British capital did not merits further investigation, 
especially as it relates to state credibility.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
645 Stone, I. (1999). The global export of capital from Great Britain, 1865-1914 : a statistical survey. New 
York, St. Martin's Press. 
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Figure 4.15 
British Investment in Australia, Top 4 Sectors (5MA)
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Note: The lines above are five year moving averages. 
Source: Derived from (Stone 1999), pp.62-71 
 
Underneath the apparently similar capital flows there were large differences in the 
nature and direction of British investment in Argentina and Australia. British 
investment in Australia largely went directly to the public credit of the colonial states, 
who then invested it in reproductive public works. The colonial states were entrusted as 
middlemen, and British investors used their sovereign status to limit their risk. As can 
be seen above, the vast majority of British investment in Australia was in public credit, 
asides from a brief competition with raw materials at the turn of the century (likely due 
to the West Australian gold rush). The third most popular sector for British investment 
was the financial sector, which should have bolstered Australian financial institutions 
and the internal capital market. This would have enabled greater financial 
intermediation and positively affected development. The Australian colonial states made 
early achievements in public credit, backed by the security of revenues and abilities in 
sound financial management. The colonial states offered highly appealing public 
securities in London at yields well below those demanded by British investors for 
Australian private activity.646 This arrangement was collectively beneficial to Australia, 
                                                 
646 Butlin, N. G., A. Barnard, et al. (1982). Government and capitalism : public and private choice in 
twentieth century Australia. Sydney ; Boston, Allen & Unwin., p.16 
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as the state provided public works on the basis of loans that would have been more 
expensive otherwise. Australian colonial states borrowed half of all the foreign capital 
imported between 1860 and 1900.647 Their efficiency at borrowing was evidenced by 
relatively low interest rates.648 The Australian private sector gained indirectly via the 
lower capital costs of state enterprises.  
Figure 4.16 
British Investment in Argentina - Top 4 Sectors (5MA)
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Note: The lines above are five year moving averages. 
Source: Derived from (Stone 1999), pp.62-71 
 
British investment in Argentina was quite different and quickly diverted from an initial 
enthusiasm for public credit in the early 1870s and 1880s to direct foreign investment. 
This shift was due to the Baring Crisis, which was a result of Argentina coming to the 
brink of default on public debt. From 1890 foreign capital was directed to investments 
(especially railroads, properties, and mortgages) instead of state financing, and there 
were no new loans to the national government until 1914.649 British investors had 
become aware of the opportunities in Argentina, but quickly learned to be wary of 
lending to the state. Investment in railways was especially predominant, and direct 
investment in public utilities was much higher than in Australia. The Australian colonial 
                                                 
647 Ibid., p.16-17 
648 Buckley, K. D. and E. L. Wheelwright (1988). No paradise for workers : capitalism and the common 
people in Australia, 1788-1914. Melbourne ; New York, Oxford University Press., p.105 
649 Oszlak, O., A. Fontana, et al. (1982). La formación del estado argentino. Buenos Aires, Republica 
Argentina, Editorial de Belgrano., p.226 
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states were entrusted to invest foreign capital to best uses, and must have shown 
themselves relatively capable of doing so (or at least upheld a good mirage to British 
investors backed by locally credible fiscal institutions). After the Baring Crisis, the 
Argentine state was not entrusted to any significant extent to responsibly invest external 
funds, even though this appears to have been the initial preference of British investors. 
The 1890 Baring Crisis greatly diminished whatever public credit the Argentine state 
had in the minds of foreign investors. Direct British investment provided the public 
goods necessary for Argentina’s continued development, and the state was largely 
relegated to providing a secure institutional environment. British investment in 
Argentina largely bypassed the state, leaving public credit relatively undeveloped. In 
contrast British investment played a major role in constructing colonial states’ public 
credit and credibility in Australia, pushing them towards positive path dependencies that 
later proved crucial in the early twentieth century.  
Figure 4.17 
Argentine Bond Spread over Australia, 1870-1935
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Sources: See Statistical Appendix, Table 4.17 
 
As seen previously, there was remarkable divergence in the real interest rates of bonds 
after 1945. Figure 4.17 shows that between 1870 and 1935 there was a considerable 
convergence in interest rates on public bonds. The higher risk of investing in the public 
debt of Argentina resulted in a generally higher interest rate than in Australia. The 
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Baring Crisis greatly and understandably compounded this, and interest rates on 
Argentine public debt soared to three times those of Australia. This did not last long, 
and by 1904 the spread between Argentine and Australian public debt had decreased to 
a more normal historical level, continuing to converge thereafter. From 1913 Argentine 
and Australian public credit interest rates more or less fully converged, suggesting they 
were considered roughly equal in desirability by foreign lenders.  
 
III Budget Deficits and Public Credit 
 
The budget deficit as a percentage of GDP was seen in the previous chapter as a good 
indicator of overall state credibility. The budget deficit also reveals much about public 
credit, as budget deficits must be met in the short term by borrowing and/or seigniorage. 
In the medium to long term extra taxation is also an option, but a budget deficit is 
essentially what taxation fails to cover. As long as a state can finance deficits through 
borrowing (and/or reserves), budget deficits are not inflationary.650 If a state lacks 
credibility and credit, taxation and borrowing are not viable options. The only options 
for such a state are seigniorage and balanced budgets. Seigniorage causes inflation that 
erodes the value of debts held in national currency and is thus not only a default on 
money but also on locally denominated debts, and should make creditors increasingly 
wary of public credit. Opting for seigniorage to cover budget deficits over the long run 
is akin to opting for a path dependency of low state credibility and public credit. 
Argentina was eventually forced to choose seigniorage in the postwar period to cover 
sustained high budget deficits. The other option of increasing taxation and balancing the 
budget was not taken. Extensive seigniorage undermined public credit, compounding 
the underlying problem of low credibility. Divergence began in the postwar period, as 
persistently high budget deficits in Argentina resulted in seigniorage, undermining 
public credit and credibility, and hopefully ending in the hyperinflation of the 1980s.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
650 Della Paolera, G. and A. M. Taylor (2001). Straining at the anchor : the Argentine Currency Board and 
the search for macroeconomic stability, 1880-1935. Chicago, University of Chicago Press., p.85-7 
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Figure 4.18 
Budget Deficits/Revenue, 1880-1982
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Note: The lines above are five year moving averages. 
Sources: Australian data is total public deficits to revenue and is derived from (Vamplew 1987), pp.254-85; Argentine data is 
federal and derived from (Della Paolera and Taylor 2003), appendix. See also Statistical Appendix, table 4.19 
 
The budget deficit problem in terms of the state’s extractive power can be seen in the 
proportion of budget deficits to revenue. A credible state can maintain a low average 
ratio, being able to increase fiscal revenues as required. A high and sustained deficit to 
revenue suggests low credibility, as the state is either unable to obtain sufficient 
taxation or adjust expenditure accordingly. Figure 4.18 shows that Australia, asides 
from the World Wars, was able to maintain a low and relatively constant level of budget 
deficits to revenue, which improved in the postwar period. Argentina followed a similar 
if more volatile course until the postwar period, when it moved to a high level of budget 
deficits to revenue. Unlike budget deficits to GDP in Chapter Three, the entire postwar 
period emerges as one of clear fiscal crisis, a crisis that emanated from insufficient 
fiscal revenues. Argentine fiscal institutions failed to provide enough revenue due to an 
underlying failure of credibility, whereas Australian fiscal institutions moved to a 
higher level of credibility in the postwar period. This begs the question of how such 
high Argentine budget deficits relative to revenue were financed. The previous section 
showed that Argentine public credit declined in the postwar period. As a result the 
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dramatic increase in budget deficits must have been financed by seigniorage. Such a 
scenario would have consolidated a negative path dependency of Argentine state 
credibility and credit.  
Figure 4.19 
Annual Debt+Monetary Increase/Budget Deficit, 1921-80
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Note: The lines above are five year moving averages. 
Sources: See Statistical Appendix, Table 4.19 
 
The Argentine budget deficit figures underestimate the actual deficit in the postwar 
period as measured by combined annual growth in borrowing and seigniorage. Figure 
4.19 tests how well budget deficits were met by seigniorage and borrowing. If there 
were a perfect fit between theory and reality the budget deficit would be covered by 
seigniorage and borrowing over time, oscillating around 100% in Figure 4.19. The 
Australian data fits this expectation fairly well, but the Argentine data does not. One 
caveat is that only the figures for the Argentine federal budget deficit are available, but 
the Argentine federal state was the most important and eventually assumed the debts of 
the provinces. The level of combined borrowing and seigniorage is probably a very 
good indication of total actual Argentine budget deficits, especially in the postwar 
period. The postwar period, once again, marks a turning point. Until 1946, the average 
ratio of debt and monetary growth relative to the budget deficit in Australia was 134%, 
slightly above the expectation, but understandable considering the extraordinary 
expenditures of the World Wars. In the postwar period of 1946-81 the average dropped 
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to 92%, slightly below expectations. Argentina in contrast was often well above the 
expectation indicated by the federal budget deficit. Until 1946 the growth of money and 
debt relative to the budget averaged 159%.651 This is greater than 100%, but not greatly 
different than Australia. Dramatic change occurs after 1946, when the Argentine 
average increases to 324% from 1946 to 1980. This is well beyond reasonable 
expectations, indicating that the budget deficit grossly underestimates the actual growth 
of money and debt. This suggests that the budget deficit was much greater in the 
postwar period than previously indicated. Argentina issued far more money and debt 
than was justified by the budget deficit alone, suggesting that public financial 
management was particularly poor. State enterprises were likely a major reason for this, 
as they were a major expense outside state control. In contrast the budget deficit 
reasonably approximates Australian debt and money creation over time.  
 
Figure 4.20 
Balance towards Money Creation(M1), 1921-71
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Note: The lines above are five year moving averages. 
Sources: See Statistical Appendix, Table 4.19 
 
 
 
                                                 
651 This does not include the exceptional year of 1920, when there was a massive reduction in both M1 
and in debt. If this is included the average drops to the unlikely Figure of 60%. 
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Figure 4.21 
Currency Growth Rates, 1884-1974
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Note: The lines above are five year moving averages. 
Sources: Derived from (Mitchell 2003); (Mitchell 2003) 
Figure 4.22 
Argentine seigniorage, % of deficit financing,1929-72
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Source: (Reutz 1991) 
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Figure 4.23 
Annual CPI in Logs (base of 10), 1935-2003
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Sources: Australian data derived from (Statistics 2005) 1935-49, and (International Monetary Fund) 1950-2003; Argentine data 
derived from (Cottely 1981) 1935-48 and (International Monetary Fund) 1949-2003. 
 
The picture of debt and seigniorage financing as a percentage of the budget deficit is by 
no means perfect, especially for Argentina. One way to get beyond this is to 
disaggregate the annual increase in debt and money to see which predominates. Figure 
4.20 compares the proportion of money growth within the total of debt and money 
growth. This shows that Argentina began a long and slowly increasing reliance upon 
seigniorage for financing from the early 1940s onwards, whereas Australia remained 
much more dependent on debt. Figure 4.21 confirms the trend towards seigniorage by 
comparing annual growth of currency in circulation. In Argentina currency growth 
increases substantially from the early 1940s onwards. The Perón government of 1946-
55 begins a shift to seigniorage that lasts throughout the postwar period and greatly 
accelerates in the 1970s.652 Figure 4.22 is from a detailed study of Argentine public 
financing, and shows a dramatic shift to dependence on seigniorage in the postwar 
                                                 
652 Figure 4.21 has been abbreviated to 1974 as Argentine currency growth is so high thereafter that 
graphical comparison is no longer useful. 
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period that begins with Perón.653 After the initial shift, the reliance upon seigniorage 
grew persistently throughout the postwar period, from around half to almost three 
quarters of deficit financing. Figure 4.23 shows the ensuing inflationary effects of 
seigniorage financing in Argentina relative to Australia. Only a logarithmic scale can 
achieve the comparison as inflation reached such heights in Argentina, and inflation is 
very divergent in the postwar period. The exponential scale on the right hand side 
corresponds to the annual levels of inflation. Figures 4.20, 4.21, 4.22, and 4.23 tell very 
similar stories of postwar divergence. A credible state with access to public credit 
should obtain most financing for deficits via public credit, rather than seigniorage. To 
maintain credibility, the money supply should be managed according to the overall 
economic cycle as a macroeconomic tool. In Argentina seigniorage covered an average 
58% of Argentine deficit financing from 1942-80 and 51% from 1946-72.654 In 
Australia seigniorage covered 18-35% of deficit financing from 1942-80.655 The 
postwar Argentine period was one of persistent defiance of the intertemporal budget 
constraint.656 This eventually leads to default, either through a repudiation of debts or 
their monetisation (i.e. hyperinflation).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
653 Reutz, T. (1991). "Ilusiones Fiscales, dimensión y método de financiamiento del déficit fiscal del 
gobierno, 1928-1972." Ciclos (año 1) - Instituto de Investigaciones de Historia Económica y Social, 
Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, Universidad de Buenos Aires 1(1). 
654 The first Figure is derived from Figure 4.20 and the second is from Figure 4.22. See Ibid., pp.137-138 
655 The range is due to the inclusion and exclusion of 1960 from the average (excluded from Figure 4.20). 
Including 1960 lowers the average to 18%. 
656 A state’s intertemporal budget constraint is the requirement that the discounted present value of 
primary surpluses in terms of GDP be equal to the initial stock of government debt in terms of GDP. See: 
Horne, J. and International Monetary Fund. Fiscal Affairs Department. (1991). Indicators of fiscal 
sustainability. Washington D.C., International Monetary Fund., p.3-4 
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Figure 4.24 
Australian Growth in Tax & Debt, 1852-1982, unadjusted 
for inflation
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Note: The lines above are five year moving averages. 
Sources: Figures are for total tax and public debt outstanding, (Vamplew 1987), pp.254-285 
 
Figure 4.25 
Argentine Growth in Tax & Debt, 1865-1980, adjusted for 
inflation from 1914
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Note: The lines above are five year moving averages. 
Sources: See Statistical Appendix, Table 4.25 
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Increasing state credibility should be reflected in debt and taxation growth, but with 
taxation growth exceeding debt growth overall. The comparison of Argentina and 
Australia on these lines is somewhat similar prior to the postwar period. Both countries 
experienced relatively high growth in debt relative to taxation prior to the Baring Crisis. 
During WWI there was another burst of relatively high debt growth that was quickly 
followed by taxation growth in each. Yet the postwar period was remarkably different. 
Australia sustained a clear and remarkable growth in taxation, well in excess of debt 
growth. As debt was quite high in the mid twentieth century, this explains how the debt 
was so greatly reduced. Fiscal revenues grew even faster than debt. In contrast 
Argentina did not experience a single predominant postwar trend, as both debt and 
taxation growth rates were increasingly erratic. Relatively high taxation growth 
occurred in the mid twentieth century, but this then collapsed. The period thereafter is 
increasingly volatile and unclear. Figures 4.24 and 4.25 illustrate some similarity in 
Argentine and Australian fiscal and public credit prior to the postwar period, and their 
striking postwar divergence.  
Figure 4.26 
Argentine Path Dependencies, 1884-1985
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Sources: See Statistical Appendix, Table 4.26 
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Figure 4.27 
Australian Path Dependencies, 1850-1982
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Sources: See Statistical Appendix, Table 4.26 
 
Figures 4.26 and 4.27 compare taxation and debt as a proportion of GDP over time. 
State credibility should positively correlate with an increasing ability to tax and issue 
public credit. The Figures show that there was considerable divergence from WWI in 
tax and public credit that accelerated from WWII onwards. Until WWI debt and 
taxation were at similar levels, with Argentina being more successful at lowering total 
public debt. From WWI the Australian state increased public debt remarkably, which 
was soon followed by an equally remarkable increase in extractive taxation powers from 
WWII. By 1982 Australian federal taxation alone exceeded total public debt relative to 
GDP, indicating a very high level of credibility. Australia created a powerful positive 
path dependency of credibility and public credit over the postwar period. In contrast the 
extractive taxation power of the Argentine state remained low and constant, while 
public debt was small and declining until the 1960s. The Argentine state has not been 
able to raise a comparable level of debt as the Australian state since the late nineteenth 
century. In the 1970s Argentine public debt increased but fiscal institutions remained 
weak. This soon ended in default, despite the low ratio of public debt to GDP. The rise 
in Australian public debt due to the World Wars became an opportunity for initiating 
extensive further development of Australian fiscal institutions and public credit. This 
was a path that Argentina did not follow, and Argentine public credit appears lower in 
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the late twentieth century than it was in the late nineteenth century, reflecting a 
remarkable decline in state credibility.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter attempted to deal with the links between public credit, public goods, and 
state credibility. The postwar period emerges as the key period of divergence by all 
indications. State credibility from a fiscal institutional perspective (as was seen in the 
previous chapter) declined markedly in Argentina from the mid 1950s, while it 
markedly increased in Australia. Public credit followed a similar path, stagnating in 
Argentina in the postwar period. Not only did Argentine public credit remain small and 
insignificant, but it decreased in quality as unconsolidated debt became highly 
significant. This was in complete contrast to Australia where public credit grew 
dramatically, increasing in quality as it shifted to the less vulnerable domestic capital 
market. As for public goods provision, Argentina moved to monopolise and control 
many of the most important sectors of the economy and public goods via state 
enterprises. Yet the Argentine state had little experience of providing public goods 
directly, and was not very good at it. A particular problem was chaotic and non-
transparent public financing, especially in state enterprises. This also stands in contrast 
to Australia where the state had excelled at direct provision of public goods, but moved 
away from this model in the postwar period. Argentina’s move to direct provision of 
public goods in the postwar period was not reflected in an increased capacity for 
borrowing and taxation, which ultimately meant a path dependency of seigniorage and 
declining state credibility.  
 
The Argentine state’s new role as a direct provider of public goods could have 
significantly increased public credit and credibility had the new role been well executed. 
The Australian state had long fulfilled such a role, and shown much ability to deliver. 
This had enabled the construction of credibility amongst taxpayers by providing them 
with desirable public goods that promoted development, as well as building public 
credit with foreign lenders through a reliable rate of return. An activist state role 
requires both bureaucratic skill and sound management of public finances to be 
successful. The previously limited role of the Argentine state meant it had little to no 
such skill legacies. The state was relatively small in scope and the majority of public 
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financial history was poor and chaotic. The danger of the state providing extensive 
public goods necessary for development on such a foundation was that the state would 
monopolise their provision and fail in delivery. Should the state fail to deliver the 
necessary public goods, it would do more to obstruct development than aid it. The 
postwar history of the Argentine state reveals such an obstruction. The Argentine state 
did not develop either the bureaucratic skill or the necessary financial management 
necessary to fulfil a crucial and self-assigned role.  
 
All measurements above indicated that the postwar period was one of dramatic 
divergence between Argentina and Australia in terms of public credit, public goods, and 
state credibility. The roots of this divergence extend as far back as WWI, but did not 
really yield until after WWII. None of the measurements above indicate that Argentine 
public credit has ever been well developed. Possibly the period of greatest advance was 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, but even this needs to be qualified. The 
Bank of England’s bailout of the Argentine state during the Baring Crisis was prompted 
considerably by moral hazard, i.e. self-interest on the part of British creditors played an 
indeterminately large role in their decision to bail out Argentina and prevent open 
default, likely much less than their faith in Argentine public credit. Nonetheless the 
Argentine state shortly did show a responsibility to public credit, one that was 
reinforced by a credible commitment to the gold standard. This dramatically increased 
Argentine public credit amongst external creditors, as witnessed by the convergence of 
interest rates with Australia, and partly explains the increase in British capital flows to 
Argentina in the early twentieth century. Argentina’s anchorage to the gold standard 
meant a self imposed exclusion from the temptations of seigniorage. Yet the Argentine 
state proved unable to long resist this temptation once independent monetary policy was 
reintroduced from 1935. Australia did not allow itself the temptation, committing more 
or less to sterling until the 1970s. A necessary precursor for public credit is fiscal 
credibility, i.e. sufficient credibility to adjust fiscal revenue in accordance with needs. 
Argentina has yet to demonstrate the credibility and fiscal institutions that would be 
required to sustain public credit. This is especially evident in the historical incapacity to 
borrow significantly from an internally sourced capital market.  
 
How does a state build public credit and credibility? The comparative histories of 
Argentina and Australia show that Australia has a rich history of public credit and 
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public goods provision, while Argentina neither developed public credit nor much of a 
capacity for delivering public goods. In the long term, it is important that public credit 
and credibility are built through the provision of public goods (i.e. taxpayers are 
provided with a return). War and ideology have served as opportunities to dramatically 
and suddenly build both credit and credibility in Australia and elsewhere, despite the 
undoubted squandering of resources in the battlefield. This is not to say that war in itself 
is necessary. Whether war and ideology build or destroy state credibility and fiscal 
institutions is largely through the opportunity they provide via public credit. In Australia 
the World Wars combined with an increasing nationalist ideology and a great increase 
in public credit, which taxpayers proved willing to fund. This resulted in a great 
increase in state credibility, but an increase built upon former successes in public goods 
provision. It was also convenient that the actual physical destruction of the war was 
very largely overseas. In Argentina the World Wars did not provide a similar 
opportunity. Nor did the Argentine state fully utilise the earlier opportunities to develop 
public credit provided by global capital markets prior to WWI, when it might have 
established itself as a significant borrower and provider of public goods like Australia 
did. British investment learned from its mistakes and largely avoided Argentine public 
credit, preferring direct investment. Only from 1922 to 1945 did Argentina begin to 
develop public credit alongside an ability to provide public goods, but this proved 
extraordinary and was reversed from Perón onwards. External credit markets once again 
provided Argentina with opportunities to build public credit from the 1970s. At this 
time Argentina and Australia both began to borrow externally again on a large scale. 
This quickly led to default in Argentina, along with the collapse of military dictatorship, 
and leaving behind few tangible investments. The potential opportunity to build state 
credibility was worse than wasted, as heavy foreign debt greatly helped undermine 
credibility further. The building of public credit and credibility are obstacles that still 
stand in the way of Argentina’s long-term development.  
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Chapter Five: The Crux of Divergence, 
Income Taxation 
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‘there is a lack of agreement between those that determine public expenditure and those 
that pay for it. The State undertakes commitments … and taxation isn’t always 
concomitant with the magnitude and quantity of plans assumed by the State.’ (Peire 
1959), p.37 
 
‘In sum, it is the LACK OF SOLIDARITY between the taxpayer and the treasury that is 
the cause of evasion. Without that indispensable bond, without an acceptance, not 
formal but REAL of joint responsibility, it will not be possible to tackle those actions 
needed to achieve the common good.’ (Peire 1959), p.41 
 
‘For some time an apparently inexplicable transformation has been occurring in the 
general moral climate of the country [Argentina] … in a single word, dissatisfaction.’ 
(López 1957), p.47 
 
‘In Argentina legal and illegal tax evasion arose with extraordinary force with the 
beginning of the political war against the economy.’ (López 1957), p.54 
 
‘The Argentine tax system has been managed regressively from a social point of view. 
Income tax, instead of continuing its growth as it has in the most advanced countries, 
has been declining in Argentina, and regressive forms of consumption tax have been 
increasing. Argentina is following the opposite evolution of those countries advancing 
most quickly in economic and social terms.’ (Prebisch 1956), p.19 
 
Prime Minister Hughes – ‘the basis of true civic government rests upon taxation levied 
in proportion to the ability to pay.’ (Hansard), 11/12/1914, V.75, p.1639 
 
[Italics and translations in quotations above are mine.] 
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This chapter delves further into a particularly important insight gained from the broad 
fiscal comparison in Chapter Three. The brief success and failure of Argentine income 
tax was identified as a crucial feature of postwar divergence. As the statements above 
indicate, important contemporary observers noticed this. Prebisch directly addresses the 
decline of Argentine income tax and the socially regressive consequences as early as 
1956. López identifies a distinct change for the worse in the Argentine moral climate 
that increasingly justified tax evasion in 1957. Peire tackles the issue of evasion directly 
in 1959, which results from a ‘lack of solidarity between the taxpayer and the treasury’, 
impeding the achievement of the common good. Similarly Hughes sees progressive 
taxation as ‘the basis of true civic government’. Income taxation came to fulfil this role 
in Australia, but collapsed in Argentina. Income tax has been the only progressive tax in 
Argentina to earn significant revenue. As has been previously discussed, progressive 
direct taxation is the most potentially lucrative, socially just, and thereby desirable fiscal 
institution; but is also the most dependent upon state credibility. After a theoretical 
preamble this chapter is divided into four sections: the history of income taxation in 
Argentina and Australia; comparisons of the income tax experience; transforming 
income tax into a mass tax; and income taxation’s potential to deliver development. The 
comparative history of income taxation is an important part of the divergence story, and 
clearly shows the role that state credibility played.  
 
Preamble on State Credibility and Income Tax Cooperation 
 
The key experience in the postwar fiscal history of Argentina and Australia was the 
respective failure and success of income taxation. Argentina successfully, if belatedly, 
introduced income tax in 1932, which rapidly became a highly significant source of 
revenue. In the 1950s the Argentine income tax clearly began to fail, degenerating into 
an insignificant fiscal institution by the 1970s. Australia introduced a lucrative federal 
income tax in 1915 under the fiscal pressures of World War I (WWI), which became the 
most important fiscal resource from WWII.657 In the postwar period the federal income 
tax became the foundation of Australian fiscal institutions. Income tax also became the 
fiscal foundation of most developed societies in the postwar period, and has proven the 
                                                 
657 See Figures 3.8 and 5.1 
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most lucrative of all fiscal institutions. The rapid decline of Argentine income tax in the 
postwar period was peculiar, and was remarked upon at least as early as 1956.658 Yet the 
failure of Argentine income tax continued and has yet to be resurrected. Income taxation 
promises to be highly lucrative, but is also highly dependent upon state credibility due 
to the inherent dependence of income tax upon cooperation. Declining state credibility 
should make income tax increasingly difficult to sustain. A degeneration of income tax 
would then reinforce a decline in state credibility by reducing fiscal revenue and 
increasing the inclination to seigniorage. The different Australian and Argentine 
trajectories in income tax are an important proximate cause of postwar divergence in 
fiscal institutions, and, more importantly, wider divergence in development. Why did 
this difference emerge, and what does it tell of state credibility?  
 
The viability of income tax should be a strong indicator of state credibility. Income tax 
requires a high level of cooperation from individuals to honestly divulge their 
incomes.659 At some point individuals make a decision of how much, if any, income tax 
they are willing to pay. This can be seen as a cost-benefit calculation, where the costs 
and benefits of paying are balanced against the costs and benefits of not paying, with 
the balance determined by both the risk of being caught and the justice of income tax. 
Similarly, Levi sees individual income tax compliance as dependent upon how 
compliant society is, and whether the tax contract observes existing norms of fairness, 
including delivery of promised collective goods.660 The justice of income taxation is 
akin to state credibility, and plays a determining role in the calculation. The decision to 
cooperate is not a simple calculation, which is evident in the real world where the level 
of deterrence alone does not explain the degree of tax compliance. For instance the 
majority of Australian taxpayers pay income tax despite a very low risk of being caught 
evading, and the practice of self-assessment and voluntary compliance.661 This suggests 
other factors play an important role in individual decisions on income tax. The 
                                                 
658 Prebisch, R. (1956). Desarrollo Económico y Política Social. Mesa Redonda en la Universidad de 
Córdoba, Buenos Aires, Secretaría de Prensa de la Presidencia de la Nación., p.19. See other sources 
above and Secretaria del Consejo Nacional de Desarrollo, S. P. E. N. (1967). Estudios de Política Fiscal 
en la Argentina (Versión Preliminar), Republica Argentina, Presidencia de la Nación. 
659 This is arguably less important today as developed states are more able to measure employees’ 
incomes at their source and circumvent the need for individual cooperation to some extent. Nonetheless 
this still depends upon the willingness of people to work within the legal labor market as employees. 
660 Levi, M. (1988). Of rule and revenue. Berkeley, University of California Press., pp.146, 159-160 
661 Torgler, B. and K. Murphy (2004). "Tax Morale in Australia: What Factors Shape it and has it 
Changed over Time?" Manuscript re-submitted to Journal of Australian Taxation., pp.2-4 
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argument here is that the justice of income tax is a determining factor.662 As Peire 
observes in Argentina in the late 1950s: ‘there is a lack of agreement between those that 
determine public expenditure and those that pay for it.’ Such a situation meant the 
justice of Argentine income tax was very low. The justice of income tax is analogous to 
state credibility, and ultimately determines both individual cooperation and the viability 
of income taxation.  
 
State credibility and the justice of taxation determine the risk of not paying income tax 
in the long run. In the long run the chances of being caught and punished are determined 
by the proportion of people who feel that income tax is just and are willing to pay. If a 
large proportion is willing to pay, it is easier to find those who are not and vice versa. 
This is confused in the short run by the currently existing proportion that pays. In the 
short run it is possible for justice and risk to diverge. For example in a scenario of 
declining state credibility, a high proportion of taxpayers were willing to pay income 
tax but become less willing as credibility declines. In the short run most of these 
taxpayers will continue to pay due to the higher risk of being one of a few nonpayers, 
i.e. easier to detect. This acts to maintain income tax despite a decline in state 
credibility, and stems from the short run difficulty of coordinating individuals’ 
collective behaviour. This will remain true until an opportunity arises for a mass change 
in collective behaviour. Some examples are war, recession, and high inflation. Changes 
in state credibility may have to await opportunities for collective expression, but these 
inevitably occur in the long run. Path dependency thus gives currently credible states 
with lucrative income taxes a good deal of rope. Yet the Argentine example shows just 
how quickly and easily income tax can fail, via little more than inflation. The Australian 
example also shows that even a very well entrenched income tax can be seriously 
threatened by inflation.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
662 ‘humans are hard-wired not for logic but for detecting injustice. Trust, and the detection and 
punishment of injustice, lie at the heart of human society.’ Carr, G. (2005). The proper study of mankind - 
A survey of human evolution. The Economist. 377., p.11 
 237
The process described above can be condensed into an ideogram: 
 
             State Credibility                                                  Income tax justice 
 
        Opportunity for change in collective behaviour 
 
                                               Non-payment risk due to high proportion of taxpayers 
 
 
I History of Income Taxation 
 
Income tax has often proven a difficult fiscal institution to introduce. Britain was the 
first to achieve a significant income tax in 1799; taking advantage of the opportunity 
provided by war and national danger in 1796-99. This became permanent by the mid 
nineteenth century. England previously introduced a temporary income tax in 1660 to 
pay for war against France, which was preceded by income tax in the northern-Italian 
communes during the Renaissance.663 Prior to 1799 attempts at explicitly progressive 
taxation in Britain were strongly resisted despite proclamations of progressive intent by 
informed and politically important contemporary opinion.664 It was one thing to desire 
progressive taxation, but it was more difficult to actually introduce income tax. An 
emergency of war or fiscal rectitude could be of great assistance. Income tax quickly 
became important in Britain, and was the basis for Britain’s status as the first ‘fiscal 
state’ in the early nineteenth century.665 This achievement likely played a significant 
role in Britain’s exceptional early success in development. From the early nineteenth 
century Britain was a leader in income tax, sustaining a fiscal state, and in development. 
These processes were very likely interconnected. British income tax was so successful 
that it generated a movement for income tax elsewhere by the last quarter of the 
nineteenth century, and many nations began to adopt income tax from the early 
                                                 
663 Webber, C. and A. B. Wildavsky (1986). A history of taxation and expenditure in the Western world. 
New York, Simon and Schuster., p.337 
664 O'Brien, P. K. (1988). "The Political Economy of British Taxation, 1660-1815." The Economic 
History Review 41(1): 1-32., p.12-13, 17-22 
665 A fiscal state is one capable of combining its tax flows with long-term borrowing. See: Daunton, M. J. 
(2001). Trusting Leviathan : the politics of taxation in Britain, 1799-1914. Cambridge, UK ; New York, 
NY, Cambridge University Press., p.4-5 
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1890s.666 The history of income taxation is short, and begins in Argentina and Australia 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  
 
Argentina 
 
There was early support for income taxation in Argentina, from at least the late 
nineteenth century. In line with contemporary international thought, income tax was 
increasingly seen as an essential fiscal institution. In 1894 a book was published on how 
Argentine federal fiscal institutions needed to be reformed, which finds that the 
contemporary fiscal trend was away from indirect to more progressive direct taxation. 
The book concludes that income tax should become the foundation of Argentine fiscal 
institutions.667 This was followed by another call for more progressive Argentine fiscal 
institutions in 1909, when Nicanor Sarmiento finds that ‘the state cannot demand from 
its citizens a sacrifice that they do not have’ and should tax those better able to pay. 
This would ‘respect the economic and personal integrity of individuals’. The only way 
of satisfying such ‘justice is with a progressive tax over property and income.’668 In 
1914 the Socialist deputy Alfredo Palacios also called for reform. He finds Argentine 
fiscal institutions to be unscientific, regressive, responsive only to immediate revenue 
needs, and inconsiderate of individual circumstances.669 He highlights the regressive 
nature of fiscal institutions in their reliance on workers, as landowners went relatively 
untaxed. He also calls for more just and progressive fiscal institutions.670 In 1918 
Ernesto Hueyo, an important Argentine banker, called for an income tax, noting that the 
‘better organised nations’ had already introduced it. He argues that income tax is more 
in accord with democracy, more progressive, more socially just, and more elastic.671 In 
the early twentieth century there were various calls for more progressive and direct 
                                                 
666 Some nations also began to develop income taxation from an early date: Holland in 1797, Austria in 
1799, the duchy of Baden in 1808, and Russia in 1812; but the British income tax was the leading 
exemplar of success. Webber, C. and A. B. Wildavsky (1986). A history of taxation and expenditure in 
the Western world. New York, Simon and Schuster., pp.310, 337, 343 
667 Quesada, E. (1894). Reorganización del Sistema Rentístico Federal - El Impuesto sobre la Renta. 
Reorganización del Sistema Rentístico Federal - El Impuesto sobre la Renta, Los salones del Ateneo, 
Arnoldo Moen., pp.26,31 
668 The translation is mine, but the italics are from the original. Sarmiento, N. (1909). "El Impuesto 
Progresivo - Sobre la Propiedad y la Renta como base del Sistema Tributario." Anales de la Sociedad 
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taxation in Argentina, especially an income tax that would be more just and befitting of 
democracy. Support for such a progressive income tax has long historical roots in 
Argentina.  
 
The need for income tax as part of an overall reform of fiscal institutions was clear and 
obvious by the early 1920s. By this time income tax was the single most important tax 
in France, Germany, Sweden, Great Britain, and the US.672 Finance Minister Molina 
and President Alvear made an important attempt to introduce income tax as part of 
wider fiscal reform in 1924. Just previously, in 1923, an important conference was held 
in Buenos Aires on Argentine public finances by Gaston Jèze, which was openly 
attended by both Molina and Alvear. Jèze argues that a principal cause of Argentina’s 
constant budget deficits was the insufficient ability to raise revenue. Furthermore 
Argentine fiscal institutions were: 1) inelastic in their almost exclusive dependence 
upon consumption taxes; 2) unjust for a democracy, if not ‘antidemocratic’ due to their 
highly regressive nature; 3) incoherent, disorganised, and unplanned.673 He calls for a 
complete ‘recasting’ of Argentine fiscal institutions to be based upon three principles: 
‘democratic social justice’ (seen as essential in all modern democracies to avoid 
political breakdown), productivity, and elasticity (to address chronic deficits).674 Jèze 
argues that introducing an income tax is the single largest necessary reform in Argentina 
(alongside an inheritance tax), and would neatly address all three principles. He found it 
extraordinary that Argentina had managed to achieve such a high level of development 
in spite of a clear incapacity to formulate balanced budgets. Rather than a ‘program of 
government’, the Argentine budget was nothing more than a ‘bureaucratic forecast’ of 
revenue and expenditure.675 Introducing income tax would be a major step towards 
embedding balanced budgets and improving government. The influence of Jèze’s 1923 
conference on Molina’s 1924 attempt to introduce an income tax was likely large. 
Molina saw income taxation as part of a larger fiscal reform that would address ‘the 
                                                 
672 Webber, C. and A. B. Wildavsky (1986). A history of taxation and expenditure in the Western world. 
New York, Simon and Schuster., pp.451-452 
673 Jèze, G. (1923). Las Finanzas Públicas de la Republica Argentina, La Facultad de Ciencias 
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deficiency of our taxation system, which has changed little since colonial times.’676 He 
saw Argentine fiscal institutions as ‘incompatible with the normal development of our 
country’ due to their reliance upon indirect customs taxation.677 For Molina, as for Jèze, 
income taxation promised to be socially just (attenuating social conflict and enabling 
greater state social action), productive, and elastic (balancing the national budget).678 
Income tax was to be a just tax that would strengthen democracy and public finances.  
 
During the 1920s the budget was an object of contention between the less 
democratically successful Conservatives and the more successful Radicals (the Radical 
party dominated the federal state from 1916-30). The Conservatives and their allies 
increasingly saw the Radicals as fiscally irresponsible, which was a major reason for the 
1930 military coup. From 1923 to 1927 it became impossible to agree on a new budget, 
which meant a continual extension of the previous year’s budget. The strained 
relationship between the Executive and the Legislature in the 1920s meant that the 1923 
budget remained the standard, with only slight modifications, until 1931.679 This made 
fiscal reform such as income taxation much harder to achieve, as reforms were attached 
to the annual budget law to be presented by the President on May 1. The lack of an 
annually elaborated budget meant the Executive evaded Legislative control, permitting 
an increase in public expenditure.680 The deadlock of the 1920s not only prevented 
democratic fiscal reform, but also led many Argentines to perceive their state 
institutions (and perhaps democracy) as relatively backward. For instance: ‘In the most 
advanced nations, the budget is the primary concern of governments and parliaments, 
constituting the most serious political and economic act.’681 As Argentina clearly failed 
on this account, it was by inference a less advanced nation. Budgetary deadlock helped 
establish the cause against democracy in Argentina, making the pre-democratic past 
appear as a time when public finances were better managed. As the Argentine income 
tax came into being, it was observed that Argentina was following in the footsteps of 
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more progressive countries such as New Zealand.682 Ironically, it was only able to do so 
once democratic institutions were subjugated.  
 
It would have been preferable for Argentine state credibility and democracy to introduce 
income tax via a democratic process, such as Molina’s 1924 attempt. By not doing so, 
income tax and justice were more open to question. Why then did Molina’s democratic 
attempt to introduce income tax fail? Was it due to elite opposition, typically the reason 
for difficulties elsewhere? Failure appears to have been largely due to Molina’s 
overzealous reform package. Molina mistakenly coupled the introduction of income tax 
to a sweeping reform of fiscal-federalism, entailing the elimination of provincial taxes 
on production and trade to further unify the national market.683 These provincial taxes 
were forbidden in the Constitution, but had been re-introduced in the wake of the 1890s 
depression when the interior provinces faced financial difficulties.684 It was unwise to 
couple the introduction of income tax to the more contentious issue of fiscal federalism. 
Had income taxation alone been attempted, it could well have succeeded. Some 
provinces had no choice but to oppose Molina’s reform due to their dependence on 
internal taxation.685 Not only that, but the federal government was controlled by the 
Radicals, while the Interior provinces were controlled by the Conservatives. Molina’s 
reform would have increased the power of the federal government, and thereby the 
Radicals, which guaranteed the opposition of the Conservatives. The main obstacle to 
the 1924 income tax proposal was not the various elites, but the active opposition of the 
Interior provinces to the reform of fiscal federalism.686 In fact landowners were 
potentially in favour of it, as it could have reduced the larger threat of land taxation.687 
Industrialists were more concerned with protectionism and social policies than income 
tax. Molina’s 1924 reform also antagonised potential supporters. For example Hueyo, 
previously an open supporter of income taxation in 1918, openly opposed Molina’s 
                                                 
682 Bottini, E. B. (1931). Distribución del Impuesto. Conferencia de Extensión Universitaria, Pronunciada 
el 6 de Agosto de 1930 en la Sociedad "Luz", bajo el patrocinio de la Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, 
Buenos Aires., p.4 
683 Sánchez Román, J. A. (2004). "Chapter 2: Economic Elites, Regional Cleavages, and the Introduction 
of the Income Tax in Argentina." Unpublished., p.11 
684 Ibid., pp.18-21 
685 Internal taxation comprised almost 90% of Mendoza’s revenues, and almost 40% of Tucuman’s 
revenues. Ibid., p.22 
686 Ibid., p.2  
687 Ibid., pp.14-16 
 242
proposal.688 The introduction of income tax was likely needlessly delayed by tying 
income tax to wider reform of fiscal-federalism; at a time when the potential revenues 
could have greatly improved public finances and thereby the credibility of the new 
democracy. Poor public finances were seen as democracy’s greatest fault. Failure meant 
fiscal institutions continued on the unsteady course begun in WWI, which was largely 
due to a lack of revenue, not excessive expenditure. A 1927 US government study of 
‘Latin American Budgets’ found that Argentine public expenditure was ‘not excessive’, 
and that chronic budget deficits were caused by a failure to address the budget.689 Had 
income tax been introduced in 1924, poor public finances might have been ameliorated, 
removing a major reason for the 1930 military coup.  
 
Income taxation was introduced in 1932 unattached to a greater reform of fiscal-
federalism. Argentina was a relatively late starter as many developed states introduced 
income tax during WWI. Even within Latin America, Brazil and Mexico introduced 
income tax in 1924 and 1925 respectively, despite their much greater potential for elite 
opposition.690 The 1932 income tax overcame the constitutional obstacle of article 67, 
which stated that direct taxation was a provincial power and could not be levied by the 
federal state unless it was temporary and due to an emergency.691 Congress avoided the 
need for considering constitutional reform by simply introducing income taxation as an 
emergency temporary device valid for five years.692 Income tax nonetheless became 
permanent, even if it is now pervasively evaded.693 The reform of fiscal federalism, a 
separate issue, was later achieved in 1935 when the Provinces renounced internal 
taxation in exchange for the federal state’s assumption of their debts.694  
 
Unlike the proposed income tax of 1924, the income tax of 1932 was not advocated on 
grounds of social justice, but to increase revenue and shore up public finances. Enrique 
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Uriburu, Minister of Finance in 1932, often declared that the income tax was a 
necessity. Roberto Ortiz, Minister of Finance in 1936, also stated that the main reason 
for the income tax was to raise much needed revenue, as the state found itself unable to 
reduce expenditure as quickly as revenue declined.695 The 1932 income tax was 
somewhat less progressive than the income tax envisaged by Molina.696 Nonetheless the 
existence of progressive brackets meant social justice was an implicit goal. The 1932 
income tax was not explicitly addressed to social justice as Molina’s 1924 income tax 
was. A 1932 observation on the introduction of income tax finds that:  
‘It is the little pleasing work of our present government to have to re-establish 
the equilibrium of public finances and our national economy, a very difficult job 
… We must recognise that an unbalanced budget is the worst evil that can afflict 
public finances. … In order to achieve a balanced budget, the provisional 
government has implemented the income tax, that is the tax that has most 
contributed to the organisation of public finances.’ (Ramm Doman 1932), 
pp.202-3  
This portrays income tax as an evil made necessary by previous fiscal profligacy, not a 
means to achieve greater social justice. Likewise, a 1935 Ministry of Finance 
publication explains that in the early 1930s ‘The most important thing was to clean up 
the public finances. … The new taxes were undoubtedly heavy. But unfortunately they 
were necessary.’697 The final introduction of income tax had little to do with ideas of 
social justice, and was painted as a necessary revenue raising exercise.  
 
A more positive justification for the new income tax was the increased role of the state. 
The new income tax was also validated by a large program of new public works, and 
increased attention to the agricultural sector.698 This broadly concurs with the general 
theory of this thesis: that the state needs to be accountable to citizens/ taxpayers to 
achieve the common good necessary for development. Unfortunately the 1930s were 
undemocratic. The potential lack of fit at this time between desired public goods 
(expressed democratically) and those actually delivered may be evident in the state’s 
focus upon the traditional agricultural sector rather than the increasingly important 
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cities. A democratic polity would likely have focussed more upon urban public goods, 
as Argentina was highly urbanised. Perón’s later attack upon the agricultural elites, 
widely perceived as the power behind the 1930s regime, could be interpreted as 
resentful democratic retribution. Nonetheless the regime at least perceived the need to 
provide a return on taxation through the provision of public goods:  
‘The Executive Power believes that after demanding such an extraordinary 
sacrifice from the nation’s citizens [i.e. income taxation], it is equitable and 
fitting to return to the private economy, to whatever degree possible, the 
resources that are no longer indispensable to the nation.’ (Nación 1935), p.14  
Government in the 1930s was driven by a strong desire to make the Argentine state 
more credible, but the rural focus of public goods suggests the lack of democracy 
allowed it to be out of touch. A rural focus worked well in the late nineteenth century, 
but was outdated by the 1930s, as the burgeoning urban and industrial expansion begun 
in the 1920s required a shift in emphasis. This occurred in Australia during the interwar 
period, when there was a switch from rural to urban public goods driven by 
democracy.699 The 1930s regime thereby fomented later social conflict when democracy 
returned under Perón. Nonetheless the role of the state increased substantially at this 
time, successfully fostering much development.700  
 
The Peronist regime of 1946-55 greatly increased the historical level of state 
expenditure.701 Total state expenditure increased by 70% in 1946 alone, but revenues 
hardly increased, resulting in an enormous increase in the budget deficit. This was 
concealed by indirect financing, i.e. seigniorage.702 Perón’s regime also began the 
discredible habit of booking a large amount of expenditure outside the formal budget, 
amounting at times to around 50% of total expenditure.703 The bulk of this outside 
expenditure supported a policy of import substitution, being spent on IAPI (Argentine 
Institute of Trade Promotion), the Banco Hipotecario Nacional (National Mortgage 
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Bank), and the state rail system. The Peronist regime largely reversed the 1930s 
achievements in public finance. Public accounting had been widely reorganised from 
1933-38 to ensure that all state expenditure was within a single budget, and to eliminate 
unconsolidated (floating) debt.704 As the quality of public finances declined from 1946 
onwards, so did the justice of taxation, as there was an increasing lack of solidarity 
between taxpayers and state expenditure.  
 
The Peronist regime did mark the return of democracy, which meant the role of income 
tax shifted sharply back to the earlier aim of social justice. Income tax became an 
explicit tool for income redistribution alongside a then proven role of raising revenue. 
In 1950 the Ministry of Finance declared that tax was no longer simply to collect 
revenue but also to actively redistribute income.705 The income tax had always passively 
redistributed income, being a progressive tax paid only by the wealthy, but this was no 
longer deemed sufficient. The income tax was made more progressive, and new income 
taxes on extra profits and extraordinary profits were introduced. This was thought to be 
necessary in order to ‘destroy’ the situation of economic privilege that had governed the 
country.706 Perón converted income taxation into an aggressive tool for income 
redistribution, defying the wealthy few who actually paid it. The harsh language of the 
Ministry of Finance likely undermined the justice of income tax; just as increasingly 
shaky public finances undermined overall credibility. The irony of a faltering income 
tax was that the overall fiscal regime became more regressive. Prebisch observes in 
1956 that Argentine fiscal institutions were becoming more regressive, in stark contrast 
to other developed countries and earlier Argentine experience.707 Incompetent 
management of public finance appears to have played a large role in this. Seigniorage 
became the chosen instrument of the Peronist regime to fund an increase in social 
justice, but undermined the objective in the process.  
‘The excessive and disorderly intervention of the State has seriously disturbed 
the economy in detriment to its efficiency and, together with inflation, has 
generated sources of extraordinary benefits that contrast with desired social 
policy. The intervention of the State is certainly indispensable to accelerate the 
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rhythm of development and promote its social meaning.’ (Prebisch 1956), pp.33-
34 
There was nothing necessarily wrong with increased state intervention according to 
Prebisch, except how this intervention was financed. Instead of unjustly forcing 
contributions via inflation tax, the Argentine state needed to foster credibility and 
consent with taxpayers to finance desired expenditure.  
 
As seen in previous chapters, a massive decline in Argentine fiscal institutions began 
during the Peronist regime of 1946-55. In 1956 Federico Pinedo (a former Minister of 
Finance) pointed out a considerable increase in tax evasion in this period. One indicator 
was business, which declared a net income of 69% of total net income in 1942. This 
declined suspiciously to a mere 41% by 1955.708 Either relative business income 
declined massively as a proportion of the economy, or tax evasion increased 
enormously. Pinedo warned that income tax needed to shift from a tax on the wealthy to 
a mass tax, and that further attempts to increase the burden on the wealthy would not 
increase revenue. Increased revenues could only come from the taxation of middle and 
small income earners. Inflation meant this had occurred unintentionally via bracket 
creep, which pushed constant real wages into higher nominal brackets over time. Yet 
bracket creep was also seen as the primary reason for an intense increase in evasion 
begun in the 1950s.709 By 1960 one estimate found that half of all income tax was 
evaded.710 A more general reason cited for the extraordinary increase in evasion was the 
political war against the economy from 1946-55.711 After Perón the state floundered in 
an undemocratic setting to normalise and re-establish taxation through ‘blanqueos’, 
amnesties to reincorporate capital back into the legal fiscal system beginning in 1956. 
These efforts were undermined by repeated use, acting to increase evasion by 
entrenching expectations of future blanqueos. In 1958 the Secretary of Finance revealed 
that 70% of those taxpayers inspected were found to be evading tax.712 In 1959 income 
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tax evasion was estimated as being larger than the fiscal deficit.713 Another indication of 
how extensive evasion became was the breakdown in the parallel logic between GDP 
(an expression of the sum of individual incomes) and income tax in 1952.714 Tax 
evasion was part of a notable change in the overall moral climate, attributed to the 
dissatisfaction with inflation.715 The Argentine experience of evasion at this time was 
unusual. In the early 1960s income tax evasion was not a major problem in other high-
income countries.716 Even the tool of collecting income tax at its source, a means of 
reducing evasion elsewhere, was apparently a means for evasion in Argentina.717 In sum 
the decrease in income tax justice in the early postwar period quickly found collective 
expression in widespread and severe tax evasion.  
 
Argentine income tax evasion was attributed by one government source in the 1960s to 
three causes: 1) the lack of sufficient means to efficiently police evasion; 2) instead of 
evaders being punished, they were awarded with various opportunities for amnesty in 
the numerous “blanqueos”, which led to expectations of non-punishment; and 3) the 
inefficiency of state expenditure in some sectors served as a widely publicised 
justification for evasion.718 Of these three reasons, the last is the most fundamental and 
convincing, dealing with the underlying issue of state credibility. Poor public 
expenditure is a clear, just and obvious reason to evade tax. In order to build credibility, 
and thereby cooperation in tax, a state must act like a firm and provide public goods. As 
for the first two reasons, there can never be sufficient means to efficiently police 
evasion, and the blanqueos were a symptom not a cause of evasion (even if they helped 
entrench evasion). Yet the last reason was barely studied in the report. Peire more 
explicitly attributes the primary cause of tax evasion to something akin to low state 
credibility.719 The ‘taxpayer and the treasury’ came to be at odds in Argentina, the 
former spending what the other would not volunteer, with the deficit between them 
being settled in seigniorage. By the mid 1950s Argentina already demonstrated that 
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more complex fiscal institutions such as progressive income tax required cooperation 
stemming from state credibility. Some understood the essence of the problem, but they 
were paid little heed. Public finances continued to be grossly mismanaged, and 
taxpayers continued to be unwilling to fund public finances.  
 
Australia 
 
The origins of Australian income tax extend back to the gold boom of the mid 
nineteenth century. The surge in migration caused by the gold boom almost 
immediately coincided with increasing popular demands for more progressive taxation, 
including new taxes on land, income, and wealth.720 Taxation became a popular and 
contentious issue, as evidenced by riots against the gold license fee paid by prospectors 
that eventually led to its repeal. Yet in the short run the gold rushes led to greater public 
expenditure and an immediate need for increased revenue, which was obtained through 
further regressive indirect taxation. The first direct taxes, death duties, were introduced 
in 1851, but were relatively insignificant in terms of revenue.721 The push for greater 
democracy begun with the gold rushes meant that established ideas about taxation and 
the state’s role were challenged from the mid nineteenth century onwards. Before 
federation in 1901, this had led to progressive direct taxes on income and land in most 
colonies.722 This mirrored a similar movement in England, where accumulated wealth 
became an obvious target for taxation as democracy broadened. In the late nineteenth 
century most Australian colonies progressively discriminated against property income 
(versus income from ‘personal exertion’) with higher taxation rates, and some also 
adopted varying tax rates on incomes, land or estates.  
 
Progressive and direct taxation was introduced in the Australian colonies in the latter 
half of the nineteenth century as a result of the broadening of democracy begun with the 
gold rushes. The obvious economic, and inequitably distributed, resource in nineteenth 
century Australia was land, which led to the promotion of land taxation from the 1840s. 
Land taxation could be considered a rough form of income taxation in the nineteenth 
century Australian context, as land ownership clearly correlated with the ability to 
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produce wealth. Ineffective land policies allowed highly concentrated land tenure to 
continue for much of the nineteenth century, and most of the best public land passed to 
private freehold by the 1870s.723 The pastoralists’ inequitably large land holdings 
caused great public unrest. Land taxation was very popular, and was seen as a way to 
redress such inequity. Land taxes were among the first taxes put forward by the 
popularly elected assemblies from the 1870s. All the Australian colonies (States after 
1901) introduced land taxation between 1877 and 1915. This was driven by democracy 
but also by the need for greater revenues, as revenues from land sales and customs 
duties were declining.724 Yet the original aim of colonial land taxes was development, 
not revenue, as taxation was meant to ‘unlock the land’ for agricultural development by 
the smallholder. They were also specially designed not to discourage wealth creation 
and accumulation, levying tax only on the original unimproved value of the land rather 
than current capital value. The new federal state also introduced a land tax in 1910, 
which was the first to tax the extensive pastoral and grazing lands held by crown lease 
in western NSW, Queensland, the Northern Territory and northern Western Australia.725 
The federal land tax successfully encouraged subdivision and more intensive 
production, but may not have redistributed wealth (one of its intentions). It also raised 
much revenue, but was abolished in 1952 to compensate the States for their loss of 
income tax in 1942. As the Australian economy developed over the twentieth century, 
with new prosperities in industry and mining as well as from land, Australian wealth 
increasingly took the form of assets other than land.726 By the 1970s land taxation had 
clearly become partial and discriminatory, and was long superseded by income taxation.  
 
Australia’s first income taxes were introduced by the individual colonies in response to 
financial and budgetary crises. Tasmania and South Australia introduced income taxes 
in 1880 and 1884 respectively, followed by most of the other colonies during the 1890s 
depression. This was in line with international norms, as income taxation became 
increasingly widely adopted from the early 1890s.727 In order to overcome the 
objections of local elites, the budgetary threat had to be substantial (usually around 6-
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7% of output) before income tax could be introduced.728 By 1907 all Australian 
colonies/States had introduced income tax. Only the relatively less developed colonies, 
such as Queensland and Western Australia, were able to maintain a traditional 
dependence upon indirect taxation until after federation. This suggests that income tax 
was an important to continuing development as the economy became more complex. 
The greater resources generated by income taxation were necessary to foster broader 
collective action. New South Wales managed to delay introducing direct taxation until 
1895 by selling crown lands. Victoria initially found itself unable to introduce income 
tax due to the strong opposition of pastoralists, turning instead to heavy excise taxes. 
These regressive taxes were sold to the popular masses as protectionism, popularly seen 
as an employment policy by the early labour movement.729 Yet their primary purpose 
was to raise revenue. By 1895 Victoria also had to resort to income tax. Income taxation 
was established in the key Australian colonies by the late nineteenth century.  
 
A federal income tax was introduced in 1915 and soon came to monopolise income 
taxation. In contrast to earlier reactions against federal land and estate taxes, federal 
income tax was widely accepted due to the heavy financial pressures of WWI.730 The 
federal income tax was designed not only to raise revenue, but also to be progressive 
and redistribute income. It was the first Australian income tax to have continuously 
rising marginal rates and, initially, only taxed the wealthy. The federal income tax 
levied property income at a higher rate than personal exertion income (ended in 1953), 
and used all available means to be progressive. Prime-Minister William Hughes stated 
in 1914 that progressive taxation was ‘the basis of true civic government’.731 The 
federal income tax embodied that goal, aiming to achieve a more just society. Another 
MP, Mr. Finlayson, remarked in 1916 that the federal income tax was ‘a fair, 
reasonable, and proper method of taxation … incomes are, after all, the surest index to 
what people are able to pay by way of taxation.’732 Ideological support for progressive 
taxation was widely accepted. Opposition emerged, but was unsuccessful in checking 
the progressive intent. Dr. Earle Page, federal Treasurer and founder of the Australian 
Country Party, saw federal income tax as merely a war-time revenue raiser that needed 
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to be discarded as soon as possible: ‘The federal income tax was imposed to meet war 
necessities. … The Government is anxious that this form of direct taxation be … 
evacuated … at the earliest possible moment.’733 Despite his position as Treasurer, Earle 
Page was unsuccessful in renouncing federal income tax due to continuing financial 
pressures. His comments suggest there was a significant minority that were antagonistic 
towards income tax. Income tax quickly proved desirable for elasticity, as the 
experience of WWI proved the danger of dependence on indirect customs duties in the 
absence of trade. This strengthened the movement to direct taxation. As one MP, Mr. 
Anstey, put it ‘The Government is existing precariously upon revenue derived from 
Customs. It is living in a house of cards that may collapse at any moment.’734 From 
1915 onwards the balance turned increasingly against indirect taxation and towards 
direct taxation.735  
 
The federal income tax barely touched wage and salary earners in the late 1920s. In 
1928 only incomes above £250 were subject to income tax, when the living wage was 
below £52.736 Special wage taxes were introduced in the 1930s to fund the greater cost 
of public unemployment insurance, which meant wage and salary earners became used 
to paying direct taxes on income by the late 1930s. World War II furthered this process 
by officially entrenching the taxation of lower incomes, as income tax moved from an 
elite to a mass tax. The war meant that the federal state needed far more revenue, and an 
attempt was made to formalise the taxation of lower incomes in 1940 by lowering the 
exemption to £150, much nearer the living wage. This was strongly opposed and 
eventually led to a compromise where the exemption was lowered to £200.737 Such 
were the financial pressures of war that the exemption soon dropped to £105 by 1943, 
when the living wage was estimated at £60. From 1942 income tax became virtually 
universal at substantial rates for all income levels.738 The 1930s Depression and WWII 
were the opportunities whereby income tax was transformed from a tax on the wealthy 
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into a mass tax. The Liberal Treasurer in 1940, Mr. Spender, found that income 
taxation:  
‘was originally designed to produce a moderate revenue by taxing higher 
incomes with considerable severity while falling lightly on middle incomes and 
exempting lower incomes altogether. It is unfortunately necessary now to widen 
the field so as to obtain a substantial contribution from middle incomes. … All 
that it [Australia] asks is that burdens imposed shall be equably shared, 
according to its democratic ideals.’ (Hansard), 2/5/1940, Vol. 163, pp.479-81  
Income taxation came to be supported by all political parties, as long as it was ‘equably 
shared’, i.e. became a mass tax. This was sold as being part of ‘democratic ideals’. The 
move to a mass tax was also built on a strengthening of Australian nationalist ideology 
during WWII. For instance:  
Mr. Fadden (Assistant Treasurer) – ‘they [defence and war expenditures] are 
productive of ultimate immunity from conquest. Hence all classes are required 
to understand that the Government is taxing them for their own good, for the 
support of public safety, for the honour of Australia, and for the stupendously 
important purpose of financing the cause of the Allies in a war that has to be 
fought to a finish, if life is to be worth living.’ (Hansard), 9/5/1940, V.163, 
p.662  
The move to a mass tax was also an opportunity to change the administration of income 
tax and begin collecting at the source, which made income tax more easily enforceable 
on the much larger population on lower incomes:  
‘To make the [federal income] tax an efficient and equitable war-time 
instrument it is clear the field must be broadened into incomes under £400, 
which account for 70 per cent of the total personal incomes in Australia. … In 
the case of wage and salary earners arrangements will be made for taxes to be 
collected at the source since regular periodical contributions avoid the hardship 
of lump sum payments.’ (Hansard), 21/11/1940, Vol.165, pp.86-8  
The new tax collection system was called pay-as-you-earn (PAYE) and facilitated the 
move to a mass tax, beginning to withhold income tax on wage and salary incomes from 
1944.739  
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World War II provided an opportunity not only for moving income tax from an elite to a 
mass tax, but also for much needed fiscal-federal reform. The introduction of a federal 
income tax on top of already existing State income taxes complicated Australian fiscal 
institutions from a fiscal-federal perspective. A labyrinth of income taxation (upon 
dividend, company, and personal incomes) emerged in Australia from 1915, with all 
levels of government taxing incomes.740 By 1942 Australia had 26 separate income 
taxes. These varied to a large degree in principle, and burdened taxpayers unequally.741 
Some rationalisation of Australian fiscal-federal relations was necessary, but it was not 
until WWII that change became possible. Attempts at synchronising income tax in the 
fiscal-federal sphere began shortly after federal income tax was introduced, with many 
attempts between 1916 and 1942.742 The most important attempt at tax synchronization 
previous to WWII was the Uniform Income Tax Act in 1937, but was unsuccessful.743 
The federal state clearly expressed a desire to monopolise income tax as early as 
1923.744 World War II gave the federal state the opportunity to successfully monopolise 
income tax on the tenuous constitutional grounds of defence and grants powers.745  
 
The federal state determined that a large increase in revenues was required due to 
WWII, and much of this would have to come from income tax, but the ability to do so 
was seriously limited by State income taxes. The federal state felt obliged to limit its 
income tax to the highest rate imposed by any State, which meant a large proportion of 
incomes remained inaccessible to federal income tax.746 As a result the federal state 
imposed itself as the sole income taxation authority in 1942, ending the States’ ability to 
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levy income tax. The States challenged this on constitutional grounds but were 
ultimately unsuccessful in the High Court.747 This defeat quickly led to the States’ 
acquiescence as there was widespread support for tax simplification. The legislation 
became permanent despite being originally limited to the length of the war plus one 
financial year.748 The move to exclusive federal income tax marked a major reform of 
fiscal-federal relations, as well as allowing for increased progressivity. The long process 
of fiscal federal reform of income tax, from 1915-42, is an example of slow but 
ultimately successful democracy. Federal income tax originally complicated fiscal 
federal relations, but eventually led to fiscal federal reform in the federal state’s favour. 
In the meantime federal income tax stabilised federal fiscal institutions with significant 
and stable new revenue.  
 
Income tax was increased in 1943, and as the war came to an end the government 
wanted to lock in this increase. As a result the increase was renamed as a ‘Social 
Services Contribution’ in 1945, in anticipation of postwar pressure to reduce income 
tax. At the end of WWII there was widespread discontent among working people with 
income tax.749 The federal state desired to maintain high expenditure in order to pay for 
postwar reconstruction and welfare spending, rather than reduce taxation. The public’s 
distaste for income taxation’s transition from an elite to a mass tax was compensated by 
the provision of many desired public goods in the postwar period. For example a quarter 
of income taxation was allocated to a new National Welfare Fund for future expenditure 
on social welfare.750 This funded widows’ pensions (introduced in 1942), 
unemployment benefits (introduced in 1944), and child endowments. These increased 
the justice of income taxation by providing widely desired public goods, easing the 
transition to a mass tax. By the early 1960s the principle of mass taxation was well 
accepted, and the separated social services contribution was reincorporated back into the 
income tax. The ‘Social Services Contribution’ was always part of the income tax, 
being a separate tax in name only. This gave the state some breathing space to justify 
the 1943 income tax increase with greater public goods. The burden of income tax on 
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low and middle-income earners was not severe in the 1960s, and was generally seen as a 
fair price to pay for benefits received.  
 
The redistributional role of income tax slowly evolved in the postwar period. The 
original progressive structure in the 1950s slowly diminished as the ability to earn 
revenue slowly increased with bracket creep. This bracket creep was driven by low and 
persistent inflation in combination with a lack of adjustment in income tax brackets. 
This greatly helped entrench income taxation in the postwar period as a mass tax, as 
opposed to the pre-1942 identity as a ‘class tax’.751 Most industrialized nations followed 
a similar postwar trajectory.752 The crucial aspect of this positive bracket creep, as 
opposed to the destructive effects in Argentina, was that bracket creep occurred slowly. 
The effects were fairly imperceptible as inflation was low due to an avoidance of 
seigniorage. Australian income tax brackets were not adjusted from 1950-51 until the 
latter 1970s.753 This meant income tax became much less progressive over time and 
revenues greatly increased. By the 1970s bracket creep became a problem as inflation 
greatly accelerated. Much like in Argentina, this more rapid bracket creep spawned 
widespread evasion. Bracket creep became openly acknowledged and tax brackets were 
revised. The 29 brackets from 1950-51 were reduced to 14 in 1974-75, to 7 in 1975-76, 
and to 3 in 1978-79.754 By the 1970s many people had been pushed into much higher 
nominal brackets than their real incomes justified. Increased inflation from the late 
1960s pushed up the real burden of income taxation and coincided with increasing 
unemployment in the 1970s.755 Such evident injustice quickly led to widespread 
evasion, reducing progressivity and tax justice even further. Evasion became 
increasingly common, especially amongst higher income earners.756 Evasion combined 
with income tax concessions to compromise income tax as a means for redistribution. 
By the 1980s the Australian tax system was widely perceived as economically 
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destructive to production, consumption, saving and investment.757 Postwar Australian 
income tax policy was one of neglect in the face of bracket creep, which substantially 
reduced progressivity and eventually acceptability. Inflation led to a similar, if less 
disastrous, process as that which occurred in Argentina, by reducing income taxation 
justice. As Australian income taxation had become more entrenched as a mass tax by 
this time, it was more resilient. The Australian federal state also came to realise the 
injustice and implement significant reform to correct the situation, which did not occur 
in Argentina.  
 
The justice of Australian income tax greatly declined during the 1970s as evasion 
became increasingly normal.758 More rapid inflation eroded tax morale, promoting 
evasion by pushing average wages into the top marginal tax brackets. This coincided 
with a more socially conflictive political environment during the Whitlam government 
of 1972-75, which was the first postwar Labor government to win a federal election, 
launching a large and long awaited program of extensive social reform. The social 
conflict generated was so extensive that the Governor-General sacked the Prime 
Minister and his government in 1975, despite the probable lack of constitutional power 
to do so. Tax avoidance began to threaten the Australian income tax in the 1960s, and 
was facilitated by incentives to stimulate investment or support particular industries, 
especially by court interpretations that created large gaps in company taxation. This 
greatly increased in the 1970s, when inflation combined with the ambitious social 
reforms of the Whitlam Government and rising tax burdens.759 A failed attempt was 
made to index income taxation to inflation in 1976. This was followed by a Royal 
Commission in the late 1970s, which found that tax avoidance schemes had spread to 
the most respected members of society. New legislation in 1980 began to close the most 
obvious tax loopholes, but the income tax base continued to decline.760 Australian 
income tax appeared on the brink of entering a negative path dependency much as 
Argentina had. Income tax began an impressive recovery from 1985 as a result of the 
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‘National Taxation Summit’. This led to extensive reforms, including the introduction 
of capital gains and fringe benefits tax; an increase in the rate of company taxation to 
the top personal tax rate; a decrease in personal income tax rates; and the end of various 
industry concessions.761 These reforms were strongly opposed by the business 
community but reversed the considerable damage to income tax that occurred from the 
1960s to the early 1980s.  
 
Inflation seriously damaged Australian income tax from the late 1960s to the mid 
1980s. Unlike Argentina, Australia repaired income tax through significant reform and 
by ending high inflation. Australia thus avoided entering a negative path dependency as 
Argentina did. Ingenious ways of evading tax are no longer the popular dinner party 
topic as they were in the 1970s and 1980s. More exact evidence for income taxation’s 
recovery is found in a study of Australian tax morale, which compares tax morale in 
1981 and 1995. In 1981 Australian tax morale was well below the OECD average, but 
by 1995 morale was slightly above the roughly equal OECD average.762 The Australian 
state managed to dodge the bullet that eventually sank the fiscal viability of the 
Argentine state, but the obstacles to doing so were lower. Social conflict was much 
lower in Australia than in Argentina (no military coups have ever occurred in Australia), 
and the onset of inflation, while destructive, was after a long period of success that saw 
income tax entrenched as a mass tax. This long period of success meant income tax was 
more difficult to dislodge and that Australian fiscal institutions were more clearly 
dependent on it. It was clear that income taxation could not be allowed to die, and that 
the survival of income tax was crucial to sustaining the (beneficial) state. Another large 
and important difference is that Australia largely avoided seigniorage as a major source 
of revenue, as at least some of the high inflation of the 1960s and 1970s was due to 
external events. Australia managed to avoid opting for a negative path dependency 
centred on seigniorage, as Argentina did in the postwar period.  
 
II Comparisons of the Income Tax Experience 
 
As seen in Chapter Three, indirect taxation declined in importance as a source of 
revenue in Argentina and Australia until the mid twentieth century, as both sought more 
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762 Torgler, B. and K. Murphy (2004). "Tax Morale in Australia: What Factors Shape it and has it 
Changed over Time?" Manuscript re-submitted to Journal of Australian Taxation., p.18-21 
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equitable, stable and substantial sources of revenue from direct taxation in order to 
finance their states’ ability to play a significant and sustainable economic role.763 This 
was part of a global movement in developed countries. For instance in the 1920s 
indirect taxation provided about 35% of tax revenue in Britain, 50-60% in France and 
Germany, and 70% in Sweden (similar to nineteenth century fiscal norms).764 Direct 
taxation is more difficult to collect than indirect taxation because of an inherent reliance 
on cooperation. Hobson observes that a state’s ability to collect direct taxation 
(especially income tax) relative to indirect taxation is a good indicator of state 
strength.765 This idea, particularly in reference to the experience of income tax, is 
explored here. Income tax as a measure of state strength is easily expanded to include 
state credibility. A state’s ability to collect income tax indicates state strength, as this 
ability reflects the underlying faith of society in the state. A society that has faith in the 
state should cooperate with income tax. The proportion of income tax to revenue should 
be a broad measure of state credibility.  
Figure 5.1 
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Notes & Sources: Argentine data is ‘Income and Wealth taxes’ and is derived from (Mitchell 2003). Australian data is derived from 
(Vamplew 1987) and (Mitchell 2003). 
                                                 
763 See Figures 3.5, 3.6, 3.7, & 3.8 and discussion on indirect and direct taxation in Chapter Three. 
764 Webber, C. and A. B. Wildavsky (1986). A history of taxation and expenditure in the Western world. 
New York, Simon and Schuster., p.452 
765 Hobson, J. M. (1997). The wealth of states : a comparative sociology of international economic and 
political change. Cambridge ; New York, Cambridge University Press., p.234 
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The proportion of income taxation to revenue should positively correlate with state 
credibility. The comparison between Argentina and Australia shows remarkable 
convergence in income tax as a proportion of federal revenue until 1955, with striking 
divergence thereafter. In fact there is a brief period in the mid-1930s when the 
Argentine fiscal base is more dependent on income tax than the Australian. Argentine 
income tax was successful, as a proportion of federal state revenue, for at least twenty 
years, from 1932 until the mid 1950s. Using income tax as an indicator of state 
credibility, Australian credibility grew substantially from WWI onwards. In Argentina 
the initial success of income taxation reflected a fairly high achievement of credibility 
(at least amongst the wealthy elite paying income tax), despite a dearth of democracy. 
By the mid 1940s Argentine income tax largely reached a peak of success in terms of 
revenue, and began to openly fail from the mid 1950s. Argentine income tax 
experienced the first serious decline in the mid 1950s, but remained a significant source 
of revenue until the 1970s when there was a more or less permanent collapse. Both the 
1950s and the 1970s were periods of very high inflation. If the foregoing discussion on 
credibility and income tax holds, the failure of Argentine income tax from the mid 
1950s was caused and likely preceded by a failure in state credibility. This observation 
can be repeated for the final failure of Argentine income tax in the mid 1970s. The 
opportunity for collective change and evasion in both instances was high inflation. A 
change to a negative path dependency should have been preceded by a decline in state 
credibility, followed by an opportunity for a change in collective action. The 
opportunity in the late 1940s/early 1950s was an aggressive increase in income tax rates 
that combined with high inflation, and in the mid 1970s due to a very large increase in 
inflation. These opportunities greatly and rapidly increased the opportunities and 
justifications for evasion. The timing suggests a major failing in state credibility 
occurred sometime between the mid 1940s and mid 1950s. Argentine income tax has 
now long been an insignificant fiscal institution. In contrast the Australian federal 
income tax has remained the most important fiscal institution.  
 
III Entrenching Income Tax as a Mass Tax 
 
An important idea illustrated in Chapter Three is that the expansion of democracy 
should promote a shift in the weight of taxation from indirect taxation (paid by a poorer 
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majority) to direct taxation (paid initially by a wealthier minority). Income tax has been 
a popular means for achieving such a shift. If the wealthier minority is reasonably 
willing to pay the initial income tax, the increased resources of the state should provide 
an opportunity to provide more public goods. If the state seizes this opportunity to 
provide greater public goods that promote development, and thereby state credibility, 
the state will reinforce the process. Development will increase the overall wealth of 
society, enabling a greater proportion of people to afford income tax. This process could 
transform income tax from an elite tax on the wealthy few into a mass tax, one paid by a 
wealthier average, which would also entrench income tax. Income tax would move from 
being a relatively fragile institution paid by a few into a more permanent one paid by 
many. As the proportion of society that pays income tax increases, it becomes more 
difficult to coordinate collective action against income tax. Initially the successful 
introduction of income taxation typically depends on acceptance by a wealthy minority, 
but if the increased resources made available by income tax foster greater development, 
income tax should slowly become more widespread and less progressive. This scenario 
is confused by high inflation and can easily be frustrated, for instance if the state 
provides poor quality public goods or excessive collective goods that hinder and/or fail 
to foster development.766  
 
The ideogram below outlines the potential for income tax to encourage a positive path 
dependency of credibility and development:  
 
Income tax           Resources          Greater Potential for Public Goods Provision (PGP) 
 
Greater State Credibility                            Greater Development via PGP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
766 See previous chapters for further discussion. 
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Figure 5.2 
Wealthier minority vs. Poorer majority?, 1932-44
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
19
32
19
33
19
34
19
35
19
36
19
37
19
38
19
39
19
40
19
41
19
42
19
43
19
44
Top 25(Aus)
Aus payers/pop
Top 25(Arg)
Arg payers/pop
 
Sources: See Statistical Appendix, Table 5.2 
 
Figure 5.2 compares the Argentine and Australian experiences of income tax from 
1932-44. It looks at the proportion of income tax paid by the highest earning quarter of 
income taxpayers (as a proportion of the income taxpayer population). The period is 
highly significant. At this time the Argentine income tax was most successful, and the 
Australian income tax began to transit from an elite to a mass tax. What is striking from 
the comparison is the high dependence of income tax on a wealthy minority in both 
countries. Both Australian and Argentine income taxes were elite taxes for much of this 
period, as the top earning quarter of the income taxpayer population paid the vast 
majority of income tax. Australia’s greater dependence is lessened somewhat by the 
somewhat larger proportion of the population that paid income taxation by this time. 
The average Argentine proportion of the population that paid income tax was only 
0.85% from 1932-44. This compares to an Australian average of 4.05% prior to WWII 
(from 1932-39), but the Australian income tax was almost 20 years older. Few people 
were paying income taxation in Argentina and Australia prior to WWII, and of those 
few, an elite quarter paid the vast bulk (70-90%) of it. Income tax was then a fragile 
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institution in Argentina and Australia, dependent upon a small group of wealthy people, 
despite an increasing dependence upon income tax for revenue.  
 
The other striking feature of the comparison is that the Argentina is relatively static, 
while Australia evidences the beginning of dramatic change. With the commencement 
of WWII Australian income tax began a permanent shift from an elite to a mass tax. 
This change occurred too quickly to be due to greater development alone, enabled by a 
larger state capacity for public goods provision. Rather the state used WWII as an 
opportunity, via nationalism and national emergency, to demand a greater sacrifice in 
taxation. The external threat of war to the masses enabled their better cooperation with 
the state for the benefit of increased security. There was an impressive leap in the 
participation of income taxpayers as a proportion of the total population, from about 4% 
to almost a third of the population near the war’s end. This shift proved permanent. The 
move to mass income tax was later solidified by greater public goods provision and 
development in the postwar period. The great increase in the income taxpayer 
population was mirrored in a relative decline in the burden upon the wealthy elite, 
presumably because this elite was already paying much of what it was willing to bear. 
The important development in Australian income tax in the postwar period was the 
successful consolidation as a mass tax, evident in Figure 5.3 below. In contrast 
Argentine income taxation remained a fragile elite tax, never entrenching itself as a 
mass tax.  
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Figure 5.3 
Elite to Mass Income Tax - Australia 1915-70
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Sources: See Statistical Appendix, Table 5.2 
 
Figure 5.3 expands the Australian data from 1932-44 to 1915-70. It confirms that the 
shift to mass taxation began in WWII and was consolidated in the postwar period. The 
proportion of Australian income taxpayers continued to gradually increase, stabilising 
around 40% of the postwar population from the mid 1950s. The trend in the burden of 
income tax also continually shifted away from the elite top earning quarter of the 
population. This trend continued even after the proportion of income taxpayers to total 
population stabilised. Australian income tax thus successfully transited from an elite to 
a mass tax, which became less progressive over time. This was as an indication of 
success, at least prior to the emergence of rapid bracket creep and increasing evasion in 
the 1970s. Mass taxation meant the income tax became entrenched, i.e. more difficult to 
counter collectively, as well as becoming Australia’s fiscal institution par excellence. 
The Australian state became utterly dependent upon it. In order for income tax to be 
continually successful, the Australian state must have used the opportunity presented by 
the increased fiscal revenues reasonably well. This would have maintained the justice of 
income taxation. In contrast the Argentine experience shows an opposite trajectory, as 
the increased resources provided by income tax were not used effectively to provide 
public goods that delivered development. In Australia the delivery of postwar 
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development (or at least the ability of the state to not impede it) lifted all real incomes 
substantially over the postwar period, reinforcing the ability of the mass to pay income 
tax.  
Figure 5.4 
Elite to Mass Tax measured by GDP, 1935-52
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Sources: See Statistical Appendix, Table 5.4 
 
Figure 5.4 compares Australian and Argentine income taxation from the perspective of 
GDP. This also shows the similarity in Argentine and Australian income tax prior to 
WWII, as well as capturing the shift in Australian income tax from an elite to a mass 
tax. Australia and Argentina were remarkably similar in the amount of income that was 
subject to income tax relative to GDP prior to WWII, at around 10-13%. They were also 
similar in the amount of income tax that was paid as a proportion of GDP, at around 
1%. World War II resulted in a large, dramatic and sustained divergence, when 
Australia increased both the amount of income that was subject to income tax relative to 
GDP, and the amount of income tax that was paid relative to GDP. The War led to 
dramatic and sustained changes in both, reflecting the shift from an elite to a mass tax 
that occurred in the early 1940s. This further substantiates the story.  
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Figure 5.5 
How few? - Low Barriers to Collective Action - 
Dependence upon Elites (#s adjusted to Australia)
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Sources: (Nacion 1935-1945),(Maddison 2003); (Taxation 1915-60), (Maddison 2003) 
 
Figure 5.5 gives an idea of how dependent elite income tax was on the wealthy few. As 
an elite tax, income tax was exposed to fairly easy rebellion by the wealthy elites that 
paid the bulk of it. Figure 5.5 compares the number of elite individuals who paid the top 
quarter of income tax. This shows just how vulnerable Argentine and Australian income 
taxes were prior to WWII, dependent on the cooperation of surprisingly few individuals. 
After adjusting Argentine figures to Australia’s relative population size for the sake of 
comparison, the graph shows that the number of elite individuals was roughly similar in 
terms of total population prior to WWII. Unlike Australia, Argentine income tax 
retained a dependence on the wealthy few. The average number of such elite individuals 
was only 1694 from 1932-44, and the majority of them lived in the city of Buenos Aires 
and likely socialised together.767 The only region of Argentina to ever pay a significant 
share of income taxation was the federal capital, the city of Buenos Aires.768 The 
boundaries to the collective action of the Argentine elite in regards to income tax were 
not high. If there was a reduction in the perceived justice of income tax, it would not 
                                                 
767 This is the actual, not the adjusted number. 
768 The city of Buenos Aires was the source of 69-79% of income taxation from 1934-40. Calculated from 
Memoria 1940, Nacion, M. d. H. d. l. (1935-1945). "Memorias, Direccion General del Impuesto a los 
Reditos.", p.23 
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have been difficult for a change in path dependency from positive to negative to occur. 
Low barriers to collective action amongst the elite ceased to be true in Australia from 
WWII, as the bulk of the income tax burden spread to a much larger number of 
individuals coupled with greater administrative powers by collecting at source. Such a 
large number of disparate individuals was much more difficult to coordinate. The move 
to a mass tax greatly increased the barriers to concerting collective action amongst 
income taxpayers, entrenching income taxation and allowing a positive path 
dependency to take a stronger hold. In Argentina the aggressively anti-elite and socially 
conflictive democratic populism of Perón may have destroyed the elite’s willingness to 
pay income tax, engendering a silent but eventually powerful rebellion against the state, 
one that may have emanated from the country clubs of Buenos Aires.  
 
IV Delivery of Development and Entrenchment of Income Taxation 
 
Did income tax allow the state to deliver greater development, or at least not impede 
development by preventing a scramble for resources leading to seigniorage? There are 
indications that income tax was an important variable in a positive cycle of economic 
growth and development. To truly entrench income tax as a fiscal institution and sustain 
a shift to mass taxation, there should also be some delivery of development. This will 
not only increase the perception of income tax as just, encouraging the necessary 
cooperation, but will also mean more people can afford income tax. Increased 
development, especially if spurred by the provision of desired public goods, should 
increase tax morale and state credibility.  
 
The best way of increasing the proportion of income taxpayers must surely be to slowly 
expand the income tax base by raising incomes per capita as a result of development. If 
this is the case, a low level of inflation derived from increasing demand for resources 
could be useful to slowly spread income tax via ‘bracket creep’. Bracket creep has been 
a convenient means for expanding the income tax base, as income tax brackets are 
adjusted more slowly than inflation. People are slowly pushed into higher income tax 
brackets as their nominal wages increase. This is fine as long as inflation is low and 
largely driven by increasing demand from development, which would imply that 
increasing nominal wages partly reflect increasing real wages. Bracket creep removes 
the need for constant political settlements to increase income tax rates, but is a double-
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edged sword. Bracket creep can either help the process of entrenching income taxation 
or destroy income tax by spawning widespread evasion if it occurs too quickly with 
little development.  
 
Inflation due to discredible seigniorage can drive rapid bracket creep that should 
undermine the justice of income tax and encourage non-cooperation. This is a major 
threat to income tax, as bracket creep can push people very quickly into higher income 
tax brackets, the injustice of which is obvious, confronting, and widespread. Rapid 
bracket creep without a concurrent adjustment in income tax brackets can easily 
increase income tax beyond the ability of people to pay. This facilitates the coordination 
of collective action for evasion; a process that could open a vicious path dependency of 
lower fiscal revenues that drive increased seigniorage. As collective action to evade 
income tax succeeds, the state is further deprived the state of substantial resources. 
Rapid inflation due to seigniorage is thus an opportunity to switch from a positive to a 
negative path dependency.  
 
Encouragement of a vicious path dependency via seigniorage:  
   Seigniorage              High Inflation & Bracket Creep          Income Tax Injustice             
 
                     Decline in Fiscal Revenues                   Increasing Evasion 
 
Bracket creep helped entrench income tax in Australia until the late 1960s, early 1970s 
when it began to prompt increasing evasion. In Argentina bracket creep destroyed 
income tax in two blows, one with the high inflation of Peronism in 1946-55, and the 
other with the hyperinflation of the 1970s. Ultimately bracket creep is limited in the 
ability to raise income tax revenues by the rate of the highest income tax bracket. Once 
inflation has pushed everyone into that bracket, no further revenue benefits can be 
derived from bracket creep. In fact if such a point is reached, disregarding the 
encouragement of evasion, inflation results in declining revenues due to the ‘Tanzi 
effect’. This reduces real income tax revenues via the delay between assessment and 
collection, as the real value of money declines so rapidly during periods of high and 
hyperinflation. Income tax typically has the longest lags between assessment and 
payment. Taxpayers rationally choose to delay payment as long as possible, as their 
assessed payments are fixed in nominal terms while their real values constantly decline. 
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The Tanzi effect came into effect in Argentina during the very high inflation of the 
1970s, accelerating income tax’s final demise. Inflation can thus act to reduce the 
justice of income taxation due to overly rapid bracket creep, encouraging evasion, and 
finally undermine the capacity of income tax to collect revenue as inflation becomes 
very high.  
Figure 5.6 
Average Income Tax Rates, Inflation, & Evasion, 1932-
70
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Sources: See Statistical Appendix, Table 5.6 
 
The effects of bracket creep upon average income tax rates and evasion can be seen 
above. The average income tax rate (the proportion of total income tax to total taxable 
income) is an indication of bracket creep. As people are pushed into higher income tax 
brackets the average income tax rate increases. This can also occur via legislation. 
Figure 5.6 actually underestimates the average Argentine income tax rate from 1945 
onwards, by using an unweighted average of tax rates according to each bracket rather 
than total income tax/total taxable income. Nonetheless Figure 5.6 shows that prior to 
WWII, average Argentine and Australian rates were similar. With WWII, Australian 
average income tax rates increased dramatically to around 20%, and then declined 
somewhat in the postwar period while maintaining a substantial part of the previous 
gain. This was not due to bracket creep but to democratically endorsed legislation. After 
a slow decline, there was persistent but slow growth in average Australian income tax 
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rates from the 1960s onwards with bracket creep. The large changes in the average 
Australian income tax rate were due to legislation in this period, except perhaps in the 
late 1940s/ early 1950s when relatively high inflation corresponded with an increase in 
the average income tax rate. These largely democratic origins of increases in Australian 
income tax suggest credibility, being enacted by elected representatives. Argentina 
serves as a dramatic contrast, where average income tax and inflation rates increased 
dramatically during the Peronist government of 1946-55, surpassing the Australian 
average at least as early as 1947 and continuing to increase thereafter. The rapid rise in 
the average Argentine income tax rate was largely driven by inflation due to 
seigniorage, which should have undermined the justice of income taxation. By the 
1950s income tax evasion (see the estimated percentage of total income not declared in 
Figure 5.6) was quite high, increasing even further with the surge of inflation in the late 
1950s. This estimate corresponds to the contemporary literature that describes a recent 
and massive increase in tax evasion and fraud.769 As López puts it: ‘legal and illegal tax 
evasion arose with extraordinary force with the beginning of the political war against 
the economy.’770 Argentine income tax entered a negative path dependency of 
increasing non-cooperation and declining state credibility early in the postwar period.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
769 Pinedo, F. (1956). El Fatal Estatismo. Buenos Aires, Guillermo Kraft Ltda., p.88; López, A. T. (1957). 
"Las sistemas fiscales como generadores de deshonestidad." Revista de Ciencias Económicas 62., p.54; 
Peire, J. J. (1959). Evasión Impositiva. Buenos Aires, Talleres Gráficos "Fanetti".; TECHINT (1963). 
"Sistema Impositivo y la Presion Tributaria." Boletin TECHINT 134: 13-56., p.53; Secretaria del Consejo 
Nacional de Desarrollo, S. P. E. N. (1967). Estudios de Política Fiscal en la Argentina (Versión 
Preliminar), Republica Argentina, Presidencia de la Nación. 
770 López, A. T. (1957). "Las sistemas fiscales como generadores de deshonestidad." Revista de Ciencias 
Económicas 62., p.54 
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Figure 5.7 
Balance between average Income Tax and GDP growth 
rates, 1916-70
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Note: The above lines are five year moving averages. 
Sources: See Statistical Appendix, Table 5.7 
 
Figure 5.7 substantiates an answer to the question of this section: Did income tax allow 
the state to deliver development, or at least not impede development? It compares the 
growth in average income tax rates with GDP growth. To assess whether the growth in 
income tax is beneficial or destructive, account needs to be taken of how fast the real 
economy is growing. Real incomes can only grow as fast as the economy, and usually 
less so.771 If income tax rates are growing faster than the real economy, they will 
eventually be perceived as unjust and reduce tax morale. Is the burden of income tax 
compensated by growth in real incomes, thus helping entrench income tax? A state that 
successfully encourages development should be able to offset tax increases at least to 
the extent that it can offer growth in real individual incomes via development. In an 
ideal world the efficiency gains might be such that growth in income tax is negative 
when balanced against growth in real individual incomes. Figure 5.7 finds this was 
largely the case in both Argentina and Australia prior to WWII, when the average 
growth in income tax rates was less than the average growth in real GDP, asides from a 
brief period in the early 1930s in Australia. Making the large assumption that much of 
                                                 
771 The assumption that individual incomes grew as quickly as real GDP is unlikely in reality, as there 
would be some lag effect and not all growth would be evenly distributed. 
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this economic growth was enabled by the increased resources available to the state from 
income tax, income tax was not only important to development, but the cost/benefit 
calculation of income tax was also largely in favour of income taxpayers. In Australia 
WWII resulted in an episode of much greater growth in income tax rates than GDP, but 
this was due to legislation and was followed by an even more positive trend than 
previously. The Australian postwar experience is one where individual incomes may 
have grown faster than income tax. In Argentina WWII marks a watershed where 
income taxation begins to grow persistently faster than the economy, contrasting 
strongly with Australia. Australian state credibility should thus have been increasing in 
the postwar period, as the state increased income tax but also fostered and/or delivered 
the growth and development necessary to pay for it. The opposite was the case in 
Argentina, where state credibility should have been declining. The Argentine graph also 
implies that the fall in state credibility began as early as the mid 1940s.  
 
Or Disentrenchment and Tax Evasion? 
 
A comparison of changes in income tax rates and revenues is made below. Legislation 
and bracket creep led to generally increasing rates of income tax in Argentina and 
Australia, averaging about 10% and 5% respectively from 1933-62. This should have 
led to increasing income tax revenue (all other things being equal). If this did not occur, 
tax evasion is strongly suggested. What was the actual effect of growth in income tax 
rates on income tax revenues?  
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Figure 5.8 
Balance between growth in Income Tax Revenue (+) and 
Average Rates (-), 1933-62
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Note: The above lines are five year moving averages. 
Sources: See Statistical Appendix, Table 5.8 
 
In a healthy fiscal environment the balance above should be positive, or at least neutral. 
It is generally desirable that income tax revenue grows faster than income tax rates (i.e. 
the balance is positive), as this implies that there is increasing capacity to pay and low 
evasion. This is because income tax revenue is growing with the economy and/or 
responding well to changes in income tax rates. If the balance is negative, income tax 
rates are growing faster than income tax revenue. This suggests either income as a 
whole is declining due to recession, and/or tax evasion is increasing (more likely over 
time). A negative balance in spite of increasing average income tax rates due to bracket 
creep suggests that income tax is increasingly illegitimate. The comparison suggests the 
late 1940s and early 1950s as a crucial juncture in Argentina, as income taxation 
became more prone to evasion thereafter. This fits well with the foregoing, and gives a 
specific turning point. In contrast Australia shows a positive balance throughout, asides 
from the late 1930s/ early 1940s due to legislation. Apart from this episode the 
Australian balance is positive, suggesting a healthy postwar fiscal environment and a 
positive path dependency with development.  
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Figure 5.9 
Bracket Creep Argentine Style, 1932-62
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Note: The descending ‘Balance’ line is a three-year moving average of the Argentine data from Figure 5.8 
Sources: Asides from the ‘Balance’ line, the data is taken directly from (TECHINT 1963), p.50 
 
Figure 5.9 charts the effects of bracket creep on real (1932) Argentine incomes over 
time, using tax brackets from 1,000 to 1,000,000 pesos of income. It shows how income 
tax rates (as a proportion of net taxable income) increased over time in constant terms 
alongside the Argentine balance between income tax revenue and average rates from 
Figure 5.8 (the black line, using a three year moving average instead of a five year 
moving average). Initially income tax rates remained in a range of roughly 5-12% from 
1932-42, a period when income tax was widely accepted and became an important 
Argentine fiscal institution. The story changes thereafter. Three periods then emerge: 1) 
from 1943-49 when rates increased dramatically at first, then slowly increased over 
time, ranging from 3-26%; 2) from 1950-55 when there was another dramatic increase, 
followed by relative stability, ranging from 7-40%; and 3) from 1956 onwards when 
there were further and more regular annual increases, with rates ranging from 8-54%. 
When compared to the Argentine balance from Figure 5.8, the crucial juncture appears 
to be the dramatic increase in rates of 1950.772 This led to a sudden and persistent rise in 
evasion, which was only briefly reversed with Perón’s fall in the mid 1950s. The 
                                                 
772 Figure 5.9 uses a three-year moving average rather than a 5 year moving average to more precisely 
date the change. 
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dramatic increase appears to be the result of the Peronist government’s intention to 
convert income tax into ‘the axis of the taxation system’, especially as an aggressive 
tool for income redistribution.773 For instance:  
‘The point of view of the government of General Perón from 1946 has been to 
achieve greater justice ... for which it has been necessary to destroy the situation 
of economic privilege that governed the country’. (Nación 1950), p.29  
The dramatic increase of 1950 achieved exactly the opposite by undermining the justice 
of income tax, increasing evasion, and thereby moving the Argentine fiscal system 
solidly back on a regressive path. Income tax rates were increased but new forms of 
income tax were added to capture previously untaxed forms of ‘accidental’ income, 
including occasional earnings and extraordinary benefits. Between 1942 and 1955, 
income tax rates were increased 18 times.774 These measures were initially successful in 
increasing income tax revenue, but quickly failed thereafter as evasion became 
widespread. Income tax was rejected by its payers, who were often the explicitly 
targeted scapegoats of the Peronist government. Their rejection of more aggressive 
income tax under a hostile government is hardly difficult to imagine. Nonetheless the 
Australian experience shows that such mistakes are not necessarily intractable, and later 
governments failed to recognise the situation, and worsened it by increasing rates 
further. The turning point for Argentine income tax was the late 1940s, from which the 
Argentine fiscal system never recovered.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The different experiences of income tax emerge as a crucial juncture in the history of 
Argentine and Australian fiscal institutions and development. Argentina made a brief 
and successful attempt to establish progressive income tax, but this began to fail with 
the long period of high social conflict and inflation embarked upon from the mid 
twentieth century. The final decline of income tax was completed in the mid 1970s with 
the resurgence of very high inflation. The failure of income tax, from having been one 
of Argentina’s most important fiscal institutions in the mid twentieth century, was 
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774 Sales taxes were increased 56 times during this period! Blanco, E. A. M. d. H. d. l. N. (1956). La 
Política Presupuestaria, La Deuda Publica y La Economía Nacional. Conferencia dictada en la Escuela 
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almost total by the hyperinflation of the late 1980s. Few Argentines bothered to pay 
income tax in the late twentieth century. Australia on the other hand succeeded in 
transforming and entrenching income tax as a mass tax, one that the state had long been 
utterly dependent upon by the late twentieth century. Nonetheless the Australian income 
tax story was not an unqualified success, as a long and substantial period of evasion 
emerged from the late 1960s to the early 1980s. This was successfully reversed by the 
mid 1990s due to the large tax reforms of the mid 1980s.  
 
What does the experience of income tax tell of divergent development? It strongly 
indicates the different experiences of state credibility and thereby institutional capacities 
to positively influence development. Looking back to the initial quotes of this chapter, a 
great disparity emerged in Argentina from the 1950s between those that allocated state 
expenditure and those that paid for it. This was largely due to a failure of credibility. As 
the Argentine state greatly increased its economic role and expenditure, taxpayers were 
increasingly unwilling to fund it. Rather than taking steps to either convince Argentine 
taxpayers to pay (perhaps via democratic engagement and incorporation; and more 
desirable public goods and less collective goods) or reducing expenditure, the Argentine 
state chose the “easy” short-term political option of seigniorage. Seigniorage forced 
society to fund public expenditure, but with ultimately disastrous effects. Seigniorage 
only makes sense in the very short-run, being politically cheap and non-confrontational. 
Over the long run seigniorage exacerbates the decline of state credibility by 
undermining its foundations, such as income tax. No postwar Argentine government 
truly grasped the underlying fiscal expression of the political problem, which would 
have entailed considerable reform of fiscal institutions and an adjustment in state 
expenditure. This may have been due to a lack of understanding of the essential 
problem, one that appears yet to be grasped today. The lack of action was also due to 
increasing political instability that was partly a result of the negative path dependency 
Argentina was set upon from the mid twentieth century. As Argentine income tax was 
not transformed into a mass tax, failure was much easier and quicker when problems of 
credibility arose. The Argentine state became an increasing impediment to development, 
driven by an inability to legitimately fund itself, by a ‘lack of solidarity’ between state 
and society. Argentine institutions failed to encourage solidarity between state and 
society, an important expression of which was the level of income tax evasion. The 
comparison of income taxation clearly demonstrates the differing experiences of state 
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credibility, and the importance income tax revenues had upon the ability of institutions 
to positively influence development. Divergence in income taxation closely parallels 
divergence in development in the Argentine-Australian example, from approximately 
1950 onwards. The breakdown of Argentine state credibility and income tax was 
incredibly expensive, and the Argentine state has yet to be reconstructed on credible 
fiscal bases. The failure of Argentine income tax shows how quickly a successful fiscal 
institution can fail, via little more than inflation. The rapid decline of Argentine fiscal 
institutions and development is a warning of how fast things can go wrong.  
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‘The fiscal revenues of all the [Australian] colonies is much greater than that of the 
Empire of Brazil, whose income doesn’t reach 100 million patacones, in spite of its 
more extensive, fertile and watered lands, and a population four times greater. Is the 
difference due to character or institutions?’ (Newton and Llerena 1882), Vol. 6, p.350 
 
‘Bad governments have always had bad finances. This has delayed national progress, 
and squandered and misappropriated national revenues, while neglecting the need for 
their enlargement; nevertheless the country [Argentina], pushed by its own destiny, has 
grown by its own energy, carried out its historical ends, and become the first nation of 
South America. But so much more could have been achieved with good governments 
and good finances.’ (Rodríguez 1940), p.123 
 
‘Those countries that are well administered, that know where they are going and have a 
methodical order to their public finances, enjoy a credit that nations who march to the 
randomness of events, without calculations or precautions for the future, lack.’ (Mexía 
1913), p.170 
 
‘the [Argentine] Republic does not have the finances that reflect its national economy. 
There is a profound and radical opposition and contrast between Argentina’s economic 
“prosperity” and the chaos of its public finances.’ (Jèze 1923), p.19 
 
‘Hereby it is manifest that during the time men live without a common power to keep 
them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war; … In such condition 
there is no place for industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain: … and which is 
worst of all, continual fear, … and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and 
short.’ (Hobbes 2004), p.91 
 
[Italics and translations in quotations above are mine.] 
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State Credibility 
 
The particular conclusion the thesis draws from the Argentine-Australian comparison is 
that the construction of state credibility, expressed primarily through fiscal institutions, 
explains divergence. State credibility is an imprecise concept, but fiscal and monetary 
institutions, as well as public goods provision are measurable manifestations of it. The 
most fundamental of these are fiscal institutions. Legitimate fiscal institutions are 
necessary to support stable money and monetary institutions, and are also necessary to 
enable effective public goods provision. They facilitate a solvent state potentially 
capable of collective action. If fiscal institutions are to maintain their capacity to earn 
revenue, they generally need to provide society with a return, i.e. public goods. States 
that are embedded within their societies, that represent and attempt to foster them via 
public goods provision, should eventually encourage societies that are more capable of 
development regardless of initial geography.  
 
The thesis finds that the most fundamental variable within fiscal institutions is direct 
and progressive taxation, especially income tax. Income tax is particularly important in 
explaining divergence, as it has the largest impact upon the state’s capacity to deliver 
the necessary public goods without creating perverse economic incentives (e.g. inflation 
tax). Income tax has long been the most potentially lucrative source of fiscal revenue, 
upon which the solvency of many developed states depend. Yet direct taxation is 
particularly sensitive to state credibility, as it requires an exceptionally high level of 
voluntary cooperation. Compulsion alone is of very limited utility in regard to direct 
taxation. Indeed less credible and weak states are far more dependent upon indirect than 
on direct taxation.775 State credibility is crucial to the establishment of consensual, 
progressive, and lucrative direct taxation.  
 
The 1929 Perspective 
 
Did contemporary observers identify the potential for divergence before it occurred 
from the mid twentieth century? Looking forward to the unknown from the year 1929, 
around the peak of convergence, which country, Argentina or Australia, appeared to 
                                                 
775 Hobson, J. M. (1997). The wealth of states : a comparative sociology of international economic and 
political change. Cambridge ; New York, Cambridge University Press., p.19 
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have a brighter future? What were the views on state credibility and fiscal institutions at 
this time? Imagining the perspective of 1929 without the knowledge of what was to 
come, but only what went before, could the dramatic future divergence of Argentina and 
Australia have been predicted? Argentina was then proud of the recent past and 
confident of a bright future, albeit with seemingly short-term political problems. 
Argentina had vigorously joined the developed world, and had widely been seen as a 
developed country since the late nineteenth century.776 The progressive achievements of 
the early twentieth century were proudly displayed in the buildings and layout of central 
Buenos Aires; reflecting confidence, modernity and a widely held belief in progress. In 
1929 Argentina was near the peak of a half-century wave of development and 
transformation. A prediction of future demise would have been brave. Australia in 
contrast appeared prematurely aged for a new settler economy in 1929, having achieved 
little meaningful growth since the 1890s depression, almost as long a period as 
Argentina’s boom. British lenders were concerned over the Australian state’s future 
viability as a borrower. By World War II, the pessimistic view of the future was such 
that Australia decided it must either ‘populate or perish’. A prediction of Australian 
postwar success may have been as equally brave as a prediction of Argentina’s future 
problems. An historian comparing Argentina and Australia in 1929 might easily have 
been more confident in a brighter Argentine future.  
 
Yet important early twentieth century observers of Argentine fiscal institutions 
predicted grave future problems. The call for substantial fiscal reform in Argentina went 
back at least as far as 1894, when there was an insistence to reorganise Argentine fiscal 
institutions on the basis of income taxation, though this was not achieved until 1932.777 
In 1913 an important former Minister of Public Works predicted future developmental 
problems if Argentina did not learn how to budget beyond immediate revenues and 
expenditures, so as to enable the public goods necessary for continued development.778 
The public works the state managed to execute by 1913 were well below what was 
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required to continue Argentina’s progress. The Argentine state lacked a plan of 
investment in public works, such as ports and railways funded by public debt. Public 
investment was unplanned and financed haphazardly via annual budgets. To safeguard 
future development, it was necessary to separate an investment plan in public goods 
from the annual budget.779 This separated investment would have been financed by 
long-term public debt rather than directly from annual revenues. Until at least 1913 
Argentine public administration functioned despite serious errors, but only due to a 
combination of underlying economic success and the minor importance of public works 
directly undertaken.780 Argentine institutions consolidated sufficiently in the late 
nineteenth century to prompt development, but required further sophistication to 
maintain development, and this was evident to inside observers at least as early as 1913. 
The Argentine state already suffered grave underlying fiscal problems, evident in 
widespread fiscal and administrative incapacity and incompetence, and a need to 
develop greater capacities. It was marching ‘to the randomness of events’.781 
Consolidated under a powerful oligarchy and at a height of economic success in 1913, 
the Argentine state had yet to develop the institutions necessary to manage significant 
economic intervention that became increasingly important after WWII.  
 
The most prescient predictor of a dire Argentine future if fiscal institutions were not 
quickly reformed was Gaston Jèze. He was considered the French expert on public 
finance. His reputation clearly preceded him when he gave a conference in Buenos 
Aires in 1923 that was personally attended by President Alvear and Finance Minister 
Molina. In 1924 Finance Minister Molina made the most significant attempt to 
introduce income taxation prior to its successful introduction in 1932, and this attempt 
incorporated many of Jèze’s ideas. Jèze found it extraordinary that Argentina had 
managed to achieve so much development despite a clear incapacity to formulate 
balanced budgets. Rather than a ‘programme of government’, the Argentine budget was 
nothing more than a ‘bureaucratic forecast’ of revenue and expenditure.782 Jèze argued 
that all Argentina’s fiscal problems stemmed from an inability to form a budget 
reflecting a ‘programme of government’. He noticed the ‘profound and radical 
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opposition and contrast between Argentina’s economic “prosperity” and the chaos of 
public finances’, predicting that the resulting chronic deficit would ‘disturb long term 
economic prosperity’.783 This brave prediction followed from the cool logic of state 
credibility and fiscal institutions. The deficit could only seriously be overcome through 
a policy of fiscal reorganisation, of which income tax was the most necessary reform.784 
The necessary fiscal recasting should be guided by democratic ideas of ‘social justice’, 
best exemplified by progressive income taxation. This concern with social justice 
closely corresponded to state credibility. Jèze confidently predicts that Argentina would 
experience serious political tremors and social disturbance if it continued to ignore 
fiscal social justice.785 Shortly thereafter the Argentine state found it impossible to agree 
on a budget for the remainder of the 1920s. This was followed by the 1930 military 
coup and the decline of democracy, fulfilling much of Jèze’s worst predictions. 
Substantial fiscal reform in a democratic setting and upon the basis of social justice was 
never achieved. Argentina’s underlying fiscal problem, and the potent threat to future 
development, was identifiable and perceptible at the height of economic success.  
 
In Australia the 1920s were also a time of grim fiscal warnings for the future. British 
investors began to caution investors against Australia’s long-term fiscal viability, 
arguing that Australian public borrowing was unsustainable.786 Indeed Australia was 
less able to borrow externally from WWI onwards, and had to develop a more internal 
market for public debt as its borrowing needs continued to increase.787 Members of 
Parliament in the 1920s extensively discussed the impending fiscal dangers of excessive 
war borrowing coupled with insufficient taxation and growth. The fiscal squeeze of 
WWI quickly led to a federal income tax, which eventually monopolized the field of 
income tax and became the fiscal foundation of the Australian federal state from WWII. 
Nonetheless the federal income tax did not become the primary source of revenue until 
WWII. In the meantime WWI had to be primarily financed through borrowing, leaving 
a large and difficult debt burden through the interwar period. Australian public debt 
reached levels of more than twice GDP at this time, which combined with the 
experience of depression in the 1930s. More substantial revenue had to be found, and 
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federal income tax was the obvious path. As the debt burden was still very large by 
WWII, borrowing was ruled out as the primary source of funds, resulting in a fiscal 
revolution of sorts. The Australian federal state centralized substantial revenue powers 
that allowed for the eventual elimination of the debt carried from WWI. Ultimately the 
fiscal challenges posed by the World Wars in terms of expenditure were deftly exploited 
as opportunities to greatly expand the federal state’s fiscal range and revenue. Yet how 
did Australia survive the fiscal challenges of the interwar period and avoid fiscal 
collapse? The answer is that high levels of state credibility enabled Australia to borrow 
very large amounts relative to the underlying economy. Both Australian lenders and 
taxpayers ultimately retained their faith in the Australian state. The virtuous cycle of 
citizens’ faith in the state, reciprocated in credible fiscal management, was tested in the 
interwar period and emerged much stronger through the reforms of WWII. Australia’s 
postwar economic recovery was underwritten by the interwar construction of even 
stronger and more credible fiscal institutions.  
 
Nonetheless the Australian postwar period was not one of unlimited success in fiscal 
and economic development. The gap in relative GDP per capita that opened at the end 
of the nineteenth century has long persisted. Australia’s success was to maintain its 
relative position in GDP per capita despite declining terms of trade and considerable 
population growth. Yet the significant success of Australian fiscal reforms during 
WWII also meant fiscal institutions were allowed to stagnate without reform for much 
too long, to a point where they threatened continued development from the 1970s. The 
increasingly dire fiscal situation began to be addressed in the mid 1970s as Australia 
teetered on the edge of a major break in state credibility that was increasingly reflected 
in extensive tax evasion and avoidance. Yet Australia managed to confront the need to 
address fiscal issues and state credibility, restoring a more virtuous cycle from the mid 
1980s onwards. Once again: How did Australia avoid fiscal collapse? Beyond 
credibility two factors greatly helped: 1) the federal state had so long been dependent 
upon income tax by the 1970s that the failure of income tax was more clearly equivalent 
to the demise of the state; and 2) the successful transformation of income tax into a 
mass tax during WWII meant it was more resilient. Had the 1985 fiscal reform been 
postponed to 1995, the gloomy predictions of an Argentine future for Australia might 
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have been more prescient.788 Yet the counterfactual did not occur. Despite widespread 
lack of faith in the federal state evidenced in tax evasion, Australians retained and 
regained their confidence in the federal state, which was eventually reciprocated 
sufficiently to restore a virtuous cycle of credibility, taxation, public goods, and 
development. The Australian experience of the 1970s and early 1980s suggests that a 
virtuous cycle does not necessarily maintain itself. Thus it is potentially critical to the 
continued success of developed countries that the importance of the links between fiscal 
institutions, state credibility and public goods provision is appreciated.  
 
Geography and Institutions 
 
Newton and Llerena’s opening quotation neatly frames the debate over what determines 
development and divergence. In 1882 they compare the fiscal achievements of Australia 
and Brazil, asking how Australian fiscal institutions were so much stronger despite 
Brazil’s far richer factor endowments. Why had Brazil failed to translate these rich 
factor endowments into more substantial fiscal revenue and development? They wonder 
if this difference was ‘due to character or institutions?’ They answer that the difference 
was due to institutions, not character or what might be labeled culture today.789 
Geography was not the determining cause as Brazilian factor endowments in 
agriculture, population, and water were so clearly superior to those of Australia. Newton 
and Llerena were Argentines, or bonarenses, who travelled the world on behalf of the 
Buenos Aires’ provincial government. The purpose of their trip was to find models for 
future Argentine development, for which they looked to the then most advanced 
agricultural centres: England, the US, and Australia.790 Australia was easily their 
favourite, and was the focus of study in five of ten volumes. Their question and answer 
identifies similar elements to those identified in this thesis: institutions (especially 
fiscal) and geography (particularly factor endowments). The debate amongst which 
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elements are most responsible for development and divergence in these terms is at least 
as old as 1882.  
 
This thesis compares Argentina and Australia on similar terms. What is the relationship 
between geography and institutions, and how does it account for divergence? Which is 
more responsible for success in development and why? This thesis answers that 
institutions are primarily responsible for success or divergence in development, and that 
the primary institutions responsible are fiscal institutions. Fiscal institutions engender 
development via state credibility. Geography’s long-term impact is limited to how it 
affects fiscal institutions and state credibility. In the Argentine-Australian comparison 
these effects were small. Geography could have influenced fiscal institutions through an 
over-concentration of land tenure and the natural resource curse.  
 
Over-concentration of land tenure has been suggested as the primary reason for 
Argentina’s long-term institutional failure, as it led to an economic and political elite 
whose interests and inequality generated conflict that ultimately derailed development. 
As discussed in Chapter One, Engerman and Sokoloff argue that factor endowments are 
the fundamental causation of development as they determine institutions through their 
production function, e.g. slave plantations lead to dictatorial institutions, whereas small 
farms lead to democracy.791 They propose that North American development was more 
successful due to factor endowments that encouraged small farms. Argentina largely 
shared the same North American factor endowments, but this did not result in small, 
family-sized farms. In order to repair this apparent self-contradiction, they argue that 
Argentina’s response of inequitable land tenure was unique and thereby encouraged the 
wrong institutions. This argument is insufficient as it conflicts with Australian 
experience. Australia had highly concentrated and inequitable land tenure, but still 
managed to achieve successful democratic institutions that contained social conflict and 
engendered substantial development. A link from concentrated land tenure to fiscal 
institutions might be established by arguing that overly concentrated land tenure created 
an insuperable degree of inequality, such that direct and progressive direct taxation 
could not be generated. Yet both Argentina and Australia created substantial and 
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successful progressive income taxes in the first half of the twentieth century initially 
paid by wealthy elites.792 The fiscal problem that drove postwar divergence arose 
thereafter. As Argentina and Australia had similarly concentrated and inequitable land 
tenure, but experienced divergence nonetheless, land tenure cannot be the answer. In 
fact causation could easily run the opposite way, with land concentration resulting from 
the failure of fiscal institutions. As fiscal institutions fail they tend to create inflation, 
and the primary means of protecting wealth from inflation is to buy hard assets such as 
land.793 A poor institutional environment may mean that land is the only domestic 
commodity that holds value.  
 
The second means for geography to potentially impact fiscal institutions is via wealthy 
factor endowments that a small group can capture and control, thereby encouraging 
poor institutions, i.e. the natural resource curse. It could be argued along these lines that 
Argentina’s sheer wealth of factor endowments overly concentrated wealth (similar to 
land tenure above), but may also have meant that less capable institutions were required 
for development (the permutation of the natural resource curse explored here). In 
contrast Australia’s limited endowments may have necessitated a stronger state more 
capable of acting collectively sooner. Australia’s early development required an 
appropriate institutional environment as the primary factor endowment was usually poor 
pasture land. This was a comparative advantage only because of abundance. Excluding 
Antarctica, Australia is the world’s driest continent with some of the world’s oldest and 
poorest soils. The Australian state and its colonial antecedents were the leading 
investors in public goods such as railways, but also in scientific research to overcome 
problems related to low soil fertility, persistent drought, and a variety of plagues.794 It 
was able to play such a role due to high state credibility, reflected in solid fiscal 
institutions. In comparison Argentine endowments were so evidently rich that little 
collective action was required for development, beyond the establishment of order. 
Trade flourished once credible order was established, which perhaps resulted in a 
deceptively easy achievement of fiscal institutions (trade was then the basis of fiscal 
institutions). Trade in Australia had initially required greater collective action, and was 
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thus more of an institutional achievement. As staple exports declined in Argentina and 
Australia with changing international circumstances in the early twentieth century, so 
did fiscal institutions based on trade. This meant both polities then had to develop more 
difficult fiscal institutions.  
 
World War I initiated a long period when factor endowments in staple exports were 
suddenly less capable of delivering fiscal revenue and development. This new context 
meant institutions became more important to successful development. The achievement 
of public order alone no longer sufficed, and capacity to act collectively was 
increasingly important. Australia’s relatively poor endowments had previously required 
the development of institutions with significant capacities for collective action. 
Australia thus had an institutional head start over many developed countries, not only 
Argentina. Fiscal dependence on indirect taxation on trade was common amongst 
developed nations until WWI. Argentine institutions may have been more limited in 
scope than in Australia, but were nonetheless strong and credible during the gold 
standard period. The gold standard required strong and credible fiscal institutions to 
guarantee the commitment to gold. Monetary institutions are ultimately an extension of 
fiscal institutions. Since Argentina maintained a credible commitment to gold until the 
1930s, when the gold standard finally disappeared, Argentine fiscal and monetary 
institutions must have been fairly credible. In fact Argentina was considered ‘more 
orthodox than the core’ itself in the commitment to the gold standard from 1914-27.795 
Argentina succeeded in establishing a “good housekeeping seal of approval.” 
Geography may have influenced the under-development of fiscal institutions to the 
extent that Argentina was cursed by an over-abundance of factor endowments that made 
development relatively easy, i.e. development did not require institutions more 
sophisticated than those that could provide a basic level of order. Yet Argentina 
experienced almost half a century of development within a stable public order, which 
provided a large window of opportunity to develop broader, more capable institutions; 
an opportunity that remained open until at least the military coup of 1930. Argentina’s 
failure to develop more capable institutions was not simply determined by wealthy 
factor endowments.  
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New research on the natural resource curse shows that causation does not run from 
wealthy endowments to institutions. The natural resource curse is less a curse of 
resources than of institutions, which explains why some resource rich countries such as 
Norway and Australia are so successful. If the quality of institutions is controlled for, 
the resource course is only visible in countries with inferior institutions.796 In other 
words, institutions still determine success in development. Going one step further, the 
discovery of endowments often requires considerable investment, as is the case with 
minerals, oil and gas. Causation may well run from institutions to factor endowments, 
which are normally considered as geographically given. It may well be that Argentina is 
extremely well endowed in minerals, oil and gas, much better than is already known. 
Yet the institutional environment makes the considerable investment required to find 
these resources a fool’s game. It should be recalled that the Australian mineral industry 
only became sustainably important after significant foreign investment in the 1960s and 
1970s. Argentina’s high institutional risks combine with good opportunities for 
discovering similar resources in other locations, so that those companies with the 
necessary expertise look elsewhere. It was only when Argentina’s institutional 
environment improved with political consolidation in 1880, achieving public order, that 
development based on well-known, wealthy factor endowments could be pursued. As 
Argentina’s institutional environment declined over the twentieth century, growth 
became increasingly difficult in spite of wealthy factor endowments.  
 
In sum it is difficult to believe that fiscal institutions were significantly influenced by 
geography directly or indirectly. The Australian-Argentine comparison illustrates that 
geography is the more dependent variable. If a state can order its fiscal institutions and 
act collectively in society’s interests, initial geography is of little importance. 
Institutions largely determine geography. What determines successful institutions? The 
key factor is collective action, particularly state credibility, i.e. a society’s faith in the 
state to act collectively in the interests of society. State credibility enables fiscal 
institutions and the crucial provision of public goods, which are essential to 
development. Successful institutions depend upon the ability of a society to act together. 
The problem is bundling independently weak individuals and companies into something 
stronger. As discussed in Chapter One, Olson describes why such a process of achieving 
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successful collective action is so difficult to achieve. The rational individual interest is 
not equivalent to the social or collective interest, and this is increasingly true as a group 
increases in size. This thesis extends the collective action problem from one of groups 
within society to society as a whole, via the concept of state credibility. State credibility 
is revealed through fiscal institutions, monetary institutions, public goods provision, and 
public credit. Of these fiscal institutions is the most explicit and important. Fiscal 
institutions plainly expose how state and society are bundled together, indeed if they are 
bundled together. Powerful fiscal institutions indicate capable collective action and a 
strong state embedded within society, and weak fiscal institutions indicate the opposite. 
The predominant type of fiscal institutions also reveals the strengths and weaknesses of 
the bonds between state and society. For instance a dependence upon indirect taxation 
usually reveals state weakness, whereas reliance upon progressive direct taxation shows 
a credible and lucrative state embedded within society.797 The study of fiscal institutions 
is essential to understanding actually existing underlying political economies.  
 
How to explain convergence and divergence?  
 
Institutions were essential to successful development in all periods in Argentina and 
Australia, but different demands were made upon them at different times and places. 
Initially Argentina only required a minimal state, one that could credibly provide order 
and control revenue and expenditure so as to sustain the gold standard. When 
circumstances changed in the interwar period, Argentina was somewhat unprepared, as 
were many other relatively developed countries (Australia was more extraordinary in 
this regard). Argentina had not previously constructed the necessary fiscal institutions 
for a large-scale increase in state activity, and it was increasingly difficult to do so after 
the 1930 military coup. Institutional stability came to an end just as demands for wider 
and deeper institutions greatly increased. These wider and deeper institutions were 
necessary to continue the provision of public goods, many of which were formerly 
provided by foreign investment under the gold standard, especially public works and 
public credit. Future public goods would have to be administered by the state and be 
more dependent upon internal funding. At first Argentina successfully managed this 
transition in the 1930s, but the lack of democratic credibility ultimately undermined 
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this. In contrast Australia had a long tradition of building deep and wide institutions to 
support development, which had been built in conjunction with democracy.  
 
What determines development?  
 
Institutions determine development, and are themselves determined by collective action, 
particularly state credibility. State credibility enables fiscal institutions and the crucial 
provision of public goods, which are essential to development. Fiscal institutions are 
expressed annually through the budget. The budget is the core of the state and 
institutions: ‘The budget is a law in form, … But in fact the budget is not a law. It is a 
programme of government.’798 Avellaneda also saw the importance of the budget, that it 
was the fulfillment of ‘good administration’, which was the ‘truth of institutions’, and 
‘the most serious act of political and economic life’.799 The budget concerns the 
conversion of ‘financial resources into human purposes’, but the limitations of revenue 
mean that the budget is a mechanism for making economic and political choices.800 It 
reflects the power and political economy behind the state. The largest part of the budget, 
the base, is protected from serious scrutiny and represents ‘the pillars of society’. A 
comprehensive attack upon the budget is equivalent to a revolution, as it opens the 
social contract to renegotiation.801 Fiscal institutions are thus the essence of the state 
and institutions. They clearly express how state and society are bundled together, and 
their capacity for collective action. Fiscal institutions are fundamental to development 
not only to the extent that development requires collective action, but also to the extent 
that an enfeebled state can obstruct development.  
 
This thesis demonstrates that fiscal institutions are the base of a pyramid upon which 
the institutions necessary for development must be built. It is only when fiscal 
institutions are viable, that is capable of providing a balanced budget, that important 
                                                 
798 Italics and translation are mine. Jèze, G. (1923). Las Finanzas Públicas de la Republica Argentina, La 
Facultad de Ciencias Económicas de la Universidad de Buenos Aires y en el Instituto Popular de 
Conferencias de "La Prensa" bajo los auspicios del Instituto de la Universidad de París en Buenos Aires., 
p.52 
799 Avellaneda, N. A. s. o. P. N. A., 1874-80) (1928). Discurso de Presentación por el Académico Doctor 
Pedro Olaechea y Alcorta. Conferencia de Nuevo Académico Doctor Nicolas A Avellaneda en el acto de 
su recepción, Buenos Aires, Academia Nacional de Ciencias Económicas., pp.14, 19-20 
800 Webber, C. and A. B. Wildavsky (1986). A history of taxation and expenditure in the Western world. 
New York, Simon and Schuster., p.18 
801 Ibid., p.31 
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public goods can be provided. These public goods include monetary institutions, such as 
a national money, independent monetary policy, and a lender of last resort. Without 
these it is very difficult for financial institutions to develop, which are necessary for the 
widespread affordability of capital (essential for pervasive entrepreneurship). Of course 
the state can only provide such extensive public goods (directly and/or via regulation of 
the market) if it has the necessary fiscal institutions to be strong and credible. A weak 
state will have difficulty providing public goods even via regulation. Weak states are 
likely too prone to corruption to regulate the efficient provision of public goods. Yet 
public goods are essential to development as they provide widespread positive 
externalities that will not be provided sufficiently by the private market alone. Credible 
fiscal institutions are the essential foundation of public goods, regardless of how they 
are provided.  
 
Potential for Shifting the Focus of Development Efforts 
 
Ultimately this thesis contributes to the large and ongoing debate over what determines 
development, suggesting that state credibility and fiscal institutions are the most useful 
means for engendering development. The concept of state credibility focuses on the 
most salient aspects of engendering collective action and capable institutions. Future 
research will expand the comparison to further substantiate these ideas. The 
construction of state credibility and fiscal institutions should be a primary focus for 
fostering development. This does not yet appear to be the main focus of any important 
efforts at revitalising development and living standards. Indeed the Washington 
Consensus points in the opposite direction, of minimising and marginalising the state. 
Getting state credibility and fiscal institutions right means that everything else necessary 
for development can follow, but prospects for development will remain extremely 
limited as long as they are missing. As resources are always limited, it is essential that 
efforts to produce development focus on the most salient elements. The vast majority of 
the world’s population still live lives that are ‘nasty, brutish, and short’, without a 
credible ‘common power to keep them all in awe’  
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Statistical Appendix 
 
The following appendix is a mixture of primary and secondary data from selected 
Figures presented in the thesis. Figures that portray little manipulated data from readily 
available sources are generally not included. The order of the data follows the 
appearance of the Figures, with the number of each table corresponding to the number 
of the Figure.  
 
Table 1.1 – Australian Exports, 1861-1985 (proportion of total exports) 
Year Wool Gold/Mining Wool + Agriculture + Pastoral 
1861 27.01% 48.85% 51.15% 
1862 27.62% 51.38% 48.62% 
1863 24.35% 49.74% 50.26% 
1864 32.11% 45.26% 54.74% 
1865 32.49% 44.16% 55.84% 
1866 35.79% 45.26% 54.74% 
1867 39.67% 38.59% 61.41% 
1868 40.09% 45.16% 54.84% 
1869 35.82% 49.25% 50.75% 
1870 35.00% 43.89% 56.11% 
1871 41.47% 32.72% 67.28% 
1872 42.22% 32.89% 67.11% 
1873 41.67% 34.09% 65.91% 
1874 47.47% 28.02% 71.98% 
1875 48.40% 26.40% 73.60% 
1876 52.34% 21.70% 78.30% 
1877 52.81% 29.00% 71.00% 
1878 52.10% 23.53% 76.47% 
1879 56.13% 14.15% 85.85% 
1880 51.65% 16.12% 83.88% 
1881 48.00% 23.27% 76.73% 
1882 50.55% 19.05% 80.95% 
1883 55.81% 16.28% 83.72% 
1884 57.49% 8.01% 91.99% 
1885 50.19% 18.73% 81.27% 
1886 58.06% 13.82% 86.18% 
1887 64.10% 7.69% 92.31% 
1888 54.67% 16.26% 83.74% 
1889 58.78% 16.55% 83.45% 
1890 54.61% 15.02% 84.98% 
1891 56.11% 15.83% 84.17% 
1892 58.08% 12.28% 87.72% 
1893 50.30% 14.46% 85.54% 
1894 46.73% 17.13% 82.87% 
1895 46.43% 16.37% 83.63% 
1896 46.67% 19.39% 80.61% 
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1897 35.45% 34.13% 65.87% 
1898 34.83% 33.58% 66.42% 
1899 36.42% 24.69% 75.31% 
1900 28.48% 29.78% 70.22% 
1901 31.87% 39.62% 54.93% 
1902 30.75% 45.76% 50.85% 
1903 30.63% 49.67% 44.42% 
1904 31.03% 40.47% 54.63% 
1905 36.60% 31.61% 62.66% 
1906 34.09% 36.35% 58.67% 
1907 41.40% 29.94% 65.76% 
1908 36.88% 37.04% 57.65% 
1909 40.61% 24.68% 70.06% 
1910 40.11% 17.41% 77.58% 
1911 34.25% 26.12% 69.16% 
1912 34.74% 29.74% 64.87% 
1913 35.02% 19.44% 75.50% 
1915 38.04% 16.35% 76.25% 
1916 37.19% 28.97% 64.48% 
1917 30.00% 24.74% 69.05% 
1918 31.25% 20.41% 70.54% 
1919 40.38% 11.32% 78.11% 
1920 34.92% 10.37% 80.84% 
1921 26.74% 10.76% 81.33% 
1922 38.87% 7.53% 86.72% 
1923 49.74% 9.58% 85.19% 
1924 48.36% 10.93% 83.30% 
1925 39.84% 6.86% 88.86% 
1926 43.44% 10.52% 84.67% 
1927 42.35% 14.24% 81.47% 
1928 48.25% 8.54% 86.50% 
1929 44.48% 7.51% 87.94% 
1930 29.85% 28.38% 67.05% 
1931 31.34% 19.59% 75.71% 
1932 30.34% 15.41% 80.53% 
1933 30.74% 22.38% 73.99% 
1934 47.11% 11.88% 83.66% 
1935 35.57% 12.67% 81.36% 
1936 39.18% 14.16% 80.15% 
1937 39.46% 13.95% 80.11% 
1938 30.60% 15.82% 77.86% 
1939 31.44% 19.19% 74.39% 
1940 34.03% 19.53% 73.40% 
1941 25.60% 19.33% 67.16% 
1942 34.75% 10.96% 65.55% 
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1943 36.07% 5.46% 70.11% 
1944 32.14% 5.19% 71.37% 
1945 32.59% 7.19% 73.35% 
1946 36.10% 5.71% 71.43% 
1947 41.61% 6.09% 73.19% 
1948 37.03% 4.61% 79.55% 
1949 43.07% 5.77% 81.67% 
1950 51.44% 4.60% 85.62% 
1951 64.89% 3.64% 88.77% 
1952 49.05% 7.20% 79.15% 
1953 47.75% 7.71% 81.73% 
1954 50.90% 6.01% 82.02% 
1955 46.94% 5.45% 82.05% 
1956 44.41% 6.25% 78.68% 
1957 50.10% 6.42% 77.82% 
1958 46.86% 5.83% 76.16% 
1959 38.16% 5.87% 76.18% 
1960 42.44% 5.50% 77.13% 
1961 37.01% 7.04% 74.57% 
1962 35.77% 8.11% 75.18% 
1963 36.22% 6.59% 75.11% 
1964 35.39% 6.56% 76.30% 
1965 31.44% 7.84% 72.00% 
1966 30.03% 11.21% 67.83% 
1967 27.66% 10.86% 65.42% 
1968 24.52% 13.73% 60.07% 
1969 24.71% 17.13% 55.21% 
1970 19.33% 20.35% 50.51% 
1971 13.01% 22.28% 46.52% 
1972 12.39% 23.19% 46.97% 
1973 19.45% 21.22% 52.15% 
1974 17.34% 25.04% 48.62% 
1975 8.95% 29.73% 41.88% 
1976 10.42% 32.80% 41.62% 
1977 12.99% 33.10% 41.89% 
1978 9.93% 33.45% 38.93% 
1979 11.11% 31.22% 40.32% 
1980 8.77% 29.61% 41.79% 
1981 9.99% 29.23% 40.38% 
1982 9.75% 31.00% 36.71% 
1983 8.71% 33.92% 32.27% 
1984 8.37% 32.69% 31.76% 
1985 8.20% 32.36% 32.23% 
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Note: The third column, Wool+Agricultural+Pastoral, is estimated prior to 1901 by 
adding wool to ‘other’ exports, which appears to have been primarily agricultural and 
pastoral exports. Pastoral exports are composed of meat and fish. 
Derived from: (Vamplew 1987) 
 
Table 1.2 – Proportions of Cultivated Land according to Holding Size (hectares) in 
Australia (1910-11) and Argentina (1914) 
Land Area - Argentine Pampas Land Area-Australia 
50 or less 1.98% 20.6-40.5 1.48%
51 to 100 hectares 3.84% 40.9-202.3 14.95%
101 to 500 hectares 23.62% 202.7-404.7 15.41%
501 to 1000 hectares 9.27% 405.1-2023.4 30.29%
1001 to 5000 hectares 27.46% 2023.8-4046.9 9.03%
5001 to 10000 hectares 15.52% 4047.3-8093.7 8.57%
10001 to 25000 hectares 10.78% 8094.1-20234.3 10.69%
25001 hectares and more 7.54% >20234.3 9.59%
Derived from: (Argentina 1914), pp.3-7 & (Heaton 1925), pp.443-4 
 
Table 1.3 – Proportions of Land Holdings according to Holding Size (hectares) in 
Australia (1910-11) and Argentina (1914) 
Land Area - Argentine Pampas Land Area-Australia 
50 or less 34.71% 20.6-40.5 16.26%
51 to 100 hectares 17.89% 40.9-202.3 49.80%
101 to 500 hectares 37.33% 202.7-404.7 18.31%
501 to 1000 hectares 4.76% 405.1-2023.4 13.60%
1001 to 5000 hectares 4.30% 2023.8-4046.9 1.11%
5001 to 10000 hectares 0.71% 4047.3-8093.7 0.53%
10001 to 25000 hectares 0.25% 8094.1-20234.3 0.30%
25001 hectares and more 0.06% >20234.3 0.09%
Derived from: (Argentina 1914), pp.3-7 & (Heaton 1925), pp.443-4 
 
Table 1.4 – Concentration of Land Ownership in Buenos Aires Province (hectares), 
1836-1890 
Year 
Total Number of 
Holdings Average Size (ha)
Median Size 
Upper limit
Median Size Lower 
limit
1836 270 6657 5000 3751
1864 869 2771 1750 1001
1890 1740 1376 1000 501
From: (Sabato 1990), p.57 
 
Table 1.5 – Argentine Population and GDP per capita relative to Australia, 1870-2001 
Year 
Argentine Population relative to 
Australia 
Argentine GDP per capita relative to 
Australia
1870 101% 40%
1871  
1872  
1873  
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1874  
1875  
1876  
1877  
1878  
1879  
1880  
1881  
1882  
1883  
1884  
1885  
1886  
1887  
1888  
1889  
1890 109% 48%
1891  
1892  
1893  
1894  
1895  
1896  
1897  
1898  
1899  
1900 125% 69%
1901 128% 75%
1902 131% 71%
1903 135% 73%
1904 138% 74%
1905 141% 81%
1906 145% 78%
1907 148% 75%
1908 151% 78%
1909 154% 74%
1910 156% 73%
1911 158% 73%
1912 158% 77%
1913 159% 74%
1914 160% 66%
1915 162% 66%
1916 166% 63%
1917 169% 58%
1918 169% 71%
1919 167% 70%
1920 165% 73%
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1921 166% 71%
1922 168% 72%
1923 170% 75%
1924 173% 75%
1925 174% 71%
1926 176% 72%
1927 177% 75%
1928 179% 79%
1929 181% 83%
1930 184% 87%
1931 186% 85%
1932 189% 77%
1933 190% 75%
1934 192% 76%
1935 194% 74%
1936 195% 71%
1937 197% 72%
1938 199% 69%
1939 201% 71%
1940 201% 67%
1941 203% 63%
1942 204% 57%
1943 206% 54%
1944 207% 62%
1945 208% 63%
1946 209% 71%
1947 210% 76%
1948 211% 75%
1949 211% 70%
1950 207% 67%
1951 206% 68%
1952 206% 64%
1953 206% 65%
1954 205% 64%
1955 204% 65%
1956 203% 65%
1957 202% 67%
1958 201% 69%
1959 200% 61%
1960 199% 63%
1961 198% 68%
1962 197% 63%
1963 196% 58%
1964 196% 60%
1965 195% 63%
1966 194% 62%
1967 193% 60%
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1968 192% 59%
1969 191% 61%
1970 189% 61%
1971 188% 61%
1972 188% 62%
1973 188% 62%
1974 189% 64%
1975 189% 62%
1976 191% 59%
1977 192% 61%
1978 193% 57%
1979 193% 57%
1980 194% 57%
1981 193% 52%
1982 193% 50%
1983 194% 52%
1984 194% 50%
1985 194% 44%
1986 194% 46%
1987 195% 45%
1988 194% 42%
1989 194% 38%
1990 194% 38%
1991 194% 42%
1992 194% 44%
1993 195% 45%
1994 195% 46%
1995 195% 43%
1996 195% 43%
1997 195% 45%
1998 195% 45%
1999 195% 41%
2000 196% 40%
2001 196% 37%
Derived from: (Maddison 2003) 
 
Table 1.9 – Exports/GDP in Argentina and Australia, 1900-96 
Year Argentina Australia
1900  24%
1901  25%
1902  22%
1903  22%
1904  24%
1905  27%
1906  28%
1907  28%
1908  27%
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1909  24%
1910  25%
1911  24%
1912  22%
1913 33% 21%
1914 36% 20%
1915 35% 17%
1916 33% 17%
1917 25% 24%
1918 30% 20%
1919 36% 20%
1920 38% 24%
1921 29% 19%
1922 34% 19%
1923 31% 17%
1924 36% 17%
1925 28% 20%
1926 30% 18%
1927 37% 17%
1928 32% 17%
1929 30% 18%
1930 23% 14%
1931 34% 16%
1932 32% 18%
1933 29% 18%
1934 27% 19%
1935 29% 17%
1936 26% 18%
1937 28% 21%
1938 19% 19%
1939 23% 17%
1940 19% 19%
1941 17% 18%
1942 17% 17%
1943 17% 15%
1944 17% 20%
1945 16% 19%
1946 17% 19%
1947 15% 21%
1948 12% 24%
1949 9% 26%
1950 12% 26%
1951 9% 31%
1952 7% 21%
1953 10% 23%
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1954 11% 19%
1955 9% 18%
1956 10% 17%
1957 10% 19%
1958 10% 16%
1959 11% 15%
1960 10% 16%
1961 9% 15%
1962 12% 17%
1963 12% 16%
1964 10% 18%
1965 10% 16%
1966 11% 15%
1967 10% 15%
1968 10% 15%
1969 10% 15%
1970 10% 16%
1971 9% 15%
1972 9% 15%
1973 9% 17%
1974 9% 16%
1975 8% 16%
1976 10% 15%
1977 12% 15%
1978 13% 15%
1979 12% 15%
1980 10% 18%
1981 12% 16%
1982 12% 15%
1983 12% 15%
1984 12% 15%
1985 15% 16%
1986 12% 16%
1987 11% 17%
1988 14% 17%
1989 16% 16%
1990 19%  
1991 16%  
1992 15%  
1993 14%  
1994 15%  
1995 19%  
1996 20%  
Derived from: (Pinkstone, Meredith et al. 1992), p.393 & (Gerchunoff and Llach 1998), 
pp.463-5 
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Table 1.10 – Argentine & Australian Exports per capita in US$, 1948-2002 
Year 
Argentine Exports per 
capita (US$) 
Australian Exports per 
capita (US$) 
Argentine Exports per capita as 
a % of Australia’s 
1948 100.1229 214.2078 47%
1949 62.48503 201.5241 31%
1950 68.65769 202.9055 34%
1951 66.79919 242.6382 28%
1952 38.50029 201.3174 19%
1953 61.74134 229.4578 27%
1954 55.2598 186.4342 30%
1955 49.06011 194.266 25%
1956 48.97108 202.428 24%
1957 49.70325 231.643 21%
1958 49.82354 169.1246 29%
1959 49.74781 199.5516 25%
1960 52.34769 199.4667 26%
1961 46.01778 225.0457 20%
1962 57.12621 219.7625 26%
1963 63.13681 256.2299 25%
1964 64.24371 273.3419 24%
1965 67.0194 263.7871 25%
1966 70.47281 273.0626 26%
1967 63.87164 294.0299 22%
1968 58.82075 292.651 20%
1969 68.31627 343.5919 20%
1970 73.99957 380.4871 19%
1971 71.46435 406.8356 18%
1972 78.37659 492.9068 16%
1973 129.6232 713.1315 18%
1974 153.3848 805.5915 19%
1975 113.6802 859.5662 13%
1976 147.9918 937.3703 16%
1977 210.3676 940.9479 22%
1978 234.6864 1007.07 23%
1979 282.1954 1293.527 22%
1980 285.5251 1506.212 19%
1981 320.5416 1456.756 22%
1982 263.2617 1429.304 18%
1983 266.4488 1326.109 20%
1984 271.5337 1500.549 18%
1985 277.0533 1445.123 19%
1986 222.8336 1420.81 16%
1987 203.8872 1650.045 12%
1988 288.7251 2028.103 14%
1989 298.5852 2231.316 13%
1990 379.7603 2353.898 16%
1991 363.2686 2442.836 15%
1992 366.1222 2464.852 15%
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1993 387.3603 2426.087 16%
1994 456.3464 2663.784 17%
1995 603.0574 2938.905 21%
1996 675.9238 3295.505 21%
1997 738.8852 3396.912 22%
1998 731.372 2983.055 25%
1999 637.2525 2959.621 22%
2000 710.4922 3334.694 21%
2001 707.2508 3275.511 22%
2002 676.9087 3327.528 20%
Derived from: (International Monetary Fund) 
 
Table 3.1a – Federal Revenue as a proportion of GDP, 1884-1982 
Year Argentina Australia
1884 10.62%
1885 10.77%
1886 12.31%
1887 13.58%
1888 13.51%
1889 17.51%
1890 17.20%
1891 5.09%
1892 8.41%
1893 10.36%
1894 9.15%
1895 8.22%
1896 8.45%
1897 10.49%
1898 9.18%
1899 11.72%
1900 9.98%
1901 8.17% 2.58%
1902 8.51% 5.61%
1903 8.09% 6.24%
1904 7.85% 5.73%
1905 6.90% 5.69%
1906 7.01% 5.47%
1907 7.37% 5.25%
1908 6.73% 6.18%
1909 6.30% 5.52%
1910 6.71% 5.50%
1911 6.71% 6.06%
1912 6.81% 6.17%
1913 6.53% 6.02%
1914 6.00% 5.55%
1915 4.85% 5.90%
1916 4.84% 7.00%
1917 5.41% 7.33%
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1918 3.89% 7.54%
1919 5.17% 8.46%
1920 5.42% 9.13%
1921 5.44% 10.31%
1922 5.60% 10.24%
1923 6.10% 9.32%
1924 6.10% 9.15%
1925 7.22% 8.66%
1926 6.89% 9.33%
1927 6.75% 9.64%
1928 7.32% 9.36%
1929 7.22% 9.65%
1930 6.92% 10.86%
1931 7.98% 11.92%
1932 10.01% 13.04%
1933 8.57% 12.83%
1934 9.10% 12.03%
1935 9.11% 11.91%
1936 8.91% 11.52%
1937 8.33% 10.64%
1938 9.01% 10.62%
1939 8.75% 11.53%
1940 8.08% 12.46%
1941 7.09% 15.47%
1942 7.05% 18.55%
1943 6.86% 22.72%
1944 8.48% 25.98%
1945 8.02% 29.24%
1946 7.53% 29.36%
1947 9.05% 30.47%
1948 9.88% 27.42%
1949 9.81% 28.27%
1950 9.80% 25.11%
1951 9.86% 27.41%
1952 10.26% 30.86%
1953 9.13% 27.82%
1954 8.82% 25.03%
1955 7.37% 24.51%
1956 7.34% 24.13%
1957 6.86% 25.53%
1958 9.46% 25.19%
1959 8.97% 22.96%
1960 10.24% 23.12%
1961 12.08% 24.76%
1962 9.63% 24.25%
1963 8.79% 22.03%
1964 8.88% 22.21%
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1965 8.90% 22.19%
1966 9.31% 23.51%
1967 8.05% 23.89%
1968 7.34% 24.84%
1969 7.11% 23.27%
1970 7.56% 23.48%
1971 6.62% 23.07%
1972 6.67% 22.89%
1973 5.43% 22.71%
1974 6.12% 23.08%
1975 11.19% 27.47%
1976 12.23% 28.06%
1977 14.09% 28.87%
1978 15.95% 29.51%
1979 16.42% 28.16%
1980 12.76% 27.01%
1981 12.31% 27.00%
1982 10.62% 27.34%
Sources: For Argentina the figures are derived from: 1884-1899, (Della Paolera and 
Taylor 2003); 1900-82, (OXLAD). For Australia the figures for Commonwealth 
Revenue are derived from (Vamplew 1987) and the figures for GDP from 
(Mitchell 2003). 
 
Table 3.2 – Total Government Expenditure to GDP, 1884-1982 
Year Australia Argentina
1884 18.58% 15.89%
1885 18.08% 16.40%
1886 19.66% 15.87%
1887 17.46% 17.12%
1888 17.01% 19.86%
1889 16.59% 25.77%
1890 19.65% 22.42%
1891 20.02% 8.76%
1892 21.78% 10.00%
1893 22.08% 10.63%
1894 21.09% 10.75%
1895 17.84% 10.41%
1896 19.87% 15.67%
1897 22.58% 12.50%
1898 20.73% 20.92%
1899 19.88% 12.41%
1900 20.10% 10.34%
1901 20.42% 8.65%
1902 21.21% 12.64%
1903 21.38% 10.79%
1904 19.54% 10.17%
1905 19.19% 13.59%
1906 18.06% 10.25%
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1907 17.19% 9.14%
1908 18.60% 8.80%
1909 19.02% 11.68%
1910 19.22% 10.60%
1911 20.47% 10.60%
1912 22.34% 12.90%
1913 21.97% 11.12%
1914 22.38% 12.46%
1915 26.30% 11.56%
1916 27.84% 9.86%
1917 29.16% 9.11%
1918 29.21% 7.56%
1919 30.50% 7.20%
1920 31.09% 7.17%
1921 30.66% 9.80%
1922 29.25% 10.44%
1923 25.99% 10.11%
1924 26.62% 9.43%
1925 25.05% 9.78%
1926 28.13% 11.00%
1927 28.40% 13.57%
1928 29.69% 11.74%
1929 30.86% 12.71%
1930 32.86% 14.89%
1931 36.64% 15.46%
1932 35.35% 15.32%
1933 33.37% 16.11%
1934 31.73% 13.92%
1935 31.79% 14.34%
1936 30.85% 14.50%
1937 28.05% 14.06%
1938 27.59% 15.16%
1939 29.51% 16.14%
1940 32.06% 15.21%
1941 38.17% 14.57%
1942 45.94% 16.86%
1943 59.04% 18.12%
1944 59.15% 20.21%
1945 57.14% 20.46%
1946 49.13% 17.66%
1947 43.29% 17.87%
1948 38.17% 34.41%
1949 38.27% 27.69%
1950 37.20% 26.80%
1951 38.72% 25.53%
1952 45.30% 26.08%
1953 40.56% 26.92%
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1954 37.89% 29.55%
1955 36.33% 27.26%
1956 35.73% 24.15%
1957 37.01% 20.00%
1958 36.83% 26.12%
1959 35.32% 22.61%
1960 34.44% 22.39%
1961 35.95% 24.96%
1962 36.44% 24.61%
1963 29.87% 22.50%
1964 30.48% 21.01%
1965 30.86% 19.60%
1966 32.63% 21.49%
1967 32.69% 22.27%
1968 33.70% 22.26%
1969 32.06% 21.52%
1970 32.37% 21.44%
1971 32.19% 20.58%
1972 32.89% 19.60%
1973 32.12% 21.16%
1974 32.19% 23.44%
1975 37.08% 23.35%
1976 37.88% 22.15%
1977 38.21% 21.92%
1978 39.61% 24.27%
1979 37.93% 22.06%
1980 37.66% 23.68%
1981 38.13% 
1982 38.70% 
Note: from 1884-1912 Argentine expenditure is federal expenditure not total state 
expenditure.  
Sources: For Argentina the figures are derived from (Della Paolera and Taylor 2003). 
For Australia the figures are derived from (Vamplew 1987) 
 
Table 3.3 – Budget Deficits to GDP, 1884-1988 
Year AustraliaArgentina
1884 6.07% 5.27%
1885 5.54% 5.63%
1886 6.67% 3.56%
1887 4.90% 3.54%
1888 3.75% 6.35%
1889 3.69% 8.26%
1890 6.21% 5.22%
1891 5.94% 3.67%
1892 4.97% 1.59%
1893 4.85% 0.27%
1894 2.93% 1.60%
1895 2.29% 2.20%
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1896 2.86% 7.22%
1897 3.92% 2.01%
1898 4.24% 11.74%
1899 3.09% 0.69%
1900 3.37% 0.59%
1901 4.14% -1.68%
1902 5.01% 3.04%
1903 4.27% 0.67%
1904 2.83% 0.32%
1905 1.78% 4.92%
1906 1.01% 1.57%
1907 0.69% 0.34%
1908 1.03% 0.11%
1909 2.50% 3.46%
1910 2.61% 2.81%
1911 3.44% 2.55%
1912 4.66% 4.56%
1913 5.10% 0.60%
1914 5.34% 4.30%
1915 9.60% 3.50%
1916 11.73% 2.40%
1917 13.76% 4.60%
1918 12.69% 0.70%
1919 13.58% 0.10%
1920 11.97% -1.30%
1921 9.52% 1.30%
1922 6.89% 2.50%
1923 4.79% 0.00%
1924 5.17% 0.90%
1925 4.56% -0.50%
1926 5.79% 3.40%
1927 5.57% 1.80%
1928 6.00% 0.30%
1929 5.12% 2.70%
1930 5.44% 3.70%
1931 6.45% 0.80%
1932 4.45% 4.90%
1933 2.13% 1.30%
1934 2.81% 1.40%
1935 3.16% -1.00%
1936 2.76% 3.00%
1937 2.52% 4.00%
1938 2.32% 4.20%
1939 2.94% 5.00%
1940 5.22% 4.40%
1941 11.02% 7.60%
1942 17.47% 2.40%
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1943 28.25% 1.90%
1944 25.99% 6.00%
1945 19.01% 4.40%
1946 11.50% 8.20%
1947 5.16% 11.60%
1948 3.35% 15.60%
1949 2.94% 11.70%
1950 5.35% 6.80%
1951 5.97% 5.20%
1952 7.99% 5.80%
1953 5.84% 10.00%
1954 5.68% 9.50%
1955 5.06% 8.30%
1956 5.03% 5.20%
1957 4.38% 6.30%
1958 4.41% 9.30%
1959 4.91% 2.70%
1960 4.09% 2.70%
1961 3.98% 3.60%
1962 4.60% 3.60%
1963 4.76% 4.10%
1964 5.12% 5.00%
1965 4.17% 3.50%
1966 4.71% 2.70%
1967 5.50% 3.40%
1968 5.56% 1.70%
1969 4.09% 0.90%
1970 3.47% 1.80%
1971 3.09% 3.10%
1972 3.07% 3.70%
1973 3.64% 7.60%
1974 2.78% 8.10%
1975 6.56% 16.10%
1976 6.53% 13.60%
1977 5.91% 8.30%
1978 7.12% 10.30%
1979 6.49% 8.30%
1980 5.11% 9.10%
1981 4.61% 16.80%
1982 4.17% 19.60%
1983 21.00%
1984 10.00%
1985 6.57%
1986 6.02%
1987 10.45%
1988 10.75%
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Sources: For Argentina the figures are derived from: 1884-1912, (Vamplew 1987); 
1913-84 (Domenech, Cavallo et al. 1986); 1985-88 (Latinoamericanas 1991). 
For Australia the figures are derived from (Vamplew 1987) 
 
Table 3.4 – Argentine Export Taxation as a proportion of Federal Revenue, 1864-1993 
Year 
1864 27.62%
1865 28.53%
1866 25.81%
1867 19.41%
1868 18.11%
1869 20.12%
1870 12.49%
1871 15.25%
1872 12.67%
1873 10.86%
1874 12.47%
1875 12.21%
1876 19.02%
1877 16.87%
1878 13.13%
1879 13.25%
1880 17.82%
1881 17.51%
1882 14.47%
1883 10.96%
1884 9.06%
1885 6.02%
1886 4.26%
1887 2.77%
1888 0.00%
1889 0.00%
1890 0.00%
1891 0.00%
1892 7.75%
1893 5.69%
1894 7.97%
1895 6.77%
1896 5.50%
1897 5.07%
1898 4.54%
1899 3.60%
1900 2.92%
1901 4.72%
1902 4.05%
1903 3.15%
1904 2.65%
1905 2.43%
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1906 0.00%
1907 0.00%
1908 0.00%
1909 0.00%
1910 0.00%
1911 0.00%
1912 0.00%
1913 0.00%
1914 0.00%
1915 0.00%
1916 0.00%
1917 0.00%
1918 15.54%
1919 16.96%
1920 18.27%
1921 8.99%
1922 4.04%
1923 4.65%
1924 6.59%
1925 7.17%
1926 0.00%
1927 0.00%
1928 3.90%
1929 2.45%
1930 1.46%
1931 0.36%
1932 0.25%
1933 0.00%
1934 0.00%
1935 0.00%
1936 0.00%
1937 0.00%
1938 0.00%
1939 0.00%
1940 0.00%
1941 0.00%
1942 0.00%
1943 0.00%
1944 0.00%
1945 0.00%
1946 0.00%
1947 0.00%
1948 0.00%
1949 0.00%
1950 0.00%
1951 0.00%
1952 0.00%
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1953 0.00%
1954 0.00%
1955 0.00%
1956 13.34%
1957 8.39%
1958 1.22%
1959 10.49%
1960 6.34%
1961 4.77%
1962 3.79%
1963 15.16%
1964 12.58%
1965 2.80%
1966 3.25%
1967 9.06%
1968 9.33%
1969 6.46%
1970 6.18%
1971 6.69%
1972 10.46%
1973 15.45%
1974 7.63%
1975 8.22%
1976 12.37%
1977 4.87%
1978 1.97%
1979 1.89%
1980 1.43%
1981 0.99%
1982 3.44%
1983 9.24%
1984 7.57%
1985 10.29%
1986 5.34%
1987 1.54%
1988 1.29%
1989 14.76%
1990 8.57%
1991 2.10%
1992 0.17%
1993 0.06%
Derived and compiled from: 1864-89 (Cortés Conde 1989); 1890-1912 (Della Paolera 
1988); 1913-80 (Della Paolera and Taylor 2003); 1981-93 (Veganzones and 
Winograd 1997) 
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Table 3.7 – Argentine Sources of Federal Revenue, 1864-1993 
Year Direct Income Indirect Other Customs
1864 1.89% 0.00% 82.69% 15.42% 
1865 1.82% 0.00% 94.25% 3.93% 
1866 2.34% 0.00% 107.72% -10.06% 
1867 1.35% 0.00% 87.81% 10.84% 
1868 0.00% 0.00% 96.62% 3.38% 
1869 0.00% 0.00% 98.92% 1.08% 
1870 0.00% 0.00% 96.18% 3.82% 
1871 0.00% 0.00% 116.61% -16.61% 
1872 0.00% 0.00% 84.78% 15.22% 
1873 0.00% 0.00% 84.90% 15.10% 
1874 0.00% 0.00% 82.59% 17.41% 
1875 0.00% 0.00% 75.17% 24.83% 
1876 0.00% 0.00% 93.21% 6.79% 
1877 0.00% 0.00% 100.02% -0.02% 
1878 0.00% 0.00% 86.16% 13.84% 
1879 0.00% 0.00% 77.05% 22.95% 
1880 0.00% 0.00% 83.43% 16.57% 
1881 6.74% 0.00% 93.61% -0.35% 
1882 3.36% 0.00% 84.18% 12.46% 
1883 3.04% 0.00% 77.36% 19.60% 
1884 2.91% 0.00% 80.47% 16.62% 
1885 3.55% 0.00% 70.82% 25.63% 
1886 3.43% 0.00% 69.56% 27.01% 
1887 2.96% 0.00% 59.35% 29.59% 
1888 3.17% 0.00% 60.31% 28.51% 53.74%
1889 2.74% 0.00% 45.63% 51.63% 40.59%
1890 13.15% 0.00% 72.33% 14.52% 65.07%
1891 11.39% 0.00% 72.19% 16.42% 62.78%
1892 5.95% 0.00% 93.96% 0.09% 79.53%
1893 6.09% 0.00% 93.66% 0.24% 78.19%
1894 6.74% 0.00% 92.52% 0.74% 75.92%
1895 6.32% 0.00% 89.35% 4.34% 71.46%
1896 6.66% 0.00% 90.40% 2.94% 66.92%
1897 5.94% 0.00% 79.45% 14.61% 53.97%
1898 6.73% 0.00% 84.13% 9.14% 54.94%
1899 5.61% 0.00% 75.30% 19.09% 42.56%
1900 6.90% 0.00% 87.20% 5.90% 49.20%
1901 6.89% 0.00% 85.70% 7.41% 48.29%
1902 6.49% 0.00% 79.24% 14.27% 44.34%
1903 6.18% 0.00% 82.75% 11.07% 47.32%
1904 6.15% 0.00% 86.00% 7.85% 51.17%
1905 6.62% 0.00% 83.74% 9.64% 50.97%
1906 6.16% 0.00% 86.54% 7.30% 52.97%
1907 6.57% 0.00% 87.32% 6.12% 52.83%
1908 6.53% 0.00% 84.93% 8.54% 53.78%
1909 6.77% 0.00% 88.79% 4.44% 54.53%
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1910 6.22% 0.00% 89.97% 3.81% 57.17%
1911 6.61% 0.00% 88.39% 5.00% 57.01%
1912 6.72% 0.00% 86.09% 7.19% 55.95%
1913 7.55% 0.00% 86.24% 6.21% 56.89%
1914 4.00% 0.00% 85.65% 10.32% 54.70%
1915 4.26% 0.00% 83.85% 11.97% 47.13%
1916 4.24% 0.00% 84.49% 11.31% 50.23%
1917 4.61% 0.00% 82.70% 8.55% 45.93%
1918 4.44% 0.00% 85.79% 9.73% 68.80%
1919 3.57% 0.00% 85.60% 10.81% 70.97%
1920 3.14% 0.00% 89.15% 7.71% 79.73%
1921 3.40% 0.00% 83.40% 13.23% 62.23%
1922 3.58% 0.00% 88.54% 7.88% 61.45%
1923 3.11% 0.00% 90.45% 6.43% 64.63%
1924 3.98% 0.00% 88.04% 7.98% 68.56%
1925 3.87% 0.00% 90.88% 6.84% 71.13%
1926 4.15% 0.00% 88.12% 7.75% 61.91%
1927 4.04% 0.00% 86.27% 9.71% 60.01%
1928 3.88% 0.00% 88.97% 7.13% 65.41%
1929 3.94% 0.00% 87.26% 8.80% 61.91%
1930 4.55% 0.00% 86.68% 8.80% 58.24%
1931 4.38% 0.00% 77.29% 18.40% 47.68%
1932 27.48% 6.26% 72.23% 0.00% 39.49%
1933 27.80% 8.31% 72.20% 0.00% 40.09%
1934 28.18% 8.51% 71.82% 0.00% 38.67%
1935 27.79% 9.41% 72.21% 0.00% 35.05%
1936 27.67% 8.95% 71.90% 0.05% 32.81%
1937 25.10% 10.18% 74.38% 0.06% 36.22%
1938 27.65% 12.19% 71.86% 0.06% 33.26%
1939 29.19% 12.98% 70.39% 0.07% 29.13%
1940 31.03% 13.75% 68.65% 0.06% 25.32%
1941 32.59% 13.96% 67.10% 0.06% 20.67%
1942 36.96% 18.36% 62.79% 0.06% 16.83%
1943 42.41% 22.05% 56.81% 0.10% 10.24%
1944 47.52% 28.88% 51.59% 0.18% 7.85%
1945 53.98% 24.57% 45.24% 0.22% 6.91%
1946 53.21% 22.88% 45.84% 0.29% 10.80%
1947 62.27% 28.34% 36.92% 0.27% 12.56%
1948 65.07% 27.41% 32.94% 1.45% 8.86%
1949 64.15% 24.71% 34.16% 1.44% 4.20%
1950 64.69% 24.77% 34.73% 0.33% 2.89%
1951 60.31% 24.75% 39.23% 0.19% 4.77%
1952 63.54% 27.31% 36.18% 0.10% 2.88%
1953 62.56% 22.35% 36.39% 0.87% 1.57%
1954 62.91% 21.11% 36.77% 0.16% 2.00%
1955 63.03% 21.40% 36.04% 0.77% 2.42%
1956 65.10% 24.24% 33.96% 0.70% 2.45%
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1957 59.81% 24.30% 38.20% 1.71% 2.71%
1958 60.66% 25.54% 36.80% 2.29% 2.92%
1959 62.38% 26.49% 35.51% 1.81% 5.33%
1960 60.25% 25.07% 38.05% 1.34% 3.26%
1961 59.62% 23.27% 39.26% 0.87% 2.70%
1962 49.38% 16.90% 47.67% 2.61% 11.71%
1963 46.49% 15.37% 50.64% 2.62% 13.39%
1964 51.51% 14.45% 47.30% 0.22% 16.25%
1965 52.88% 19.87% 46.72% 0.11% 14.38%
1966 51.19% 19.79% 48.34% 0.09% 11.25%
1967 53.54% 17.52% 45.63% 0.06% 14.88%
1968 50.10% 14.78% 49.45% 0.05% 13.03%
1969 49.22% 15.23% 50.28% 0.04% 12.89%
1970 48.58% 13.83% 45.68% 4.56% 11.03%
1971 51.06% 13.01% 46.81% 0.81% 11.83%
1972 47.73% 12.54% 50.08% 0.07% 16.62%
1973 53.59% 12.49% 44.06% 0.19% 13.15%
1974 47.71% 9.89% 46.39% 3.84% 9.85%
1975 46.28% 6.50% 48.82% 1.07% 10.66%
1976 46.04% 8.26% 51.07% 0.10% 15.03%
1977 40.71% 10.44% 51.21% 4.44% 8.29%
1978 43.38% 9.52% 52.99% 0.80% 5.96%
1979 44.30% 6.70% 52.63% 0.02% 6.95%
1980 43.69% 8.02% 53.65% 0.01% 8.12%
1981 30.05% 9.87% 68.46% 0.02% 9.39%
1982 29.98% 8.68% 68.68% 0.10% 9.48%
1983 28.93% 8.03% 68.58% 1.46% 14.43%
1984 31.20% 4.94% 66.17% 1.38% 12.13%
1985 35.77% 6.04% 61.65% 0.18% 15.11%
1986 37.71% 7.05% 60.33% 0.02% 11.87%
1987 40.24% 9.34% 54.52% 3.35% 9.78%
1988 40.21% 10.50% 56.44% 1.20% 7.90%
1989 38.17% 12.54% 58.30% 0.56% 18.53%
1990 39.39% 4.53% 57.95% 1.60% 11.16%
1991 38.57% 4.58% 57.76% 2.39% 5.45%
1992 38.87% 7.12% 58.45% 2.39% 5.50%
1993 41.68% 10.34% 55.40% 2.87% 5.79%
Figures are derived from: 1864-89 (Cortés Conde 1989); 1890-1913 (Della Paolera 
1988); 1914-31 (Vazquez-Presedo 1971); 1932-93 (Veganzones and Winograd 
1997) 
 
Table 3.8 – Australian Sources of Taxation, 1850-1982 
Year Direct Indirect Other Income Tax Customs 
1850 0.00% 74.41% 25.59% 0.00% 74.41% 
1851 0.00% 90.32% 9.68% 0.00% 89.72% 
1852 0.00% 93.69% 6.31% 0.00% 93.33% 
1853 0.00% 95.13% 4.87% 0.00% 95.13% 
1854 0.00% 87.88% 12.12% 0.00% 87.88% 
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1855 0.00% 87.73% 12.27% 0.00% 87.73% 
1856 0.00% 89.77% 10.23% 0.00% 89.77% 
1857 0.00% 92.44% 7.56% 0.00% 92.44% 
1858 0.00% 91.13% 8.87% 0.00% 91.13% 
1859 0.00% 90.37% 9.63% 0.00% 90.37% 
1860 0.00% 90.05% 9.95% 0.00% 90.05% 
1861 0.00% 89.17% 10.83% 0.00% 89.14% 
1862 0.00% 88.93% 11.07% 0.00% 88.81% 
1863 0.00% 88.49% 11.51% 0.00% 88.49% 
1864 0.00% 89.65% 10.35% 0.00% 89.65% 
1865 0.00% 84.66% 15.34% 0.00% 83.60% 
1866 0.00% 83.35% 16.65% 0.00% 81.08% 
1867 0.00% 85.28% 14.72% 0.00% 82.60% 
1868 0.00% 85.02% 14.98% 0.00% 82.38% 
1869 0.00% 85.02% 14.98% 0.00% 82.46% 
1870 0.00% 84.02% 15.98% 0.00% 81.42% 
1871 0.00% 81.08% 18.92% 0.00% 77.52% 
1872 0.00% 85.97% 14.03% 0.00% 82.28% 
1873 0.00% 87.07% 12.93% 0.00% 83.11% 
1874 0.00% 85.86% 14.14% 0.00% 80.86% 
1875 0.00% 82.07% 17.93% 0.00% 80.49% 
1876 0.00% 83.36% 16.64% 0.00% 81.18% 
1877 0.00% 82.60% 17.40% 0.00% 80.36% 
1878 0.97% 82.04% 17.00% 0.00% 79.20% 
1879 3.96% 78.82% 17.22% 0.00% 76.33% 
1880 2.26% 79.27% 18.48% 0.13% 74.19% 
1881 2.67% 79.94% 17.39% 0.18% 72.40% 
1882 2.17% 81.56% 16.28% 0.14% 73.70% 
1883 2.20% 80.75% 17.05% 0.14% 73.02% 
1884 2.06% 80.49% 17.45% 0.12% 72.91% 
1885 1.99% 80.43% 17.57% 0.12% 72.13% 
1886 4.14% 78.94% 16.92% 0.11% 70.63% 
1887 3.13% 79.09% 17.77% 0.13% 69.24% 
1888 2.93% 79.84% 17.23% 0.13% 68.48% 
1889 2.53% 80.30% 17.17% 0.42% 69.10% 
1890 2.60% 79.41% 17.99% 0.48% 66.23% 
1891 2.94% 78.58% 18.49% 0.82% 68.70% 
1892 3.16% 78.97% 17.86% 1.08% 69.30% 
1893 3.81% 76.40% 19.79% 1.43% 66.19% 
1894 4.12% 76.46% 19.42% 1.40% 67.08% 
1895 6.35% 73.52% 20.13% 3.45% 64.72% 
1896 5.79% 76.64% 17.57% 3.50% 67.37% 
1897 9.28% 73.35% 17.37% 5.86% 63.84% 
1898 9.82% 73.23% 16.96% 4.46% 62.72% 
1899 8.53% 74.49% 16.98% 4.55% 63.55% 
1900 9.72% 73.36% 16.92% 5.25% 64.21% 
1901 9.45% 73.37% 17.17% 5.38% 63.38% 
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1902 8.63% 74.92% 16.44% 4.83% 65.23% 
1903 11.23% 73.53% 15.24% 7.46% 64.71% 
1904 10.61% 72.82% 16.56% 7.09% 62.54% 
1905 11.79% 71.22% 16.99% 7.70% 61.04% 
1906 11.96% 71.02% 17.02% 8.08% 59.85% 
1907 11.58% 70.17% 18.25% 8.04% 58.63% 
1908 9.11% 73.23% 17.66% 6.73% 63.65% 
1909 8.64% 71.87% 19.49% 6.64% 61.65% 
1910 8.53% 72.78% 18.69% 6.79% 61.16% 
1911 8.51% 74.11% 17.39% 6.45% 58.45% 
1912 9.87% 73.83% 16.31% 7.73% 57.84% 
1913 10.32% 72.54% 17.15% 8.12% 58.60% 
1914 12.44% 69.58% 17.98% 10.38% 54.18% 
1915 13.72% 70.40% 15.88% 11.59% 53.10% 
1916 26.92% 64.78% 8.29% 22.50% 49.51% 
1917 35.27% 63.66% 1.07% 29.14% 46.42% 
1918 40.68% 52.99% 6.33% 35.32% 36.18% 
1919 43.36% 53.08% 3.56% 38.75% 38.14% 
1920 43.01% 51.60% 5.39% 37.60% 36.84% 
1921 39.95% 54.57% 5.49% 35.55% 42.67% 
1922 41.64% 49.29% 9.07% 37.01% 37.17% 
1923 33.47% 55.20% 11.33% 29.34% 42.41% 
1924 30.58% 57.44% 11.97% 26.53% 44.28% 
1925 31.24% 57.33% 11.43% 26.76% 43.59% 
1926 30.79% 57.74% 11.48% 26.38% 43.54% 
1927 30.72% 58.08% 11.20% 26.45% 43.82% 
1928 30.90% 57.14% 11.96% 25.08% 41.18% 
1929 29.80% 57.08% 13.12% 24.97% 40.29% 
1930 31.31% 56.25% 12.44% 25.03% 39.92% 
1931 39.66% 47.49% 12.84% 34.50% 28.73% 
1932 36.78% 51.44% 11.78% 32.09% 29.01% 
1933 35.45% 54.34% 10.21% 30.03% 31.80% 
1934 31.00% 57.14% 11.87% 27.19% 33.84% 
1935 30.12% 59.03% 10.85% 27.47% 35.90% 
1936 30.19% 58.50% 11.30% 27.78% 35.67% 
1937 31.35% 57.75% 10.90% 28.98% 35.53% 
1938 31.75% 57.80% 10.45% 29.62% 36.63% 
1939 32.25% 56.25% 11.50% 30.15% 34.46% 
1940 33.29% 54.93% 11.79% 31.37% 33.85% 
1941 45.87% 52.24% 1.90% 43.33% 29.59% 
1942 54.28% 44.34% 1.37% 48.33% 23.98% 
1943 57.95% 41.04% 1.01% 52.45% 22.88% 
1944 61.90% 37.19% 0.91% 56.98% 20.70% 
1945 62.00% 33.25% 4.75% 57.73% 17.93% 
1946 59.26% 36.61% 4.13% 55.05% 19.93% 
1947 52.59% 40.31% 7.11% 48.28% 23.70% 
1948 53.79% 40.12% 6.09% 49.25% 24.40% 
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1949 54.06% 38.18% 7.76% 49.67% 22.99% 
1950 52.59% 40.42% 6.99% 47.79% 24.56% 
1951 56.58% 32.99% 10.44% 52.65% 19.23% 
1952 57.80% 37.05% 5.16% 53.36% 20.70% 
1953 59.29% 35.03% 5.67% 54.86% 18.18% 
1954 55.63% 39.07% 5.30% 51.28% 21.38% 
1955 54.12% 40.85% 5.04% 49.78% 22.83% 
1956 54.38% 40.53% 5.09% 49.90% 22.24% 
1957 53.19% 41.05% 5.76% 48.46% 22.35% 
1958 52.40% 41.42% 6.18% 47.70% 22.23% 
1959 49.90% 43.30% 6.80% 45.08% 22.81% 
1960 49.70% 43.77% 6.53% 44.86% 22.49% 
1961 52.67% 41.03% 6.30% 47.86% 21.30% 
1962 53.75% 39.37% 6.88% 48.82% 20.68% 
1963 60.60% 38.03% 1.37% 45.69% 21.44% 
1964 61.83% 36.86% 1.31% 47.36% 20.64% 
1965 63.54% 35.20% 1.26% 49.90% 19.60% 
1966 63.57% 35.18% 1.25% 50.33% 20.23% 
1967 63.78% 34.96% 1.26% 50.28% 19.96% 
1968 64.00% 34.76% 1.24% 50.59% 19.50% 
1969 64.01% 34.72% 1.27% 50.95% 18.67% 
1970 65.04% 33.75% 1.22% 52.75% 17.66% 
1971 65.74% 33.18% 1.09% 53.94% 17.81% 
1972 66.77% 32.05% 1.17% 54.37% 17.30% 
1973 66.09% 32.60% 1.32% 53.49% 16.72% 
1974 67.82% 31.03% 1.15% 55.27% 15.92% 
1975 71.01% 28.04% 0.95% 57.74% 14.63% 
1976 68.85% 29.97% 1.18% 55.96% 15.99% 
1977 69.39% 29.53% 1.08% 56.79% 15.30% 
1978 69.96% 29.01% 1.03% 57.41% 14.87% 
1979 66.93% 32.02% 1.05% 54.72% 18.23% 
1980 66.24% 32.46% 1.30% 54.83% 19.50% 
1981 66.72% 31.97% 1.31% 55.99% 19.34% 
1982 67.61% 30.96% 1.42% 57.05% 17.59% 
Figures derived from (Vamplew 1987) & (Barnard 1985) 
 
Table 3.9 – Directions of Argentine Expenditure (% of total), 1863-1993 
Year  Largely Public Works Debt Servicing Security Other  Administration 
1863 11.11% 29.12% 50.12% 9.65% 
1864 11.37% 23.84% 55.03% 9.76% 
1865 7.62% 23.30% 62.69% 6.39% 
1866 6.79% 20.13% 67.42% 5.66% 
1867 6.14% 15.60% 72.66% 5.59% 
1868 12.61% 12.45% 69.78% 5.15% 
1869 12.63% 20.17% 59.66% 7.53% 
1870 9.38% 28.18% 54.90% 7.54% 
1871 10.99% 33.88% 48.18% 6.94% 
1872 9.50% 42.74% 41.68% 6.07% 
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1873 12.84% 32.01% 49.44% 5.71% 
1874 22.75% 37.71% 31.62% 7.92% 
1875 29.16% 27.08% 35.64% 8.12% 
1876 16.46% 38.95% 34.88% 9.70% 
1877 15.13% 38.34% 36.90% 9.63% 
1878 19.19% 35.50% 27.40% 17.92% 
1879 14.33% 37.56% 33.84% 14.27% 
1880 18.37% 28.93% 44.55% 8.15% 
1881 26.56% 30.80% 30.63% 12.02% 
1882 26.36% 46.27% 13.62% 13.74% 
1883 44.59% 25.22% 19.38% 10.81% 
1884 43.82% 24.20% 14.77% 17.21% 
1885 47.06% 22.97% 15.01% 14.95% 
1886 39.34% 27.31% 16.24% 17.11% 
1887 33.67% 26.54% 13.43% 26.36% 
1888 46.43% 22.63% 12.22% 18.72% 
1889 57.58% 14.87% 9.48% 18.06% 
1890 53.59% 15.31% 10.88% 20.22% 
1891 35.69% 34.12% 14.70% 15.49% 
1892 27.27% 25.70% 18.59% 28.44% 
1893 30.86% 28.00% 23.02% 18.12% 
1894 25.72% 39.55% 19.43% 15.30% 
1895 31.97% 32.45% 35.59% 
1896 25.29% 35.46% 39.25% 
1897 35.09% 25.62% 21.75% 17.54% 
1898 20.99% 24.19% 36.93% 17.88% 
1899 23.54% 33.64% 22.68% 20.14% 
1900 31.67% 34.95% 19.18% 14.20% 
1901 28.90% 39.90% 16.97% 14.23% 
1902 22.35% 38.30% 27.38% 11.98% 
1903 26.54% 45.74% 14.20% 13.52% 
1904 35.42% 33.21% 17.07% 14.30% 
1905 36.70% 29.90% 17.11% 16.29% 
1906 44.03% 26.34% 12.12% 17.52% 
1907 39.66% 25.88% 13.94% 20.52% 
1908 39.76% 26.18% 14.26% 19.80% 
1909 47.96% 19.26% 16.61% 16.18% 
1910 45.87% 16.39% 21.45% 16.29% 
1911 43.38% 16.22% 22.87% 17.52% 
1912 42.33% 17.99% 18.60% 21.08% 
1913 42.15% 19.96% 16.83% 21.06% 
1914  
1915  
1916  
1917  
1918  
1919  
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1920 44.28% 23.30% 37.93% -13.22% 7.69%
1921  
1922  
1923  
1924  
1925  
1926  
1927 38.34% 21.20% 46.45% -11.80% 5.69%
1928  
1929  
1930 49.81% 28.20% 38.87% -22.60% 5.78%
1931  
1932  
1933  
1934  
1935  
1936  
1937  
1938  
1939  
1940 53.85% 19.80% 34.26% -14.54% 5.79%
1941  
1942  
1943  
1944  
1945  
1946  
1947  
1948  
1949  
1950  
1951  
1952  
1953  
1954  
1955  
1956  
1957  
1958  
1959  
1960  
1961 28.12% 0.29% 9.57% 57.10% 4.93%
1962 27.08% 0.59% 10.12% 57.15% 5.06%
1963 28.13% 0.30% 9.48% 57.19% 4.89%
1964 31.91% 0.65% 9.54% 52.64% 5.26%
1965 32.86% 0.35% 9.89% 50.88% 6.01%
1966 34.43% 0.33% 10.49% 48.20% 6.56%
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1967 35.44% 0.00% 10.13% 48.10% 6.33%
1968 36.83% 0.32% 10.48% 46.35% 6.03%
1969 36.72% 0.33% 10.82% 45.90% 6.23%
1970 35.41% 0.00% 10.49% 47.87% 6.23%
1971 36.33% 0.00% 10.00% 47.00% 6.67%
1972 33.57% 1.04% 10.49% 48.96% 5.94%
1973 36.62% 0.91% 10.15% 45.24% 7.08%
1974 41.10% 0.82% 9.32% 41.65% 7.12%
1975 38.96% 0.52% 10.13% 43.38% 7.01%
1976 31.75% 1.10% 11.14% 49.32% 6.69%
1977 32.65% 1.16% 11.76% 46.48% 7.94%
1978 35.03% 1.32% 10.96% 44.67% 8.02%
1979 36.90% 1.75% 11.61% 40.81% 8.93%
1980 56.33% 7.83% 12.03% 15.68% 9.10%
1981 57.43% 15.11% 11.74% 7.75% 9.28%
1982 50.97% 21.66% 12.90% 7.41% 8.07%
1983 51.69% 12.75% 11.51% 16.51% 8.49%
1984 56.41% 11.60% 8.79% 15.36% 8.89%
1985 59.29% 12.77% 8.12% 11.45% 9.68%
1986 61.47% 9.11% 8.94% 11.52% 10.38%
1987 61.11% 8.14% 8.37% 13.53% 10.23%
1988 58.55% 7.40% 8.64% 16.43% 10.42%
1989 58.61% 10.63% 9.04% 11.75% 11.56%
1990 66.61% 5.81% 7.76% 9.71% 12.13%
1991 68.09% 7.27% 8.37% 4.88% 13.67%
1992 70.04% 7.83% 8.25% 2.54% 13.41%
1993 72.94% 6.19% 7.43% 2.35% 13.14%
Note: The definition of ‘Largely Public Goods’ varies accordingly: from 1863-90 it is 
the Interior Ministry and Public Education. For 1891-1913 it is the expenditure of the 
Interior Ministry. From 1920 onwards it includes: education, health, social security, 
welfare, housing, employment, agriculture, public buildings, and infrastructure.  
Derived from the following sources: 1863-90 (Oszlak 2004); 1891-1913 (Della Paolera 
1988); and 1920-93 (Veganzones and Winograd 1997) 
 
Table 3.10 – Directions of Australian Expenditure (% of total), 1850-1982 
Year  Largely Public Goods Debt Servicing Security  Other Social
1850 27.51% 0.88% 19.05% 52.56% 6.53%
1851 30.73% 2.57% 15.32% 51.38% 7.14%
1852 23.05% 2.39% 15.31% 59.25% 3.07%
1853 44.81% 0.11% 21.33% 33.75% 4.09%
1854 41.08% 0.34% 17.10% 41.49% 4.78%
1855 39.76% 1.69% 16.78% 41.76% 4.72%
1856 51.29% 5.31% 15.57% 27.83% 6.86%
1857 54.81% 4.65% 18.95% 21.59% 7.17%
1858 53.32% 4.69% 20.28% 21.71% 8.26%
1859 60.59% 6.86% 17.30% 15.25% 6.80%
1860 62.65% 6.62% 15.47% 15.26% 5.76%
1861 56.27% 9.34% 17.53% 16.86% 7.48%
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1862 55.99% 7.05% 16.38% 20.58% 7.57%
1863 53.68% 10.98% 15.78% 19.56% 8.85%
1864 50.37% 13.08% 14.59% 21.96% 7.87%
1865 51.39% 12.72% 13.66% 22.23% 7.50%
1866 51.94% 11.40% 13.15% 23.51% 8.76%
1867 52.40% 14.14% 12.47% 20.98% 8.24%
1868 48.75% 17.96% 12.90% 20.38% 9.23%
1869 47.67% 21.42% 12.59% 18.32% 8.94%
1870 45.80% 21.36% 12.46% 20.38% 9.41%
1871 44.51% 27.08% 12.20% 16.22% 8.22%
1872 44.48% 21.84% 12.60% 21.07% 9.07%
1873 50.67% 17.18% 12.20% 19.95% 9.70%
1874 52.58% 17.81% 10.44% 19.18% 10.97%
1875 60.00% 14.40% 9.86% 15.74% 11.67%
1876 56.24% 17.46% 9.34% 16.96% 11.56%
1877 58.06% 13.00% 9.59% 19.36% 12.00%
1878 60.18% 12.76% 10.00% 17.06% 11.57%
1879 64.59% 11.81% 9.93% 13.67% 10.65%
1880 65.80% 13.40% 9.40% 11.40% 10.40%
1881 64.80% 13.93% 8.31% 12.96% 10.66%
1882 65.09% 14.25% 8.28% 12.39% 10.35%
1883 68.38% 12.48% 7.87% 11.26% 9.67%
1884 66.82% 12.82% 8.06% 12.30% 9.79%
1885 66.92% 14.02% 8.08% 10.98% 9.12%
1886 64.84% 14.37% 8.82% 11.97% 8.93%
1887 63.84% 15.57% 8.34% 12.24% 9.33%
1888 63.13% 16.36% 8.58% 11.92% 8.90%
1889 63.02% 16.29% 8.11% 12.58% 9.18%
1890 65.49% 16.29% 7.37% 10.85% 8.64%
1891 65.67% 16.24% 7.46% 10.63% 9.08%
1892 60.88% 17.86% 8.49% 12.77% 9.52%
1893 55.35% 22.73% 8.22% 13.70% 10.32%
1894 53.42% 25.05% 8.50% 13.02% 10.11%
1895 52.17% 25.23% 8.43% 14.17% 10.56%
1896 54.13% 24.48% 8.03% 13.36% 10.39%
1897 56.66% 22.87% 7.38% 13.09% 10.12%
1898 59.74% 21.49% 7.41% 11.35% 9.64%
1899 57.67% 22.36% 7.77% 12.20% 9.75%
1900 58.49% 20.92% 8.68% 11.92% 10.05%
1901 58.96% 19.71% 8.77% 12.56% 9.73%
1902 63.02% 18.70% 7.30% 10.98% 10.63%
1903 62.46% 19.97% 6.72% 10.85% 11.15%
1904 58.81% 22.25% 7.25% 11.69% 11.41%
1905 56.68% 23.23% 7.66% 12.43% 11.96%
1906 56.42% 23.50% 7.61% 12.47% 11.80%
1907 53.13% 24.54% 5.39% 16.94% 11.20%
1908 55.82% 22.26% 7.65% 14.27% 11.12%
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1909 58.35% 21.12% 6.45% 14.08% 11.26%
1910 59.06% 19.99% 6.82% 14.12% 11.75%
1911 59.53% 17.97% 9.74% 12.75% 10.93%
1912 62.46% 16.20% 8.84% 12.50% 10.53%
1913 64.14% 15.23% 7.90% 12.73% 10.86%
1914 66.49% 14.30% 7.47% 11.74% 11.21%
1915 54.72% 12.71% 20.98% 11.59% 9.79%
1916 43.58% 12.59% 34.58% 9.25% 7.98%
1917 40.32%  
1918 41.50%  
1919 30.74% 18.25% 43.29% 7.71% 7.44%
1920 27.82%  
1921 50.11% 19.24% 19.81% 10.85% 12.15%
1922 51.12% 22.59% 14.09% 12.20% 10.92%
1923 52.78% 25.13% 10.22% 11.87% 10.89%
1924 53.88% 27.65% 8.87% 9.60% 11.96%
1925 54.21% 27.04% 9.04% 9.72% 11.81%
1926 55.27% 25.14% 10.03% 9.57% 11.61%
1927 54.66% 24.08% 8.61% 12.64% 11.75%
1928 54.91% 24.28% 9.80% 11.01% 12.57%
1929 55.38% 26.48% 8.64% 9.50% 14.14%
1930 53.80% 28.10% 8.89% 9.21% 14.58%
1931 47.83% 33.62% 9.17% 9.38% 15.93%
1932 46.12% 35.29% 9.03% 9.56% 16.58%
1933 50.09% 32.34% 8.48% 9.08% 21.80%
1934 49.99% 30.96% 8.77% 10.28% 21.17%
1935 52.48% 28.71% 8.99% 9.82% 20.37%
1936 54.66% 27.24% 9.46% 8.65% 21.55%
1937 53.06% 26.80% 10.22% 9.91% 21.22%
1938 52.57% 25.68% 10.52% 11.23% 20.85%
1939 53.21% 24.95% 11.39% 10.45% 20.09%
1940 45.20% 21.30% 24.32% 9.17% 18.12%
1941 32.90% 15.65% 45.17% 6.28% 12.68%
1942 25.64% 11.86% 57.56% 4.94% 9.81%
1943 19.72% 8.95% 67.55% 3.78% 7.40%
1944 23.31% 9.95% 61.19% 5.56% 10.70%
1945 26.24% 12.61% 54.10% 7.04% 12.36%
1946 27.54% 14.70% 47.45% 10.31% 11.10%
1947 39.79% 16.45% 28.59% 15.17% 16.07%
1948 46.07% 16.09% 15.81% 22.03% 20.25%
1949 50.62% 14.18% 18.13% 17.06% 21.43%
1950 52.02% 12.72% 16.48% 18.78% 21.54%
1951 51.06% 9.32% 21.72% 17.90% 17.99%
1952 49.81% 7.78% 17.72% 24.69% 18.96%
1953 52.01% 8.42% 21.25% 18.33% 18.85%
1954 49.88% 8.71% 19.37% 22.04% 19.86%
1955 50.46% 8.67% 19.01% 21.86% 20.86%
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1956 51.64% 8.85% 18.83% 20.67% 22.09%
1957 49.09% 8.38% 16.58% 25.95% 21.30%
1958 50.52% 8.52% 17.73% 23.23% 22.98%
1959 52.81% 8.55% 17.72% 20.91% 25.10%
1960 53.02% 8.70% 17.29% 20.99% 25.47%
1961 51.54% 8.28% 16.34% 23.84% 25.43%
1962 54.80% 8.56% 14.84% 21.81% 27.69%
1963 55.52% 9.03% 9.56% 25.89% 40.47%
1964 53.31% 8.67% 9.96% 28.06% 39.27%
1965 53.15% 8.25% 10.26% 28.34% 37.93%
1966 52.60% 7.79% 11.52% 28.08% 37.07%
1967 51.14% 7.53% 13.47% 27.86% 36.70%
1968 49.99% 7.25% 14.18% 28.59% 35.68%
1969 50.42% 7.49% 13.69% 28.39% 36.82%
1970 52.56% 7.72% 11.37% 28.35% 37.27%
1971 53.64% 7.70% 10.76% 27.90% 39.21%
1972 55.52% 7.30% 9.89% 27.30% 40.52%
1973 56.93% 7.27% 9.50% 26.29% 44.08%
1974 58.62% 6.38% 8.80% 26.19% 45.76%
1975 59.20% 5.48% 7.28% 28.04% 46.56%
1976 60.36% 5.15% 6.94% 27.54% 52.27%
1977 62.18% 9.33% 6.87% 21.61% 51.12%
1978 62.02% 9.93% 6.68% 21.36% 50.76%
1979 61.38% 10.61% 6.81% 21.20% 51.12%
1980 60.29% 10.80% 7.08% 21.83% 50.08%
1981 59.69% 11.04% 7.21% 22.06% 49.03%
1982 59.06% 11.26% 7.36% 22.32% 48.99%
Note: The definition of ‘largely public goods’ in Australia consists of the following 
categories: State Enterprise expenditures/capital outlays; social expenditure; primary 
industries, and other public works. 
The above categories and figures are derived from (Barnard 1985). 
 
Table 3.11 – Directions of Australian public capital expenditure, 1860-1975 
Year Mainly Rural/Primary Exporters Mainly Urban Not Discernible 
1860 56.60% 18.92% 24.48% 
1861 45.76% 20.35% 33.89% 
1862 58.71% 17.91% 23.38% 
1863 49.96% 21.57% 28.47% 
1864 52.61% 14.37% 33.02% 
1865 43.66% 18.15% 38.19% 
1866 36.95% 26.85% 36.19% 
1867 44.17% 33.59% 22.24% 
1868 56.36% 24.42% 19.22% 
1869 50.06% 22.42% 27.52% 
1870 49.50% 23.82% 26.68% 
1871 41.17% 23.02% 35.80% 
1872 51.56% 17.43% 31.01% 
1873 43.82% 24.56% 31.62% 
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1874 49.08% 23.98% 26.94% 
1875 56.10% 18.38% 25.52% 
1876 46.72% 25.10% 28.18% 
1877 45.15% 25.97% 28.87% 
1878 54.24% 20.86% 24.90% 
1879 58.31% 19.02% 22.67% 
1880 59.03% 17.77% 23.21% 
1881 62.68% 18.77% 18.55% 
1882 61.28% 19.03% 19.69% 
1883 60.34% 21.87% 17.79% 
1884 60.61% 18.06% 21.33% 
1885 62.57% 18.99% 18.44% 
1886 62.92% 21.34% 15.74% 
1887 60.57% 17.54% 21.89% 
1888 63.75% 18.14% 18.11% 
1889 61.41% 21.41% 17.18% 
1890 59.43% 22.05% 18.52% 
1891 61.23% 18.66% 20.12% 
1892 57.88% 20.52% 21.59% 
1893 57.75% 20.59% 21.66% 
1894 58.48% 19.56% 21.96% 
1895 49.54% 25.26% 25.20% 
1896 51.68% 24.30% 24.02% 
1897 53.63% 24.65% 21.73% 
1898 44.48% 27.40% 28.12% 
1899 49.14% 25.72% 25.13% 
1900 50.02% 28.03% 21.95% 
1901 39.09% 32.91% 35.15% 
1902 39.99% 29.07% 37.18% 
1903 46.22% 22.25% 37.62% 
1904 45.97% 26.60% 36.89% 
1905 2.60% 27.93% 46.04% 
1906 45.40% 25.88% 38.83% 
1907 46.16% 26.44% 36.04% 
1908 43.66% 30.83% 32.52% 
1909 48.40% 29.17% 27.99% 
1910 50.46% 27.82% 26.75% 
1911 54.03% 25.94% 24.08% 
1912 51.06% 27.69% 24.54% 
1913 49.62% 31.02% 22.34% 
1914 50.96% 28.64% 23.32% 
1915 52.01% 26.84% 23.93% 
1916 50.93% 25.97% 12.93% 
1917 47.01% 27.59% 28.71% 
1918 45.76% 28.28% 29.89% 
1919 45.21% 29.54% 28.64% 
1920 46.22% 36.47% 19.26% 
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1921 43.15% 39.51% 18.85% 
1922 37.59% 40.27% 23.74% 
1923 32.22% 44.15% 25.25% 
1924 30.13% 41.25% 30.20% 
1925 30.58% 39.28% 31.53% 
1926 36.78% 29.64% 34.92% 
1927 35.82% 29.75% 35.66% 
1928 33.83% 31.41% 35.97% 
1929 31.37% 32.14% 37.76% 
1930 28.61% 32.16% 40.72% 
1931 19.93% 42.81% 39.33% 
1932 25.24% 34.81% 43.01% 
1933 23.79% 32.82% 46.35% 
1934 24.37% 34.74% 43.75% 
1935 23.44% 37.71% 41.05% 
1936 24.05% 38.11% 39.83% 
1937 21.30% 40.98% 39.59% 
1938 20.72% 43.15% 37.78% 
1939 19.99% 40.78% 40.95% 
1940 27.35% 28.86% 43.79% 
1941 30.37% 28.62% 41.01% 
1942 43.04% 21.61% 35.35% 
1943 42.00% 23.11% 34.89% 
1944 42.17% 22.06% 35.77% 
1945 35.23% 25.95% 38.82% 
1946 28.09% 35.91% 36.00% 
1947 29.74% 37.33% 32.93% 
1948 26.25% 39.06% 34.69% 
1949 27.21% 43.66% 29.13% 
1950 24.37% 48.84% 26.79% 
1951 24.62% 51.39% 23.99% 
1952 23.35% 53.07% 23.59% 
1953 23.53% 51.90% 24.57% 
1954 21.94% 51.84% 26.22% 
1955 21.46% 49.99% 28.54% 
1956 20.96% 49.84% 29.20% 
1957 19.68% 49.83% 30.49% 
1958 18.94% 49.59% 31.47% 
1959 17.99% 49.96% 32.13% 
1960 17.02% 48.21% 34.76% 
1961 17.13% 49.39% 33.46% 
1962 16.48% 49.56% 33.96% 
1963 16.26% 50.23% 33.42% 
1964 16.00% 49.73% 34.27% 
1965 14.87% 50.71% 34.42% 
1966 14.63% 42.76% 34.00% 
1967 14.11% 51.31% 34.58% 
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1968 13.70% 50.12% 36.18% 
1969 13.78% 50.95% 35.27% 
1970 14.25% 49.98% 35.78% 
1971 12.80% 50.82% 36.38% 
1972 13.31% 48.41% 38.23% 
1973 12.95% 50.94% 36.11% 
1974 11.45% 52.02% 36.53% 
1975 11.88% 54.86% 33.26% 
Notes – The rural categories are: Railways; Ports, Harbours, and Sea Transport; 
Agriculture, Forestry, and Lands. The urban categories are: Commonwealth 
Broadcasting, Urban Transit, Housing, Electricity & Gas, Education, Water & 
Sewerage, Public Buildings, and Miscellaneous (predominantly public buildings and 
recreation). Not discernible includes: Posts and Telegraphs, Civil Aviation, Roads and 
Bridges, Health, and Defence.  
The above categories and figures are derived from (Vamplew 1987). 
 
Table 4.6 – Total Australian Public Revenue Sources, 1850-1962 
Year Taxation State Enterprises Land Revenue All Other
1850 53.51% 0.90% 38.02% 7.57%
1851 39.32% -0.62% 40.87% 20.44%
1852 31.63% -0.92% 60.27% 9.02%
1853 33.13% -1.84% 63.92% 4.80%
1854 42.27% -11.68% 61.02% 8.39%
1855 62.50% -19.82% 47.69% 9.63%
1856 73.87% -30.91% 44.82% 12.22%
1857 65.99% -23.76% 46.12% 11.65%
1858 71.63% -27.96% 44.67% 11.66%
1859 92.82% -70.05% 63.07% 14.16%
1860 128.85% -135.60% 84.98% 21.77%
1861 74.13% -40.64% 53.30% 13.20%
1862 73.74% -45.94% 60.23% 11.97%
1863 75.47% -39.18% 51.12% 12.60%
1864 61.22% -25.39% 45.72% 18.44%
1865 54.79% -17.57% 48.16% 14.62%
1866 63.25% -28.33% 51.77% 13.31%
1867 76.43% -35.72% 45.69% 13.60%
1868 69.66% -27.24% 44.71% 12.87%
1869 63.43% -16.13% 39.63% 13.07%
1870 64.53% -17.55% 39.51% 13.51%
1871 64.56% -16.30% 37.47% 14.27%
1872 58.03% -7.41% 38.17% 11.22%
1873 64.07% -13.59% 38.55% 10.97%
1874 62.69% -16.69% 42.40% 11.60%
1875 60.28% -31.11% 57.61% 13.22%
1876 52.14% -20.95% 57.44% 11.37%
1877 47.12% -14.53% 56.56% 10.85%
1878 58.37% -25.11% 55.30% 11.43%
1879 77.06% -55.84% 62.19% 16.58%
 327
1880 80.42% -62.22% 63.22% 18.58%
1881 69.49% -46.75% 63.50% 13.76%
1882 67.42% -37.95% 57.75% 12.78%
1883 121.71% -111.40% 67.89% 21.81%
1884 114.56% -98.54% 61.60% 22.37%
1885 107.53% -86.26% 57.77% 20.95%
1886 129.21% -105.39% 52.95% 23.23%
1887 94.47% -58.82% 46.65% 17.70%
1888 80.87% -31.81% 37.28% 13.66%
1889 83.79% -30.94% 32.85% 14.30%
1890 119.92% -88.96% 49.04% 19.99%
1891 102.27% -58.62% 40.85% 15.51%
1892 78.80% -18.98% 28.80% 11.38%
1893 61.31% 0.95% 27.48% 10.26%
1894 57.67% 5.81% 25.14% 11.38%
1895 60.48% 8.83% 20.69% 10.01%
1896 58.56% 8.62% 22.93% 9.89%
1897 61.38% 5.52% 23.20% 9.89%
1898 69.46% -5.40% 25.03% 10.91%
1899 62.51% 5.68% 21.64% 10.17%
1900 64.38% 2.56% 22.28% 10.77%
1901 66.58% -0.61% 21.69% 12.34%
1902 74.02% -10.13% 21.48% 14.63%
1903 74.88% -6.62% 18.63% 13.11%
1904 63.78% 6.78% 17.12% 12.33%
1905 56.67% 16.60% 15.11% 11.62%
1906 54.84% 20.04% 13.67% 11.45%
1907 55.20% 19.90% 13.59% 11.31%
1908 62.45% 12.19% 13.73% 11.64%
1909 66.96% 3.75% 16.11% 13.18%
1910 68.08% 2.12% 15.75% 14.05%
1911 72.14% -2.85% 15.33% 15.39%
1912 85.24% -19.72% 15.61% 18.87%
1913 93.76% -32.28% 16.68% 21.84%
1914 100.05% -41.93% 17.00% 24.88%
1915 99.32% -41.03% 15.08% 26.64%
1916 91.59% -26.58% 11.19% 23.80%
1917    
1918    
1919 71.77% 2.90% 6.27% 19.06%
1920    
1921 82.60% -3.57% 6.03% 14.94%
1922 83.15% -7.93% 5.90% 18.88%
1923 82.19% -6.04% 5.47% 18.37%
1924 81.85% -6.62% 5.43% 19.34%
1925 83.54% -8.19% 5.27% 19.39%
1926 90.05% -14.92% 5.55% 19.32%
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1927 88.55% -10.89% 4.98% 17.36%
1928 87.76% -10.35% 5.02% 17.57%
1929 79.47% -3.88% 4.55% 19.86%
1930 80.41% -2.95% 3.94% 18.60%
1931 74.25% 4.04% 3.13% 18.58%
1932 70.65% 9.84% 2.97% 16.53%
1933 70.74% 11.37% 2.91% 14.97%
1934 70.53% 10.75% 3.02% 15.70%
1935 73.54% 8.39% 3.11% 14.96%
1936 75.36% 7.94% 3.04% 13.66%
1937 74.52% 8.85% 2.98% 13.66%
1938 75.44% 8.61% 2.86% 13.09%
1939 78.65% 6.49% 2.62% 12.24%
1940 80.71% 6.05% 2.36% 10.88%
1941 82.30% 6.29% 2.02% 9.38%
1942 83.89% 6.19% 1.57% 8.35%
1943 83.63% 7.12% 1.40% 7.85%
1944 85.97% 5.79% 1.32% 6.93%
1945 86.99% 4.46% 1.19% 7.36%
1946 89.86% 2.68% 1.12% 6.34%
1947 89.75% -0.51% 1.12% 9.63%
1948 92.95% -2.40% 1.27% 8.18%
1949 92.07% -5.85% 1.13% 12.66%
1950 98.24% -10.29% 1.23% 10.82%
1951 100.66% -14.37% 0.96% 12.75%
1952 107.91% -16.80% 1.28% 7.62%
1953 99.77% -14.24% 1.31% 13.16%
1954 100.74% -12.08% 1.22% 10.12%
1955 97.96% -9.90% 1.17% 10.77%
1956 99.42% -10.51% 1.23% 9.86%
1957 93.48% -8.41% 1.18% 13.75%
1958 96.92% -7.47% 1.13% 9.42%
1959 96.47% -7.45% 0.98% 10.01%
1960 96.49% -6.88% 0.98% 9.41%
1961 94.55% -4.66% 0.91% 9.21%
1962 94.99% -6.01% 0.94% 10.08%
Figures are derived from (Barnard 1985). 
 
Table 4.8 – Total Public Debt per capita in US$, 1883-1971 
Year Argentina Australia
1883 43.93078 
1884 52.78163 
1885 37.28414 
1886 34.90788 
1887 34.52427 
1888 60.67348 
1889 39.1697 
1890 32.75288 
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1891 62.97192 
1892 92.39677 
1893 78.15941 
1894 62.76097 
1895 68.22223 
1896 81.39573 
1897 82.85423 
1898 123.8327 
1899 117.0049 
1900 92.35941 
1901 85.5982269.4988049
1902 83.73962276.6189168
1903 80.13193284.0552494
1904 78.25829286.3332654
1905 69.87744285.4768922
1906 66.11637289.5402818
1907 69.11831286.5518121
1908 62.37354285.4962644
1909 67.24881289.2132006
1910 64.02592287.2809244
1911 71.61089288.9122461
1912 68.41526293.415009 
1913 66.5769300.9409882
1914 64.42275328.8935491
1915 62.57526357.4417447
1916 65.76841436.3743048
1917 74.64118505.2308215
1918 68.76114613.8094667
1919 63.29897579.251076 
1920 47.87315524.2824675
1921 45.77744576.1015761
1922 51.27896694.426955 
1923 42.35016718.761578 
1924 58.04784714.0815865
1925 68.84674774.2812993
1926 70.17514804.5850059
1927 82.73202811.8258103
1928 98.7541837.3796096
1929 102.5076829.9697735
1930 89.77389828.7869325
1931 69.57181800.4698883
1932 71.1433661.5927817
1933 87.22405803.1360617
1934 81.95392961.2845571
1935 70.9311942.2567657
1936 84.14738958.0091729
1937 85.47122949.8258132
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1938 71.49263939.6272614
1939 76.8735857.7786834
1940 86.5102763.896592 
1941 86.63949843.1600632
1942 99.09375950.5120201
1943 119.48391155.592625
1944 129.24381338.714747
1945 145.54121464.433384
1946 165.53191537.74718 
1947 149.94551530.335034
1948 85.812551527.016953
1949 57.635811373.896113
1950 64.248521044.046809
1951 44.635431063.042751
1952 63.681271104.358278
1953 93.446481145.586063
1954 84.816961177.709222
1955 77.162851189.91348 
1956 92.714031208.801487
1957 101.81171210.166882
1958 76.098751192.745784
1959 89.245881186.979505
1960 102.35881179.724444
1961 115.05281182.183053
1962 89.696121186.962885
1963 110.1901961.0891282
1964 104.8971982.4979385
1965 93.247691000.186725
1966 106.50911016.252207
1967 96.934371050.308431
1968 118.14541103.795283
1969 128.49691133.617724
1970 118.24521175.050293
1971 72.282321184.828565
Sources: For Argentina the figures are derived from: (Vizcaíno 1972), (Della Paolera 
and Taylor 2003), & (Mitchell 2003). For Australia the figures are derived from: 
(Vamplew 1987), (Mitchell 2003).  
 
Table 4.9 – Total Public Debt to GDP, 1870-1982 
Year Australia Argentina
1870 35%
1871 38%
1872 34%
1873 30%
1874 31%
1875 22%
1876 35%
1877 36%
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1878 36%
1879 42%
1880 47%
1881 47%
1882 47%
1883 49%
1884 59% 43%
1885 62% 34%
1886 69% 29%
1887 65% 31%
1888 66% 50%
1889 65% 39%
1890 71% 33%
1891 77% 58%
1892 95% 76%
1893 111% 78%
1894 116% 68%
1895 123% 58%
1896 112% 66%
1897 118% 70%
1898 104% 80%
1899 104% 89%
1900 101% 66%
1901 101% 69%
1902 99% 61%
1903 107% 56%
1904 104% 49%
1905 106% 37%
1906 102% 33%
1907 91% 34%
1908 93% 31%
1909 89% 31%
1910 84% 27%
1911 79% 30%
1912 78% 28%
1913 75% 28%
1914 76% 31%
1915 88% 28%
1916 92% 26%
1917 102% 25%
1918 123% 19%
1919 121% 17%
1920 122% 15%
1921 118% 19%
1922 127% 19%
1923 118% 17%
1924 120% 17%
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1925 111% 19%
1926 121% 22%
1927 119% 24%
1928 125% 28%
1929 128% 30%
1930 141% 36%
1931 179% 41%
1932 205% 44%
1933 199% 45%
1934 188% 38%
1935 181% 34%
1936 166% 35%
1937 153% 32%
1938 143% 36%
1939 148% 38%
1940 142% 40%
1941 139% 38%
1942 135% 39%
1943 145% 43%
1944 167% 42%
1945 189% 44%
1946 194% 38%
1947 184% 30%
1948 156% 27%
1949 136% 27%
1950 120% 27%
1951 94% 22%
1952 94% 23%
1953 87% 26%
1954 84% 29%
1955 82% 31%
1956 78% 29%
1957 74% 26%
1958 72% 26%
1959 68% 19%
1960 63% 17%
1961 61% 16%
1962 61% 17%
1963 59% 16%
1964 55% 16%
1965 52% 13%
1966 52% 13%
1967 49% 12%
1968 50% 13%
1969 46% 12%
1970 44% 17%
1971 41% 18%
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1972 38% 22%
1973 35% 20%
1974 30% 20%
1975 29% 19%
1976 28% 19%
1977 28% 19%
1978 30% 24%
1979 30% 30%
1980 29% 37%
1981 25% 48%
1982 23% 60%
Sources: For Argentina the figures are derived from: (Vizcaíno 1972), (Della Paolera 
and Taylor 2003), (Dornbusch and Pablo 1987), & (OXLAD). For Australia the 
figures are derived from (Vamplew 1987). 
 
Table 4.10 – Debt Servicing as a proportion of Expenditure, 1863-1971 
Year Argentina (federal) Australia (total)
1863 29% 11%
1864 24% 13%
1865 23% 13%
1866 20% 11%
1867 16% 14%
1868 12% 18%
1869 20% 21%
1870 28% 21%
1871 34% 27%
1872 43% 22%
1873 32% 17%
1874 38% 18%
1875 27% 14%
1876 39% 17%
1877 38% 13%
1878 36% 13%
1879 38% 12%
1880 29% 13%
1881 31% 14%
1882 46% 14%
1883 25% 12%
1884 24% 13%
1885 23% 14%
1886 27% 14%
1887 27% 16%
1888 23% 16%
1889 15% 16%
1890 15% 16%
1891 34% 16%
1892 26% 18%
1893 28% 23%
 334
1894 40% 25%
1895 32% 25%
1896 25% 24%
1897 26% 23%
1898 24% 21%
1899 34% 22%
1900 35% 21%
1901 40% 18%
1902 38% 16%
1903 46% 18%
1904 33% 19%
1905 30% 20%
1906 26% 20%
1907 26% 19%
1908 26% 18%
1909 19% 17%
1910 16% 16%
1911 16% 14%
1912 18% 13%
1913 20% 13%
1914 20% 13%
1915 21% 13%
1916 23% 13%
1917 25% 14%
1918 28% 18%
1919 27% 17%
1920 23% 18%
1921 21% 18%
1922 19% 21%
1923 19% 22%
1924 19% 22%
1925 18% 22%
1926 20% 21%
1927 17% 21%
1928 21% 21%
1929 22% 21%
1930 21% 22%
1931 26% 25%
1932 34% 22%
1933 33% 22%
1934 25% 21%
1935 20% 20%
1936 17% 19%
1937 14% 19%
1938 13% 18%
1939 14% 17%
1940 19% 15%
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1941 19% 12%
1942 17% 9%
1943 18% 7%
1944 13% 8%
1945 12% 9%
1946 10% 11%
1947 9% 12%
1948 6% 12%
1949 6% 10%
1950 7% 9%
1951 6% 7%
1952 7% 6%
1953 7% 6%
1954 7% 6%
1955 8% 7%
1956 7% 7%
1957 8% 7%
1958 5% 7%
1959 4% 7%
1960 4% 7%
1961 4% 7%
1962 5% 7%
1963 7% 8%
1964 8% 8%
1965 6% 7%
1966 6% 7%
1967 7% 7%
1968 8% 7%
1969 6% 7%
1970 7% 7%
1971 7% 6%
Sources: For Argentina the figures are derived from: 1863-90 (Oszlak 2004), 1890-1913 
(Della Paolera 1988), 1914-71 (Vizcaíno 1972) & (Della Paolera and Taylor 
2003). For Australia the figures are derived from (Vamplew 1987). 
 
Table 4.11 – External Public Debt to Exports, 1900-71 
Year Argentina (federal) Australia (total)
1900 286%
1901 250% 248%
1902 236% 307%
1903 187% 311%
1904 157% 236%
1905 118% 209%
1906 129% 180%
1907 141% 149%
1908 108% 183%
1909 112% 168%
1910 120% 136%
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1911 160% 141%
1912 109% 144%
1913 69% 135%
1914 69%
1915 61% 211%
1916 63% 208%
1917 71% 167%
1918 47% 231%
1919 36% 161%
1920 35% 123%
1921 55% 125%
1922 55% 154%
1923 49% 172%
1924 43% 190%
1925 58% 148%
1926 66% 178%
1927 61% 195%
1928 71% 207%
1929 88% 207%
1930 141% 282%
1931 137% 259%
1932 165% 270%
1933 84% 262%
1934 89% 225%
1935 81% 247%
1936 76% 206%
1937 41% 172%
1938 70% 180%
1939 72% 210%
1940 75% 172%
1941 61% 183%
1942 52% 197%
1943 39% 226%
1944 22% 186%
1945 21% 179%
1946 3% 73%
1947 2% 41%
1948 1% 28%
1949 2% 21%
1950 1% 18%
1951 0% 11%
1952 0% 16%
1953 0% 13%
1954 0% 14%
1955 0% 16%
1956 0% 16%
1957 0% 12%
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1958 0% 15%
1959 0% 16%
1960 0% 15%
1961 13% 15%
1962 7% 13%
1963 6% 28%
1964 5% 22%
1965 12% 24%
1966 9% 22%
1967 5% 21%
1968 9% 24%
1969 11% 24%
1970 13% 18%
1971 14% 17%
Sources: For Argentina the figures are derived from: (Vizcaíno 1972), (Della Paolera 
and Taylor 2003), & (OXLAD). For Australia the figures are derived from: 
(Pinkstone, Meredith et al. 1992) & (Vamplew 1987). 
 
Table 4.12 – Real Government Bond Yields, 1900-72 
Year Australia Argentina
1900 7.564444
1901 -5.96233
1902 -2.55298
1903 5.51
1904 9.912449
1905 -0.33783
1906 3.45
1907 3.38
1908 -2.68
1909 3.66
1910 1.859216
1911 1.716923
1912 -7.49075
1913 4.85
1914 0.860169
1915 -10.2841
1916 3.631429
1917 -0.3038
1918 -1.72667
1919 -8.46
1920 -7.31681
1921 19.84136
1922 10.11333
1923 3.991149
1924 7.133596
1925 5.96
1926 2.927273
1927 6.451111
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1928 5.43 7.1
1929 3.012809 5.1
1930 9.965604 5
1931 16.85483 23
1932 9.808205 18
1933 7.974054 -6
1934 0.793099 18.2
1935 1.940137 -2.4
1936 2.388649 -3.7
1937 0.02 1.4
1938 1.115897 3.5
1939 1.4 2.6
1940 0.141463 2.3
1941 -1.61588 1.9
1942 -5.73876 -1.6
1943 -0.89371 2.9
1944 4.230099 4.3
1945 3.24 -13.1
1946 1.25 -11.6
1947 -0.71157 -8.4
1948 -7.20736 -7.64
1949 -6.27171 -20
1950 -6.255 -16.8
1951 -16.1157 -23.9
1952 -13.6153 -25
1953 -0.06184 0
1954 3.912195 0.2
1955 2.092816 -6.5
1956 -1.63114 -7.4
1957 2.857857 -15.8
1958 3.253275 -17.9
1959 3.253262 -49.5
1960 1.454473 -15.2
1961 2.482857 -3.5
1962 5.276825 -14.1
1963 4.321594 -11.4
1964 1.909048 -11.5
1965 0.884031 -16
1966 2.164925 -18.4
1967 1.396812 -16.4
1968 2.652448 -7.1
1969 1.838328 5.9
1970 1.997616 0.4
1971 0.339712 -15.3
1972 -0.3141 0
Sources: For Argentina the figures are the real interest rates paid on government bonds 
and are directly from (Reutz 1991). For Australia the real interest rates are derived from 
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the nominal rates paid on government bonds (Vamplew 1987) deflated by CPI 
(Statistics 2005). 
 
Table 4.13 – Internal Debt as a proportion of Public Debt, 1900-71 
Year Australia (total) Argentina (federal) Unconsolidated (Argentina, federal)
1901 15% 0%
1902 17% 0%
1903 18% 0%
1904 19% 0%
1905 20% 0%
1906 21% 0%
1907 24% 0%
1908 26% 0%
1909 26% 0%
1910 27% 0%
1911 30% 0%
1912 32% 0%
1913 32% 0%
1914 31% 0% 11%
1915 33% 0% 20%
1916 39% 0% 27%
1917 44% 0% 29%
1918 46% 0% 34%
1919 50% 0% 37%
1920 53% 0% 41%
1921 55% 0% 43%
1922 53% 0% 45%
1923 53% 0% 43%
1924 51% 0% 37%
1925 51% 0% 31%
1926 50% 0% 28%
1927 50% 0% 22%
1928 47% 0% 16%
1929 48% 0% 25%
1930 48% 0% 32%
1931 48% 0% 35%
1932 47% 0% 31%
1933 48% 40% 25%
1934 49% 42% 24%
1935 50% 61% 3%
1936 51% 65% 2%
1937 51% 72% 4%
1938 52% 67% 10%
1939 52% 68% 8%
1940 53% 65% 13%
1941 55% 62% 18%
1942 61% 65% 18%
1943 68% 65% 22%
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1944 74% 67% 26%
1945 77% 67% 27%
1946 80% 72% 27%
1947 81% 77% 22%
1948 81% 82% 18%
1949 81% 85% 15%
1950 82% 88% 12%
1951 83% 90% 9%
1952 84% 93% 7%
1953 84% 94% 6%
1954 85% 96% 4%
1955 84% 91% 9%
1956 84% 88% 12%
1957 85% 89% 11%
1958 85% 76% 24%
1959 84% 61% 39%
1960 84% 58% 42%
1961 84% 55% 39%
1962 84% 51% 44%
1963 84% 45% 51%
1964 84% 34% 63%
1965 85% 28% 66%
1966 86% 22% 73%
1967 86% 18% 78%
1968 87% 21% 73%
1969 86% 22% 71%
1970 88% 56% 35%
1971 89% 60% 31%
Note: Prior to 1933 all debt in Argentina is assumed to be external despite much of it 
being labelled internal, as contemporary sources noted that internal debt was largely 
held by foreigners and did not indicate it was held in Argentina.  
Sources: The figures for Argentina are derived from: Unconsolidated debt – 1914-27 
(Luisi 1934), 1928-71 (Vizcaíno 1972); Internal debt – (Vizcaíno 1972). The figures for 
Australia are derived from (Vamplew 1987). 
 
Table 4.17 – Argentine Bond Spread over Australia, 1870-1935 
Year Argentina Australia Argentine as proportion of Australian
1870 9.24 4.87 190%
1871 8.72 4.79 182%
1872 7.98 4.71 169%
1873 7.64 4.64 165%
1874 7.82 4.55 172%
1875 8.9 4.45 200%
1876 12.78 4.57 280%
1877 10.63 4.48 237%
1878 10.67 4.38 244%
1879 9.21 4.49 205%
1880 7.93 4.49 177%
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1881 7.05 4.1 172%
1882 6.92 3.82 181%
1883 6.85 4 171%
1884 6.73 4.26 158%
1885 7.9 4.2 188%
1886 7.86 4.18 188%
1887 8.79 4.17 211%
1888 8.02 3.81 210%
1889 8.01 3.55 226%
1890 10.34 3.52 294%
1891 10.29 3.65 282%
1892 9.15 4 229%
1893 8.73 3.97 220%
1894 8.94 3.86 232%
1895 8.28 3.56 233%
1896 7.74 3.56 217%
1897 7.78 3 259%
1898 7.87 3.11 253%
1899 7.89 3.04 260%
1900 8.01 3.12 257%
1901 7.8 3.34 234%
1902 7.7 3.83 201%
1903 6.45 3.51 184%
1904 6.05 3.79 160%
1905 5.93 4.01 148%
1906 5.29 3.45 153%
1907 5.64 3.38 167%
1908 5.68 3.57 159%
1909 5.36 3.66 146%
1910 5.11 3.82 134%
1911 5.21 3.64 143%
1912 5.36 3.83 140%
1913 5.4 4.85 111%
1914 4.9 4.25 115%
1915 5.1 4.47 114%
1916 5.3 5.06 105%
1917 5.3 5.33 99%
1918 5.1 4.94 103%
1919 5.3 5.29 100%
1920 5.6 5.87 95%
1921 5.4 7.22 75%
1922 5 6.78 74%
1923 5 6.29 79%
1924 5 6.01 83%
1925 5 5.96 84%
1926 5 5.2 96%
1927 4.9 5.34 92%
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1928 4.9 5.43 90%
1929 5.3 5.26 101%
1930 5.7 5.57 102%
1931 7 6.51 108%
1932 9.1 4.68 194%
1933 4.9 3.92 125%
1934 4.3 3.61 119%
1935 4 3.31 121%
Note: The Argentine figures are: 1870-1913, yield on external long-term government 
bonds (títulos públicos) annual average; and 1914-35, yield on external Argentine 
customs loan. The Australian figures are the interest rates on government bonds. 
Sources: The figures for Argentina are from (Della Paolera and Taylor 2003), appendix 
& p.301. The figures for Australia are from (Vamplew 1987), p.240. 
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Table 4.19 – Annual Debt + Monetary Change as a proportion of Budget Deficit and related figures, 1921-80 
Year Aus. Arg. 
Aus.M
1 Arg.M1 Aus.debt Arg.debt Aus.BD Arg.BD
1921 83% 118% 301.1 0.00013651 816,479 1,277,726,389 65811 0.00000900
1922 50% 197% 296.9 0.00014511 873,291 1,294,886,001 47470 0.00001617
1923 131% 88% 302 0.00017517 894,435 1,315,753,717 36200 0.00000898
1924 28% 196% 306.8 0.00018095 939,425 1,523,581,867 40534 0.00000744
1925 145% 736% 303.9 0.00017475 952,269 1,743,973,922 39306 0.00000510
1926 56% 213% 315.9 0.00019024 1,002,937 1,845,844,777 47994 0.00001056
1927 98% 126% 311.1 0.00020257 1,032,444 2,155,518,099 48131 0.00003674
1928 17% 247% 301.2 0.00021775 1,084,439 2,685,182,341 52158 0.00001590
1929 -41% 100% 302.3 0.00020404 1,092,643 2,945,756,950 43813 0.00002273
1930 111% 6% 247.8 0.0002006 1,101,658 3,268,692,488 42629 0.00003848
1931 227% 57% 241.8 0.00017062 1,151,896 3,322,932,398 41513 0.00002139
1932 53% 158% 254.8 0.00017735 1,241,069 3,461,582,505 26951 0.00001452
1933 229% 78% 251.2 0.00018641 1,256,795 3,561,930,929 13485 0.00001368
1934 124% 66% 286.3 0.00018704 1,273,678 3,661,532,077 19050 0.00001722
1935 87% 93% 297.2 0.00018853 1,292,916 3,453,484,556 22605 0.00001183
1936 84% 237% 313.1 0.00022028 1,306,254 3,686,790,380 21700 0.00001779
1937 77% 61% 341.4 0.00023919 1,313,304 3,958,003,598 21644 0.00002899
1938 111% 138% 353.5 0.00022968 1,325,138 4,338,773,137 21578 0.00002855
1939 351% 143% 357.6 0.000231 1,347,557 4,777,319,049 26720 0.00004454
1940 198% 329% 451.2 0.000251 1,403,930 5,197,602,124 51712 0.00003528
1941 223% 132% 500.4 0.000325 1,486,887 5,302,336,704 118242 0.00004567
1942 218% 290% 647.8 0.000375 1,691,609 6,161,986,313 218156 0.00005244
1943 113% 273% 888.9 0.000441 2,072,041 7,093,899,626 403716 0.00007368
1944 80% 195% 1147.1 0.000549 2,425,280 7,919,608,192 377463 0.00010071
1945 71% 262% 1253.3 0.000663 2,684,421 9,122,229,177 270187 0.00012681
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1946 36% 252% 1325.3 0.000875 2,846,422 10,647,260,499 168801 0.00013496
1947 122% 616% 1395 0.001063 2,879,007 11,465,431,035 80483 0.00007189
1948 180% 320% 1539 0.001424 2,920,039 12,914,574,299 62704 0.00014957
1949 398% 256% 1755 0.0017572 2,946,579 15,171,358,761 63635 0.00026234
1950 283% 289% 2133 0.0022039 3,048,970 18,095,917,105 136381 0.00026399
1951 90% 171% 2729 0.0026733 3,197,905 21,075,777,411 202231 0.00038864
1952 105% 318% 2639 0.003041 3,415,140 26,093,717,364 290349 0.00038722
1953 101% 297% 2963 0.003772 3,590,291 33,733,806,790 240714 0.00046362
1954 65% 306% 3129 0.0043861 3,768,365 41,306,540,440 256003 0.00053349
1955 52% 242% 3159 0.0052607 3,921,936 51,473,793,270 242996 0.00073414
1956 61% 204% 3090 0.0060194 4,075,628 63,707,517,494 261862 0.00096147
1957 -9% 446% 3239 0.00675835 4,176,450 72,339,265,768 248085 0.00089381
1958 43% 245% 3179 0.00988273 4,177,911 103,972,965,017 255275 0.00305070
1959 54% 185% 3274 0.0142086 4,249,588 146,156,014,864 305900 0.00425992
1960 5% 213% 3522 0.0178541   4,317,464 168,522,329,094 280875 0.00230095
1961 53% 209% 3293 0.0205278 4,422,568 196,073,934,640 290148 0.00200166
1962 61% 217% 3379 0.0219564 4,540,982 247,060,245,470 343094 0.00525950
1963 91% 268% 3464 0.028282 9,434,268 304,413,884,935 766 0.00634503
1964 46% 189% 3732 0.0395567 9,862,958 428,345,482,845 914 0.01197638
1965 54% 314% 3791 0.0497414 10,224,530 483,759,900,000 817 0.00730631
1966 78% 206% 3816 0.0671484 10,640,146 648,192,319,865 967 0.01767564
1967 90% 256% 4074 0.08715 11,139,406 773,536,239,050 1240 0.01400032
1968 70% 177% 4414 0.1104 11,915,036 955,618,960,235 1336 0.01696414
1969 83% 243% 4750 0.12227 12,512,650 1,060,512,890,988 1105 0.01448197
1970 60% 502% 4985 0.14699 13,195,972 12,174,086,997 1038 0.01424800
1971 101% 305% 5312 0.20288 13,491,882 16,354,453,056 1015 0.04301900
1972 197% 449% 5796 0.29226 14,035,242 6,671,611,111 1124 0.07734000
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1973 46% 225% 7285 0.573 14,764,926 25,183,428,571 1519 0.26135700
1974 243% 568% 7451 0.91049 15,303,282 36,844,145,455 1402 0.37603000
1975 93% 473% 8389 2.67609 17,769,930 211,393,480,784 4053 1.892160
1976 79% 250% 9572 9.51397 20,337,850 831,419,230,797 4757 8.054780
1977 92% 502% 10377 21.37 23,290,310 1,457,350,425,688 4914 10.123751
1978 94% 455% 11266 57.63 26,922,704 2,908,303,512,725 6429 24.113478
1979 51% 688% 13146 138.29 31,086,035 8,521,631,915,607 6636 32.057620
1980 28% 487% 14843 273.5 32,782,555 17,301,602,832,441 5865 74.024270
Notes and Sources: Australian M1 ($m), (Vamplew 1987), p.247-8; Argentine M1 (2001 US$), (Della Paolera and Taylor 2003), appendix; 
Australian debt is total public debt, (Vamplew 1987), p.285; from 1921-71 Argentine debt is national (nominal monies), (Vizcaíno 1972), 
pp.254-6, and from 1972-80 it is the change in internal and external public debt (nominal money); Australian budget deficit is the difference 
between total expenditure and total revenue and is in £’000 from 1921-62 and $’000 from 1963-80, (Vamplew 1987), p.256; and the Argentine 
budget deficit is federal, (2001 US$), (Della Paolera and Taylor 2003), appendix. 
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Table 4.25 – Argentine Revenue and Debt figures, 1865-1980 
Year Revenue Debt
1865 8,345,686
1866 8,387,026
1867 13,054,047
1868 12,598,842
1869 12,373,610
1870 14,896,938 47,505,986
1871 10,376,500 84,265,110
1872 20,683,245 80,012,729
1873 22,911,474 78,480,297
1874 18,472,588 77,183,464
1875 21,428,232 82,877,423
1876 13,623,914 86,813,567
1877 13,776,540 82,230,897
1878 17,517,508 80,649,083
1879 21,793,818 77,738,976
1880 19,760,479 86,313,102
1881 20,807,739 107,075,511
1882 26,867,107 124,112,684
1883 32,705,623 128,047,256
1884 36,169,793 122,503,098
1885 39,463,388 155,400,000 
1886 46,631,506 162,900,000 
1887 68,741,073 191,300,000 
1888 67,831,522 410,700,000 
1889 114,822,175 563,800,000 
1890 73 893,100,000 
1891 75.5 1,432,300,000 
1892 110.9 1,412,700,000 
1893 124.7 1,386,100,000 
1894 121.7 1,404,400,000 
1895 131.4 1,385,736,693 
1896 129.1 1,239,720,254 
1897 149.9  1,289,066,747 
1898 136.7 1,328,690,665 
1899 164 1,247,569,941 
1900 150.8 1,039,981,139 
1901 152.4 1,029,876,788 
1902 155.6 1,033,251,166 
1903 171.6 969,107,696 
1904 188.6 969,439,553 
1905 205.4 873,721,067 
1906 228.8 862,637,246 
1907 243.6 950,815,435 
1908 254.2 906,683,221 
1909 274.7 1,022,058,321 
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1910 302.1 1,029,069,700 
1911 310.1 1,196,681,365 
1912 336.4 1,207,950,247 
1913 349.6 1,238,004,135 
1914          250.1  1,392,858,841 
1915          237.2   1,530,117,430 
1916          240.5  1,705,207,190 
1917          241.0  1,916,253,927 
1918          308.3  1,977,737,264 
1919          389.6  2,049,376,597 
1920          493.9  2,122,105,556 
1921          456.5  2,242,939,126 
1922          438.9  2,360,639,803 
1923          524.4  2,292,867,965 
1924          577.6  2,412,056,561 
1925          643.3  2,543,806,790 
1926          619.3  2,557,040,363 
1927          658.4  2,778,035,643 
1928          702.9   2,802,136,762 
1929          718.0  3,090,190,349 
1930          621.4  3,317,497,999 
1931          662.6  3,566,779,662 
1932          595.4  3,566,300,000 
1933          586.2  3,637,000,000 
1934          749.5  3,707,500,000 
1935          826.9  3,466,900,000 
1936          823.7  3,668,400,000 
1937        1,046.3 3,915,200,000 
1938          993.7  4,327,000,000 
1939          994.0  4,883,000,000 
1940        1,088.8 5,185,000,000 
1941        1,043.1  5,783,900,000 
1942        1,089.5 6,329,600,000 
1943        1,106.7 7,130,200,000 
1944        1,417.3 7,964,000,000 
1945        1,529.8 9,159,300,000 
1946        1,981.0 10,830,300,000 
1947        3,250.0 11,538,600,000 
1948        4,094.4 12,940,000,000 
1949        5,613.4 15,194,500,000 
1950        7,577.8 18,096,000,000 
1951      11,012.9 21,454,000,000 
1952      13,475.1 26,104,300,000 
1953      13,384.8 33,733,800,000 
1954      14,715.5  41,306,600,000 
1955      15,588.0 51,468,700,000 
1956      19,747.1 63,703,000,000 
 348
1957      20,469.7 72,343,200,000 
1958      30,192.4  103,960,600,000
1959      47,358.8  146,153,900,000
1960    108,347.8  168,520,400,000
1961    158,625.5  196,973,000,000
1962    155,912.0  247,927,700,000
1963 180071.5  305,259,600,000
1964 257536.4  419,166,100,000
1965 357028.7  484,546,100,000
1966 473519.8  648,922,400,000
1967 743780.3  774,017,800,000
1968 731181.4  956,053,200,000 
1969 856601.9 1,060,906,900,000
1970 1046480 12,177,500,000 
1971 1317780 15,914,300,000 
1972 2416630 23,063,600,000 
1973 3272420 46,620,900,000 
1974 5549360 80,504,300,000 
1975 11401700  257,418,900,000
1976 91820940 1,144,833,600,000 
1977 285518000 2,194,688,200,000
1978 816491100 4,584,544,600,000
1979 1681181000
1980 3607283000
Notes and Sources: Revenue, 1864-89 (Cortés Conde 1989), 1890-1913 (Della Paolera 
1988), 1914-31 (Vazquez-Presedo 1971), 1932-59 (TECHINT 1963), 1960-80 (Della 
Paolera and Taylor 2003); Debt, 1870-84 (Tornquist Ernesto & cia limitada Buenos 
Aires. 1920), 1885-94 (Cottely 1981), 1895-1910 (Dell'Oro Maini 1920), 1911-31 
(Luisi 1934), 1932-78 (Cottely 1981). After 1914 both revenue and debt figures are 
deflated with inflation using (Domenech, Cavallo et al. 1986) from 1914-48 and 
(International Monetary Fund) 1949-80. 
 
Table 4.26 – Debt & Revenue/Tax as a proportion of GDP, 1850-1985 
Year Argentina-Debt Argentina-Revenue Australia-Debt Australia-Tax 
1850    1.88 
1851    3.69 
1852    2.72 
1853    3.59 
1854   0.26 3.66 
1855   3.17 4.44 
1856   5.98 5.35 
1857   6.81 4.94 
1858   7.56 5.05 
1859   10.55 4.57 
1860   15.43 4.34 
1861   17.52 4.16 
1862   23.01 4.13 
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1863   24.02 4.1 
1864   24.47 3.89 
1865   24.88 4.89 
1866   26.36 4.34 
1867   30.29 4.83 
1868   31.4 4.56 
1869   34.33 4.79 
1870   34.77 4.28 
1871   38.44 3.84 
1872   33.97 4.43 
1873   29.72 4.31 
1874   31.32 4.12 
1875   21.59 3.62 
1876   35 4.05 
1877   35.61 4.11 
1878   36.25 4.09 
1879   41.93 3.96 
1880   46.62 3.97 
1881   46.56 4.36 
1882   46.62 4.7 
1883   48.9 4.4 
1884 42.8% 10.6% 59.37 4.64 
1885 34.2% 10.8% 61.57 4.63 
1886 29.1% 12.3% 69.4 5.24 
1887 31.0% 13.6% 64.86 4.82 
1888 50.0% 13.5% 65.84 5.16 
1889 39.0% 17.5% 65.33 5.23 
1890 33.3% 17.2% 71.19 5.3 
1891 57.8% 5.1% 77.12 5.46 
1892 76.3% 8.4% 94.72 6.6 
1893 77.9% 10.4% 110.9 6.36 
1894 68.3% 9.2% 116.11 6.6 
1895 58.0% 8.2% 122.65 6.28 
1896 65.7% 8.4% 111.71 6.59 
1897 70.5% 10.5% 118.39 7.04 
1898 79.7% 9.2% 104.26 6.27 
1899 89.2% 11.7% 104.35 6.31 
1900 66.3% 10.0% 101.44 6.21 
1901 69.0% 10.3% 100.68 5.95 
1902 61.3% 9.6% 98.77 6.14 
1903 55.7% 10.1% 106.52 6.99 
1904 49.2% 9.8% 104.15 6.5 
1905 36.9% 8.7% 106.39 6.49 
1906 32.7% 8.7% 101.65 6.27 
1907 34.3% 8.8% 90.98 6.11 
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1908 30.9% 8.7% 92.52 6.82 
1909 30.5% 8.2% 89.47 6.14 
1910 26.5% 7.8% 83.75 6.08 
1911 30.5% 8.1% 79.46 6.49 
1912 27.8% 8.3% 77.62 6.92 
1913 28.1% 8.4% 75.09 6.61 
1914 31.0% 6.9% 76.3 6.4 
1915 28.4% 5.9% 88.44 6.68 
1916 26.3% 5.4% 92.12 7.05 
1917 25.2% 4.7% 102.41 6.58 
1918 18.8% 4.6% 123.25 6.88 
1919 17.3% 5.4% 121.25 7.98 
1920 15.0% 6.3% 122.41 9.34 
1921 18.7% 6.9% 118.15 10.78 
1922 19.2% 6.7% 126.74 10.78 
1923 17.0% 7.0% 118.46 10.26 
1924 17.0% 6.7% 119.74 10.29 
1925 19.3% 7.3% 110.6 9.91 
1926 21.6% 7.5% 120.9 10.85 
1927 24.1% 7.6% 119.42 11.49 
1928 27.9% 7.5% 124.72 11.57 
1929 30.2% 7.6% 127.64 11.9 
1930 36.5% 7.2% 140.69 13.36 
1931 41.2% 8.3% 179 15.3 
1932 43.9% 9.5% 205.13 16.18 
1933 45.2% 9.5% 198.86 16.41 
1934 37.8% 7.9% 187.85 14.93 
1935 34.5% 9.0% 180.57 14.73 
1936 34.7% 8.2% 165.97 14.76 
1937 32.4% 7.6% 152.97 14.09 
1938 36.4% 8.3% 142.71 14.22 
1939 38.2% 8.1% 148.16 15.19 
1940 40.2% 7.5% 141.81 16.06 
1941 38.1% 6.5% 138.63 16.94 
1942 39.2% 6.4% 135.49 18.96 
1943 42.9% 6.2% 144.99 19.84 
1944 41.9% 7.4% 166.97 22.38 
1945 43.7% 7.1% 188.91 26.37 
1946 37.7% 6.7% 193.96 26.65 
1947 29.5% 8.9% 184.49 27.64 
1948 27.3% 11.8% 155.86 25.28 
1949 26.7% 9.1% 136.29 25.38 
1950 26.9% 9.1% 119.59 22.97 
1951 21.9% 9.8% 94.43 25.33 
1952 23.4% 10.3% 93.99 28.43 
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1953 26.2% 9.1% 87.1 24.53 
1954 29.0% 9.0% 83.62 22.85 
1955 30.5% 7.4% 81.68 22.29 
1956 28.9% 7.2% 78.34 22.11 
1957 25.6% 6.6% 73.71 22.59 
1958 26.0% 7.6% 72.1 23.53 
1959 19.2% 10.2% 68.27 21.69 
1960 16.7% 10.8% 62.94 21.81 
1961 16.2% 13.1% 60.62 23.12 
1962 17.0% 10.7% 60.83 22.72 
1963 15.8% 9.4% 58.63 22 
1964 15.8% 9.5% 55.3 22.14 
1965 12.6% 9.3% 52.15 23.41 
1966 13.4% 9.8% 51.84 24.63 
1967 12.0% 11.6% 49.41 24.02 
1968 12.7% 9.8% 49.58 24.9 
1969 11.9% 9.6% 46.26 24.73 
1970 16.7% 9.9% 44.14 25.63 
1971 18.2% 8.6% 41.03 25.95 
1972 21.8% 9.5% 38.39 26.58 
1973 20.0% 7.4% 35.41 25.57 
1974 20.4% 9.0% 30.34 26.89 
1975 18.6% 6.2% 28.76 28.43 
1976 18.6% 9.4% 27.92 28.98 
1977 19.2% 10.3% 28 29.53 
1978 23.9% 11.8% 29.8 29.52 
1979 30.2% 8.8% 30.42 28.46 
1980 37.3% 9.4% 28.56 29.46 
1981 48.1% 12.3% 24.94 30.5 
1982 60.3% 10.6% 22.7 31.32 
1983 59.5% 9.7%  
1984 60.5% 9.9%  
1985 64.3% 15.7%  
Notes: Argentine figures are federal whereas Australian are total. 
Sources: From 1884-1969 Argentine debt to GDP is derived from (Vizcaíno 1972) & 
(Della Paolera and Taylor 2003), and is directly from (Dornbusch and Pablo 1987) from 
1970-85. From 1884-1980 Argentine revenue to GDP is derived from (Della Paolera 
and Taylor 2003) and from 1981-85 is derived from (OXLAD). Both Australian debt 
and taxation to GDP figures are derived from (Vamplew 1987). 
 
Table 5.2 – Proportion of Income Tax paid by wealthiest quartile of income taxpayers 
versus the remainder (bottom 75%), and income taxpayers/population, 1915-70 
 Australia Argentina 
Year Top 25% Bottom 75% Inc. taxpayers/Pop. Top 25% Bottom 75% 
Inc. 
Taxpayers/Pop
1915 22.3% 77.7% 2.1%   
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1916 25.1% 74.9% 1.8%   
1917 29.0% 71.0% 6.4%   
1918 27.2% 72.8% 7.7%   
1919 26.8% 73.2% 8.4%   
1920       
1921 28.8% 71.2% 13.9%   
1922 20.7% 79.3% 8.3%   
1923 20.9% 79.1% 7.7%   
1924 23.6% 76.4% 3.4%   
1925 25.7% 74.3% 3.7%   
1926 22.8% 77.2% 3.8%   
1927 25.9% 74.1% 4.1%   
1928 23.7% 76.3% 4.2%   
1929 27.3% 72.7% 4.2%   
1930 27.6% 72.4% 5.2%   
1931 24.6% 75.4% 4.7%   
1932 25.5% 74.5% 3.7% 82.3% 17.7% 0.7%
1933 26.0% 74.0% 3.5% 82.9% 17.1% 0.7%
1934 23.3% 76.7% 3.5% 83.9% 16.1% 0.7%
1935 22.3% 77.7% 3.9% 70.3% 29.7% 0.7%
1936 26.1% 73.9% 3.6% 76.0% 24.0% 0.6%
1937 23.0% 77.0% 4.3% 76.0% 24.0% 1.1%
1938 23.6% 76.4% 4.8% 75.0% 25.0% 1.1%
1939 22.0% 78.0% 5.0% 76.6% 23.4% 1.0%
1940 28.2% 71.8% 8.9% 77.8% 22.2% 0.9%
1941 26.3% 73.7% 11.0% 81.2% 18.8% 1.0%
1942 25.2% 74.8% 20.1% 81.4% 18.6% 0.7%
1943 27.6% 72.4% 27.2% 80.4% 19.6% 0.8%
1944 29.3% 70.7% 28.1% 79.8% 20.2% 0.8%
1945 26.6% 73.4% 27.6%   
1946 24.9% 75.1% 27.5%   
1947 26.8% 73.2% 32.2%   
1948 22.5% 77.5% 34.3%   
1949 30.9% 69.1% 35.8%   
1950 38.6% 61.4% 36.9%   
1951 16.7% 83.3% 38.3%   
1952 28.7% 71.3% 39.4%   
1953 17.7% 82.3% 39.2%   
1954 20.3% 79.7% 40.9%   
1955 26.3% 73.7% 39.7%   
1956 31.0% 69.0% 40.1%   
1957 20.4% 79.6% 40.2%   
1958 20.7% 79.3% 39.5%   
1959 23.1% 76.9% 39.9%   
1960 29.1% 70.9% 40.5%   
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1961 32.2% 67.8% 41.1%   
1962 17.9% 82.1% 40.8%   
1963 20.0% 80.0% 41.4%   
1964 24.8% 75.2% 39.7%   
1965 29.4% 70.6% 40.5%   
1966 31.7% 68.3% 40.9%   
1967 17.2% 82.8% 41.5%   
1968 19.4% 80.6% 41.3%   
1969 24.1% 75.9% 40.6%   
1970 28.4% 71.6% 42.4%   
Sources: Australian data is constructed from the annual statistical volumes of: (Taxation 
1915-60), (Statistics 1960-71). Argentine data is constructed from the annual statistical 
volumes of: (Nacion 1935-1945). Population data is from (Maddison 2003). 
 
Table 5.4 – Income subject to income tax/GDP & Income tax payable/GDP, 1915-70. 
 Australia Argentina 
 Year 
Taxable 
Income/GDP
Inc. Tax 
Payable/GDP Taxable Income/GDP 
Inc. Tax 
Payable/GDP
 1915-16  8.2% 0.4%  
 1916-17  11.3% 0.8%  
 1917-18  12.8% 1.2%  
 1918-19  12.1% 1.1%  
 1919-20      
 1920-21  15.9% 1.2%  
 1921-22  11.2% 0.8%  
 1922-23  10.2% 0.7%  
 1923-24  10.9% 0.7%  
 1924-25  9.2% 0.6%  
 1925-26  11.0% 0.6%  
 1926-27  9.6% 0.5%  
 1927-28  9.9% 0.5%  
 1928-29  10.7% 0.5%  
 1929-30  12.2% 0.7%  
 1930-31  13.9% 1.3%  
 1931-32  10.5% 1.1%  
 1932-33  8.2% 0.7%  
 1933-34  7.6% 0.5%  
 1934-35  8.7% 0.5%  
 1935-36  9.0% 0.5% 11.8% 0.7%
 1936-37  9.3% 0.4% 10.8% 0.7%
 1937-38  10.8% 0.5% 10.7% 0.7%
 1938-39  11.2% 0.6% 10.7% 0.7%
 1939-40  10.5% 0.8% 11.4% 0.8%
 1940-41  13.5% 2.0% 12.6% 0.9%
 1941-42  13.1% 2.8% 12.7% 1.0%
 1942-43  25.0% 4.3% 13.3% 1.5%
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 1943-44  30.1% 6.5% 11.7% 1.3%
 1944-45  33.1% 7.4%  
 1945-46  30.7% 6.6%  
 1946-47  28.8% 5.8%  
 1947-48  29.5% 5.1%  
 1948-49  32.3% 5.0%  
 1949-50  32.6% 4.8%  
 1950-51  28.9% 4.0%  
 1951-52  32.4% 6.9%  
 1952-53  31.2% 6.0%  
 1953-54  33.7% 5.3%  
 1954-55  34.4% 5.1%  
 1955-56  34.1% 5.4%  
 1956-57  33.6% 5.3%  
 1957-58  32.2% 4.9%  
 1958-59  31.8% 4.9%  
 1959-60  32.9% 5.2%  
 1960-61  32.4% 5.2%  
 1961-62  32.2% 5.0%  
 1962-63  32.3% 5.1%  
 1963-64  32.0% 5.5%  
 1964-65  32.1% 5.7%  
 1965-66  32.0% 5.8%  
 1966-67  31.6% 5.9%  
 1967-68  31.7% 6.2%  
 1968-69  31.6% 6.4%  
 1969-70  31.7% 6.8%  
Sources: Australian data is constructed from the annual statistical volumes of: (Taxation 
1915-60), (Statistics 1960-71), plus (Mitchell 2003). Argentine data is constructed from 
the annual statistical volumes of (Nacion 1935-1945) plus (OXLAD). 
 
Table 5.5 – The number of individuals paying the top quartile of Income Tax Paid 
Year Australia Argentina
1915 149  
1916 69  
1917 239  
1918 267  
1919 248  
1920   
1921 724  
1922 327  
1923 1411  
1924 1699  
1925 2258  
1926 1782  
1927 1725  
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1928 1899  
1929 1882  
1930 1304  
1931 1042  
1932 779 1513
1933 472 1489
1934 811 1831
1935 830 962
1936 994 1181
1937 1411 2263
1938 1205 2005
1939 1165 2214
1940 2067 2303
1941 2269 1984
1942 5626 982
1943 16339 1678
1944 17986 1620
1945 27153  
1946 28226  
1947 20327  
1948 17875  
1949 14006  
1950 12406  
1951 8878  
1952 18787  
1953 21741  
1954 21498  
1955 21705  
1956 37380  
1957 28631  
1958 37952  
1959 40927  
1960 50476  
1961 54411  
1962 56348  
1963 67472  
1964 88563  
1965 90872  
1966 96099  
1967 115844  
1968 126960  
1969 154701  
1970 191169  
Sources: Australian data is constructed from the annual statistical volumes of: (Taxation 
1915-60), (Statistics 1960-71). Argentine data is constructed from the annual statistical 
volumes of: (Nacion 1935-1945). Population data is from (Maddison 2003). 
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Table 5.6 – Average Income Tax Rates, Inflation, & Evasion, 1932-70 
 Australia Argentina 
Year Av. Inc. Tax  Inflation Av. Inc. Tax Inflation Evasion
1915 5.6%     
1916 7.5%     
1917 6.9%     
1918 9.1%     
1919 8.4%     
1920      
1921 7.3%     
1922 6.6%     
1923 6.7%     
1924 6.8%     
1925 6.1%     
1926 6.1%     
1927 5.4%     
1928 5.2%     
1929 6.0%     
1930 9.4%     
1931 9.6%     
1932 7.7% -5.1% 5.9% -11.1% 
1933 6.2% -4.1% 6.1% 6.3% 
1934 5.8% 2.8% 6.2% -5.9% 
1935 5.5% 1.4% 6.3% 6.3% 
1936 4.5% 1.4% 6.3% 11.8% 
1937 4.4% 4.0% 6.6% 0.0% 
1938 5.8% 2.6% 6.6% 0.0% 
1939 6.1% 2.5% 6.6% 2.6% 
1940 15.9% 3.7% 6.7% 2.6% 
1941 17.7% 4.7% 6.9% 2.5% 
1942 14.1% 9.0% 7.8% 4.9% 
1943 19.9% 4.1% 11.5% 2.3% 
1944 20.6% -1.0% 11.2% 0.0% 
1945 19.8% 0.0% 12.5% 18.2% 
1946 18.1% 2.0% 15.0% 17.3% 
1947 14.9% 3.9% 15.3% 13.1% 
1948 13.0% 10.4% 15.7% 14.5% 
1949 11.6% 9.4% 16.5% 29.1% 
1950 10.3% 9.4% 23.6% 32.4% 
1951 17.2% 19.3% 25.0% 33.3% 46.9%
1952 15.7% 17.4% 26.6% 41.7% 49.6%
1953 14.9% 4.6% 26.7% 3.9% 49.9%
1954 12.9% 0.5% 27.0% 4.2% 49.1%
1955 11.9% 2.4% 27.9% 11.6% 50.6%
1956 12.1% 6.2% 31.1% 13.6% 43.9%
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1957 12.7% 2.2% 32.4% 24.3% 46.3%
1958 12.0% 1.7% 33.8% 31.7% 52.6%
1959 12.1% 1.7% 41.8% 111.0% 63.5%
1960 12.1% 3.4% 43.2% 28.0% 59.1%
1961 12.9% 2.9% 43.6% 14.0% 
1962 12.4% -0.4% 44.8% 28.1% 
1963 12.8% 0.4% 23.5% 
1964 13.7% 2.4% 22.1% 
1965 14.7% 3.9% 28.4% 
1966 15.4% 3.0% 31.8% 
1967 16.0% 3.6% 29.6% 
1968 16.5% 2.4% 16.2% 
1969 17.3% 3.1% 7.7% 
1970 18.1% 3.6% 7.0% 
Notes and Sources: Argentine average income tax rate is the unweighted average of 
income tax paid by each income bracket; from 1932-44 (Nacion 1935-1945), from 
1945-62 (TECHINT 1963). Argentine inflation is from (OXLAD). The estimate of 
Argentine evasion is the estimated percentage of total income that was not declared, 
(Secretaria del Consejo Nacional de Desarrollo 1967). Australian average income tax 
rate is calculated by dividing the total income tax paid by total taxable income, 
calculated from (Taxation 1915-60) & (Statistics 1960-71). Australian inflation is from 
(Statistics 2005). 
 
Table 5.7 – Growth rate in average Income Tax Rates minus the Growth Rate in Real 
GDP, 1916-70 
Year Australia Argentina
1915   
1916 35.0%  
1917 -6.8%  
1918 35.4%  
1919 -13.7%  
1920   
1921   
1922 -14.9%  
1923 -4.2%  
1924 -4.3%  
1925 -14.5%  
1926 -3.5%  
1927 -13.2%  
1928 -2.8%  
1929 17.6%  
1930 66.1%  
1931 8.8%  
1932 -25.8%  
1933 -27.1% -1.3%
1934 -11.5% -6.3%
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1935 -10.7% -2.8%
1936 -23.5% -0.7%
1937 -6.2% -2.5%
1938 29.3% -0.4%
1939 3.5% -3.8%
1940 155.0% -0.1%
1941 0.8% -2.1%
1942 -31.9% 11.9%
1943 37.3% 48.2%
1944 7.2% -14.0%
1945 0.8% 14.8%
1946 -4.7% 10.8%
1947 -20.4% -8.5%
1948 -19.0% -3.3%
1949 -17.5% 6.4%
1950 -17.8% 42.1%
1951 62.2% 2.0%
1952 -9.4% 11.3%
1953 -8.6% -4.9%
1954 -19.7% -2.9%
1955 -13.1% -3.7%
1956 -1.9% 8.6%
1957 3.2% -1.0%
1958 -10.7% -1.7%
1959 -5.3% 30.1%
1960 -3.9% -4.5%
1961 6.3% -6.1%
1962 -10.3% 4.4%
1963 -3.1%  
1964 0.0%  
1965 2.8%  
1966 1.8%  
1967 -2.7%  
1968 -2.7%  
1969 -1.8%  
1970 -1.6%  
Sources: Argentine average income tax rate is the unweighted average of income tax 
paid by each income bracket; from 1932-44 (Nacion 1935-1945), from 1945-62 
(TECHINT 1963). Argentine GDP data is from (OXLAD).  Australian average income 
tax rate is calculated by dividing the total income tax paid by total taxable income, 
calculated from (Taxation 1915-60) & (Statistics 1960-71). Australian GDP data is from 
(Maddison 2003). 
 
Table 5.8 – Growth rate in Income Tax Revenue minus the Growth of Average Income 
Tax Rates, 1916-70 
Year Australia Argentina
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1916 102.8%  
1917 35.9%  
1918 -1.3%  
1919 45.2%  
1920 24.4%  
1921 20.3%  
1922 13.5%  
1923 -17.9%  
1924 -8.0%  
1925 16.4%  
1926 5.1%  
1927 22.4%  
1928 -1.4%  
1929 -14.7%  
1930 -53.6%  
1931 27.7%  
1932 12.6%  
1933 19.3% 21.9%
1934 -5.5% 15.6%
1935 10.1% 23.7%
1936 30.3% -5.8%
1937 9.8% 31.0%
1938 -21.2% 11.7%
1939 2.8% 2.5%
1940 -141.9% 0.6%
1941 46.0% -6.8%
1942 65.7% 23.2%
1943 -10.8% -23.2%
1944 20.8% 52.9%
1945 21.1% -29.7%
1946 7.8% -13.7%
1947 14.7% 70.6%
1948 24.5% -1.2%
1949 27.7% -18.1%
1950 13.6% -19.0%
1951 -5.1% 6.4%
1952 30.5% -12.0%
1953 6.1% -4.6%
1954 8.7% -2.1%
1955 8.5% 1.4%
1956 6.2% 21.1%
1957 2.8% -30.1%
1958 10.8% 13.5%
1959 -7.3% -43.1%
1960 10.0% 10.0%
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1961 13.3% 12.0%
1962 6.7% -32.9%
1963 -102.9%  
1964 8.8%  
1965 14.5%  
1966 6.5%  
1967 3.0%  
1968 8.0%  
1969 8.3%  
1970 13.8%  
Sources: Argentine data is derived from (Nacion 1935-1945) for 1933-44, and from 
(TECHINT 1963) for 1945-62. Australian is derived from (Taxation 1915-60), 
(Statistics 1960-71), & (Vamplew 1987). 
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